16, January 2007 First day: Kant- knowledge through experience, but there are certain things we can uncover that are necessary requirements for experience... think back to modern and categories!!! Get the journal Kantschuden in the libraryJournal of History of Philosophy Kantian Review Most of these are hidden in the library, plus many books, use these for the short and term paper Please keep up w/ the reading this semester... Pay attention to the letters A and B, these are the two editions in which the book was written by Kant, pay close attention to the changes and why he may have changed the wording or the system in which he was working with. Paul Gyer Kant and Kant`s transcendentalism by Henry Allison interpretation Dr. K will use sometimes Bounds of Sense: Sir Peter Strawson deals w/ a lot of prior commentaries and other stuff, some of his interpretations are pretty flawed. Grahm Bird- dissenting view Kent SmithPrichardLangton- uses Allison, but she says that Kant expresses as a thesis, humility as respect to knowledge, b/c we can not know the thing in itself, the inner constitution of any object All give reference to Kant, different views of his works...
January 18, 2007 First Law and Ob class will be on Feb 1, at 530 Give Ross a call and see what`s up with him not being in class The preface and first sections give a lot of prelim stuff that will be very important for later in these passages and semester Big pic: transcendental aesthetics Presents theory and account of human knowledge. Stated problem Kant says: things have reached an end pass, a crisis, he says this has arisen out of the exercise of human reason. Human reason follows its own natural procedure, the problem is this procedure is the problem, it gets itself in trouble. MetaphysicsA priori: prior to cognition, apart from experience, it is necessarily true. You do not have to experience for it to be true Kant says it is inherent to seek something that is constant. Critique is human`s reasons assessment of it`s own capacities, power it has, regarding its attempt to secure knowledge that goes beyond experience. Not confined by experience. It is a task that reason assigns to itself. To determine the source of its power and the limitations of this power. Human Reason (HR) places limits on its own power. What is the model for knowing or cognizing something a priori? Pg 17 or so We need to be able to attribute F as a characteristic of X...
B xiii- Reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own plan... When we get to the Work of Reason, the role is tied to the sense of projecting general hypothesis that nature is required to answer. As in scientific hypothesis. Pg. 21 Copernican revolution: Kant refers to this work as similar. Copernicus said the sun was fixed and the Earth revolved, changing the theory all others held prior to this. Kant is suggesting that instead of our knowledge conforming to an object, it is the object that conforms to our concepts. Epistemology: Locke- idea object--how do we justify that our experience taps into the real world? 17th and 18th century asked how the idea resembled the object. Could we know the object in itself? The skeptic says we can not know the thing in itself, only the resemblance of that object. Kant is proposing that the object must conform to the nature of our cognition of it. In other words object cognition (idea) Kant says the object of experience is an appearance. And all of our knowledge or cognition is of appearance and the thing in itself is something of which he can never know anything about So the appearance has to conform to the nature of our minds (how we cognize things) Some interpret this as idealism. The only things we know are the representations. This seems like it might be mind dependent, requires our mind in order for the thing to exist. Kant introduces @ Pg 22 he says not only the objects as they appear but also as they may be thought of (as in ideas) He says that the things in themselves are what give arise of sensation from within ourselves. So he says that the things themselves must exist. K affirms existence of things in themselves and that they are the cause of the material of our experiences. B xxviii- take the object in two different senses... K is telling us that there is one thing that can be considered in two separate ways. One in which it is simply thought of, we can have no knowledge. The second is the way in which we experience the thing and our knowledge of it. It is the same object. Although K will only venture into understanding the object in the first sense, which is the appearance of it. B/c this is the only way we can have knowledge of the object Langton says that his emphasis on the two conceptions of the single object, shows K`s humility of knowledge, that we can not KNOW the nature of the thing, we can simply know the appearance. Intuition: it is a broader term than sensation, it is the way in which something is given to us for cognition, knowledge There are necessary requirements for us to have any knowledge at all. For instance, every event in this world has a cause and the event follows necessarily. Experience is more than what is directly given to us through our senses, it is also the necessary requirements for us to have any knowledge at all. What are the necessary intuitions? Pg 51 A7 Analytic: necessary truths ie: a bachelor is an unmarried person Synthetic: not necessary ie: a tree is green (but it could also be orange, blue, red...)
Synthetic a priori: this is where K uses math to show that the union of 5+7 does not necessarily prove to be 12 analytically, instead we must count in order to make it to 12. He also uses the geometrical proof of the straight line. Quantity and Quality. The line is a quality, however to get from pA to pB we must use quantity to get there, in other words we must count. He is claiming that we have knowledge that is necessarily true, but we have to be cautious in what we say HR can actually accomplish. There is a humility behind K`s HR theory. Re-read pg 59-68 with Tuesday`s reading. January 23, 2007 71-104 Transcendental Aesthetic Secondary Sources: 1st Critique Standard Commentary Norman Kemp Smith translation of Kant`s first critique H. Day Paton Jonathan Bennet- an approach to the material careful chrono of work Karl Ameriks- a number of things, Interpreting Kant`s 3 Critiques, essential reading for the Self P.F. Strawson`s Bounds of Sense Henry Allison- Kant`s Transcendentalism (can be rather technical, breaks down arguments, overall approach to reading Kant`s first Critique) Prichard Others Graham Bird- very much against prevalent tide of Kant research during his time Kant and Claims of Knowledge- very thick book, technical by Paul Gayer 3rd Critique Science stuff- Eric Watkins: Kant`s view of Causality Gayer The claims of taste Manfred Kuhne- biography of Kant Kenneth WestfallGood sources in articles, look at Journal`s, Kantstudien- German Kantian Review- English Journal of History of Philo Journal of Philo quarterly There is possibly more on his ethics than on the stuff we are doing. Today`s lecture: Transcendental Argument: Assuming something is given, assume that propositions in geometry are necessarily true propositions, synthetic truths. We have knowledge about not only the concept of lines... but we have knowledge about geometric objects. Ie: we know it is necessarily true that the shortest distance b/w two objects is a straight line. How is this possible? TA takes something that is given and traces it back to how we know this is possible.
But it also tells us necessary true knowledge about our experience Prove that certain concepts, propositions, principles that tell us something necessarily true about something we experience, but dig deeper and give us knowledge about a priori truths The Newtonian View and Leibniz View (conception of space and time)Kant`s distinction b/w appearances and things in themselves What does Kant say about our experience and the objects of our knowledge? First, we need to be clear about some basic words Kant uses, look at Key Passages Handout. Sensibility: Passive: The ability (capacity) to acquire presentations is sensibility Sensation: is an effect that an object has on my ability (capacity) Empirical Intuition: intuition that refers to the object through sensation (a way to refer to an object, intentionality is built into the object, it is directed towards an object) Intuition: show to, refers to an object (ie: I see something) Experience: something that is presented in our field of experience Intellectual Intuition: the ability to present something and refer to an object in a purely creative way, only god can do it... ie: let there be light. There is a receptive element to Kant`s empiricism Appearance: the object of any empirical intuition K: we only know appearances, the word appearances is the active form of shown Matter: the raw material of the appearance Form: the way in which an appearance can be ordered in certain relations Distinction b/w appearance and thing in itself: How one experiences something and the thing itself Traditionally this question has been answered by trying to explain how the appearance matches the thing in itself. Skeptics try to drive a wedge b/w the two concepts, they say prove it. Kant does this differently: He says that we can never know the thing in itself, we can simply know the appearance of the object and how we perceive it. But what is an appearance? Phenomenalist: appearances are phenomena, K: an appearance is the object, viewed from the prospective of the necessary requirements for us to have any necessary knowledge at all. Allison refers to this as the epistemic conditions: They must be met for us to have any knowledge whatsoever K: space and time Concepts and principles necessary for us to have any experiences Appearances are things (the actual things) viewed w/ these necessary requirements space and time. Things in themselves, are the actual things w/o the necessary requirements of intuition. Langton: Kantian Humility, we do not know things as they are in themselves.
She says the appearance and the thing in itself are the same thing, but that the appearance is in relation to other things. She says that everything we can know about objects are nothing but relational concepts. A thing in itself is something that is a part of any relational property, we can not know it, b/c we can only know the thing in relational terms. We can not know the intrinsic value of an object. Primary and secondary qualities PQ- appearance [App](geometric) SQ- things in itself [Tii] (hot, cold, so on) Kant does not understand PQ and SQ in the above way. He says that none, of the properties or characteristics we ascribe to objects tell us nothing about the Tii. We are only ascribing the appearances we have. What are atoms? They are forces, + and -, relational properties. These are all we can ever know. Relational properties as we experience them. Again, the App and Tii are the same object. This is so freaking important to K. Our experience is empirically real. There is no illusion. Experience is experience that is conceptualized. I may not know something is a tree, but I do know that it is a substance and it has particular properties and I can describe it. We will go over space and time in the next lesson, then we will move on to the next reading so read it.
January 25, 2007 Next weeks reading is very difficult, give it plenty of time. Transcendental deduction of the categories. Two versions of it. Kant rewrote this section for a reason, there is no way to integrate the text b/c it is so different. Sort out the different cognitive functions he discusses, intuition and understanding. Then the main argument of the section, take very good notes and pay attention to it carefully. Kant maps out our basic cognitive functions. Unfortunately I need to read 105-140 and then Tuesdays readings. Lecture: B41: He attempts to show that space is a necessary condition for presenting anything outside my inner consciousness. The point for Kant is that spatial relations among objects we experience, are not characteristics that are intrinsic to those actual objects. Rather, the objects must presuppose space. He is denying Leibniz`s claim that space is relational. Leibniz states that the space would disappear if the objects were gone. K says b/s b/c the objects presuppose space. In other words, space is not contingent on the object. Space is a priori cognition that is never able to be seen as absent. K says it is a necessary condition for anything to appear to us at all. K also sides w/ Newton by saying space is singular, it must therefore be intuitional. It can`t be conceptual b/c concepts go from one to another, space is singular so there can be no conceptual relation. All spaces are parts, limitations, specific regions within one infinite overall space. An infinite whole.
He does depart from Newton b/c he does not believe space is an entity, something in itself. Leibniz vs. Clark: Clark defends the view that space is coeternal w/ god, a Newtonian view. K says space is a necessary condition for anything to appear to me in my perception if and only if there is a certain amount of necessary true knowledge that falls from the concept of space and is only possible... Prolegomena: in context of systematic theology. What sets out the method of the exposition of those doctrine, the teachings under certain headings, and it also sets the norm for the exposition to follow. It is an introduction, a set of guidelines and principles. What makes this knowledge of geometry genuinely possible? B/c geometry gives us genuine knowledge of our experiences. It is only possible if space as a form of intuition is a necessary requirement for our sense experience. Whenever we are affected by objects, space is immediately presented along w/ the objects. B 41: the argument, it must start w/ something universally accepted. 1. geometry is synthetic a priori knowledge (the principles of geometry are necessarily true) (it tells us something about the structure of our experience, so what conditions must be met in order to qualify this as such) (ie: look at finished house and tear it down to the blue print) 2. Geometry must be presented intuitionally. (b/c it is synthetic a priori knowledge) 3. this intuition must be a priori (not based simply on experience) (it`s basis must be in the subject, ie: us) 4. some intuition must exist in the mind, precede objects, and it must be that in which objects are determined in an a priori manner. 5. this is possible only if space is a form of intuition, or outer sense. K is arguing that space is only a form of intuition, a form of outer sense and so on. The above argument is very subjective. Space is an epistemic condition for me to perceive anything at all. It tells us something about any relational property anything has. Very basic relational property as perceived by us. The space is real. B/c it is a necessary condition for us to have any experience at all. Experience always involves concepts, so this is just a necessary condition for us to intuit anything, or being able to refer some sensation to some object. Space and time are purely phenomenal, they are relational properties. They are not intrinsic properties of things themselves, K says we do not know an objects intrinsic properties, we can only know its outer properties. Geometry can only give us synthetic a priori knowledge of the world b/c the principles must be related to the outer world in someway. Space is the form by which, the way in which, we sense things. Think of space as a filter or ordering device, it allows our experiences to be affected by outer objects. It is necessary. Sensory perceptions must be spatially ordered in order for us to process the incoming experiences. Geometry is therefore informative in nature, it is not just a set of definitions
A very similar argument is put forth for time. Anything that we experience is subject to some temporal order. This is an inner sense, but applies to internal and external senses. Space is a necessary condition for us to have any experience. K thought that Newton made the mistake of thinking of space and time as ontological arguments, actual existing things. K says that they are purely epistemological and that they are not existing things. General Logic and Transcendental Logic Pg. 105 General Logic is simply rules for thinking. We do not care about the content, ie: the premises being true, we just care about the logic behind it. TL: is pure thinking The 3 major sections that make up the TA: What does the metaphysical deduction do? It identifies candidates for categories. It is an effort to show that the candidates for categories can be selected as a basis for any judgment at all. Knowledge is propositional: it involves judgments, propositions Pg 117 TL divisions The candidates for categories underlie knowledge of any object. K does not try to prove any of the candidates are categories. Initially here, in the metaphysical deduction, he is not attempting this at all. There are basic concepts prior to propositions. When we reach the TD K tries to show that some categories are necessary epistemic conditions for us to have experience at all. That these categories are somehow responsible for the objects of our experience. Yet here, he is trying to simply explicate what the meaning of a category is, and what an object is. He is not defending the categories, just explaining them. A concept implies a judgment and vice versa Analytic of principles, is meant to link the TA with the TD. The concept of cause actually expresses that it itself is a category Banquo is a dog. Dog is predicated by Banquo, but in order to find this we must have a conception of a dog and this goes down the shoot until we find the most basic concepts. These concepts are involved with all judgments. Ie: the tables of judgments on page 124. Then we can move on to the table of concepts on page 132 These basic judgments are involved in all experiences of objects. READ 105-140 before moving on into the Tr. Ded. For Tuesday January 30, 2007 There is a connection b/w the two sections of the deduction. He wrote the B deduction in order to supplement and advance the preparatory work done in the A deduction. A lot of the standard commentaries suck when dealing w/ the metaphysical deduction of the categories, b/c they see it as arbitrary, simply gathered up from here or there, simply collected from logic texts of K`s day, or from Aristotle`s logic, and they see little
connection b/w this section and the transcendental deduction. This view has been seriously objected recently. Kinlaw makes comments towards some of these objections and follows some of the same ideas. What does a concept do? What does the concept of a tree do? It gives you parameters: it orders, pulls together, exclusion and inclusion, a function that orders all of the different things about a tree, and puts them into one basic unified concept that we name a tree. The point he is making in TL is that concepts are related to judgments. If we lump all trees together in a concept, the tree is the subject to which I would state the character of green to, which is a judgment I made b/c of my knowledge of the concept of tree. A judgment is a way of conceptualizing something. When K gets into TD, he talks about mental syntheses; this scares some people b/c they believe psychology and logic do not go together. Going back. The metaphysical deduction Pure Concepts, table on pg 124 Categories, table pg 132 Forms of judgment are not prior to forms of concepts. Instead concepts depend in part on judgments for their sense of meaning. See Banqou example above. Every judgment involves a concept from at least one of the classes on pg 124. The very most basic concepts are intrinsic to knowledge of anything at all. Pure concepts are forms of judgments: 1. Prolegomena II, they (concepts) are themselves nothing but logical functions and as such do not constitute... 2. MPhys. Found. Of Natural Sciences: they (concepts) are nothing but mere forms of judgment in so far as these forms are applied to pure intuitions... 3. B 143, Now the categories... Judgment is nothing more than stripping empirical information from concepts until you arrive at the most basic concept. The form of judgment is a way of getting some sort of uniformed continuity. Ex: a cherry is red, round, juicy, sweet and tart. This is a proposition. There is some unity to the characteristics that I ascribe to cherry. The word cherry is the thing to which I ascribe these characteristics. This judgment gives some conceptual unity. Judgment has a particular logical form to it, it is necessary to keep conceptual unity in a general sense. It is a function of unity among representations. Every judgment at the same time is an act of conceptualizing. Each function of a judgment involves a peculiar way of conceptualizing presentations in a certain way.
Having a concept or being able to conceptualize in a certain way is a necessary requirement for forming judgments in a certain way. Read 138-140 again for a brief recap of the judgment, concept stuff If there is a world w/ perfect justice, then in it all wicked people in that world will be punished. This ex. Asserts some rules. The rule is ground and consequent. The consequent, all wicked people are punished, the ground, a world w/ perfect justice. To assert this relation, to judge hypothetically, is to relate two states of affairs according to the rule of ground and consequent. This rule, is for conceptualizing a manifold in general when a corresponding judgment is applied to it (putting sand on a fire and the fire going out). K wants to contend judgment is involved in what he calls thought, it is a function of the understanding. And actually, the work that the understanding does, in its pure logic funtion (different ways of judging) is actually the same function he will be talking about in the TD when he is talking about actual objects. The TD says that there are categories, certain ways of conceptualizing, that the concepts are necessary requirements for any experiences. The function that the understanding performs in this section, is the same function that performs when one is simply thinking about the concepts and judgments. K the understanding produces judgments of a particular logical form by combining concepts in specific way. If it is the case that the understanding in its logical function, judgments in general, is the same as when those judgments are ways of conceptualizing or applied specifically to objects of our experience, then the logical function of judgments is also the same as the forms according to which the understanding unites, in a way to determine judgments. Concepts are logical functions of judgments viewed in connection w/ a collection of sensory material. If p > q. this is the same as, if sand is thrown on fire, then the fire goes out. K has to prove these theories. He begins the A deduction by proving we have knowledge about experience. Starting on page 153, he discusses the mental activities that are necessary in order to advance any knowledge. Transcendental Apperception, what the hell is that? Find out!!! b/c he has caught a lot of hell for using this term. We will go over a deflated understanding of it, not very intense b/c we are dumb. We will look at these 3 functions very intensely next time. These are extremely important for any advancement in this work.
February 1, 2007 TD A- what does it set out to do? Categories are necessary components for serious mental acts. K begins the section w/ explaining how concepts relate to objects a priori Contrast his work w/ an empirical deduction, discuss the mater in which you acquired a concept through experience and reflection upon the experience. An explanation of the concepts by tracing them back to an experience, ie: Berkeley, Hume and Locke K says this is incorrect, he says we have concepts that are prior to the experiences. They lie at the basis of any type of judgment or proposition. Do these concepts relate to an object? They are a priori as has already been proven. But do they relate to objects and if so, how? If they do they are distinct, unusual, they do so w/o any form of experience, no borrowing. K says is it conceivable for objects to appear to us w/o the requirement that they are products of our understanding, and that the understanding would not contain in itself any necessary requirements for the experience. The TD does 2 things: 1. explain the manner in which concepts relate a priori objects 2. and it attempts to show that there are certain subjective requirements for judgments and thinking. These subjective conditions for thinking actually possess some objective validity. The are valid in their application. K construes this as furnishing conditions for the possibility of any knowledge. How is it the case that we can have something represent a priori determination of an object? I can specify, this, that and so forth, apart from my experience from it, how do I show this? K must be able to prove this question through the concepts alone. 2 ways to discuss an object (intuition and thought): 1. through intuition 2. knowledge of X as a concept, through which an object is thought and agrees w/ a particular intuition. When I determine an object, I specify things about it, make statements about it, express propositions about it. I am trying to show that through these concepts I think the object and determine it as this or that and it corresponds to the way in which the object is given to me. A 93: Concept through which an object is thought, and agrees w/ this intuition. What does a concept do? It is a function of a judgment, it orders things, it brings them into some sort of unity. There has to be a correlation b/w unity of thought, and that which is a thought. K will argue that this agreement of thought, the thought of X, is an agreement b/w the thought and appearance. There has to be a synthesis b/w the intuition of X, and there has to be recognition of X as a concept. The application of categories brings the two together. Categories relate to objects, they are necessary requirements for thinking about objects. There are certain mental functions that must be present for one to think about things. These functions are the acts of synthesis
Synthesis: bringing everything together and makes it one. It is not creative, rather it is required for us to represent anything at all. Manifold: there must be some order, pulling some stuff together and excluding other things. We must run through the diversity of the manifold. Pg 153: The acts of synthesis: 1. Apprehension: the lowest grade of synthesis, basically a synopsis of what we gathered through intuition. It represents a synopsis of our appearances. 2. Reproduction: Image, when K uses the term imagination he is discussing the power of performing an image, this is not like the imaginary monster in the closet. It is a way of reproducing each synopsis and having a way of recollection of each as I proceed through each one. Co-existent sequence. 3. Recognition in concept: having a formal unity in concepts, when I think of some object, X, at Time 1, and the same X, at Time 2. We must be able to do this in order to think of intuition as a whole. It is one consciousness that combines the manifold. Questions for final::: Does K have a coherent thought for the self? Transcendental Appercetion: This is the unity of consciousness The unity that is represented in an object, or the relation b/w or among objects, or how things might have a reciprocal effect on one another... there has to be a corresponding functional unity that brings about the synthesis, performed by the understanding. TA is presupposed as the basis or foundation for any synthetic act. It has to be there for some foundational functional unity, underlying all the acts of the mind. Apperception, there is an awareness. Concept represents unity w/in diversity, than there must be a unity w/ experiences. February 8, 2007 Kant pick up w/ 1st deduction, key points and concepts of this argument However, the B deduction is the one Dr. K will treat as crucial What is K doing? Try not to overlook the metaphysical deductions he is going through. They will assist in the Transcendental Deduction; there is a continuity that runs through K`s process. B will take longer and we will go through it more slowly b/c some connections b/w concepts and judgments are not clear. Neo-Kantians: decided to dismiss the A deduction and relied on the B deduction b/c of its logical steps towards showing a connection b/w concepts and judgments, did not rely on the psychological implications of the A deduction. Heidiger and others chose to keep the A deduction as a basis for what follows and used it to their advantage. Dr. K prefers the second system, there is a continuity b/w the two. A is not complete and B is used to fill in the blanks. There are very few if any similarities, A is a building block for B. This is perhaps the best way to look at the deductions as a pair.
17th century: a judgment is a relating together as ideas. Locke. Agreement or disagreement of ideas. They take ideas as given. K see`s the problem much more in depth than this. An idea is not given. Everything has to be put together, synthesized. 3 fold synthesis, above ^. Anything that is before you must come through the synthesis. Begin w/ sensory information, presented to us. It is not all conscious and it is not all received by us. A manifold presupposes that there is some minimal degree of determinateness. Of what is in front of us, what we are aware of. Associating an image is something anyone, including animals, is capable of. Our goal is to show how this association of sensory elements is able to form into one of our concepts for unity. We are required to think of this concept as a whole. By taking the various associations and synthesizing them, I am able to take them and think of them as one single representation. This is how we form concepts. What allows us to recognize something as a concept? B/c concepts allow us to associate our intuitions or images as something outside ourselves. We are capable through concepts to know about Things. A 105, Pg 157 Clearly... The pulling together and synthetic unifying of essential elements into a single representation upon which we can recognize and answers to a concept. And a unity of function in our acts of synthesis we are performing. The synthesis, is not something that happens to be this way but could be otherwise, it has to be this way, it must follow a specific rule. Concepts are simply different forms of these rules. Pg 158 A 106, But a concept... K says that a concept is a rule if they are reproduced, synthesized, according to a particular rule. All of this presupposes, and is not possible w/o, a unity of consciousness. This is TA. A 107, we can not recognize an image in our perceptual field as a concept, unless we can take this image, reproduced, and recognize it as a concept, we would not be able to give it a name and say it`s true. We can not recognize an image or a concept or associations b/w concepts, w/o this unity of consciousness. No cognition, no connection, w/o TA 3 acts of a play. The identity of all 3 must be present in one consciousness in order for them to be put together and considered as a whole. We do not receive the world ready made, we have to make it. The sensations must be pulled together and reproduced according to some necessary rule. Guided reproduction of the sensory material into an image, guided through the concept. In order for one to have consciousness of the object, the 3 synthetic acts must share some identity, the single consciousness. An identity of function. There is a functional identity amongst the 3 acts, and therefore are overall one in the same function. Pg 159 A108, in cognizing the manifold... identity of function!!! Ones own identity, unity.
Pg 168-9: Argument for affinity: The objective ground, is where the basis for concepts will lay. In the B deduction, K will make the connection b/w concepts and judgments, something that is not done in the A and the argument for affinity. February 13, 2007 Read 24 through schematism. General problem of how a concept can apply to a judgment. How does the application take place? This will come to us in the reading of the schematism, the mediation of the application, how we can generate principles that give us a priori knowledge of the sensible world. Stuff we find in the axioms, analogies and postulates. Also, what predictably is seen as very important, the analogies particularly the first 3. The B deduction makes clear that the TD is a continuation of what was started in the MD and that the MD is not a throw away section. At the basis, thinking involves judgments and the functions of judgments can be categorized into particular concepts and certain concepts must be categorized into categories and these allow us to understand what we can sense, or perceive. 15: a shift in terminology, about the understanding. B130 pg 176: All combination is an act of understanding, this is something that We perform. Prior to this, combination was an act of imagination or understanding. Presenting an object, three components: manifold, synthesis of the manifold, and synthetic unity of the collection. Combination is a representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. This means that it is the last stop of representation. The unity is what makes the whole process available. 24, B152 imagination. In order for the imagination to be able to present an object in intuition even w/o the object presence, it is the way in which intuitions can be brought to the unity of consciousness. 16, the I think must be capable... what is the I think? It is a presentation, but it is also an act of spontaneity, in other words it is not something that arises through senses. It is the identity of consciousness in the synthesis of presentations into one consciousness. Unity of consciousness: does not take us that far, it does not give us the meaning of I. This unity is only possible b/c we bring about this unity, and do it by combining the manifold of given intuitions into a single consciousness. Whenever we combine various representations, we synthesize them together, and identify them as a single act of awareness. We bring them about, in the act of representing anything as an object at all. This requires that the components of any sensory material get synthesized, and that there is an act of a single consciousness, and we bring about this unity by taking the different acts and pull them together as a single act. B134 pg 179 Hence synthetic... B135 pg 179 yet it does declare... There has to be continuity between the various conscious acts are all apart of the same consciousness. T1 must correlate to T2 and so on. This can only be done w/ a unity of consciousness. I am only aware of the Unity of Consc. When I am bringing these acts about. In other words only when I am actively pulling representations together.
If I add, I think, to all of my representations, I must have united them into a single consciousness. 17 Pg 181 First understanding is the power of cognition Cognition is an act by which given representations are referred to an object. Definition of an Object: simplified: all of the sensory qualities and elements that I pull together, in a concept and are united. Cognition consists solely on the basis of unity of Con The understanding itself is actually various ways of bringing about unity of Con. The representations are united under the categories and under the concept of an object. Judgments: a way of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. Categories are the basis for any thought at all, but there are also certain concepts that lie at the basis of all cognition, so this ties the categories to judgments. Part 2 of B deduction 24: how is this so? 1. time is an intuition b/c it is given as distinct and whole, it has different components, but it is given as a whole. So I am able to use this intuition as a factor in synthetic magnitude, ie: Tuesday at 9:00 Imagination allows us to use time in this synthesis. Questions about imagination: Why does imagination have anything to do w/ the logical functions of judgment? K says that the imagination is a spontaneous act of thought and subject to apperception and the categories. But this statement is subject to circular arguing. The unity of apperception does not logically entail the unity of time? Why not unite under concepts and judgments under different time frames? Notes prior to schematism Schemata: K refers to them in different ways. Henry Allison makes out 7 different ways. K says some 3rd thing which is homogenous on one hand w/ the category and the other w/ the appearance and makes possible the application of the category to the appearance. K says conditions that cause schema, conditions of sensibility K says formal and pure condition of sensibility... we shall call the schema of the concept The schema gives us a sensible condition for a logical relation (b/w ground/consequence) and by doing so allows us to apply the concept to the categories of intuitions. Plan reading, axioms and presentations, we will move through the section more quickly, more time on analogies, so read the faster stuff more quickly than the schedule says. February 15, 2007 On Tuesday we will get to at least the first analogy. So read through at least that section. Why is the schema necessary? What does it accomplish? Pg 213: a presentation of a universal procedure... providing a concept w/ its image.
The concepts are purely concepts, they are not empirical, they are determined through intuitions and in order for us to associate the concept w/ an image the imagination must have a method for connecting the two. The schema accomplishes this. The schema do not apply directly to the actual content of our experience, they apply to the form of sensibility. It is basically a conceptualization of time. An ordering, application of a logical function, to experience b/c it specifies various temporal orderings to objects. It specifies a property or relation of appearances in time, taken as a sensible condition, or an analog, or logical relation in the category. Schema is the sensible sensation of a category. The sensible sensation is that which applies the rule in a category to temporal relationships. Time is necessary condition for any intuition to be presented to us. The model Dr. K uses to show this: Every composite is alterable. Bodies are composite. Therefore, bodies are alterable. What does this model show us? There is a sumsumption (application) of a condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment. The universal rule is given by: Every composite is alterable. Assume possible judgment as by: bodies are composite, and sumsume (apply) it to a rule. In the second premise (minor) there is a condition of another possible judgment, bodies, sumsumed under the condition of a rule, major premise. This condition, is met in the case of bodies, and warrants the conclusion. We have an analog to the pure concept. Categories are the universal rule. We need the minor in order to find the conclusion. The minor in K`s case is the schema. The schema applies directly to pure intuition. Categories apply to intuitions by means of a schema which specifies certain ways in which time or temporal relations are ordered. Therefore, a conclusion, or knowledge, can be made about the categories. Schema`s allow a conceptualization of time. They objectify time for us. Thus, they allow for objective reality for the object involved. Schema is time, subject to a certain ordering, follows certain rules, and gives a certain way of determining time w/ in the basic concepts. The logical functions of thought, judgments, are translated into temporal terms and the transcendental schemata become rules for the universal application of rules for appearances. Schema give real applications to categories, it also limits the scope of categories. What happens when one moves past the schema? Metaphysics. Something that we can never know, we just speculate on. Pg 216 substance: pure logical view. Substance is something that must always be a subject and not a predicate. How do I apply this to an experience? This statement is purely logical, it doesn`t tell me anything at all about substance, about an object of my experience or any true principle about my experience. So how do I do it?
K would say that we use the schemata, temporally, to affirm the object as a real subject that is a possessor of properties, but can never be a property. Re-identifiability: if I can identify it through the changes it makes through time. Ie: if I get a hair cut, someone still knows who I am. This presupposes some persistence through time. Cause: something happens after something else and it always does so. I can relate to causal relationships b/c the schema shows a temporal sequence that is equally necessary. GroundConsequent: there is a temporal order in cause and effect. It is irreversible. Mediates the logical rules into real rules as they apply to actual experiences, through time. Modalities: Possibilities: Is this really possible over some period of time? Actualities: What does it mean to experience something as real in empirical sense, there must be some temporal location assigned to that object. It must be actual at some given time. Necessities: DOES NOT mean existing at all times (like substance does). It means instead, that there is existence in relation to all of time. How do we take logical concepts of the above 3, and translate them into general applications of experience? The schema translates the categories into time. Rules that allow for application of rules. Why don`t we do all of this using the intuition of space? Because space is outside, and time is absolutely necessary for any experience whatsoever. This allows us to show that there are principles for each category that represent synthetic a priori knowledge about the nature of the world, our experience. We can show how the categories can demonstrate some knowledge. In axioms In all appearances the sensible and the real, which agrees to the sensible and the real, the object, has in the sensible an intensive magnitude. There is a degree of intensity of any experience. The quality of the experience, greater than zero. Read for all of next week. The principles will be moved through quickly, then we will slow down w/ the analogies February 20, 2007 Refutation of idealism, pay close attention of this concept for next time. Backdrop thesis: when the category substance is applied to experience, how does the application take place? What principle, synthetic a prior, can we derive from it? Axioms: basic principles of pure understanding, all appearances according to their pure intuitions are extensive magnitudes. What does this mean? Extensive magnitude: take all of our appearances as spatially and temporally related to us, and apprehend and pull together the space and time that is a part of that appearance.
Ie: a category like quantity as applied to the content of our experience, we must be able to apprehend the components of our experience and the spatial and temporal aspects of the content in our experience. The differences in spatial and temporal aspects designate an extension beyond the content of our experience. Magnitude: the rule for how we apprehend things. K only the raw material of experience is given to us. The structure and coherence are what we must be able to produce or our experiences would be unruly and incoherent. We have to show how an appearance can be distinguished from other experiences and K does this through the use of magnitude rules which guide how we will give order to spatial and temporal framework of our experiences. Magnitude becomes a necessary rule for synthesizing things that are alike. This makes appearances extensive magnitudes. Anticipations: In all appearances the sensation and the real, which agrees with it, are intensive magnitudes. Intensive magnitudes are those w/ a degree (a spot in time) The sensation, and the object that agrees w/ this It is subjective, it can vary from person to person, this is where K uses the =0 analogy. There is a degree of intensity to everything, the color red, it has a certain intensity, but this intensity may be sensed by each person differently. Very subjective by nature. Corresponding to the degree of stimulation on my senses. This is a degree of influence on my senses. It can still be known as a necessary truth, it is just individualized. Every object of perception has an intensive magnitude, the degree of impact upon our senses (our empirical content). Analogies: Permanent of substance 2 things - all time determinations, there must be some permanent backdrop - through all change, there must be something that is permanent and that endures, through change Pg 252 A182: changes in appearance, there is something in which remains constant. Ie: a change in someone`s appearance is only noticed if the someone is a constant We are able to see the change b/c the substance is schematized and the schema allow us to tell something about it. All objects of experience are substances, in a sense that their various states change w/in time, and that there are characteristics applied. HO argument of first analogy I can not take things as successive or coexistent unless there is some temporal backdrop 1. as a framework in which things can be so. 4. I have a time lapse photography of someone, from when they were 21-45, and they lose their hair. The change that takes place, is perceived w/in something permanent, ie: time. 5. any real thing, we talk about what is real in it, the only thing we talk about is substance, substance alone is what we attribute characteristics to.
6. substance is permanent is true by definition 7. notion for all change to take place against the backdrop of time, the permanence is substance. This is broken into two parts. 1-4= backdrop thesis: there is something permanent that is the backdrop of experience 5: everything that is an appearance is subject to this change 6: substance must be absolutely permanent Steps broken down: 1. the temporality of all appearances plays a foundational role. 2. contends that time retains its identity as a temporal framework throughout change, unaltered. 3. A schema of reference is necessary to represent time. 4. there must be something perceptually modeled for time.
Second analogy: Hume maintained that the most we could do w/ cause and effect, is that I have observed associations in my past experience, and these associations have been there so consistently that I project they will be there in the future. K completely rejects this idea. There must be some necessity in K`s framework How can we say that this association or pattern is not really distinct from this` association or pattern? K uses the example of a house A single object, the house, it makes no difference how I preview the object, I can come to the same end result either way. Not so w/ events In the case of events, K tries to show how the cause and effect principle are to be applied. K regards the association of events as a undetermined series of events. Sand goes on fire, fire goes out. There is an association of perceptions, nothing else. You must treat your associations as indeterminate material that has yet to be applied to rules. He then looks at the event and says, how do you explain our awareness of time, and the succession that takes place which is entirely subjective. Irreversibility thesis: If we experience a succession that is objective, we must be able to show that the succession can not be reversed. We apply this to experience when we show that the application of a general concept of the experience, when the concept translates into the experience there is a rule in temporal relations, one thing following another that is irreversible. Question: is this a strong enough conception to what capture we mean by causation, by saying the cause determines the effect? The temporal succession is irreversible. Everything else is in science, ie: what is in the sand, fire and what not. The second analogy gives us a determinate universe (even though K says we have free will). Every event has an irreversible cause. Everything else is experimental science.
February 22, 2007 Refutation of idealism: makes use of first analogy. Argument is laid out in the handout. 1st question: this is the refutation of idealism, who is the mark, who is he after? The skeptic. He is referring to Descartes arguments for skepticism in meditation 1. The skeptics say, we can not know w/o absolute knowledge that our experience puts us in touch w/ reality. K says this is BS. The skeptic is trying to get you to an agnostic position, you do not know whether or not your experience puts you in touch w/ outer things. The skeptic starts w/ an assumption and goes to a skeptical solution. K says that you can not maintain the basic assumption while also denying that you have genuine outer experience. Cartesian Skeptic: conflates, fuses, two things that are distinct. 1. The consciousness of the completely indeterminate I think of apperception, it is the unity of consciousness. 2. There is an awareness of myself as a particular subject which is given to me in empirical self consciousness, from within when I retrospect in my own mind. K says that when the Cartesian Skeptic gets the unity of apperception and the determinate empirical self consciousness together they make a huge mistake. This conflation is the source of what the skeptic finds any plausibility their appeal may have, fails upon. Once the distinction b/w these two forms of self consciousness is made, we can see that the skeptics appeal falls apart. This is K`s main focus in the section of refutation of idealism. K will show that awareness of inner sense is not possible w/o the awareness of external objects. This completely destroys the Descartes style argument and it refutes any skeptics claim. The argument: We can not have inner awareness, introspective awareness, w/o specific requirements being met before hand. The inner awareness is subject to the necessity of something external to us. K starts w/ what the skeptic affirms, ie: the consciousness of ones own existence. He then says a requirement of inner experience is subject to determination of time. The skeptic doesn`t investigate what the necessary requirements are for having an experience, this is why they find the conclusion of I think, yet they still claim they can`t know if something outside their own I think exists. Actual argument::: 1. Being aware of my own consciousness as determined in time, means I must be aware of myself somewhere in time. 2. Back drop thesis from first analogy. 3. Presentations change, this presupposes something permanent; therefore my existence in time can be specified. This permanent can not be an intuition within me. The existence of mental states can therefore be referred to as the I. K has
argued that we have a thought of this I and so the I does not refer to anything specific or determinate which could then serve as a permanent backdrop in which my mental states could be changed within the structure of time. K says that inner sense does not give you the I think of apperception; he says it just gives you a bundle of past experiences, this is very similar to Hume`s inner experience, and that introspection can not be the source of apperception. a. Introspection does not give me the impression of self b. They only give presentations 4. Two ways to read this here: Dr. K says the first one doesn`t work a. We are given presentations of external objects. But K says that we do not simply believe or imagine that there is true outer sense, he says that there must be genuine outer objects in which we reflect upon. The skeptics refuse to accept this line of reasoning, b/c there might be a faculty in the mind that generates experience for me, and therefore I could potentially have no idea of anything outside myself. b. Start w/ premise that we have inner sense, this the skeptic must accept. If the skeptic cannot doubt inner experience, then he can not doubt any necessary condition or requirement that makes inner experience possible. K says that there is a permanent backdrop to inner experience, this backdrop is an outer experience (as seen in step 2) now the skeptic can not doubt that he has intuited or experienced objects as being in space, at least as long as he insists that he has inner experience. 5. They happen at the same time K correlates inner experience w/ outer experience, outer having the priority. K gives us the strongest idea that appearances are nothing more than perceptions is fundamentally wrong. He gives this argument in the second edition, b/c he is tired of being read in the wrong way. It is basically a conclusion to the previous several sections. He takes all of the ideas he substantiated and then links them together to dismember the skeptics approach. K has a humility thesis, we can not know the TII, the inherent nature of things themselves, we can only know its phenomenal properties. K is highly influenced by the previous statement. After the phenomena and noumena chapter, the reading and approach will be changing. It will be less technical, K will be talking in more general terms, some of the stuff will be critical analyses, the assignments will be longer, shifting from knowledge and understanding, to the role of reason, what happens when we extend the concepts of understanding beyond their scope. When we overlook the restrictions that the categories must be confined to in their application. Be ready to read a lot and go through it quickly. Paper is due by midnight Friday.
February 27, 2007 Pg 312 Phenomena: something that we experience. Noumena: 2 sections 1. positive sense: an object of intuition, just not our way of intuiting it, something we are not capable of 2. negative sense: not an intuition at all, considering the object apart from our own way of intuiting transcendental object in A edition: seems to be equated with the TII. A 366, yet in A109 he says something different about TII. How can an appearance tell me something about an object? By showing that this particular appearance has a certain necessary order and appearance associated w/ it. A253 the transcendental object from noumena: Kant is going to show that categories are confined to informing us aobut the nature and structure of possible experience. They are logical functions of judgments, they only work upon what is provided for them, ie: sense experience, they can not be applied to that which lies outside of experience. Theory of double effect: empirical objects giving arise to our senses but do TII interact w/ us. No. they don`t have too, and according to Kant, they can`t. B/c that implies that we can apply a concept to a TII and that is beyond the bounds of sense and cannot be done. Suggestion from Dr. K: Explain what Kant means that space and time are intuitions How things are related to judgments Do exam, clear head, read the next two assignments for the first class after break. 2 hours max... March 20, 2007 Ideas of Reason: they refer to something (objectively real), as opposed to being regulated models for something. Conditions for possible propositions and for given. Conditions: it is the middle term of syllogism, ideas of reason refer to something that is unconditioned. How does this get generated in the first place? We can state that what the hypothesis is concerned w/ is the overall unity. What each case brings together as a whole. Reason insists upon taking all of the basics of understanding and gives them the greatest comprehension of them. Immanent- confined in the boundaries of experience. Transcendent misuse of the categories: making judgments w/o bearing in mind the limitations that are placed upon the categories, (ie: they always refer to some possible experience) then I may not always stay w/in the limits the categories contain. I may extend beyond the categories in this sense. Transcendent principle, doesn`t result from using the understanding w/o paying attention to those limits, instead, by their very nature, extend and demand of us, to expand beyond the boundaries of any possible experience. When used properly, they give systematic
overall unity to all the rules of understanding, but, K says, there is an almost inedible tendency of the human mind to treat these principles as objective principles, as if they told us something about the principles in themselves. Regulative model for purposes of understanding something, which is fine, except when one assumes there is something that corresponds to these models How does reason function? By making mediate inferences, arguments. Kant`s argument: 1. Everything composite is changeable (rule) 2. bodies are composite (composite= middle term) 3. therefore, bodies are changeable K says that it is the middle term that does the work, the rule is given, but w/o the middle term, we can not link the two. In this example we start w/ given judgment or rule, but we could ask a question about this general rule, in our syllogism. Ie: we could treat it as a conclusion, by asking how composite things and changeable things are related. Then we would have to show another syllogism that shows this. Each time we did this, we would get a more comprehensive rule that is in the premise, ad finite. So K is saying that for any general principle, given judgment, rule, is itself conditioned 3 types of syllogisms 1. categorical 2. hypothetical 3. disjunctive The ideas of reason result from applying a particular form of the syllogism to a synthetic union of... The ideas of reason represent the kinds of relation, which, the understanding represents by the categories. Pg 376: inferences reason`s task... This is a legitimate subjective law, for orderly management, model, for the understanding. Yet, if we try to take this as objective, we completely screw the pooch. This ideas are necessary concepts of reason. Seek for every conditioned the unconditioned, ideas of reason will be generated this way. All knowledge is conditioned, yet reason is constrained to view all of this as a whole, even if we can`t comprehend it all. Pg 376: Three ideas: Paralogisms Pg. 380: Rational psychology: the target is invalid syllogisms, and understandings of the notion of self, TARGET = DESCARTES D assumes, I am a thinking thing. K says this is a mistake and he tries to point out why. The basic error is to misconstrue transcendental apperception, unity of consciousness, unity of synthetic acts, the I think as if it were some objective noumena self. K says to understand the I think properly is to understand it as a unity of function, NOT as an entity
The I does not refer to any particular individuating content that would distinguish it or exclude it from anything else. The most that the word I can designate is something in general, not an entity. Rational psychology: a metaphysical theory of the soul, it is not arrived at through empirical science, it is based solely on the analysis of the self`s capacity to think. Pg 384: elements of self K says: I think Transcendental object = x X only gives the bare form of an object, it is what we get when we set aside all sensible content, sense experience by which we represent some object. We have the bare form of an object, in this case, the I think is a bare form of thinking, it is what's left after all inner experience is set aside. Analogous b/w the 2 is that you have either the bare form of the object, or the bare form of a subject, you do not have the actual object or subject. Rational psychology is based on an error, it confuses the bare form of a subject, I think, as if it were a real subject, and on top of that a noumena one. B411 Pg 427: What cannot... The problem of this syllogism is the ambiguity within the clause of that which cannot be thought of otherwise than as a subject... The conclusion says that the thought, as a thought, is the subject, and implies existence, yet no where in the syllogism is there any support for this conclusion The 1st paralogism confuses substance as a logical category: and substance is a schematized category. PG 388: I can not infer enduring intuition of I March 22, 2007 Criticism: Strawson`s bounds of sense, criticism arises when a general question is asked, what is the subject of transcendental apperception? This is a misplaced question, the person asking the question is already going down the opposite road. A possible answer is, the noumenal self. What supporting evidence? Some parts of K`s discussion on self knowledge and so forth. In this case, the subject of apperception would know itself as it appears to itself in inner-sense. Strawson argues that K is trying to make a connection b/w the empirical self and TA. S says, K is committed to the view that TA is consciousness of the noumenal self and is identical to the empirical self. S is completely wrong on this. He is brilliant, but wrong. On the other hand, S points out that apperception and the consciousness of thinking occurs in time, so the object of consciousness must be something that is assigned w/ a history. S contends that K identifies the empirically self consciousness, w/ apperception, K ends up committed to the absurd view that the empirical self is the real sensible self. Yet this criticism is avoided by seeing the question is misplaced. Apperception is not the consciousness of the subject, it is the consciousness of the activity of the thinking, not the consciousness of the thinker. The objects of inner sense are objects of thinking, not the thinker.
The correct contrast is b/w inner sense, consciousness of the contents of our mind, subjective states and the activity of thinking. There is no room for additional consciousness of the mind, or the thinker. Descartes makes the mistake of conjoining the thinking w/ a subject. The only consciousness one possesses is the activity of thinking, and being aware of this process. But there is no awareness of a subject that is doing this thinking. What is the I that thinks, Scott. But this is a space time object. The most that this can give us, is the thought of the bare form of the subject that might be presupposed as a condition of thinking. What you cannot do, is identify the subject of apperception w/ some form of the noumenal self. Kant`s overall strategy in the antinomies. How is the unconditioned, in respect to time, represented differently than that of space? Time is a series. Any point in time is contingent upon the time that precedes it. Not on any time that comes after it. If the whole series is unconditioned than it is infinite, if only a particular point is, then it is conditioned and there is an absolute beginning. This series always goes backwards. b/c what occurs in the future has no bearing on what is going on NOW. Space on the other hand is an aggregate. A whole. It does not have the same conditions as time. T3 is the condition that makes T4 possible, in space everything is coordinated. None is a condition for the possibility for another. Any given space is a boundary for the space next to it. Ie: space Q is limited by space R, but it is also a limit of space R. In time, the unconditioned only concerns present and past time. The question is, does time have an absolute beginning or not? Pg. 450: There are 4 cosmological ideas, all representing a completion of a series of conditioned appearances. 1. concerns the questions of time 2. take w/in appearances the whole thing, concerns the ultimate limits of matter or any physical object. Are objects infinitely divisible, or is there a base particle. 3. can we say something arises through causal necessity, or can something arise by an act of freedom? 4. concerns whether what is changeable depends ultimately on something that is unchangeable. There is a fundamental error in the first 2 antinomies and neither the thesis or anti-thesis, are correct. But w/ the 2nd two, there is a way of resolving them in which one can be true. The 3rd is going to be our focus in these two. K says that both causal necessity and free will can be true. The 1st 2 rely on a concept that cannot be used. Note: the ideas represent completeness in the synthesis of appearances. Pg 450: A416: Hence... Note: ideas of reason, represent totality and the unconditioned. These two things are different. Completeness: the totality of the series that is contingent (infinite)
Unconditioned (in time): what reason seeks completeness in the series of the premises that together presuppose no further premises. (not contingent or conditioned by anything else) So an absolute beginning in time is unconditioned in regards to time, although it may be conditioned by the supreme being. Antinomies are doctrines that are supported by reason, but become antinomies b/c their opposite can also be supported by reason. So the contradictory statements are both supported by reason, but one must be falsed. There is at the foundation of both statements a conceptual world that is faulty. The questions that generate these antimonies are valid and w/ human reason, these questions should arise. We will go over the antinoies themselves next week. Particularly the third one, so re-read it. Problem: World= whole existing in itself It seems that K is working along the lines of: 1. if world = whole existing in itself, then so construed world is [in itself] infinite or finite 2. both alternatives are false. 3. Therefore, the world as the sum total of appearances is not whole existing in itself. 4. Appearances are nothing outside our representations. This argument is taking the world as something that is transcendentally real. In other words, the thing in itself. Yet, we have already established that we can not know something in itself. First, you could read #1 as a commitment to transcendental realism, that there are things existing in themselves, that objects that we encounter in the world are also things in themselves. Especially as a way to bring out that by world we are talking about something that is conceived as it is in itself. Second, transcendental idealism, #4, very Humean. K is not saying that the word world does not refer to something, he is saying something stronger, that the term world, is an incoherent concept. Through the antinomies he does this. As represented in the proofs. He says that one of the ideas (infinite or finite) must be true, which is why the antinomies are incoherent. The problem is that the term world is supposed to refer to something, yet at the same time, ignores any condition in which the idea, world, is possible. K is denying that the word world as the sum total of appearances is the whole existing in itself. To view the world as a whole, means that we must try to look at it from the perspective of a gods eye view. Yet, objects are given to me in a succession. I can`t possibly see the world as a whole. Kant is showing here simply that free will is possible. He is not trying to establish that free will exists. He just wants to leave it open.
March 27, 2007 Antinomies: conflict that reason in its own function, following its own guidelines, ends up at. There are solutions to the antinomies, but they require open minds to understand How is it that K`s overall program of TA provides a solution to the antinomies? Going through the proofs: Knowledge involves pulling things together, operates w/ concepts, synthetically. Anything we encounter in the world is contingent, everything contingent forms a series, reason attempts to comprehend the series, but questions arise that are unavoidable, the antinomies. The task of reason is to get a completed representation of this world. But is this possible? Anything that appears is a consequent of antecedent cause? Or do somethings follow from causes that are spontaneous? These questions lead to the antinomies, a contradiction of two cases in which both are solved through reason, and there seems to be no proper solution to the question. You assume one, and derive the opposite 1. antinomy of time a. lets assume antithesis: what does the proof turn on? IF it has no beginning in time, then it presupposes that the present moment there was an infinite amount of time. But it is impossible for a successive synthesis to carry on infinitely. b. Or there is one particular member of the series, the first one, which is conditioned. c. What does it mean for an infinite amount of time to have elapsed up to this time, because this time is also infinite. d. Assume space is infinite, then this means space forms a successive series out to the infinite, but any effort to think of that series req`s an infinite succession of time, and thus you rehash the problem in 1a. e. Assume there is an absolute beginning in time: what does this presuppose? There is a first moment, prior to which there is any time? This is the concept of an empty time... but this notion says there is nothing that determines if this time exists or does not exists, completely incoherent. Then you must say time has no beginning. f. What if we say the world is spatially finite? Then the world itself would be in relation to an empty space, something outside the world, that is no object. It is a relation to nothing, but this means nothing. Therefore, it is impossible. g. Note: this bounded space, presupposes that it is bounded by something, empty space. Something w/o content. K is assuming that any bounded spatial world would have to be bounded by space. This posses the question, does the antithesis presuppose the Newtonian view of space that a spatially bounded world would have to be bounded by space? 2. Antinomy of composites a. Totum synethicum: this is a whole which is composed of parts which are given separately. Ie: the parts are pregiven, distinct from the whole, they have their own standing, not conceptually necessarily related to the whole. The whole is a synthesis of the parts. The product, the
whole, is something that is contingent, b/c you don`t have to have the whole. b. Totum analyticum: the relation b/w whole and parts, is such that the parts are conceivable only as part of the whole. c. The antithesis attacks Leibniz and the monads. Monads claimed as the simple substance. d. If there are simple substances, what would a composite of these substances be? All composition is composed of things that are externally related to each other in space (Leibniz). But, you can avoid the idea that any simple substance would have to occupy a part of space. The problem arises, whatever occupies space is a composite, b/c space is a composite. That is, a composite consisting of externally related objects. Simple substances, substantive composites, contradictory terms. e. No simple substances can be given in experience, since that would require a cognition of an object that contains no manifold of externally related elements f. Note: K treats simplicity in nature as an idea of reason, which says it is a guideline for understanding the nature of something, pulling it together synthetically. We can see that something is further and further divisible, but we can not say that something is infinitely divisible, only that it is indefinitely divisible. 3. Antinomy of freedom: a. What's at stake I this section? Free will. The cosmological conflict w/ human reason. b. Both sides could be true, but only one false. One side assumes that the world is an actual thing. That has intrinsic properties in which it is a composite that can be broken down into simple substances of which it is composed. Or there is a thing in which there is no definite end to the divisibility, therefore infinite. c. Free Will/ Causal determinism. The disagreement is over act attributes as assigned to agents. d. Act requirement: e. Explanatory requirement: f. Thesis states that there is a causality, it advances the activity requirement. An agent of herself does x, in the sense that doing x is not the result of something being done to her. This is necessary requirement for attributing the act to the agent. She of herself does something. Spontaneity on agents part, in terms of causality (NOT TIME). g. Antithesis denies freedom, and invokes the explanatory requirement. This refers only to transcendental freedom. An act must be causabley traceable to the agent. This represents a standard compatibilist view. There must be some state of affairs that were sufficient to bring about some act by the agent.
h. If an act, free act, is one that was initiated spontaneously and not conditioned by anything preceding to it, then a free act would have no connection w/ prior states of affairs w/in the agent, therefore, we could not attribute the act to the agent. i. K contends that act attribution requires a non-compatibilist view of freedom. j. He says that we live in a causally determined universe, but we can also speak of free will. k. We want to avoid that there are two worlds. A noumenal and phenomenal one. Instead we should see that we have an empirical character and an intelligible character. April 3, 2007 The basic logical error behind the antinomies: then turn to the problem of reason and why K finds it central to provide an assessment of the traditional presentation for the existence of god. General assessment of the ontological argument. K divides the arguments into 3. K thinks the cosmological argument does not need to be independently assessed by whether or not it succeeds or fails, b/c it is an argument that does not stand on its own. A single step brings you right back into the ontological argument. The ontological argument, K thinks the real work is done. Why does this ever arise, as a problem of reason in the first place? As reason demands of us? For any conditioned thing, we have to think through and represent what the condition thing is, yet we continue down this path until we find the unconditioned. How does this problem generate the problem of God? Standard syllogism: 1. if the conditioned is given, then the entire series of conditions is given. 2. objects of the senses are given as conditioned 3. therefore, the entire series of conditions is a given. Last class, I wasn`t here, the basic problem w/ cosmological ideas is that what the idea represents exceeds any possible experience. The conditioned represented can not be cognized even if the totality of nature is given to us through experience. The reason is that the totality that synthesis represents is not conceivable in cognition. K says, you can never encounter a simple appearance, or an infinite composition. Note: if the conditioned is given, we have assigned to us a regression of a series of conditioned to the condition. assume that the series is taken as a thing in itself, assume conditioned and condition are taken in themselves, then we don`t simply speak as the series being assigned to us, we now view the series as actual, as present as given to us. This would include all the members of the series and the unconditioned. 1. If it is assigned to reason, the condition is given only if you can arrive at a cognition of it. I can discover it.
2. But, if I take conditioned and condition to refer to things in themselves, then it doesn`t matter if I can cognize it or not, b/c it is a thing in itself. If something has intrinsic properties, then they are given and actual, regardless if any person can discover them or if the appear to us at all. In the first case: this synthesis occurs only as the regression follows, or as I go through it, not as a thing in itself. It becomes actual only as I go through this regression, step by step. The synthesis occurs in process, steps, the only way K goes through anything. If it the thing in itself it is actual, whether we go through the steps or not. There is an error in the syllogism as given in the above example: K takes the major premise to be a conceptual truth, b/c it takes conditioned in a purely conceptual sense. He says that in the 2nd step, conditioned is referring to as objects appear to the senses, the error then is to equivocate the minor in step 2 and take the conditions as applying to things in themselves, whereas they really only apply to objects in the senses. It construes conditions as given empirically, it takes to condition to be sequential, so one can`t presuppose that when you assert the minor premise that the absolute totality in series is presented through synthesis. Equivocation, the word conditioned is used differently in the premise than in the conclusion. What is a possible solution? Looking at the 1st antinomy. Thesis and antithesis contradict b/c they both take the word world as a thing in itself. Pg. 515: Remove the assumption that the world is a thing in itself, and both are false. B/c world does not exist in itself, then it neither has a beginning or no beginning. You will never arrive at anything actually conditioned, as you move through the series. Regulative principles, don`t indicate what their objects are, instead they indicate how empirical regression, is to be carried out. So we can arrive at as complete conception of things as possible. Pg 560: Idea of reason: regulate how the understanding functions, provide guidelines. In the idea we have a representation of completeness. A system of unity, w/o actually attaining the unity. A completeness that is represented in the idea, is presented as a goal, the goal of reason. Systematic classification and representation of the idea, they are regulative. Ideal of reason: adds something to the idea, it gives the idea the addition of individuality. This principle of idea is now embodied in an individual. What we say about this individual thing is strictly on the basis of what idea specifies about it. Wholeness and completeness. Effort to cognize an object: Take any given opposed characteristics. Pg 564 For all possible things we can attribute one thing or its contradictory thing.
To have a complete understanding of something, then I can determine the thing completely, by going through all possible predicates, as having or not having and that being assigned to x. This is an idea of reasoning: since I can never concretely show you a completely determined thing, so this idea of the thoroughgoing determination of something is an idea of reason, it is a guideline to understand something as completely and totally as possible, with the idea that we will never exhaust the assigning of predicates to something. It is not possible to us. The sum of all possibility: the only original idea that is completely determined. This gives us an ideal of pure reason. A single object that is determined thoroughly through the idea of a thing completely determined. This is something to which I can assign or exclude all possible predicates. If we get this concept, it would be the idea of total presentation of possibility. It represents the single being, the most real being. The objects determination includes all variables: This operates as analogous to a syllogism: F v ~F ~F F And we can run through all possibles to determine which way it will go. We are still talking about an idea of reason, which does not The manifold content of anything we call x, the possibility of finishing this work, in a way that encompasses everything about x, this functions as an original idea, as an archetype, a model, that guides understanding. Pg. 568: the totality of what is limited, the conditioned one It gives you a model that is presupposed that shows you how and that something like this is carried out. It allows you to discover ideas, individual things and their determinations are more precise b/c they are viewed in the aspect of the most original being. You take this most determinate idea, and transfer it into the form of a being and now you get god. How does reason move from the ideal of thoroughgoing determination, to the concept of god, as the most real, supreme being, being of all beings. K says we need to explain two moves. 1st: all possibility of things as being derived from a single underlying possibility, as represented in a single supreme being 2nd: the supreme reality is contained in a single original being. Start w/ any object of the senses. How can I carry out a complete determination of this thing? I can determine thoroughly x, only by comparing it w/ all possible predicates w/in the realm of appearances. I either assign or exclude every predicate. If I take the entire realm of appearances, how is this given to me? K says as a single all encompassing experience. The possibility of the range, x, may have, presupposes the realm of all possible predicates as its basis, what makes possible the assigning of these predicates. This gives us the sum of all empirical realism. Errors
Pg 571-2 1. assume the presupposition of reason, holds as an idea for all possible existence, and things as such 2. take the realm of all possible predicates, not as a distributive whole, but as a collective unity, a single individual 3. then take this individual as a prototype of the possibility of al things, and assume that some being exists which matches the idea. That is how you generate a concept of a genuinely most real being, the supreme being, being of all beings. The notion of God. Kant goes through the arguments of gods existence and shows that none of them function as a proof for gods existence. He says they suck basically. Read 572 and up and be able to discuss the different arguments for gods existence. The regulative use of the ideas of pure reason gets a great transition into the critique of judgment, our next task. April 5, 2007 Ontological proof for existence of god: Basically Descartes arguments Principle of Sufficient Reason 1. for any dependent being 2. for any fact whatsoever reason posits in us collective unity as goals. Reason gives systematic unity to the functions of the understanding. Gives idea of the whole, sets a priori requirements for how all parts are to be related. Knowledge as a whole is not an aggregate, or compilation of things. Knowledge is an interconnected whole, all strings are tied. This is grounded in a priori laws. Rules of understanding: organized under a single principle. Hegel and Fichte: the categories, where do they come from, the logical functions of judgment, they can be derived from a single and more basic principle. Systematic Wholeness: Kant considered this, but he didn`t execute the idea. K: for any classification there are always more specific concepts that fall under that concept. Once you find a concept, general classification, that there are always more specific differences. Continuing on forever. Reason projects for the understanding 3 things: 1. always some homogeneity, in any manifold, that can be classified in higher concepts. 2. there is some variety in this, that allows us to classify more general concepts (mammals, then sub-species) 3. There is some continuity b/w species, no major gaps to leap over. Which gives us a systematic completeness. April 10, 2007 Critique of judgment: Start slowly so that we can get a chance to write our term papers.
The judgment that something is beautiful is not a way of cognizing the object. Aesthetic judgments are purely subjective. Not in the way we tend to use this expression. I can say Dale`s paintings are beautiful. This is a subjective statement, it is not a way to determine or cognize the object. There is a certain way in which the way I experience this object and the way I present it w/ my imagination, that in doing so, there is a remarkable harmony in the faculties of my mind that arouses the feeling of pleasure. I am making a serious judgment, b/c they are not merely subjective statements. It is not a mere opinion, I will think you suck if you don`t see it my way, because this is the way anyone, and everyone, ought to experience the painting (or any object). Aesthetic judgments have a universality associated with them. How can an aesthetic judgment, which is subjective, be universal? This is K`s aim. Purpose/purposiveness in nature? When nature itself does not operate w/ a purpose, an end at which nature moves towards. There is some overall unity, law likeness, to the overall plurality of empirical laws. We do not experience any sort of basic principles that pull all of these together. They are rules of thumb. Ie: nature takes the shortest way. Nature takes no leap. In other words, we judge classifications and are able to put them in species, subspecies and so forth. We use reflective judgment throughout this process. Reflective judgment means that we start w/ the particular and we move to the universal. How do we account for a judgment in sciences? Moving away from the science revolution of K`s time. Another thing K is dealing w/ is the movement of the study of organisms. That the purposiveness of their being is survival. How does nature show purposiveness? In a way that we can show from reflective judgment. Refl. Judgment: lays down the law only for itself. This is not a part of the constitution of nature, but to really understand nature, we have to make these judgments and assign some purposiveness to it. The payoff of this is that it gives us a systematic way of classifying nature. Pg. 20, purpose and purposiveness If we don`t suppose this unity, we won`t have any type of unity w/in nature and the natural world and our experience. A good bit of understanding of the natural world, is not strictly describable as knowledge of that world, but at the same time, my understanding of the world, requires me to have some sense of systematic unity of nature. I find this through reflective judgment. Reflective judgments are universal, but how is this possible? It doesn`t tell us about the constitution of the object, but it does tell us something about what is in us as we reflect upon the object. Pg. 23 tells us about this. Pay particular attention to K`s description of aesthetic concepts. April 12, 2007 Preliminary clarifications for aesthetic judgments Pg. 53: Distinction of taste: devoid of interests!!! Distinguish judgments, standard judgments, from aesthetic ones. One way to configure is to indicate that to which we will refer a presentation.
Judgments: refer presentations to an object, in order to determine it in a particular way, it`s black, its white, its solid, its cubed--a die--this is how we can know something about the object. Aesthetic judgment (AJ): the imagination refers the presentation to the subject, Kelly, and specifically to her feeling (sense of) of pleasure or displeasure to the presentation. This is why all AJ`s are subjective. This power does not contribute anything to the cognition... AJ`s are made irrespective of any interest we may otherwise have or have in the object Pg 51:Contemplation: an AJ is purely aesthetic, purely how we are affected by a sensation. Keep non-aesthetic judgments pure from outside influences. Devoid of all interest: This means to keep it pure from biases. The judgment of X being beautiful, is simply a judgment of what one likes, w/o signifying a desire for that object. A judgment that something is good, designates from the beginning, defines or determines, that the judgment is made b/c it gratifies or agrees w/ some desire. This means that the nature of the judgments are determinate. This is not so w/ AJ`s. The absence of interests is a requirement for the notion that they have a universality in them. B/c we like the object, devoid of personal inclinations I might have. This means they are completely free and unrestrained to the imagination. 9: pleasure is the result, it is not universal. Only cognition can be communicated universally. In aesthetic experience, as something presented to us, our cognitive powers are in free play. There is no concept that limits or restricts them to one ruling or judgment of good or bad. In Aesthetic experience, imagination and understanding, harmonize, and do so while both are in free play. This is why pleasure is a result of judgment, pleasure is an expression of the harmony of the two powers, imag. and under. The presentation itself does not follow a specific rule. The whole idea of something being beautiful has to just completely rock us at our core. April 19, 2007 Sublime: What is the purpose of a liberal arts education? Purpose of getting educated. Its what that thing refers to in a particular way. Causality we refer to is the purposiveness The object itself, and what it does, is thought of as an effect, a result, thought of only as by means of the object. The purpose is thought to be possible only as a result of the causal force of the object, ie: weedeater. Something being purposive w/o a purpose, the cause of this particular form, doesn`t lie in the will, but in a representation whose form can be intelligible only by treating it as if it were derived from the will. K is going to reject the idea that one can say purposiveness is constitutive of a natural world, no intelligent design silliness will find a foothold in Kant`s works.
There is enough there however, to make a reflective judgment. The phenomena as it appears to us, exhibits an arrangement of things, that make it up, that simply is not intelligible to us, except by thinking of this as having had been created by a will, following a particular guideline... Purpose: Purposive w/o purpose: ie: a sunset, it is utterly indeterminate, Purposiveness is subjective, not a specification about what the nature of the object is There is some pleasure associated w/ purposiveness, but it is tentative. The pleasure is the consciousness of the purposiveness that is in the play of our cognitive powers, which accompanies the presentation of the sunset. Aesthetic judgments have a purpose, to contribute something to the object itself, that it has a certain good or purpose that is intrinsic to it or that it brings about. April 24, 2007 Notion of the sublime, different type of experience/judgment and a different type of harmony among the faculties. Sheer boundlessness: w/ natural beauty it seems to have a purposiveness in the form that we are seeing. What excites the feeling of sublime is the objects of form that are not suited to our capacity to feel something. It rips the imagination apart, the more violence, the greater the sublimity. It is chaos in nature that brings about this feeling. We are talking about the quality, magnitude, the sense of unboundedness of the object, but at the same time, we think of the object as a whole, totality. What sort of likening is associated w/ the feeling of sublime? It is a sense of pulsating, a momentary void, inhibition of the vital powers and followed directly by a big surge. Like you just got the shit scared out of you. An object we judge to be sublime feels almost counterpurposive, at least for our power of judgment. It is something that we strive to represent as a whole, but it is experienced as incommensurate of our power to represent. It violates our imagination. It involves some sense of subjective purposiveness. To call something sublime is to call it absolutely large, it is not a comparative judgment, the standard that is adequate to the judgment is not outside the object, you are not comparing it to something else. The sublme is not something that we seek in our ideas, imagination strives to represent something that for the imagination almost seems infinite, while reason demands totality, a finished project. Imagination is just striving to get a presentation of something, that just presenting it seems completely boundless, yet we require this. The inadequacy is represented in the magnitude of the object. 106, yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us... Nature is experienced as sublime when the experience of a particular phenomena presents infinity to us. So we are trying to get some aesthetic representation, when the effort to do this exceeds our ability. We have a correlation b/w the imagination and reason. No rule is being followed here. Reason has built into it, restrictions or inabilities, specifically to identify w/in any possible experience something or object that answers to the idea. This is the aspect of reason in which we are concerned with at this point.
Sublime is so boundless, the imagination cannot form a completed image of it. Its formlessness is related to the boundlessness. May 1, 2007 Teleology in nature, teleology means an end, goal, purpose. Formal purposiveness, Construct a triangle, or circle, completely a priori according to a principle. A rule for a procedure to construct something. But, after you construct the circle, you discover that there are a lot of purposive applications of what you have constructed. This is an example of purposiveness w/ out purpose. Here are applications, engineering and survey types, w/o any purpose. There are purposeful applications for a triangle, but there is no purpose out of the constructs of one. Any purposiveness that we introduce, this is something that we have introduced by us, this involves as K notes, critical use of our reasoning. We are not making any judgment about the properties of a triangle. Teleology judgments are relate nature to observations of principle of inquiry, that are analogous w/ purposeness. We are not trying to explain nature in terms of some sort of final causality The concept of the object, contributes to bringing about the reality Objective material, A relative purposiveness, something has a natural purposiveness only if it has a means to and is advantaged over something else. But this is not the natural purposiveness that we are talking about Only if a cause is conditioned by a goal, intent, is it possible to give to this the title of natural purpose. A tree generates another tree, but in doing so, produces itself in a generic sense. It also produces itself as an individual, as it grows. Each part of the tree, generates itself in a way that sustaining any one part, requires other parts to be sustained and generated as well. Causation, sand puts out fire, strictly linear. One thing brings about something else. However, teleology in nature, is analogous to human reason. Causation via reason can be viewed as part of a series of leaning forward and/or leaning backward. An effect can be seen as a cause of that which is an effect. How? A purpose, and ideal, Natural purpose: for x, to be a natural purpose it must 1. the parts are possible only in relationship or by reference to the whole. a. This criteria by itself, makes x a work of art, not very in depth requirement b. Something that is the product of a rational idea, is distinct from a natural material, or parts. 2. the parts so combined in the unity of the whole, that they are reciprocally determines form and combination of parts a. as a grounds, basis, for us judging subjects is the systematic unity Something is a natural purpose, internally, if and only if their parts produce a whole by their causality, in such a way that the concept of the whole is regarded as a cause The parts are thought of as organs, systematically creating the other parts.
We look at an organism and we see that what`s going on in it cannot be explained simply by systematic mechanisms. The parts internal are conducive to the overall purpose of it, and then reciprocally back. The only way to grasp the nature of the structure of the thing, is to look at the embodied structure as in a purpose, but I am not saying anything at all about the constitution of the object. For me to understand how it functions, I must view it analogously w/ the way it functions. Kant distinguishes b/w a natural purpose and what we might call intelligent design. Intelligent design, super human being, but the purpose seems to be more about what or whom, instead of the organism, this takes it outside of nature, and there is something operating on nature that is outside of it. What kant is doing here, does not add to, alter, screw w/ physics at all. Physics is left in tact, in other words, we are not adding another causal basis into physics, we are only opening up a much needed, necessary, type of explanation. Another method for us to investigate nature, using our own reason to do so.