The Kant: Refutation of Idealism
Scott Michaele Welch April 16, 2007 Kant Senior Seminar Dr. Jeffrey Kinlaw
Welch INTRODUCTION: The Refutation of Idealism, written by Immanuel Kant, is a piece of philosophy that provides us with answers to many of the problems faced by the Modern Era
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philosophers. The intent of this paper is to view one of these problems, the term I am` as theorized by many in Modern philosophy and how Kant dealt with it in the Critique of Pure Reason. I will provide a basic rendition of what I am` entailed prior to Kant and a short version of his transcendental apperception for clarification. From these two introductory analyses I will advance by breaking down Kant`s Refutation in detail and finish the paper by looking at two fairly recent critiques. This paper should develop a basic understanding of how the term I am` comes to be and how Kant`s version of I am` not only gives us the knowledge of ourselves, but also of external objects. MODERN PHILOSOPHY`S I`: Kant believed the modern movement`s view on I am` was confused and underdeveloped. This can be seen throughout various sections from the Critique, however our focus on the Refutation will be more explicit and critical of the skeptics views. The remainder of this section will be devoted to providing a skeptics view of the term I am` and how this view progresses within philosophy. The skeptics of modern philosophy may be traced back to Descartes and his work on the Meditations. In this writing, Descartes attempts to give an account for our self-awareness through what has since been dubbed the Cartesian Circle. The actual problem with this Circle is not at issue here, rather the form of the term I` that Descartes creates for use in it, is. Descartes begins the Meditations with ambition to prove his existence in a purely rational manner. He does this by initially doubting every thing he
Welch knows, from outward experience to his own existence. From this point he begins to question what it is he does have the ability to know. After some debate, he advances the notion that because it is he that is capable of doubting, he must exist. In Descartes own words, I do not admit that I am anything but mind, and that, I am a thinking thing.
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(Descartes, Pg. 23) He seems to argue here, that he is capable of discovering this truth of existence in a completely a priori manner. To Descartes this means without any sensual input and/or without any backdrop to which he can apply his knowledge to. From this initial theory, other Modern philosophers advance the path much further than Descartes ever intends. The main problem with Descartes I think` eventually finds its end with more recent philosophical works by the minds of Berkeley and Hume. His vision of I think` creates a partition of mind and body, as well as, a barrier to what we can truly know. Eventually these men, and others, take the vision to a conclusion that Descartes himself would never give sanction to. I will not rehash all these arguments here, but it should be of no surprise the end we find is one that leads us into a world of uncertainty and being in possession of only one piece of knowledge, our own self-consciousness. In this mindset, the skeptic`s have paved a road of uncertainty and deluded ideas of what this I am` entails. Kant sets the tone for how he will handle this type of scenario very early in the Critique when he gives a definition to the term transcendental apperception (TA). TRANSCENDENTAL APPERCEPTION: In Kant`s work on the Critique of Pure Reason, he provides some answers to the questions the skeptics leave us with. He supplies a very thorough method on how we should tackle the problems of knowledge and gives us some basic concepts to work with.
Welch One of these fundamental tools he offers is the concept of TA. It is my belief that he does this in order to advance the position he will ultimately defend in the Refutation, in which case it is vital that this concept is fully understood. Kant defines TA as a unity of consciousness, he says, one consciousness is what unites in one presentation what is manifold, intuited by little, and then also reproduced. (Kant A104) His attempt here is to show that the definition of I am,` as presented by Descartes and others, is mistaken because they divide the mind into what is
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known and assumed. Kant believes that through the a priori intuitions of space and time, it is possible to disregard this dilemma because these intuitions, particularly that of space, provide a constant backdrop for application in experience. This backdrop enables Kant to introduce the unity of consciousness with an objective feature, a necessary concept for TA to truly take hold. The objectivity of Kant`s TA is a key feature in his argument against the skeptics. In other sections, particularly the Schematism and the Analogies, Kant completes the foundation in which he will build the Refutation upon. This paper will not dwell on these sections, as it may be assumed that the task of each will surface within the next section as we undertake the true purpose of this paper, the Refutation of Idealism. REFUTATION OF IDEALISM: This section is devoted to a thorough analysis of Kant`s understanding of the skeptic`s argument and how his proposal not only defeats their claims, but also introduces a concept that enables us to have knowledge of the I am` and external objects. Kant`s theory will be comprehensively broken down in the hopes that it will be better understood and enable us to interpret outside attacks upon it and see the flaws they have.
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Kant gives a definition of idealism, and those who support it, as the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us either to be merely doubtful and unprovable, or to be false and impossible. (B 275) From this definition, we are able to notice key ideas that he is going to attack. One of which has already been shown to be remarkably weak elsewhere in the Critique, the possibility of objects in space. The possibility for knowledge of objects external to us, is a crucial point that Kant has shown to be the wedge between the skeptics view and his own. We merely need to refer back to the section of TA to see this. In that section he develops the idea that outer experience is possible only through the constant backdrop of space. It is this backdrop that provided him a way in which he is capable of experiencing presentations of objects, which he can only attribute to experience through a manifold process. Therefore, for any presentation to be used in our imagination, or mental activities, we must have some way, ie: through intuition of space and time, to process this information. Once this step is solidified, Kant can now move on to describe the idealism he is disputing. The first of these idealistic theories has already been mentioned, the theory Descartes presents in his Meditations. Kant says of Descartes theory, it declares only one empirical assertion to be indubitable, viz.: I am. (B275) The second of the idealistic theories is labeled dogmatic idealism. He attributes this sort of idealism to the works of Berkeley, and says it declares space, with all the things to which space attaches as inseparable condition, to be something that is in itself impossible, and hence, also declares the things in space to be mere imaginings. (B275) The reason why we end up in this position, as Kant states, is because we attribute space as a property to the thing in itself. This is an obvious error that Kant has dealt with previously in the
Welch Transcendental Aesthetic and since we can never know a thing in itself, the dogmatic idealism fails on its own grounds. These two aspects of idealism are further deplored in the remainder of the Refutation. It may be said that the main focus of Kant`s criticism in the Refutation is based
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on the philosophy offered by Descartes. The main focus of this problem has already been mentioned, however as a critical step, this paper is best served by exploring it more deeply. The step in question is one that Kant continually remarks upon while outlining his argument against idealism, the backdrop thesis. When Kant allows a passage from idealism theorists (that is empirical knowledge in the form of I am` as a given in their conceptions), it may be assumed that the idealist were not very far from discovering the truth of what I am` fully allows. However, they did fail to find this term in a way that provides any true knowledge, hence the stigmatism associated with idealism. Kant says that without the backdrop of space and the intuition of time, all experience is simply random. The presentations given would have no home in the mental processes of recollection and/or association, as well as others. This is why Kant finds idealism such a hard pill to swallow. Because, Descartes and others fail to provide an objective ground to base experiences upon, they never realize how this affects the mental synthesis as Kant presents them. For this reason, Kant proposes a theorem as a foundational weapon in his attacks against the skeptics. It states: The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me. (B276) The full proof will now be explored and an explanation as to why Kant`s rendition of the term is best suited for use in philosophy.
Welch The proof begins with an emphasis on one`s existence as determined in time. (B276) Kant says in order to conceptualize existence in time there is a required presupposition that something is permanent in all perceptions one takes to be genuine.
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He furthers this point by exclaiming that this something is possible only through a thing outside me and not through a mere presentation of a thing outside me. (B276) Kant is well aware of the struggle philosophers of his time will find with the backdrop requirement, as can be seen by the constant variations in the way he presents it. He ends this introductory paragraph by saying, the consciousness of my own existence is simultaneously a direct consciousness of the existence of other things outside me. (B276) He will develop this point more in the proceeding arguments. Kant makes a direct rebuttal of idealism and uses their own arguments to show where and how they have gone wrong. He begins by explaining a fault of these earlier philosophers is that they tended to believe that all direct experience is inner experience, and we only infer external things. (B277) This is a mistake, as explained by Kant, because we must first be presented with some thing outside ourselves in order to have an experience. Therefore, all outer experience is direct through the intuition of space and awareness of this experience is the only way to find true knowledge of self-existence, through the succession of time. This point is crucial as Kant is arguing that inner experience is itself only indirect and is possible only through outer experience. (B277) He furthers this point in the next comment. In Comment 2, Kant takes the above argument and expands upon it, in an attempt to drive the point`s home. He begins by stating, all experiential use that we make of our cognitive power in determining time agrees completely with this view.
Welch (B278) He advances the meaning of this opening claim when he explains what is meant by I` as it is used. He says of the consciousness of I,` the presentation I is not an intuition at all, but is a merely intellectual presentation of a thinking subject`s self
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activity. Hence this I also does not have the least predicate of intuition that, as permanent, could serve as correlate for the time determination in inner sense... (B278) In other words, Kant advances this understanding of I` as something that is only possible through the awareness of oneself in time and the reflection upon this awareness is what allows one to recognize themselves as an I am.` The third and final comment Kant makes in this argument deals with the existence of these outside objects. He foreshadows a strong opposition to the above two claims and seems to prepare for it by making the following comment: It does not follow, from the fact that the existence of external objects is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of ourselves, that every intuitive presentation of external things implies also these things` existence; for the presentation may very well be (as it is in dreams as well as in madness) the mere effect of our imagination. (B279) As a precaution to the possible objections from the previous comments, the above statement seems to solidify Kant`s argument against the idealism of his time. It is important to note that Kant admits, not all external presentations are real (as in dreams) these presentations are possible only through the actuality of external objects. (B279) Or simply, that the presentations in dreams are reflections of some order of external objects that have previously been encountered and therefore whether they exist at this time or some other, they are not simply imaginary objects. The actuality or imaginary
Welch quality of the presentations at any given moment however is not a concern for this comment. Through previously given steps, one is capable of determining which presentations should be considered real and which should not be. At this point, Kant begins to pull these ideas together in order to present the Refutation more coherently. This next section is concerned with the necessity of material objects in
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existence. Kant identifies this as, the necessity of existence can never be cognized from concepts, but always only from the connection with what is perceived, and according to universal laws of experience. (A227) This appears to be an appeal to the significance of the laws of causality and how they affect the ability to understand the world in totality. He once again reminds us that we do not perceive the thing in itself; rather what we perceive is the changes of the appearances as they are presented to us. This point calls upon previously stated principles that we cognize the necessity only of those effects in nature whose causes are given to us, and that these changes are according to a law, ie., to a rule of necessary existence. (A228) This drives home the a prior proposition that suggests, in nature nothing happens by pure randomness, instead all causes come through a priori laws. These a priori laws also happen to be conditioned laws and therefore necessary and determinate. (B281) Kant is in the midst of designing the rules that govern reason, and how he believes this ability comes about. This ability is what transitions the concept of I am` into a realm that allows trust in experiences. Before this ability can be explored more, however, Kant makes some cautions about concept of the understanding, as idealism tends to rally behind. Kant advances his concept of the understanding as he links it to the realm of under the jurisdiction of reason. (B283) He says that the understanding is what gives
Welch 10 the rule to sensibility and apperception, the conditions which alone make experience possible. (B283) The follow up to this statement is a simple rule that says the understanding is not what creates cognition, rather it is something that uses the rules of synthesis on the presentations given, and appears to discover some truths. This concept of the understanding provides a foothold for the idea that, what is connected with perception, according to empirical laws, is actual, even if it is not perceived directly. (A232) Kant says that these rules govern presentations as they come to mind, allow the immediate inference that without material nothing can be thought at all. (A232) This concept maintains that experience is genuine and it makes possible for the actuality of external things, as well as of self-existence. Kant offers a serious caution about this idea of the understanding. He warns about the concept of understanding just covered because it is a mere concept of understanding, and cannot in any way have empirical use. It belongs, rather, solely to reason, which goes beyond all possible empirical use of understanding. (B285) Because he is concerned with following certain inalienable rules of synthesis for any cognitions, it is easy to see why he feels that allowing the understanding to trump over reason is a mistake. He later says, if an a priori determination is added synthetically to the concept of a thing, then such a proposition must without fail be supplemented by at least a deduction, if not a proof, showing that the assertion made by such a proposition is legitimate. (B286) Again, calling upon the power of reason to provide the foundation for experience and not leaving anything to chance. Kant finishes this theme by providing a detail of how the previous arguments should be received. He says,
Welch 11 Thus if a concept is connected merely in the understanding with the formal conditions of experience, then its object is called possible; if the concept is in coherence with perception, and through perception is determined by means of the understanding, then the object is actual; if the concept is determined through the perceptions` coherence according to concepts, then the object is called necessary. Hence the principles of modality affirm of a concept nothing other than the action of the cognitive power by which the concept is produced. (B287) These statements combine to give a template by which one can identify the way a concept of a thing is joined with the power of cognition. It is at this point, Kant comments on the System of Principles. This last section pulls together much of what is described throughout Section 3 of Transcendental Logic. The main area of concern here is how the Refutation fits in with prior concepts and how it is a necessary part to join them all together. I will briefly review this section and provide some key features that Kant assembles for this task. Kant begins this final section by stating, we cannot have insight into the possibility of any thing according to the mere category, but must always have available an intuition by which to display the objective reality of the pure concept of understanding. (B288) This is followed by, this confirmation that the categories themselves by are no cognitions at all, but are merely forms of thought for making cognitions from given intuitions. (B289) As seen from these statements, Kant is appealing to the ideas that only through the intuitions are cognitions formed. This has been a focal point throughout the work and will continue as he advances these ideas. He says that through intuitions and the concept of the contingent it is possible to become
Welch 12 aware of the notion of causality. Causality is what enables one to assume some thing external as a contingent object and therefore enables the idea that it has a cause and is an analytic proposition. (B291) This step is what allows the transition into the realm of outer intuitions that are necessary for I am.` Once it is agreed that outer intuitions provide a starting point for knowledge, Kant believes it is possible to factually state that categories have objective reality. The obvious intuition he relies on here is the intuition of space and through this intuition one is capable of processing the change required to identify categories in objective reality. This idea is advanced as Kant states that in order to then think about these changes it is necessary to have some successive reality and this is found through the intuition of time. He says that time empowers one to comprehend the idea that, successive existence of ourselves in different states comprehensible through outer tuition. (B292) Yet again, this dependence on intuition provides Kant a way of showing I am` and other objects are in existence. He concludes this entire section with two statements that I take to be the most important aspects of it. First, Kant says that we can easily establish, similarly, that the possibility of things as magnitudes, and hence the objective reality of the category of magnitude, can likewise be displayed only in outer intuition, and that only by means of outer intuition can it thereafter be applied also to inner sense. (B294) He highlights this remark by repeating a common theme that says the idealism given by Descartes, and others, is mistaken because they rely on inner sense alone and discard all outer intuitions. This he says limits the possibility of such cognition. (B294) The second critical statement, as I see it, is his conclusion. Kant says,
Welch 13 all principles of pure understanding are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibility of experience; and all a priori synthetic propositions also refer solely to this possibility--indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this reference. (B294) I believe he ends this section here because he has provided every bit of detail needed to criticize and trump the arguments of the idealist. These last statements reiterate to the reader his intentions and his reliance on the outer intuitions for cognition and as they become a backdrop for our own awareness, they also form the foundation for all intelligible cognition. The purpose of this section was to develop key ideas in Kant`s Refutation of Idealism and to represent his work in a way that will enable us to now go over some more current views for and against the ideas he presented and see how this part of the Critique has transformed the way we think and confront the issue of I am.` The key phrases to keep in mind while continuing through these outside analyses are the following. First, it is vital to keep in mind the significance of idealism, as displayed by Descartes and others, and why these views failed upon a further look by Kant. Second, our focus in Kant`s work is on the necessity for a constant backdrop, particularly the a priori intuitions of time and space. And third, it is important to remember that Kant is devoted to finding out what can be cognized and this process is governed by many rules with meticulousness intentions. RECENT VIEWS: This section will deal with several criticisms that the Refutation of Idealism has been subject of for more than two-hundred years. My aim at this point is to review two
Welch 14 different arguments against the Refutation and to suggest why Kant`s thesis is superior by recalling key aspects of the Refutation. I will begin by looking at a section from The Bounds of Sense written by Sir Peter Strawson. Strawson tells us in the preface to his work that Kant, seeks to draw the bounds of sense from a point outside them, a point which, if they are rightly drawn, cannot exist. (Strawson [S] Pg. 12) This initial statement is a prelude to how he has devoted this work and should remain in our minds as we review his criticisms of the Refutation. He initiates his discourse on the Refutation by denouncing the idea of necessity of something permanent in perception. (S Pg. 125) Strawson has already made several arguments against the actuality of I am` and time-relations as they concern the objects of experience. However, this portion of the paper will primarily analyze sections of his work that are directly linked to the Refutation and how these time-space relations become a problem for him. In his objection, Strawson claims that Kant fails to provide a distinction between two aspects of objects in space. He says, It is impossible to draw the necessary distinctions between (1) the time-relations of the members of a subjective series of perceptions and (2) the time-relations of at least some objects which the perceptions are perceptions of... (S Pg. 125) I believe the problem for Strawson is that he confuses the application of the intuition of space for our use in experience. This can be shown as he follows the prior remarks with, there is no question of perceiving the necessary framework itself, of perceiving, as it were, pure spatial permanence. (S Pg. 125) He further compounds the confusion as he believes that without a permanence of space we are required to assume the permanence of at least some objects. This confusion is not as
Welch 15 it seems, however. Kant insists that the intuition of space is a priori and we are incapable of perceiving its magnitude because of this. If Strawson was to have correctly understood this concept, the above argument would not have been necessary in his analysis of Kant`s Refutation and the First Analogy. We can see even further departure from the Critique as he continues to argue against Kant`s Refutation. The next criticism is a direct attack against the Refutation. He finds a problem in Kant`s transition from being conscious of his own being to the fact that something is permanent in perception. He highlights a remark by Kant that mentions the obscurity of the expressions used in his original argument. Yet, I believe this obscurity is simply a linguistic obscurity and not a foundation for Strawson`s next criticism. Strawson provides some suggestions as to how Kant`s original statements may be made more correct in theory. He adds there is only one way in which perceived things or processes can supply a system of temporal relations independent of the order of the subject`s perceptions of them... by lasting and being re-encounterable in temporally different perceptual experiences. (S Pg. 127) Again, he assigns the necessity of some object persistence in nature in order for one to be conscious of her being. He advances, saying that there is, as usual, no independent argument to the effect that the objective order must be a spatial order. (S Pg. 127) After which he calls upon specific vocabulary of Kant`s argument to prove his point, however, it is my belief that this argument does not benefit his case and in fact his use of a hypothetical reply from Kant does great damage to it. I will now focus my attention to Strawson`s last argument against the use of intuitions for our self awareness.
Welch 16 This last criticism of Kant`s work is one that attempts to debunk the tie between the two intuitions of time and space. Strawson asserts that a ground condition for selfconsciousness is, experience should contain at least the seeds of the idea of one experiential or subjective route through an objective world. (S Pg. 128) He suggests that the succession of time as Kant displays in the Critique, does not meet the above ground condition. It seems as though Strawson is again criticizing the Refutation, not on logical accuracy, but rather on word usage. He attacks the way Kant views our successive time relation with experience by suggesting if and only if we enlarge the form to here now A`, etc., and dwell on the implications of this addition, do we find the seeds of this idea. (S Pg. 128) Again he is referencing the above ground condition and that Kant does not discriminate the succession this way. He believes Kant instead simply says, Now A, Now B, Now C etc. (S Pg. 128) This objection to the Refutation is the weakest yet. He criticizes the argument Kant gives in the Refutation without recalling the premises he uses to give this argument. Strawson believes he finds a weak point in Kant`s thesis, yet he fails to fully understand the structure of the argument. Kant has shown, through the Critique and particularly the Refutation, that when we say Now A we are including the characteristics Strawson says are necessary for his ground condition. I will now switch my focus to a more recent article that objects to the Refutation. In an article written by, Jonathan Vogel, titled The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism": Two Recent Views he attempts to provide for a missing piece of Kant`s Refutation. The two recent views Vogel uses in his article are from excerpts of Henry Allison`s and Paul Guyer`s approaches to Kant`s work. Observations made by Vogel attempt to illustrate how these two theories call into doubt
Welch 17 the Refutation`s aim and his view on the solutions to these doubts. I will attempt to condense his argument and provide several reasons why I believe his analysis of these two works do not provide sufficient detail to support the conclusion of a missing link in the Refutation. At the onset of the article, Vogel sets the mood by saying, a step necessary to the completion of the Refutation appears to be missing altogether. (Vogel [V] Pg. 875) He judges that this missing step is strong enough to provide for the following conclusion, If the self can be directly known to persist through change, the Refutation fails, yet Kant seems not to address such a possibility. (V Pg. 875) Vogel has with out doubt set up a hard nosed position on this topic, and it is up to him to provide an exact proof of this in order for the argument to be valid. I will continue with a short overview of the following pieces he outlines: the supposed missing link, the two theories that the other authors provide respecting this, and how Vogel feels the problem is best solved. Vogel`s attempt at challenging the Refutation rests upon a single concept he gives as, Kant would need to supply some additional reasoning to establish that it is impossible to know the self as permanent, if the self is the only object of knowledge. (V Pg. 876-7) He finds himself at this dilemma because he has read more into the Critique than what is necessary. After outlining the argument Kant makes for the necessity of a permanent external object and how this external object, through the intuition of space, makes us aware of our succession within time, he makes a puzzling jump. He asks the question, this object could be external to the mind, but why must it be? (V Pg. 876) This question is the root to his problem because he now confuses the role of the intuition of space. If the object were from within, as he proposes, there is no way for us to
Welch 18 attribute the intuition of space to it, which was a prerequisite for Kant`s theory. Vogel furthers his criticism by describing the theories of Allison and Guyer. Vogel begins with Allison`s claims against the Refutation`s validity. The points of contention, in Allison`s view, lie at the presupposition that inner sense provides no intuition of a subject to which our representations appear. (V Pg. 877) This concern lies on the transition from outer to inner intuition and he continues with another synopsis of Allison`s work: Kant needs to establish some disparity between inner and outer sense, such that outer sense gives us direct knowledge of enduring objects, while inner sense does not. (V Pg. 877) This statement sums the analysis provided fairly well. Although Vogel seems intrigued by the conflicts at play, he does admit that Allison`s confusion of the different types of inner sense is really what causes the conflict to begin with. It seems as though Allison`s dilemma starts, and ends, because of a failure to understand Kant`s concepts of manifold and synthesis. He has confused the inner sense given through the synthesis of our outer and inner intuitions, and that inner sense that is later described in the Critique of Judgment as a feeling. Once this misunderstanding has been addressed, the original objection given by Allison, and expanded by Vogel, fail. Perhaps, Vogel`s analysis of Guyer`s work will provide a more fruitful contention. At the onset, Vogel makes clear that Guyer has focused his attention on Kant`s B-edition and the Nova Dilucidatio arguments. This line of focus presents us with the first field for contention, the difference between the two arguments. This will not be a concern for us, however. The reason I will throw this out is because it is a play on the way in which Kant has defended the concept of self knowledge, the B-edition uses persistence of objects as a ground, whereas the Nova Dilucidatio uses causation. We will
Welch 19 instead shift our focus onto the second point of contention, as presented by Vogel. The problem lies at an understanding of Kant`s purpose in the Nova Dilucidatio, if X brings about an alteration in Y, X cannot be identical to Y. (V Pg. 882) This principle, given as an interpretation of Kant`s works, causes Vogel to suggest a peculiar question. Reminiscent of the initial question asked in Vogel`s paper, he states: Imagine that a machine automatically shuts itself off it detects that it has malfunctioned. In this case, it would seem that the cause of the alteration in the machine is just the machine itself. Thus, there are instances in which X causes an alteration in Y, even though X and Y are the same thing, contrary to Kant`s principle. (V Pg. 883) From this statement, he begins to summarize Guyer`s theory and expands upon it several times. However, in my opinion, he fails to even show how X and Y are the same thing. This hypothetical scenario of the machine, only points out that separate components within the machine may cause one to act upon the other, but they are not the same component so, under that understanding, his argument fails at once. Vogel is seemingly unaware of this problem, yet he does admit to some uncertainty in both criticisms of the Refutation. In summation, Vogel says in during the conclusion of his work that neither of the above two philosophers present an end all solution to the problems he sets out to prove. He says, both commentators fail to explain how Kant would have closed what seems to be a crucial gap in his argument. The limitations of their readings give us reason to pursue alternatives. (V Pg. 887) I find it rather presumptuous to believe that either of these arguments provides us any reason to dig deeper. Kant`s original argument
Welch 20 withstands all the criticisms presented in this paper. Strawson fails because of a misunderstanding of Kant`s terminology, and Vogel`s compilation of Allison and Guyer, begs too many questions left unanswered to be considered tenable. CONCLUSION: I began this paper with a desire to further the understanding and intent of Kant`s Refutation of Idealism. I believe that through a basic knowledge of the I am` as given by the Modern Era philosopher`s we can start to gain a respect for what Kant was up against. He developed from their I am` a concept of transcendental apperception that not only provided us the knowledge of our own existence, but also provided an ability to know things outside of us. Kant uses these foundations and those developed in the Critique to expand this concept of I am` and to ultimately disassemble the skeptic`s view. This was a success in every sense of the word. The skeptical claims fail at once, with a proper understanding of the Critique as a whole. However, some still believed the Refutation had serious flaws. We witnessed several of the objections to Kant through the writings of Peter Strawson and Jonathan Vogel. The brief sketches of their work provided us an opportunity to test Kant`s theories against some of the more recent objections. In the course of unraveling these writings, we find that Kant`s original stance lies unscathed, as they tended to misinterpret rather than call forth any true opposition. In conclusion, it is through a careful analysis and understanding of the Refutation of Idealism that we are capable to fully gain knowledge of Kant`s original intent. A little more than two-hundred years have passed since Kant took on the challenge of revolutionizing the way we think and I find it remarkable that through this time his work has withstood criticisms from some of the most intelligent minds. It is my
Welch 21 belief that this section of the Critique of Pure Reason was not only necessary at the time of writing, but maintains as a necessity today and will continue to do so for many years to come. It is no small coincidence that he began this work with a strong yet humble announcement, The situation here is the same as was that of Copernicus when he first thought of explaining the motions of celestial bodies. (B xvii)
Welch 22 WORKS CITED
1. Descartes, Ren. Discourse on Method. Vol. XXXIV, Part 1. The Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 190914; Bartleby.com, 2001. www.bartleby.com/34/1/. [April 15, 2007]. 2. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Unified Edition. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996 3. Strawson, Peter. The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966 4. Vogel, Jonathan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 4. Dec., 1993, pp. 875-887. JSTOR: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00318205%28199312%2953%3A4%3C875%3ATPOSIK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0