UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY An Era of Naval Disarmament: The 1922 Five Power Treaty NS300: NAVAL WARFARE SECTION 1120 LT SEMPLE BY MIDSHIPMAN MICHAEL J. SLAGH '08, CO 16 ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 16 NOVEMBER 2006 Slagh 1 An Era of Naval Disarmament: The 1922 Five Power Treaty The Five Power Treaty of 1922 ended the race of naval armament when it was signed on 6 February 1922. The fundamentals of the treaty were an agreement to get rid of a large number of battleships and cruisers as well as to create a ten-year period in which the signatory powers would build no new capital ships. President Warren G. Harding sent a formal invitation on 11 August 1921 to Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and France which had objectives for an international naval conference. The two main objectives were distinct, including limiting armament and answering Pacific and Far Eastern questions, namely an increasingly militant Japan. i There were also economic concerns, as delegates had to please the legislators who were unwilling to spend more on shipbuilding. The ideology adhered to the American policy of negotiating at conferences, which would have worldwide repercussions. President Harding had faith in the long lasting effects of the treaty. &quot;This conference has wrought a truly great achievement...[it] will mark the beginning of a new and better epoch in human progress.&quot; ii His faith was warranted at the time, but due to the all-encompassing nature of the treaty there were a few unpredictable consequences. In actuality, the treaty not only affected the naval doctrine of U.S. forces over the next few decades, but also strategy in World War II. In 1917, disposing of Germany's Pacific empire was a major source of friction between the countries involved in World War I. As the countries contemplated a German loss, covert agreements were made that only amplified the pressure. &quot;Britain secretly agreed in 1917 to support Japan's claims to German islands...in return for Japanese support of the British empire's acquisition of Germany's much smaller south Pacific holdings.&quot; iii The agreement was not a secret as time passed, but it was not intensely publicized. Nevertheless, it increased international Slagh 2 tensions and there was no certain solution. It was clear, however, that the roles of international navies would increase with the expansion to islands in the Far East and elsewhere. After World War I, the U.S. sought a new postwar balance of power in the Middle East. America helped to turn the tide in the first World War, and as a result U.S. international influence changed completely. &quot;Whereas the end of the war saw decreased American interest and influence in Europe, after the Armistice the United States found itself the leading Western power in the Far East.&quot;iv With power came responsibility and a new era in American international affairs. Something had to be done as tensions grew and the United States was looked upon as an international presence. The growing worldwide influence of the U.S. mandated that Far Eastern questions be answered. This was not easy, as there were many interests at stake and many delegates to please. &quot;American Far Eastern policy in the decade of the 1920's was a program complicated by the many conflicting interests it was designed to serve, and further tangled by the nature of the area with which it dealt.&quot;v Foremost of these problems was the rift between Japan and China, the two superpowers of the Far East. If stability was going to be brought to the region, the two countries would have to settle their differences. In order to expedite this process, the U.S. began to realize that sustaining forces in the region would be crucial. The differences between Japan and China were varied, as an economic disparity existed between the two countries. &quot;By the 1920's Japan was a modern industrial nation possessing fairly modern machinery and blessed with enough surplus population to make cheap labor possible.&quot;vi This was not the case in China and as a result there was a sharp contrast between the two economies. While Japan had the stronger of the two economies, the United States saw great Slagh 3 potential in China due to its enormous population. Thus, the beginnings of U.S. economy of force calculations began. The United States felt that the Chinese population could benefit its mass industry someday, and policy toward China in the 1920's reflected that. &quot;It was designed to serve the American business community, it was a policy of friendship, and it did not involve the use of military force to any extent.&quot;vii The mutual understanding between the U.S. and China was bothersome to Japan and added to the Far East tensions. The chances for Naval disarmament in 1920 were slim. &quot;Even though the League of Nations was scheduled to discuss the problem a month later, few people expected much to come of its deliberations.&quot;viii Many admirals in the major nations believed that their actions would not affect international affairs, thus very few people believed there was cause for alarm or any serious consequences at the time. In less than six months, naval armament became a problem that needed to be dealt with immediately. Concerns arose among the command levels which were cause for alarm. &quot;Statesmen and Admirals struggled to stop the drift in their naval policies and chart a definite course toward and international agreement on arms limitation.&quot; ix With no end in sight, the Admirals knew that the situation needed to change or else the consequences would be dreadful. The sudden change did not take place solely within the inner circles of high-ranking officials, by November 1921 the issue became a matter of national interest. Although the Navy was a burden on the national budget, the reason for concern did not come from merely economic problems. &quot;The politics of foreign policy leadership pushed naval arms limitation from near the bottom of the list of national priorities to the very top with amazing suddenness.&quot; x It was apparent an arms race was not a desirable outcome as it would most likely lead to another world Slagh 4 war. Thus, the American leaders of 1921 were more concerned with political considerations rather than the need to cut down the fleet due to constraints on the economy. The unity of command by the U.S. leaders was crucial in setting forth new doctrine to guide them into an unfamiliar realm of warfare. At the time, the US favored settling problems of international concern by special conferences. This encouraged a round-table environment, where concerns could be discussed in an open forum. &quot;[The U.S.] sought to establish the aims of foreign policy, and to declare the methods which they approved for achieving them.&quot;xi British Prime Minister David Lloyd George shared the same naval ideology and suggested an international conference. This made the Americans anxious because the U.S. only wanted to negotiate in Washington. &quot;Establishing an American negotiating position prior to the Washington conference was the source of great anguish within the Navy.&quot;xii Harding had the invitations mailed out immediately to ensure that the conference be held on American soil. President Harding's invitation to a naval conference on arms limitations and Pacific questions was the first public acknowledgment to come from the United States that its shipbuilding was tied to diplomacy in the pacific. xiii The invitation to discuss Pacific and Far Eastern questions, though, was a shock to Japan. However, Japan's officials knew that the conference would be important and that the outcomes depended on diplomacy. &quot;Japan could ill afford to draw upon herself the odium of world public opinion by remaining away from the Far East discussions. xiv&quot; It is important to note that besides insisting that the conference be held on American ground, U.S. officials decided on five general precepts to guide the board and negotiating process. First, that the United States would agree to no limitations on its sovereign power, that it Slagh 5 would defend the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, that it would maintain ample force to keep the seas open to American commerce, that it would consent to no threat to its territory, and lastly that it would uphold its policies and the rights of its citizens wherever they may be endangered. xv The board's precepts, along with its insistence that the conference be held in Washington enabled the U.S. to establish a strong negotiating position prior to the debates. Establishing a strong position was crucial because there were few that questioned the importance of the navy. While America's leaders wanted to limit the arms buildup, all knew that a viable fleet had to be maintained. Limits needed to be set to dictate the future of foreign armaments, but this did not mean scrapping the Navy altogether. &quot;Competitive armament, however, is the result of a state of mind in which a national expectation of attack by some other country causes preparation to meet the attack.&quot; xvi With this American mindset, the conference assembled. The leaders knew the great importance of forward presence and deterrence, two of the key tenets of the physical environment of naval warfare. On Armistice day 1921, foreign leaders convened at the Washington Naval Conference. It was held in Continental Memorial Hall, and much of the negotiations were carried out by committees and their subcommittees.xvii These subcommittees met behind closed doors to discuss pressing issues, while the general assembly was open to the public. The closed meetings were not always friendly, as the balance of worldwide naval power hung in the balance. Rumors reached Washington that the intense atmosphere caused social outbursts in foreign nations. &quot;Stories of violent disagreements in committee meetings [were circulated], one of which occasioned an anti-French riot in an Italian town.&quot;xviii It was clear that much depended on the outcome and success of the treaty. Slagh 6 Surprisingly, many of the great naval leaders of America did not have much of a say in the conference. ADM Robert Edward Coontz, Chief of Naval Operations, was a man who would eventually have to sign the treaty but was barred from the debates. &quot;The bargaining and political sense of the civilian delegates took charge and American naval leaders, including Coontz, were excluded from key negotiations.&quot;xix While the civilian delegates took charge, none seemed to have a plan for the future besides a general idea of disarmament. This was an example of command and control: the admirals--although honorable and powerful--were simply outranked by others who were entrusted with the needs of America. Many of the U.S. hopes for disarmament rested on Charles Hughes, the Secretary of State. Hughes was an influential figure and in 1906, he won governorship of New York. He was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1910 and ran for President in 1916, but lost a close election to incumbent Woodrow Wilson. Most notable of his achievements, however, were his masterful negotiations at the Washington Naval Conference. When he was elected chairman of the Naval committee, Hughes wasted no time in laying out a potential compromise. &quot;[He] surprised the conference and the world by laying down a concrete program for limitation of arms.&quot; xx He walked into the conference with something that nobody else had, a clear-cut plan. All of his provisions were not in the final treaty, but his plan was the basis of cooperation for the remainder of the conference. Hughes's plan outlined specific limits placed on ship-building capacities for the each of the 5 nations. The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting Powers could not exceed in standard displacement for the United States 525,000 tons; for the British Empire 525,000 tons; for Japan 315,000 tons; for France 175,000 tons; for Italy 175,000 tons. xxi This produced a 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 ratio among the nations and set limits that were relative to each Slagh 7 other. This was important because it provided a clear outlook of the future of foreign navies. In addition, all of the signatory powers were to take a ten year break from building capital ships such as battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. There were also limits that pertained to maximum ship size and gun caliber, but those issues were secondary to determining the maximum size of each foreign fleet. One of the most alarming disagreements during the discussion came from France's assertion on building certain battleships. The French absolutely insisted on building ten PostJutland ships weighing in at 35,000 tons each. This was not feasible under the terms of the treaty, as it would allow far too much compromise of the key components. The French assertion was &quot;only withdrawn after Mr. Hughes had cabled Premier Brand, who had returned to France, that insistence upon this demand would wreck the treaty.&quot;xxii The tireless negotiations resulted in the committees achieving their goals without doing special favors for any country. Another hard-fought debate during the conference involved the issue of submarines. Because the English channel was the only separation between Britain and France, the defense against surface ships was somewhat straightforward. However, submarines proposed a very different problem. &quot;Great Britain regarded the French demand [for submarines] as a menace to her safety.&quot;xxiii Britain thought submarine warfare should be abolished completely, a position that was not shared by the other committees. Unfortunately for Britain, France was allowed a larger ratio of defensive ships (which included submarines) because of their willingness to give up the Post-Jutland battleships.xxiv When a few other minor disagreements were negotiated, the treaty was ready to be signed in February 1922. Among other disagreements, the territorial and administrative integrity of China was important to the signatory powers. &quot;All progress threatened at times to be held up by Slagh 8 the failure of Japan and China to agree.&quot;xxv For these worries, two other treaties were drafted along with two additional treaties that dealt with Pacific concerns. All were signed along with the Five Power Treaty of 1922 on 6 February. In one day, worldwide naval policy that would last until the second World War was defined. ADM Coontz regretted his role in the conference, as he claimed that the Americans were deceived of the meaning of the treaty. He felt that the navy's most important resource, it people and leaders, had been excluded from the policymaking process. &quot;Of one thing Coontz was sure: in the future, Professional navy men should not be excluded from the negotiating table.&quot; xxvi The exclusion of naval leaders in the decision making process, as well as the immense implications of the treaty, produced outcomes that were simply unpredictable. Leading up to World War II, grey areas developed in future dealings with several countries as a result of the treaty. There was no real understanding of how to punish a nation that compromised the treaty, but did not do so blatantly. The treaty was written clearly and punishment seemed to be the answer. &quot;The substantive provisions of the treaty constitute an international engagement of the type which is described in the Covenant of the League of Nations.&quot; While an overt act against the treaty was a clear breach, it became hard to define what was merely a change of opinion and what was an intrusion of the treaty. Another outcome of the conference was its failure to set quantitative limits for auxiliary warships. These ships, mainly smaller cruisers, destroyers, and submarines became exceedingly important as restrictions were placed on battleships. The only restriction placed on these ships was that they could not displace more than 10,000 tons and could not carry guns in excess of eight inches. xxvii In actuality, the limits became more of a building platform than a maximum. The standard up until World War II became building ships that displaced 10,000 tons and had Slagh 9 mounted eight inch guns.xxviii &quot;The provision was responsible for accelerating a general development of a new and powerful type of cruiser.&quot;xxix The smaller type of cruiser would benefit some nations more than others. The use of &quot;treaty cruisers&quot; would dictate naval policy in a way the signatory powers had not realized. The new developments in smaller, more inexpensive cruisers tended to favor the British. The inexpensive and easy to maintain cruisers helped the British sustain their far-reaching empire. &quot;The British preference here was for smaller cruisers...because the location of British naval stations all over the world did not require cruisers of particularly long range.&quot; xxx Not only did the they use the ships for the protection and patrol of their international interests, the British used the large number of cruisers to protect their many global lines of communication. xxxi Whereas some of the outcomes were unpredictable, there were a few that had positive effects leading up to World War II. The Five Power treaty was &quot;an Asian and Pacific version of the treaty of Versailles.&quot;xxxii This was because it sorted out many of the leftovers from World War I, such as the Far East concerns as well as settled the ratios of foreign navies. Also, because the U.S. was able to bring ship production to a halt in the 1920s, the ships of World War II were brand new because of the money saved from the treaty. This was a distinct difference compared to any other war the U.S. fought, and it proved to be a major advantage. xxxiii It is evident that a number of principles in line with naval doctrine were followed in the creation of the treaty, it is beneficial to a review a short example of how consequent battles were affected by the new doctrine. In the Battle of Midway, both U.S. and Japanese forces had an extremely limited amount of carriers and airpower. Although the battle was mostly determined through air superiority, the auxiliary vessels emphasized by the treaty, such as submarines, were able to deter the Japanese carriers long enough to allow the U.S. to get planes in the air. Because Slagh 10 of the treaty, both countries were in the process of rebuilding their fleets. This rebuilding allowed the U.S. to use superior military strategy instead of having to deal with the brute force of another nation. When the U.S. fleet became more flexible and implemented maneuver warfare, they were able to deal a crippling blow to the Japanese fleet by destroying their carriers. The control element of C2 emphasizes planning based upon accurate information and well as training and education. Coupled with a treaty-emaciated Japanese fleet, the U.S. was able to gain the upper hand in the battle of the Pacific in a single naval battle. The Five Power Treaty of 1922 ended the race of naval armament when it was signed on 6 February 1922. The fundamentals of the treaty were simple, yet the far-reaching affects were quite complicated. The agreement to get rid of a large number of battleships and cruisers only set new standards for shipbuilding that would benefit certain nations more than others. The ten year period in which the signatory powers built no new capital ships created a lost generation of naval crafts, as well as allowed the U.S. to go into World War II with fresh warships. Also, the U.S. followed numerous principles of naval doctrine both in the process of creating the treaty and in the subsequent wars that were affected by the treaty. While most of the original objectives were accomplished, some of the questions were left unanswered. Limiting the naval armament of foreign nations was accomplished, which in turn pleased the legislature by eliminating the need to spend more money. Far Eastern questions, though, were still a partial concern. The conference appalled Japanese citizens because of the unfavorable ratios, and grey areas arose later on as nations began to make slight breaches in the treaty. The ideology adhered to the American policy of negotiating at a conference which had worldwide repercussions, indeed. Slagh 11 Works Cited Andrade Jr., Ernest. &quot;The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922-1936,&quot; Military Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 113-120. Braisted, William. The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971). Dingman, Roger. Power in the Pacific : the origins of naval arms limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). Holcombe, Arthur. &quot;The Future of the Washington Conference Treaties,&quot; The <a href="/keyword/american-political-science-review/" >american <a href="/keyword/political-science-review/" >political science review</a> </a> , Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jun 1932), pp. 439-451. Interview, US Naval Academy Professor Robert Love, Annapolis, Maryland. Love, Robert. History of the U.S. Navy (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1992). Love, Robert. The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, FRUS Archive, University of Wisconsin Digital Collections, website: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS. Vinson, J. Chal. &quot;Parchment Peace: The Senate Defense of the Four-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference,&quot; The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Sep 1952), pp. 303-313. Wheeler, Gerald. Prelude to Pearl Harbor; the United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1963). Wright, Quincy. &quot;Notes on International Affairs,&quot; The <a href="/keyword/american-political-science-review/" >american <a href="/keyword/political-science-review/" >political science review</a> </a> , Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1922), pp. 285-293. Notes Quincy Wright, &quot;Notes on International Affairs,&quot; The <a href="/keyword/american-political-science-review/" >american <a href="/keyword/political-science-review/" >political science review</a> </a> , Vol. 16, No. 2 (May 1922), pp. 285. Arthur Holcombe, &quot;The Future of the Washington Conference Treaties,&quot; The <a href="/keyword/american-political-science-review/" >american <a href="/keyword/political-science-review/" >political science review</a> </a> , Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jun 1932), pp. 439. iii ii i Robert Love, History of the U.S. Navy (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1992), Vol. 1, p. 525. Love, History of the U.S. Navy, Vol. 1, p. 524. iv Slagh 12 Gerald Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor; the United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1963), p. 5. vi v Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, p. 4. Ibid, p. 5. vii Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific : the origins of naval arms limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 230. ix viii Dingman, Power in the Pacific, p. 230. x Ibid, p. 231. J. Chal Vinson, &quot;Parchment Peace: The Senate Defense of the Four-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference,&quot; The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Sep 1952), pp. 303. xii xi Love, History of the U.S. Navy, Vol. 1, p. 528. William Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), p. 567. xiv xiii Ibid, p. 568. xv Ibid, p. 581. Holcombe, &quot;The Future of the Washington Conference Treaties,&quot; pp. 439. Wright, &quot;Notes on International Affairs,&quot; pp. 285. Ibid, pp. 286. xvi xvii xviii xix Robert Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 30. Wright, &quot;Notes on International Affairs,&quot; pp. 287. xx Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, FRUS Archive, University of Wisconsin Digital Collections, website: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS. xxii xxi Wright, &quot;Notes on International Affairs,&quot; pp. 288. Ibid, pp. 288. Ibid, pp. 289. Ibid, pp. 289. Love, The Chiefs of Naval: Operations, p. 30. xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi Enest Andrade Jr., &quot;The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922-1936,&quot; Military Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 113. xxviii xxvii Ibid, pp. 113. xxix Ibid, pp. 113. Slagh 13 xxx Ibid, pp. 113. Ibid, pp. 113. Interview, US Naval Academy Professor Robert Love, Annapolis, MD. Ibid. xxxi xxxii xxxiii