of Impact Natural Disasters on Critical Infrastructures
The 1st Bangladesh Earthquake Symposium (BES-1)
Dhaka, Bangladesh
14-15 Dec 2005
Professor Saifur Rahman Director Advanced Research Institute Virginia Polytechnic Inst & State University, U.S.A. www.ari.vt.edu
Outline
Critical infrastructure interdependencies Vulnerabilities and cascading failures Kobe Earthquake in Japan, 1995 Major Floods in Europe, 2002 Hurricane Katrina in the USA, 2005 Lessons for Bangladesh
What are Critical Infrastructures
Energy Transportation Water supply Information & communication Emergency services Law enforcement Financial services Health care Food supply High vulnerability industries
Infrastructure Interdependencies
Complex relationships among various critical infrastructure elements Complex relationships among various critical infrastructure elements result in infrastructure interdependencies result in infrastructure interdependencies
Critical infrastructures are vulnerable to cascading failures Natural Hazards
Hurricanes Earthquakes
Snowstorms Floods
System Failures
Intentional events Equipment Breakdown Human error
Impacts of Natural Disasters
Earthquake Kobe in Japan, January 1995
Magnitude = 7.2 Richter scale More than 6,000 died More than 40,000 injured Estimated Damage = US$200 B
Source: Kathee Terry, NASA
Impact on Critical Infrastructures: Kobe Earthquake, Jan 1995
Effects of the Kobe earthquake in Japan, 1995:
240,000+ buildings were destroyed 1.3 million were without water 2.6 million lost electricity 860,000 were without natural gas service 300,000 lost telephone services Highways and railways broke apart
Damages to gas supply network
Damaged: 106 medium pressure gas mains Damaged: 26,459 low pressure gas service lines It took 15 hours to shut-down the system causing many fires It took 85 days to restore the natural gas service
Source: Y. Shimizu, F. Yamazaki, R. Isoyama and T. Suzuki, Super high-density realtime disaster mitigation system for city gas supply with enhanced used of GIS
Kobe Earthquake 1995
Source: pr.caltech.edu Source: www.unesco.org
Kobe Earthquake 1995
Source: www.astro.qc.ca
Kobe Earthquake 1995
Source: www.mines.utha.edu
Kobe Earthquake 1995
Over 300 fires were ignited by gas leaks from the ruptured pipelines
Source: www.mines.utha.edu
The Kobe Earthquake A comprehensive example of disasters in urban environment
Direct effect Indirect effect Electricity outages Building collapse Earthquake Highway damage
Telecom outages Gas line fracture Water line fracture Traffic light out
Impact
City had no electricity High traffic volume preventing communications among response teams Gas leaked, causing 300+ fires No water to put down fires Hampered emergency response teams
This earthquake caused a lot of damages to many complex and modern This earthquake caused a lot of damages to many complex and modern state-of-the-art infrastructures in a metropolitan region state-of-the-art infrastructures in a metropolitan region
Post-earthquake Policy Changes and Improvements to the Infrastructure
The Japanese government improved its disaster response policies Special disaster prevention routes were designated Roads, railways and highways were reinforced Earthquake-resistant shelters were built Earthquake-resistant pipelines were installed by Osaka Gas Co Real-time seismic motion monitoring and gas supply shut-off systems for the network was developed by Tokyo Gas Co.
Recovery time: Electricity & telephone 1 month; water & gas 2-3 months; buildings & roads 6 months+.
A Gas Network Monitoring System
To cope with earthquake related secondary disasters, a new realtime disaster mitigation system for a city gas network was developed by Tokyo Gas Co. starting in 1998. Operation started in 2001 Observe the status of 38,000 district regulators Shut them off remotely This remote-controlled system can achieve quick gas supply shut-off and effectively reduce gas leakage risk during earthquakes.
Major Floods in Europe, Aug 2002
More than 110 died Estimated Damage Euro15B
Most affected countries: Germany Czech Republic
Source: Risk Management Solutions, Event Report: Central Europe Flooding, August 2002
Impact on Critical Infrastructures: Major Floods in Europe, Aug 2002
Major infrastructures were severely damaged by high water levels:
Electricity outages Telecommunication links were cut off Floods damaged public transportation systems 250 roads and 256 bridge structures were damaged Gas service was cut since pipelines were damaged Clean water contaminated with flooded water
Recovery time:
Electricity 1 month; Gas 2 months; and Telephone 3 months.
Floods in Prague 2002
Source: Risk Management Solutions, Event Report: Central Europe Flooding, August 2002
Floods in Prague 2002
This is an aerial view of the swollen rivers Berounka, left, and Vltava as they flooded a huge area near Zbraslav on the outskirts of Prague.
Source: www.esa.int
Floods in Prague 2002
A metro station in Prague Floods on roads and highways
Source: Risk Management Solutions, Event Report: Central Europe Flooding, August 2002 Source: Prague TV
Floods in Prague 2002
A multi-story building collapsed because of floods
Source: Risk Management Solutions, Event Report: Central Europe Flooding, August 2002
The major floods in Europe damaged all critical infrastructures, but mobile GSMs survived
Direct effect Both direct & indirect effects
Gas pipes shut down Water contamination Telecom outages Traffic light outages
Impact
City had no gas for heating City had no electricity City had no clean water High traffic volume preventing communications of response teams Hampered emergency response teams
Electricity outages Floods Transport. systems Building collapse
Mobile GSMs were the only communications means available for the rescue Mobile GSMs were the only communications means available for the rescue teams, however, the traffic volume was very high teams, however, the traffic volume was very high
Communications during the flood situation
Mobile GSMs were the only communications means available. About 20,000 GSMs were distributed among rescue teams and state administrators. SMS messages were used to provide emergency phone numbers. To prevent overloading of mobile networks, mobile transceiver stations put were in key endangered areas. These mobile stations were powered by mobile gas/diesel gensets. T-mobile put up 31 generators in Prague; Eurotel used 66 gensets for its 100 key base stations.
Strategies Developed in Czech Republic
Developed a flood simulation system, known as LISFLOOD Established Ministry of Informatics on Jan 1, 2003 as a central government body for ICT Improvements made in the department of crisis management Improvements made in the Czech telecommunication office Implemented International Emergency Preference Scheme (IEPS) in accordance with ITU E.106
IEPS = International Emergency Preference Scheme. What is IEPS: IEPS will provide authorized users priority access to telecommunication services and priority processing of communications in support of recovery operations during emergency events.
Hurricane Katrina in the US, Sept 2005
People were evacuating as Hurricane Katrina heading for the Gulf Coast
Source: www.time.com
Hurricane Katrina, 2005
80% of the city is left under water with no power, no drinking water, telephone or food supply. Estimated damage = US$ 200B Physical damage to major infrastructures Electric power Natural gas & oil Transportation Water Telecom Banking and finance Emergency service
Source: www.abc.net.au
Hurricane Katrina, 2005
2.3 million homes were without power Nationwide interruptions in distribution of oil and gas 1.6 million customers were without telephone services in LA
Telecom switches were run on generators Telecom terminals were run on batteries Internet services were down
Source: www.abc.net.au
Hurricane Katrina, 2005
Floodwaters from Hurricane Katrina fill the streets of New Orleans
Source: www.abc.net.au
Hurricane Katrina, 2005
Electricity poles nearly pushed to the ground by Hurricane Katrina
Source: www.abc.net.au
Hurricane Katrina, 2005
Gulf of Mexico oil rig, damaged by Hurricane Katrina
Source: www.abc.net.au
An oil refinery is submerged in water in Alabama in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Hurricane Katrina, 2005
A destroyed bridge and road
Source: www.katrinahelp.com
Hurricane Katrina damaged all critical infrastructures, but mobile GSMs survived (again)
Direct effect Electricity outages Hurricane Transport. bottleneck Building collapse Refinery damages Both direct & indirect effects
Water contamination Telecom outages Traffic light outages Gas pressure loss
Impact
City had no clean water City had no electricity High traffic volume preventing communications of response teams Hampered emergency response teams City had no gas for heating Gas price spiked nationwide as 40% of the US refinery is in this area
Mobile GSMs were (again) the only communications means available for the Mobile GSMs were (again) the only communications means available for the rescue teams, however, the traffic volume was very high rescue teams, however, the traffic volume was very high
Telecommunications after the hurricane
Undamaged cellular towers were operated on backup generators. Mobile phone traffic was limited due to congested networks. Mobile phones used by rescue teams ran out of battery. Mobile transceiver stations and backup generators were used. Nearly 10,000 satellite phones were distributed for relief efforts.
Lessons for Bangladesh
Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to seismic activity Dhaka is among the 20 most vulnerable cities in the world The magnitude averaging around 5 in Richter scale In addition, floods are recurring phenomena
Q:
Source: http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/E_0002.htm
What the likely consequences What the likely consequences would be ififan earthquake would be an earthquake comparable to Kobe comparable to Kobe were to strike Dhaka? were to strike Dhaka?
Earthquake chronology (1885-2003)
Year 1885 1889 1897 Name Bengal ear...