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Course: AEM 4150, Fall 2008
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Determination: Price Interaction of Supply and Demand Economics is the only field in which two people can share a Nobel Prize for saying opposing things Price Determination: Interaction of Supply and Demand Objectives: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Examine interaction of supply and demand forces in determining market price Describe concept of market structure Illustrate price determination under perfect comp Discuss length...

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Determination: Price Interaction of Supply and Demand Economics is the only field in which two people can share a Nobel Prize for saying opposing things Price Determination: Interaction of Supply and Demand Objectives: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Examine interaction of supply and demand forces in determining market price Describe concept of market structure Illustrate price determination under perfect comp Discuss length of run in agricultural price determination Firm-level economics of perfect and imperfect comp Discuss price discrimination Market structure State of a market with respect to competition. Market structure depends on such characteristics as: number of buyers and sellers (economists commonly assume many buyers and then differentiate mkts by the number of sellers) their size distribution degree of product differentiation ease of entry into market Chapter 3 1 Markets can be classified as: Perfect competition - many sellers of homogenous product (a number of agricultural products) Monopolistic competition - many sellers of similar, but differentiated product (magazines) Oligopoly a few large firms selling Less competition homogeneous products (pure oligopoly), e.g., aluminum differentiated products (differentiated oligopoly), e.g., breakfast cereal Monopoly - one seller of unique product How would you classify following markets? U.S. corn farmers New car market in Ithaca Higher education market Electric utilities Perfectly competitive market has following traits: 1. Large number of sellers (price takers) each is so small in relation to the entire market that no buyer or seller can affect the products price Homogenous product the product of each seller is identical to that of others No barriers to entry all resources are completely mobile; it is costless for resources to enter or leave the market Perfect information on prices and costs all buyers and sellers have perfect knowledge of the relevant forces determining prices No artificial restrictions on demand, supply, or prices 2. 3. 4. 5. Some industries satisfy most of the above assumptions. Eg. In NYSE, many people buy and sell shares of stocks of IBM. However, no market is perfectly competitive, some markets approximate competitive conditions, and are defined as purely competitive. Chapter 3 2 barriers to entry Source: Perloff 1994, Modern Industrial Organization Barriers to entry can include: advertising, customer loyalty, patents, and government regulations, etc. Price determination under perfect competition Sellers objective: get highest price Buyers objective: get lowest price Collective interaction => equilibrium price Equilibrium price determined where quantity supplied equals quantity demanded Market equilibrium Price Supply P* Demand Q* Quantity Chapter 3 3 Equilibrium price is only stable price Price P excess supply (surplus) Supply Demand Quantity Qd Qs Suppliers are unable to sell all they want at the going price; therefore, they respond to the surplus by cutting their prices. P continues to fall until the mkt reaches the equilibrium. Why? Governmental policy can create surplus: minimum wage law Wage W $3/h excess supply (surplus) Labor Supply Labor Demand Qd Qs Quantity Impact of the minimum wage law: surplus of labor, i.e., unemployment Q: what if the minimum wage is below the initial equilibrium? Equilibrium price is only stable price Price Supply P Demand Qs Qd Quantity Why? excess demand (shortage) Demanders are unable to buy all they want at the going price; therefore, with too many buyers chasing too few goods, sellers can respond to the shortage by raising their P without losing sales. P continues to rise until the mkt reaches the equilibrium. Chapter 3 4 Numeric examples Assume following market demand and supply functions for compact disks Qdcd = 0.1 - 1.2 Pcd + 0.7 Ptape + 0.4 Inc + 0.2 Tastes Qscd = 33 + 0.9 Pcd - 0.9 Plab - 0.4 Penerg + 0.4 T Variable Pcd Ptape Inc Tastes Plab Penerg T Definition Price of CDs Price of tapes Income Consumer tastes Price of labor Price of energy Technology Mean 9 30 10 30 10 5 Unit $ $ $1,000 unit $ $ unit Algebraic examples (contd) Step 1: Transform demand equation in form: Qdcd = Intercept - 1.2 Pcd Variable Ptape Inc Tastes Net effect Mean 9 30 10 * Coefficient 0.7 0.4 0.2 = Effect 6.3 12 2 20.3 Net effect of demand shifters on demand is 20.3, which is added to intercept term: Qdcd = 0.1 - 1.2 Pcd + 20.3 = 20.4 - 1.2 Pcd Algebraic examples (contd) Step 2: Transform supply equation in form: Qscd = Intercept + 0.9 Pcd Variable Plab Penerg T Net effect Mean 30 10 5 * Coefficient -0.9 -0.4 0.4 = Effect -27 -4 2 -29 Net effect of supply shifters on supply is -29, which is added to intercept term: Qscd = 33 + 0.9 Pcd - 29 = 4 + 0.9 Pcd Chapter 3 5 Algebraic examples (contd) Step 3: To solve for equilibrium price, equate Qscd = Qdcd and solve for Pcd: 20.4 - 1.2 Pcd = 4 + 0.9 Pcd 16.4= 2.1 Pcd Pcd* = 7.81 To get Qcd*, plug Pcd* = 7.81 into either Qscd or Qdcd Qscd = 4+ 0.9(7.81) = 11.03 = Qcd* Algebraic examples (contd) Alternatively, construct demand and supply schedules: Qdcd 20.4 14.4 8.4 2.4 -3.6 Pcd 0 5 10 15 20 Qscd 4 8.5 13 17.5 22 Pcd 0 5 10 15 20 Qdcd>Qscd Qdcd<Qscd Pcd Qscd = 4 + 0.9 Pcd 7.81 Qdcd = 20.4 - 1.2 Pcd 0 11.03 Qcd Chapter 3 6 Example 2: Suppose S and D for paper in price inverse form are: Ps = 4 Qs (supply in price inverse form) Pd = 12 - 2 Qd (demand in price inverse form) Ps = Pd = P* (equilibrium condition) Solve for P* and Q* by equating and solving for Q* 4 Q = 12 - 2 Q 6 Q = 12 Q* = 2 P* = 8 Tax/subsidy on sellers or buyers First express all S and D functions in price inverse form P A. Tax on sellers: Supply curve shifts left (up) by the tax B. Subsidy on sellers: Supply curve shifts right (down) by the subsidy Tax on Seller C. Tax on buyers: Demand curve shifts left (down) by the tax D Q D. Subsidy on buyers: Demand curve shifts right (up) by the subsidy Tax (t) On seller A: Ps + t is the new S fnc On buyer C: Pd t is the new D fnc Subsidy (r) B: Ps r is the new S fnc D: Pd + r is the new D fnc Tax on buyer P D Q Ps = 4 Qs Q* = 2 Pd = 12 - 2 Qd P* = 8 1. Tax on sellers and equilibrium change 2. 3. $6 per unit tax (t) on seller: supply curve shifts up by t supply becomes (by adding tax to the inverse supply function): Ps = 4 Qs + 6 Ps=4Qs+6 New equilibrium with tax: 4 Q + 6 = 12 - 2 Q, solve for Q P Ps=4Qs Q* = 1 (only one equi quantity) Ps* = Pd* = 4*1+6 = 12-2*1= 10 Pd* = Ps* Buyers pay a price of $10/unit to sellers For the $10/unit that sellers receive, Tax Net Ps* $6 goes into govt $4 left for sellers D Pd* = Net Ps* +t Q Pd* = 10 (buyers price) Net Ps* = 10 - 6 = 4 (sellers net price) Even though the tax is levied on sellers, buyers and sellers share the burden of the tax: buyers pay $2 extra for each unit, sellers receive $4 less for each unit Chapter 3 7 Ps = 4 Qs Q* = 2 Pd = 12 - 2 Qd P* = 8 1. Tax on buyers and equilibrium change 2. 3. $6 per unit tax on buyer: demand curves shifts down by t demand becomes (by subtracting tax from the inverse demand function): Pd = 12 2 Qd - 6 = 6 - 2 Qd New equilibrium with tax: 4Q=6-2Q P Q* = 1 (only one equi quantity) S Ps* = Pd* = 4*1 = 6-2*1= 4 Net Pd* Sellers receive a price of $4/unit from buyers For buyers, on each unit Tax Pd*=Ps* pay $4 to sellers Pd=12-2Q need to pay $6 to govt Net Pd* = Ps* +t Pd=6-2Q Q Ps* = 4 (sellers price) Net Pd* = 4 + 6 = 10 (buyers net price) Even though the tax is levied on buyers, buyers and sellers share the burden of the tax: buyers pay $2 extra for each unit, sellers receive $4 less for each unit Subsidy The S and D for corn is the following: Ps = 5 Q Pd = 10 - 5 Q a. Solve for Q* and P* b. To encourage production, govt gives farmers a subsidy of $5 per unit produced. What is the new Q* and P*? The effect of taxessummary Taxes discourage market activity. The quantity of the good sold is smaller in the new equilibrium. Taxes on buyers and taxes on sellers are equivalent. Tax places a wedge between the price that buyers pay and the price that sellers receive. In the new equilibrium buyers pay more and sellers receive less for the good. Q1: Why are taxes generally considered inefficient? A: Where there are no externalities, this is case because taxes lead to output reductions. In case of externalities, taxes may be efficient since they lead to output reductions Q2: What determines incidence of tax between consumers and producers? (tax incidence: the study of who bears the burden of taxation) A: Magnitude of own price elasticity of demand relative to supply Q3: Under what condition do consumers pay more of the tax? A: A tax burdens falls more heavily on the side of the market that is less elastic. Therefore, if |own price elasticity of demand| < own price elasticity supply, consumers pay more of the tax. (there was a typo in the original note, please correct that) Chapter 3 8 A tax burdens falls more heavily on the side of the market that is less elastic Supply Price Price Demand Supply P* Demand Q* Quantity P* Q* Quantity |own price elasticity of demand| > own price elasticity supply |own price elasticity of demand| < own price elasticity supply Length of run in agricultural price determination Production lags for many ag goods => output predetermined by past decision Very short run - supply of nonstorable good is perfectly inelastic. Supply vertical line, implying supply consists only of the current seasons production. Given fixed supply Q1, price is determined from the inverse demand function P = D-1(Q1) Price P3 P1 P2 D Q3 Q1 Q2 Quantity S3 S1 S2 Storable commodities in very short run (ignore imports) Supply = production + inventories inventories = beginning inventory ending inventory + for inventory decrease and - for inventory increase Price PD P* D A B Quantity Production Case 1. High production, low market price Store AB as new inventories ( inventories < 0 in this case) Chapter 3 9 Storable commodities in very short run Price P* PD D C D Quantity Production Case 2. Low production, high market price Add CD to market from inventories ( inventories > 0 in this case) Result: storage makes effective supply more elastic than previous cases in very short run Price current production S w/storage = production plus inventories inventories <0 add to inventory inventories >0 release inventory 0 A B Inventory depleted Quantity Allowing for storage also reduces price variability Short run and long run Short run: a sufficient length of time for producers to respond to price changes; supply function has a positive slope S and D usually price inelastic in agriculture Long run - S and D of ag commodities more elastic P P* P* D Q* Q Q* D Q Short run price determination S P Long run price determination S Chapter 3 10 Price volatility The magnitude of the equilibrium price change (price volatility) depends on: A. price elasticities of S and D, i.e., EDp and ESp B. direction and size of shifts in S and D Shifts in S and D cause greater price fluctuations if S and/or D is inelastic rather than elastic Price volatility in the order of largest to smallest: very short run, short run, long run Inelastic S P S P* P* P S elastic S D Q Q* A. price elasticities of S and D D Q* Q Price volatility - continued P S P* P* P S P* P S D Q* Q Q* D Q Q* D Q B. direction and size of shifts S in and D S and D will shift over time, hence so will P* and Q* if shifts in D and S are equal and in the same direction, P* remains constant if S increases relative to D, P* falls if D increases relative to S, P* increases Firm-level analysis of types of competition Analysis so far based on perfectly competitive (PC) markets While ag mkts come the closest to PC, there are deviations cooperatives increased concentration in food tendency in food manufacturers, grain exporters, and other buyers of commodities milk marketing orders fruit and vegetable marketing orders Chapter 3 11 Market structures (in food and fiber) 1. Perfect competition: e.g., grain farmers Characteristics: many farmers selling standardized product farmers unable to influence price price represents demand farmers face P Firm P Market D=P=MR D Q Firm and market demand curves under perfect competition individual firm can sell any proportion of the firms output at the then prevailing price without influencing it nonetheless, the collective actions of individual firms aggregate into market demand that determines market price (with market supply) Q Price MC AC Price MC AC P1 D=P=MR P1 D=P=MR Quantity Quantity q1 Long run q1 Farmer max profit by producing q1, where MR=MC. Why? Rational people think at the margin Suppose MR > MC, then . Suppose MR < MC, then . In short run, excess profit > or < 0 In long run, firms that remain in the market must be making zero economic profits at the end of this process of entry and exit In essence, because the firms MC curve determines the quantity of the good the firm is willing to supply at any price, it is the competitive firms supply curve Chapter 3 12 Market structures (contd) 2. Monopoly: marketing orders Monopoly - single firm selling unique product which exists due to barriers to entry economic barriers. Develop a new product that has no close substitute, or the firm may operate in a market whose size permits only one firm to operate profitably legal barriers. Marketing orders allow farmers to join together and act like monopolist Distinguishing feature: demand schedule faced by the monopolistic firm coincides with the industry demand schedule; (firms demand curve same as negative sloped industry demand) Prof maximization: solution: MR = MC, where MR = P(1 + 1/EDp) Price does not equal marginal revenue. P > MR, why? Price MC P2 excess profit AC c MR D Quantity q2 Prof max solution is q2 where MR=MC monopolist selects the volume of output (q2), it then uses the demand curve to find the price that will induce consumers to buy that quantity (P2) Find the monopolists profit in the diagram The equilibrium price will change in response to: demand shift and cost curve change factors that shift demand or change costs result in a price change Same in long run because of barriers to entry At the market level P MC Pm Pc MR D Qm Qc Q Social cost of monopoly power Qm < Qc, Pm > Pc Chapter 3 13 P MC Pm AA Pc B B MR D Qm Qc Q Loss in consumer surplus moving from PC to Monopoly = A+B CS: area below the demand curve but above market price P MC Pm A Pc C MR D Qm Qc Q Gain in producer surplus moving from PC to Monopoly = A-C PS: area above the supply curve but below the market price P MC Pm B Pc C MR D Qm Qc Q Gain in producer surplus minus loss in consumer surplus from PC to Monopoly = B+C = Deadweight loss Chapter 3 14 Market structures (contd) 3. Monopolistic comp: e.g., livestock feed mkt. Characteristics: essentially a competitive market structure but with product differentiation many sellers product differentiation: many variants of a product exist that are close but imperfect substitutes costs of entry and exit are small feed physically different among sellers successful firms receive higher prices Product differentiation allows small firm to operate like monopolist Because product is unique, firms demand curve has a negative slope Firm follows a monopolists rule for prof max: MR = MC, and then uses the demand curve to find the corresponding price MR = P(1 + 1/EDp) In the short run, the two types of market structure, monopolistic competition and monopoly, are similar Price MC P3 excess profit AC c MR q3 D Quantity Profit max output is q3, where MC = MR Price is P3, and excess profit = (P3 - c)q3 > 0 in this short run solution Identical short-run situation for monopoly Chapter 3 15 Price MC AC P4=c D MR q4 Quantity At this long-run equilibrium, excess profit = 0 P > MC P = AC In comparison, P = MC = AC in PC in the long run To summarize: Perfect Comp Short run price Long run price Short run quantity Long run quantity Lowest Lowest Highest Highest Monop Comp Same as monop >PC, <Monop Same as monop <PC, >Monop Monopoly Highest Highest Lowest Lowest barriers to entry Source: Perloff 1994, Modern Industrial Organization Chapter 3 16 Price Determination under Oligopoly A few large producers (tennis balls, oil) Distinguishing feature: recognized interdependence among firms - Need to consider each others operations (price or quantity decision) - Firms face similar demand likely have similar cost structures - Illegal to set prices together in the U.S. => Many possible models of oligopoly pricing exist, difficult to make generalizations about price behavior. Examples: 1. The Cournot model 2. The Stackelberg model 3. The Bertrand model Cournot model: each firm chooses its output while believing that the output-level of its rivals remains constant; MR = MC Example: P = 10 - Q, and Q = q1 + q2, MC1= $5, MC2 = $3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. TR1 = [10 (q1 + q2)] *q1 = 10 q1 q12 - q1q2 MR1 = 10 - 2q1 - q2 MR2 = ? MR1 = MC1 MR2 = MC2 Cournot equilibrium P, q1, and, q2? Equilibrium profits? Chapter 3 17 Stackelberg model Firm 1 set its output first, and then Firm 2 after observing Firm 1s output, makes its output decision; Firm 1 must therefore consider how firm 2 will react Bertrand model: firms set prices rather than output. Each firm chooses (competes) the price at the same time. If consumers have complete information and realize firms produce identical products, they buy the one with lowest P - if P1 > P2 => Q1 = 0 and Q2 =Q - if P1 < P2 => Q1= Q and Q2 = 0 - if P1 = P2 => Q1= Q2 = 0.5Q - by a slight price cut, a firm captures all its rivals business Eventually, P = MC, firms make zero profits and no firms can increase its profits by raising or lowering its price Price discrimination (PD) Monop may further increase revenue by PD if two conditions hold: 1. Possible to identify 2 or more groups of buyers with different price elasticities of demand 2. Market can be separated to prevent arbitrage If 1 and 2 exist, revenue increased by charging higher price in more inelastic market; and lower price in more elastic market (annual member fee at Cornell golf for student? For faculty?) PD may be prohibited by law (under Robinson-Patman Act, 1936) But, ag price discrimination from marketing orders or coops for a few farm commodities is permitted exempt Chapter 3 18 Membership The RTJ Golf Course 2008 Memberships and Green Fees DAILY FEES (all day rate) MONDAY - THURSDAY FRIDAY - SUNDAY Cornell student - $31 Cornell faculty, staff and retiree - $39 Cornell Alumni - $49 Cornell student - $36 Cornell faculty, staff and retiree - $44 Cornell Alumni - $54 MONDAY - SUNDAY Cornell Student Single - $790 Couple - $1,200 Cornell staff, faculty, retirees Single - $980 Couple - $1,355 Cornell alumni Single - $1,250 Couple - $1,655 Two ways to PD, A: Income 1. Possible to identify 2 or more groups of buyers with different price elasticities of demand 2. Market can be separated to prevent arbitrage B: Time Illustration of increased revenue due to PD Assume 2 groups of buyers with differing EDp Prof max rule: allocate quantities between mkts up to point where MRmkt1=MRmkt2 Why? Because ... PD requires different demand elasticities => different demand => different MR curves Charging same price => MRs different With same P, MR1 < MR2 Price P Mkt 1 less elastic Price P MR2 MR1 MR1 q1 D1 Quantity q2 MR2 D2 Quantity Mkt 2 more elastic Common price P, q1 in mkt 1 and q2 in mkt 2 Given q1 and q2, MR1 < MR2 Why is this not optimal? Because transferring part of the available supply from the mkt with the lower MR to the mkt with higher MR increases total revenue. Chapter 3 19 Equal MRs, different prices Price P1 P2 MR1 = MR2 Mkt 1 less elastic Price Mkt 2 more elastic MR1 q1 D1 Quantity q2 MR2 D2 Quantity P P1 less elastic mkt 1 P more elastic mkt 2 P mkt 1 + mkt 2 MC P2 D1+D2 MR1+MR2 MR1 q1 D Q q2 MR2 D Q q1+q2 Q Optimum total output under PD and profit-maximizing allocation of total output between mkts Example of Legal Price Discrimination Milk Marketing Orders Authorized by federal legislation in 1930s Allows dairy farmers to price milk according to use of the raw product => milk going into fluid products gets highest price-Class I => milk going into soft products gets Class II price => milk going into cheese gets Class III price milk going into butter-nonfat dry milk gets Class IV price Q: Which class of milk is more price inelastic? Chapter 3 20 Class use Class I - fluid milk Class II - e.g., frozen dairy Class III - e.g., cheese Class IV - e.g., butter Price elasticity -0.285 (Brandow) -0.550 (Brandow) -0.700 (Brandow) -0.850 (Brandow) Two-Product Example - Milk and Manf Products Under milk marketing orders: Processors of milk pay Class prices Farmers received blend prices Example: Processor 1 2 3 Total Class I 500 0 500 1,000 Class II 0 500 500 1,000 Total 500 500 1000 2000 Suppose Class I price = 15 Class II price = 10 Revenues Processor 1 2 3 Total Class I 7,500 0 7,500 15,000 Class II 0 5,000 5,000 10,000 Total 7,500 5,000 12,500 25,000 Chapter 3 21 Market-wide utilization of milk is 50% Class I 50% Class II => Blend price = 0.5x$15 + 0.5x$10 = $12.50, or Blend price = total revenue/total quantity = 25,000/2000 = $12.50 Two-Product Example - Illustration Price Pf S PM Dm S: milk supply Df: fluid milk demand Dm: manf milk products demand In principle both class prices are subject to regulatory control, discretion actually exists only for fluid milk prices. Pf can be set administratively PM is national price determined by natl S&D for manf milk products. Without PD regulation: Pf = PM Equilibrium quantity: ? Total Revenue:? Df Qf Q* Qmilk Two-Product Example with PD Price Pf PB PM A Quantity sold from A to B receives this price Pf is set administratively at high Milk producers respond to the bled price Combined demand schedule is now AB With PD regulation: Equilibrium quantity: ? Total Revenue:? Results: Pf > PM Farmers receive PB Larger total revenue B S Dm Df Qf Q* Qmilk Chapter 3 22 Source: Mankiw Discussion questions What are the four characteristics that determine market structure? What does a firms demand curve for perfect competition look like? Is it possible to have excess profit for perfect competition in the short run? What about the long run? Is it possible to have excess profit for monopolistic competition in the short run? What about in the long run? Discussion questions (contd) What are the differences in price and quantity between perfect competition and monopoly? What are the two conditions for successful price discrimination? Chapter 3 23
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1IntroductionAn example To illustrate the idea of linear programming, we begin with an example. Consider the simple distribution problem illustrated below.Imagine we want to transport a total of ten pianos, from their current locations at three
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2Linear programsIn this section, we discuss the ingredients of linear programs more carefully. As an example for our discussion, here is a simple linear program: maximize x1 + x2 subject to x1 2 (2.1) x1 + 2x2 4 x1 , x2 0. Any linear pr
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3Linear algebra and basic solutionsTo study linear programs, we make crucial use of some basic ideas from linear algebra. Before proceeding further, we quickly review some of these ideas. As usual, we use Rn to denote the vector space of column v
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4Basic feasible solutionsTo summarize the main idea from the last section, a basis for an m-by-n matrix A is a list of numbers chosen from {1, 2, , . . . , n} such that the matrix AB with columns indexed by this list is invertible. The correspond
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5The tableauSolving simple linear programs graphically suggests the importance of extreme points of the feasible region. In the last section, we related the geometric idea of an extreme point to the algebraic idea of a basic feasible solution. Ou
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6The simplex methodWe next formalize the method we developed in the previous section. We again consider a general linear program in standard equality form: maximize cT x subject to Ax = b x 0. As before, we introduce a new variable z to keep tra
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7Finding an initial feasible tableauTo begin the simplex method for solving a linear program in standard equality form, we need to find an initial feasible tableau. Sometimes, this is easy. For example, the first linear program we studied was the
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8Phase 1 of the simplex methodLet us summarize the method we sketched in the previous section, for finding a feasible basis for the constraint system n aij xj = bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , m) (8.1) j=1 xj 0 (j = 1, 2, . . . , n). We can assume ea
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9DegeneracyIn Section 5, we introduced the idea of a &quot;degenerate&quot; tableau, by which we mean at least one of the numbers i on the right-hand side of the body of the b tableau is zero. Thus a tableau and the corresponding basis are degenerate when
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10CyclingIn Section 9, we considered the worrying possibility that the simplex method might fail to terminate because of cycling: a sequence of pivots that lead us back to an earlier tableau. In this case, unless our rules for choosing the enteri
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11Transportation and assignment problemsIn this section we study two classical and very useful linear programming models: the &quot;transportation problem&quot; and a special case, the &quot;assignment problem.&quot; Incidentally, we shall see an important class of
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12TerminationIn order for the simplex method to be a reliable algorithm, we must be sure that, starting from a feasible tableau, it terminates after a finite number of iterations. In this section we shall see that the smallest subscript rule ensu
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13Fundamental theoremsNow that we have made the simplex method a reliable finite algorithm, we can use it to deduce some striking properties of general linear programming problems. We start by asking when a linear programming problem in standard
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14The revised simplex methodmaximize cT x = z subject to Ax = b x 0,Consider once again the standard equality-form linear programCorresponding to any basis B is a unique tableau. Theorem 12.2 gave a formula for that tableau, which we can rewr
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15Multicommodity transportationLinear programs in practice are often very large. Typically these massive models arise from interfacing smaller models. In this section we describe a typical example. For more, look at Chapter 4 in the AMPL book [1]
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16DualityWe have now seen in some detail how we can use the simplex method to solve linear programs, and how, at termination, the simplex method provides a proof of optimality. This proof, as we have seen, consists of a tableau equivalent to the
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17Duality for general linear programsIn the previous section, we introduced the powerful idea of a &quot;certificate of optimality&quot; for a feasible solution x of a linear program in standard equality form. A certificate of optimality is simply a feasib
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19Complementary slacknessOver the last few sections we have seen how we can use duality to verify the optimality of a feasible solution for a linear program. If we are able to find a feasible solution for the dual problem with dual objective valu
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20Solving integer programming problemsWe now have a systematic understanding of how to solve linear programming problems. However, we have so far developed no ideas about how to solve the kinds of integer programming problems that we encountered
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1. The Race of Life a. Puri tanism &amp; Work i. Bettering Ones Condition and the Race of Life 1. A fundamental belief that anyone can better his condition through hard work has caused generations of Americans to strive for p rosperity 2. Adam Smith a. The pr
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Notes: Fitzhugh:Whatiswrongwiththefreemarket Whenwelooktothevegetable,animal,orhumankingdomswediscoverinthemallaconstant conflict,awar,orraceofcompetition,theresultofwhichis,thattheweakerorlesshealthy genera,speaciesandinvididucalsarecontinuallydisplaceda
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Notes: Fitzhugh : What is wrong with the free market When we look to the vegetable, animal, or human kingdoms we discover in them all a constant conflict, a war, or race of competition, the result of which is, that the weaker or less healthy genera, speac
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Unlike all the other thinkers we have encountered in this course, Fitzhugh, a southern apologist for slavery, and Brownson, a northern socialist, argue that liberal society and the free market are fundamentally flawed. Write an essay comparing their criti
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[Type text]George Fitzhugh was a prominent southern slavery advocate and anti-capitalist. Within his most renowned works Sociology for the South and Cannibals All!, he argues that the free market society of the north is an abject failure, as evidenced by
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Federalist Articles Direct/Indirect Democracy DIRECT DEMOCRACY - Common man is taking power - Verges on anarchy - Tyranny of people - Hard for people to assemble - Redistributive nature of laws of legislature Madisons attitude to government: Federalist #1
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16/02/200914:49:00 SocialDarwinism WilliamGrahamSumnerpopularizedHerbertSencerswritingsin America o Statesorsocietyhasnoresponsibilityorchancesforeconomic acquisition o Putsmoralvalueonindividualselfishness o Everyoneisisolated,responsibleonlytohimself;i
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Government366FINALREVIEWCourseThemes I. Americasloveaffairwithindividualliberalism Ruggedindividualism:deterministicandindividualisticviewthatmen makethemselves II. Problematicattitudetowardgovernment Negativeandantistatist III. Ambivalenceabouthumanrig
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Super lThe Lockean Tradition &amp; The Puritan Soul and American Ideals - Mark The &gt; Revolution Founding - Emily &gt; The Constitution and It's Critics - Joelle &gt; Visions of American Future - Alana &gt; Jacksonianism: Democracy and Opportunity - Adrienne &gt; Slavery,
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Govexam2notes16/02/200914:48:00Fitzhughnorthernworkersdontreceivewhattheymake,theycannotfeelthe productsoftheirlabor Themes: Wages:Fitzhughseestheseasexploitative.Brownsonseeswagesasan inverseratio,wherethepeopledoingthemostworkarereceivingtheleastamoun
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16/02/200914:48:00 I.IntellectualsontheLeft HenryDemarestLoyd(18471903) o WealthAgainstCommonwealth o RepudiatedideasofsocialDarwinism,competitiveindividualism,self interest o FollowsFitzhughcriticofselfinterest o Mostcolorfulrhetoric o Manifestoagainstm
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American political thought peoples ideas of those involved within politics, as opposed to those who are involved with the literature and analysis of politics. We can confront those texts without someone else having already commented on them. American Poli
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Government366FINALREVIEWCourseThemes I. Americasloveaffairwithindividualliberalism Ruggedindividualism:deterministicandindividualisticviewthatmen makethemselves II. Problematicattitudetowardgovernment Negativeandantistatist III. Ambivalenceabouthumanrig
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Gov3665Lecture ThePopulistsandPopulism 11/6/0816/02/200914:48:00I.TheHistoricalContext Americanlifeaftercivilwaruntilgildedagewasdominatedbybusinessmen Presidentswerevirtualnonentities Runbysenatorswhoweremillionaires,controlledpoliticaldecisions Repub
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Govexam2notes16/02/200914:47:00Fitzhughnorthernworkersdontreceivewhattheymake,theycannotfeelthe productsoftheirlabor Themes: Wages:Fitzhughseestheseasexploitative.Brownsonseeswagesasan inverseratio,wherethepeopledoingthemostworkarereceivingtheleastamoun
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11/11/08 Take Home Prelim II American Political Thought: From Madison to Malcolm Question #5Brownson and Fitzhugh: A Cry Against Capitalism and Support of FeudalismThrough the belief in Darwins theory of survival of the fittest, Brownson and Fitzhugh se
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Jeffersonianism II. Jefferson as Lockean Liberal III. The Agrarian Ideal IV. Jefferson as radical egalitarian democrat V. Jefferson and States Rights VI. Enlightenment Jefferson VII. Racist Jefferson I. Jefferson something to everyone Foundation of so muc
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16/02/200914:47:00 SlaveryandAbolotionism I.SlaveryandtheAmericanRevolution II.SlaveryandtheConstitution III.SlaveryandWomensRights IV.Abolitionism V.WilliamLloyedGarrisonandNonViolence VI.Violence(?)DavidWalker SamuelJohnsonridiculedthehypocrisyofAmeric