Approach Analytical to Securing Nuclear Materials
Michael O'Brien Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory December 3, 2004
1
Historical Perspective
For several decades, U.S. Government (USG) organizations (Department of Energy [DOE], Department of Defense [DoD], Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC], etc.) have been using a type of risk analysis, referred to as vulnerability analysis, to determine the appropriate level of security for nuclear materials in storage, use, and in transit. A variety of methods are used to determine risk Qualitative "table-top" models Qualitative "subject matter experts" Performance based "red team" exercises Quantitative detailed computer models Analyses are based on a Design Basis Threat and include scenario development and performance testing Appropriate upgrades are based on analyses Efforts are underway to create a global analytical architecture
2
Historical Perspective (continued)
Many computer models and/or "table-top methodologies" have been developed to address different parts of the same problem Effectiveness of systems against outsider threats Effectiveness of systems against insider threats Effectiveness of response forces engaging terrorist threats Radioactive release from sabotage threats Methodologies are evolving to analyze changing threats and scenarios for preventing use of acquired material Analyses focus not only on theft and sabotage but also illicit transit and smuggling scenarios involving potential use against the US
3
Historical Perspective (continued)
Software models have evolved resulting in: More standardized approach More comprehensive analyses More definitive consequences More definitive risk Enhanced ability by USG to review and validate analyses Different "target materials" require different types of analyses The threat and consequences vary with the different "target materials" Integration of models is not always achievable
4
VA Applications
The VA process is commonly used for: Nuclear storage sites Nuclear production sites Nuclear reactor sites Other radiological material areas The VA approach is also being successfully being applied to: Airports Sea Ports Ships Borders Transportation Other materials/targets needing protection Global nuclear transit system
5
Putting the Threat in Perspective
Threat Sophistication
High
Nuclear Plant Power Sabotage Research Reactor Sabotage
Nuclear Storage Sabotage
Stolen Nukes Improvised Nuclear Devices
Medium
Spent fuel Dispersal Dispersed Radioactive Sources Radiological Waste Dispersal
Low
Low
Medium
High
Potential Consequence
6
Target-Nuclear Materials
Nuclear materials are found in all shapes and sizes necessitating various types and levels of protection.
7
Target- Radioactive Materials
8
Target- Radioactive Materials
9
USG Multi-Layered Defense
10
Layered Defense Strategy
11
Layered Defense Strategy - US Ports
12
Layered Defense Strategy - US Nuclear Material Facilities
NRC-Nuclear Power Plants
NNSA-National Laboratories
13
Sites
The types of sites analyzed vary from reactors to material storage areas. Transit conditions are also analyzed.
14
Methodology for Vulnerability Analysis Detailed site characterization
Facility physical attributes System attributes Personnel attributes Procedural attributes
Diverse experienced team/subject matter experts Extensive use of scenarios Extensive use of performance testing data Review of hardware, procedures, and training documentation
15
VA Process
16
Scenario Analysis
17
VA Report Development Process
A Combined Adversary Team (CAT) can be an effective part of developing the Vulnerability Analysis Report (VAR)
18
Site VA Models Use extensive database of defeat methods and strategies Use extensive database...