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take Fourth home exercise, Econ 642 De Jong, Spring 2008 Answer all questions below. hand Please in your solutions at the start of the class of Wednesday May 21.
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 642 (Spring, 2008)
Fifth take home exercise, Econ 642 de Jong, Spring 2008 Answer all questions below. Please hand in your solutions at the start of the class of Monday May 28. Motivate all your answers. At http:/www.econ.ohio-state.edu/dejong/bushapproval.txt you wil...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
ECONOMICS 805 The Ohio State University Department of Economics Classes: T, TH 1:30-3:18 (RA 336) Recitations: F 11:30-1:18 (ARPS 386) F 1:30-3:18 (ARPS 173) Ching-Jen Sun Office: 464 Arps Tel. 688-5584 Sun.161@osu.edu Office Hours: Winter 2008 Pr...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
A Dynamic Oligopoly Game Consider the following Stackelberg game with two .rms and two states of nature. In the high state, the inverse demand function is given by pH = 120 q1 q2 where pH is the price and qi is the quantity supplied by .rm i (i = 1;...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
A Dynamic Oligopoly Game Consider the following Stackelberg game with two firms and two states of nature. In the high state, the inverse demand function is given by pH = 120 - q1 - q2 where pH is the price and qi is the quantity supplied by firm i (i...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Final ExamEcon 805 Profs. Levin, Morelli, and Peck March 13, 2001 Directions: Answer all questions, and show all work. Answer parts I and II in separate booklets. Part I: (33 points, questions 1 and 2...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Final Exam AnswersPart IIEcon 805 Profs. Levin, Morelli, and Peck March 13, 2001 3. (33 points) The following economy has n consumers and k commodities. Each consumer\'s utility function satis.es stric...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Final Exam AnswersEcon 805 Questions 2,3, and 4 Profs. Levin and Peck March 19, 2002 2. (20 points) Suppose that an economy with two commodities has the excess demand function given by z(p1 ; p2 ) = (...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. 805 Winter 2000 Midterm Examination Directions: Answer all questions, show all work, and label all diagrams. (1) 25 points Prof. James Peck A monopolist has many potential customers, represente...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. 805 Winter 2000 Midterm Questions and Answers (1) 25 points Prof. James Peck A monopolist has many potential customers, represented by the interval, [0,1]. For customer x ! [0,1], consuming one...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. 805 Winter 2003 Prof. James Peck Extra Problems in General Equilibrium Theory (Do not hand in) (1) (a) (b) An allocation is called envy free if every consumer prefers his/her allocation to the al...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 805 Final Exam Answers Professor Peck Winter 2003 Here is the distribution of scores on the .nal exam: 100 90-99 80-89 70-79 60-69 50-59 40-49 30-39 6 5 6 4 6 6 7 8 1. Consider a pure exchange e...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Final Exam Answers-Econ 805 Prof. Peck Winter 2008 1. (40 points) Consider the following two player, zero sum game between an attacker and a defender. The attacker must choose which one of three targe...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Final Exam Questions and Answers Econ 805 Prof. Peck March 16, 2004 Directions: all work. Answer all questions, carefully label all diagrams, and show 1. (30 points) Consider an exchange economy with...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Game Theory A game in normal form (strategic form) is composed of: 1. A set of players, i = 1; :; n 2. For each player, a set of possible strategies, Si 3. An outcome function, assigning an outcome to every possible combination of strategies g : S1 ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Game Theoretic Solutions Def: A strategy si 2 Si is strictly dominated for player i if there exists another strategy, s0 2 Si such i that, for all si 2 Si, we have In this case, we say that s0 strictly dominates si. i Def: A strategy si 2 Si is a st...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Bayesian Games How do we incorporate into game theory the uncertainty players face about the characteristics of other players (their payos, what they know about our payos, etc.)? We can model incomplete information by letting nature select the player...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Equilibrium in Dynamic Games In extensive form games, a strategy is a specication of what action a player chooses at each information set he/she controls. A Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game is a prole of strategies such that no player can r...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The game 2 has two WPBE outcomes. Equilibrium 1: player 1 plays R (if nature moves left), player 1 plays r (if nature moves right). player 2 plays left. Beliefs at the only multiple node information set are detemined by Bayes\' rule: (x1) = 1, and (x2...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #1 Questions and Answers Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. A consumer\'s offer curve is the locus of tangencies between the budget lines and indifference curves as relative prices change...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #1 due Thursday, January 24 Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. A consumer\'s offer curve is the locus of tangencies between the budget lines and indifference curves as relative prices cha...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #2 Answers Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. (Note: I am changing the notation so that firm g\'s output of good y is denoted as yg . This was a typo.) Consider the following economy with...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #2 due Thursday, January 31 Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. Consider the following economy with one consumer, 2 firms, and 3 goods. The three goods are two consumption goods, x and y,...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #3 Answers Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. Mas-Colell, exercise 7.D.1. Answer: A strategy must specify what actions are taken at each of a player\'s information sets. Thus, the number ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #3 due Thursday, February 21 Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. Mas-Colell, exercise 7.D.1. 2. Consider the following game. The players are three voters, who must vote either YES or NO (...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #4 Answers Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. Mas-Colell, exercise 8.E.1. Assume that 0 < M < 2s holds. Answer: First, let us convert the verbal description of the game into a Bayesian g...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 805-Homework #4 due Tuesday, March 4 Prof James Peck Winter 2008 1. Mas-Colell, exercise 8.E.1. Assume that 0 < M < 2s holds. 2. Mas-Colell, exercise 9.B.9 Just find the \"best\" subgame perfect Na...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 805Extra Problems on Production and Uncertainty: Questions and Answers Winter 2003 Prof. Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and foo...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 805Extra Problems on Production and Uncertainty Winter 2003 Prof. Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and food). For i = 1,2, consum...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm ExamEcon 805 Prof. Peck February 11, 2003 Directions: all work. Answer all questions, carefully label all diagrams, and show 1. (30 points) Consider the following game with two players, a pla...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Exam Econ 805 Prof. Peck February 10, 2004 Directions: all work. Answer all questions, carefully label all diagrams, and show 1. (30 points) Consider the following \"quality disclosure\" game, ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm AnswersEcon 805 Prof. Peck 1. (30 points) Consider the following game with two players, a plainti and a defendant engaged in a civil law suit. Nature moves .rst, selecting which side would win...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Questions and Answers Econ 805 Prof. Peck February 10, 2004 Directions: all work. Answer all questions, carefully label all diagrams, and show 1. (30 points) Consider the following \"quality d...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Answers-Econ 805 Prof. Peck February 7, 2008 1. (35 points) Consider the following economy with two goods, two firms, and one consumer. The consumer\'s utility function is given by u(x1 , x2 ) ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
A Rothschild-Stiglitz Problem Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maximize expected utility. For i = 1,2, consumer i is risk averse, with utility of certain consumpt...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Answers to Rothschild-Stiglitz Problem Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maximize expected utility. For i = 1,2, consumer i is risk averse, with utility of certain...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 806 (Fall, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 806 (Fall, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 806 (Fall, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
ECONOMICS 808 The Ohio State University Department of Economics Classes: T, TH 1:30-3:18 (ARPS 387) Recitations: F 9:30-11:18 (SB 0210) F 1:30-3:18 (SB 0200) Prof. James Peck Office: 440 Arps Tel. 292-0182 peck.33@osu.edu Office Hours: M 3:30-5:00 W...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
When and Why not to Auction* Colin M. Campbell Department of Economics Rutgers University New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901 Phone: (732) 932-8259 Fax: (732) 932-7416 campbel l@econ.rutgers.edu Dan Levin Department of Economics The Ohio State Universi...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #1 Due Thursday, April 11 Spring 2002 Levin and Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and food). For i = 1,2, consumer ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #1 Questions and Answers Spring 2002 Levin and Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and food). For i = 1,2, consumer i...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #2 Due Tuesday, April 23 Spring 2002 Levin and Peck 1. Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maxi...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #2 Questions and Answers Spring 2002 Levin and Peck 1. Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maxi...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #3 due Thursday, May 2 Spring 2002 Levin and Peck Questions 1 and 2 relate to the principal-agent problem with hidden action presented in class and taken from Mas-Colell chapter 14...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #3 Answers Spring 2002 Levin and Peck 1. (a) Dierentiating the Lagrangean expression with respect to w(), NOT with respect to , we have: f ( j e) + Simplifying, we have = w() g(...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808 Midterm Profs Levin, Morelli, and Peck Spring 2001 Directions: Answer all questions and show all work. There are two questions on part 1, and one question on part 2. Each question is worth 33...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808 Midterm Answers for Part 1 Profs Levin, Morelli, and Peck Spring 2001 1. Consider an exchange economy with 2 consumers and one consumption good per state. Both consumers have the (Bernoulli) ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Questions and AnswersEcon 808 Profs. Levin and Peck March 7, 2002 1. (30 points) In the village of Debreuvia, there are 150 consumers and one physical commodity per state of nature. For i = 1,...
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
1 L 2 R 1 L R a b 0,0 1,1 0,0 1,1 ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Games in Strategic Form Definition 11.1: A strategic game consists of: 1. a finite set N (the set of players), 2. for each player i N, a nonempty set Ai (the set of actions available to player i), 3. for each player i N, a preference relation %i o...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Bayesian Games How do we model uncertainty about the payoffs or (more generally) knowledge of the other players? The traditional distinction (see Fudenberg and Tirole) is that uncertainty about payoffs is called incomplete information, and uncertain...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Let G = hN, (Ai), (ui)i be a strategic game. Preferences must be specified over lotteries on A, which we assume are represented by the expectation of ui(a). Let (Ai) be the set of probability distributions over Ai. i ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Pearce, \"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,\" Econometrica 1984 Rationalizability is a weaker (broader) solution concept than Nash equilibrium. It looks at the implications of common knowledge of rationality, without impo...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Knowledge and Common Knowledge Game Theory requires us to be interested in knowledge of \"parameters\" like costs, valuations, and demand, but also knowledge about what other players know. Consider a finite probability space (, p) and an information ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Extensive Games with Perfect Information There is perfect information if each player making a move observes all events that have previously occurred. Start by restricting attention to games without simultaneous moves and without nature (no randomnes...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Repeated Games A repeated game (say, infinitely repeated prisoner\'s dilemma) is a special case of an extensive game. The additional structure of the same game being repeated allows for new results. \"Folk theorems\" show that any payoffs that are fea...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information In strategic games, players must form beliefs about the other players\' strategies, based on the presumed equilibrium being played. In Bayesian games, players must form beliefs about the other players\' stra...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium For an important class of extensive games, a solution concept is available that is simpler than sequential equilibrium, but with similar properties. In a Bayesian extensive game with observable actions, nature moves fir...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Cooperative Game Theory Cooperative games are often defined in terms of a characteristic function, which specifies the outcomes that each coalition can achieve for itself. For some games, outcomes are specified in terms of the total amount of dollar...
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