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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 805Extra Problems on Production and Uncertainty: Questions and Answers Winter 2003 Prof. Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and foo...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 805Extra Problems on Production and Uncertainty Winter 2003 Prof. Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and food). For i = 1,2, consum...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm ExamEcon 805 Prof. Peck February 11, 2003 Directions: all work. Answer all questions, carefully label all diagrams, and show 1. (30 points) Consider the following game with two players, a pla...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Exam Econ 805 Prof. Peck February 10, 2004 Directions: all work. Answer all questions, carefully label all diagrams, and show 1. (30 points) Consider the following \"quality disclosure\" game, ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm AnswersEcon 805 Prof. Peck 1. (30 points) Consider the following game with two players, a plainti and a defendant engaged in a civil law suit. Nature moves .rst, selecting which side would win...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Questions and Answers Econ 805 Prof. Peck February 10, 2004 Directions: all work. Answer all questions, carefully label all diagrams, and show 1. (30 points) Consider the following \"quality d...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Answers-Econ 805 Prof. Peck February 7, 2008 1. (35 points) Consider the following economy with two goods, two firms, and one consumer. The consumer\'s utility function is given by u(x1 , x2 ) ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
A Rothschild-Stiglitz Problem Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maximize expected utility. For i = 1,2, consumer i is risk averse, with utility of certain consumpt...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
Answers to Rothschild-Stiglitz Problem Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maximize expected utility. For i = 1,2, consumer i is risk averse, with utility of certain...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 805 (Spring, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 806 (Fall, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 806 (Fall, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 806 (Fall, 2008)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
ECONOMICS 808 The Ohio State University Department of Economics Classes: T, TH 1:30-3:18 (ARPS 387) Recitations: F 9:30-11:18 (SB 0210) F 1:30-3:18 (SB 0200) Prof. James Peck Office: 440 Arps Tel. 292-0182 peck.33@osu.edu Office Hours: M 3:30-5:00 W...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
When and Why not to Auction* Colin M. Campbell Department of Economics Rutgers University New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901 Phone: (732) 932-8259 Fax: (732) 932-7416 campbel l@econ.rutgers.edu Dan Levin Department of Economics The Ohio State Universi...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #1 Due Thursday, April 11 Spring 2002 Levin and Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and food). For i = 1,2, consumer ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #1 Questions and Answers Spring 2002 Levin and Peck (1) In the following economy, there are two consumers, two .rms, and two goods (labor/leisure and food). For i = 1,2, consumer i...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #2 Due Tuesday, April 23 Spring 2002 Levin and Peck 1. Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maxi...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #2 Questions and Answers Spring 2002 Levin and Peck 1. Consider the following economy with one physical commodity per state of nature and three consumers, each of whom seek to maxi...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #3 due Thursday, May 2 Spring 2002 Levin and Peck Questions 1 and 2 relate to the principal-agent problem with hidden action presented in class and taken from Mas-Colell chapter 14...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808Problem Set #3 Answers Spring 2002 Levin and Peck 1. (a) Dierentiating the Lagrangean expression with respect to w(), NOT with respect to , we have: f ( j e) + Simplifying, we have = w() g(...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808 Midterm Profs Levin, Morelli, and Peck Spring 2001 Directions: Answer all questions and show all work. There are two questions on part 1, and one question on part 2. Each question is worth 33...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ 808 Midterm Answers for Part 1 Profs Levin, Morelli, and Peck Spring 2001 1. Consider an exchange economy with 2 consumers and one consumption good per state. Both consumers have the (Bernoulli) ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 808 (Spring, 2002)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Midterm Questions and AnswersEcon 808 Profs. Levin and Peck March 7, 2002 1. (30 points) In the village of Debreuvia, there are 150 consumers and one physical commodity per state of nature. For i = 1,...
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
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Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Games in Strategic Form Definition 11.1: A strategic game consists of: 1. a finite set N (the set of players), 2. for each player i N, a nonempty set Ai (the set of actions available to player i), 3. for each player i N, a preference relation %i o...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Bayesian Games How do we model uncertainty about the payoffs or (more generally) knowledge of the other players? The traditional distinction (see Fudenberg and Tirole) is that uncertainty about payoffs is called incomplete information, and uncertain...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Let G = hN, (Ai), (ui)i be a strategic game. Preferences must be specified over lotteries on A, which we assume are represented by the expectation of ui(a). Let (Ai) be the set of probability distributions over Ai. i ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Pearce, \"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,\" Econometrica 1984 Rationalizability is a weaker (broader) solution concept than Nash equilibrium. It looks at the implications of common knowledge of rationality, without impo...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Knowledge and Common Knowledge Game Theory requires us to be interested in knowledge of \"parameters\" like costs, valuations, and demand, but also knowledge about what other players know. Consider a finite probability space (, p) and an information ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Extensive Games with Perfect Information There is perfect information if each player making a move observes all events that have previously occurred. Start by restricting attention to games without simultaneous moves and without nature (no randomnes...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Repeated Games A repeated game (say, infinitely repeated prisoner\'s dilemma) is a special case of an extensive game. The additional structure of the same game being repeated allows for new results. \"Folk theorems\" show that any payoffs that are fea...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Extensive Games with Imperfect Information In strategic games, players must form beliefs about the other players\' strategies, based on the presumed equilibrium being played. In Bayesian games, players must form beliefs about the other players\' stra...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium For an important class of extensive games, a solution concept is available that is simpler than sequential equilibrium, but with similar properties. In a Bayesian extensive game with observable actions, nature moves fir...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Cooperative Game Theory Cooperative games are often defined in terms of a characteristic function, which specifies the outcomes that each coalition can achieve for itself. For some games, outcomes are specified in terms of the total amount of dollar...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Myerson and Satterthwaite, \"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,\" JET 1983 In many bilateral bargaining situations with asymmetric information, ex post efficiency is inconsistent with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. One can...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
The (Braess) Transportation Paradox - Route 1 Bridge A A - slow road: 15 minutes - Bridge B Route 2 slow road: 15 minutes - B 1000 cars must commute from point A to point B. East-West roads take 15 minutes, no matter how many cars are on the ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Game Theory Fall 2007 Prof. James Peck Homework #1 Answers 1. O-R, exercise 19.1. Answer: There are n players, and each player i has the action set, Ai = {out} [0, 1]. Each player prefers an...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Game Theory Homework #1-Due Monday October 8 Directions: Answer all questions, and be neat. If you discuss the questions in study groups, list the members of your study group, and make sure t...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Advanced Game Theory Fall 2007 Prof. James Peck Homework #2 Answers 1. O-R, exercise 56.4. Answer: By the symmetry of the game, the set of rationalizable pure actions is the same for both pla...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Econ 817-Game Theory Fall 2007 Prof. James Peck Homework #2-Due Wednesday October 17 Directions: Answer all questions, and be neat. If you discuss the questions in study groups, list the members of yo...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 817 (Fall, 2007)
Department of Economics The Ohio State University Economics 817: Game Theory Syllabus and Reading List James Peck and David Schmeidler Autumn 2007 www.econ.ohio-state.edu/jpeck/Econ817.htm M-W 11:30 - 1:18 Derby 47 Course Objectives: This course aim...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
Important dates for Econ 840 Robert de Jong, Spring 2008 The takehome handout dates are: 1. Wednesday April 2 2. Monday April 14 3. Monday May 5 4. Monday May 19 The takehomes are all due one week after they have been handed out, at the start of cl...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
Lecture 1: Stationary Time Series 1 Introduction If a random variable X is indexed to time, usually denoted by t, the observations {Xt , t T} is called a time series, where T is a time index set (for example, T = Z, the integer set). Time series ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
Lecture 2: ARMA Models 1 ARMA Process As we have remarked, dependence is very common in time series observations. To model this time series dependence, we start with univariate ARMA models. To motivate the model, basically we can track two lines o...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
Econ 840 Exercise for March 26 De Jong, Spring 2008 Answer the question below for Wednesday\'s class. The questions below are about difference equations, and about a deterministic sequence yt . Below, i denotes -1. 1. Consider the equation yt = 0.2...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
Econ 840 Exercise for March 31 de Jong, Spring 2008 Answer the question below for Monday\'s class. You do not need to hand in your answers. Below, as in the whole course, t and t are i.i.d. regression errors. 1. Consider the difference equation yt -...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
Econ 840 Exercise for April 7 de Jong, Spring 2008 Answer the question below. Consider and AR(1) model yt = yt-1 + t where | < 1. Someone runs a linear regression of yt on yt-1 ; i.e. overdifferencing. What will be the probability limit of the resul...
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
Economics 840: Time Series Econometrics Professor Robert M. de Jong Office: 429 Arps Hall Email: de-jong.8@osu.edu Office hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 1:00-3:00pm. Classes: Mondays and Wednesdays, 9:30-11:18am. TA for this course: Jungick Lee (lee....
Ohio State >> ECON >> 840 (Spring, 2008)
First take home exercise, Econ 840 De Jong, Spring 2008 Answer all questions below. Please hand in your solutions at the start of the class of Wednesday April 9. 1. Consider the MA(3) process yt = t - (11/4)t-1 + (13/8)t-2 - (1/4)t-3 . What will be t...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
The Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ H200 Autumn 2006 Homework #1 Chapter 1, Review Question 3, Problems 5, 7, 8, Chapter 2, Review Question 7, Problem 2 (just 2a, 2b, and 2c). Prof. James Peck Due Thursday, September 28. ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. H200 Fall 2006 Prof. James Peck Homework #2 Chapter 3, Problems 2 and 7, Chapter 4, Review Question 10, Problems 8, 12, and 13. Due Tuesday, October 10 ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. H200 Fall 2006 Homework #3 Prof. James Peck Homework #3 Chapter 7, Problems 3,4, 5, and 9. Note: On Problem 9, when you are asked to draw the demand curve, this refers to the quantity of medical p...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. H200 Fall 2006 Homework #4 Prof. James Peck Chapter 8, Problems 10 and 11. Chapter 13, Problems 4, 5, and 10. Note: On Chapter 13, Problem 10, the variable cost should be $5 Q, not average variabl...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. H200 Fall 2006 Homework #5 Prof. James Peck Chapter 15 Problems 1, 6, 11, and 13. Due Tuesday, November 21 ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. H200 Fall 2006 Problems on Perfect Competition Prof. James Peck Chapter 14 Questions for Review 5 and 6, Problems 1, 7, 9, and 11. Hint for problem 11: For the original equilibrium with 1000 seller...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. H200 Fall 2006 Problems on Oligopoly and Game Theory Prof. James Peck Chapter 16 Problems 3, 6, and 11. Preparation for Final: Do not hand in. ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Ohio State University Department of Economics Econ. H200 Fall 2006 Problems on Elasticity and Government Intervention Prof. James Peck Chapter 5 Problems 2, 5, and 11. Chapter 6 Problems 1, 2, 4 Preparation for Midterm: Do not hand in. ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Principle #1: People Face Tradeoffs To get something you want, you have to give up something else you want. Scarce resources. Think of allocating your time or money. Societies face a tradeoff between more consumer goods (low taxes) and more public go...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Two Examples of Economic Models The Circular Flow Diagram: A simple model of who participates on what markets. Examples of Inputs or Factors of Production are labor, land, capital, energy, and materials. The model assumes that firms do not buy goods...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Comparative Advantage and Trade What determines which people produce which goods? In this simple \"economy\" there are two goods, meat and potatoes, and two people who we will call the rancher and the farmer. (I wonder why?) Both people have 8 hours to...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Supply and Demand A market is a group of buyers and sellers of a particular good or service. The definition of the good is a matter of judgement: Should different locations entail different goods (and different markets)? What about quality, time, or ...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
Elasticity The price elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of the quantity demanded to changes in the price. Demand is inelastic if it does not respond much to price changes, and elastic if demand changes a lot when the price changes. Nece...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
The Effect of Government on Markets 1. Price Ceilings Price controls (like price ceilings and floors) are among the most invasive government interventions on markets, and are usually very inefficient. The American Assoc. of Ice Cream Eaters wants a P...
Ohio State >> ECON >> H200 (Fall, 2006)
The Efficiency of Markets What is the best quantity to be produced from society\'s standpoint, in the sense of maximizing the net benefit to society? We need to look at the benefits to consumers and producers. Consumer Surplus Start by looking at eac...
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