Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) witnessed the beginning phases of the utilitarian philosophy, found that philosophy deficient because of its neglect, among other things, of moral duty. Kant s theory is a version of what is called duty theory or deontologism. Kant acknowledged that our lives are full of imperatives based on our own situations and our objectives. If we want to advance at work, then it is imperative that we keep our promises; if we are concerned about our friends happiness, then it is imperative that we not talk about them behind their backs. But this type of hypothetical imperative, which tells us we ought to do(or ought not to do) something in order to achieve such and such a result, is not a moral imperative, Kant argued. Keeping a promise so we ll get a solid reputation is neither morally praiseworthy nor morally blameworthy, he said. For our act to be morally praiseworthy, it must be done, not for the sake of some objective, but simply because it is right. Our action is morally praiseworthy, only if we do it because it is right to keep our promises. A moral imperative is unconditional or categorical; it prescribes an action, not for the sake of some result, but simply because that action is our moral duty. It follows from this philosophy that when it comes to evaluating an action morally, what counts is not the result or consequences of the action, as utilitarianism maintains, but the intention (motive) from which it is done. And the morally best intention, indeed in Kant s opinion the only truly morally praiseworthy intention, is that according to which you do something just because it is your moral duty. Kant answered the question, how can we tell what our moral duty is? as follows: Suppose you are considering some course of action say, whether to borrow some money you need very badly. But suppose that you know can t pay back the loan. Is it morally permissible for you to borrow money under such circumstances? Kant said to do this: First, find the maxim (principle of action) involved in what you want to do. In this case it would be Every time I m in need of money, I ll go to my friends and promise I ll pay it back, even if I know I can t. Next, ask yourself, Would I want this maxim to be a universal law or rule, one that everyone should follow? This process of universalization is the feature that lets you judge whether something would work as a moral law, according to Kant. And what does duty require? It requires that we act in accord with the <a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> , which can be formulated, Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law. For example, if you are wondering whether you should tell the truth, you should formulate a maxim, Always tell the truth, and ask whether you can will that such a rule become a universal law that is, a law that everyone ought to obey. An action is right, Kant argued, if it is done from a good will, and a will is good if it meets three conditions: 1. The maxim on which its action is based can be universalized. 2. It freely accepts its duty. 3. It treats people as ends, not means. (Unlike Utilitarianism) Summary Philosophy may be divided into three fields: physics (the study of the physical world), ethics (the study of morals), and logic (the study of logical principles). These fields may involve either &quot;empirical&quot; study of our experiences, or &quot;pure&quot; analysis of concepts. &quot;Metaphysics&quot; is the study of pure concepts as they relate to moral or physical experience. People generally presume that moral principles must apply to all rational beings at all places and all times. Moral principles must therefore be based on concepts of reason, as opposed to particularities of culture or personality. The goal of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals is to develop a clearer understanding of moral principles, so that people may better avert distractions. Several general principles about moral duties may be advanced. First, actions are moral if and only if they are undertaken for the sake of morality alone (without any ulterior motive). Second, the moral quality of an action is judged not according to the action's consequences, but according to the motive that produced it. Third, actions are moral if and only if they are undertaken out of respect for the moral law (as opposed to some other motivation such as a need or desire). Since specific interests, circumstances, and consequences cannot be considered, the moral &quot;law&quot; must be a general formula that is applicable in all situations. Rather than commanding specific actions, it must express the principle that actions should be undertaken with pure motives, without consideration of consequences, and out of pure reverence for the law. The formula that meets these criteria is the following: we should act in such a way that we could want the maxim (the motivating principle) of our action to become a universal law. It is nearly impossible to find examples of pure moral actions. Nearly every action we observe can be attributed to some interest or motivation other than pure morality. Yet this should not discourage us, for moral principles come from reason, not from experience. Indeed, moral principles could not come from experience, for all experiences depend on particular circumstances, whereas moral principles must have absolute validity, independent of all circumstances. Because it applies in all circumstances, reason's fundamental moral principle may be called the &quot;<a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> .&quot; The <a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> may be expressed according to the same formula as the moral law: act only in such a way that you could want the maxim (the motivating principle) of your action to become a universal law. When people violate the <a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> , they apply a different standard to their own behavior than they would want applied to everyone else in the form of a universal law. This is a contradiction that violates principles of reason. The <a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> may also be formulated as a requirement that we must not treat other rational beings as mere means to our own purposes. Rational beings have the capacity to pursue predetermined objectives (&quot;ends&quot;) by means of their will, yet in pursuing their goals they never think of themselves as mere means to another purpose; they are themselves the purpose of their actions- -they are &quot;ends in themselves. If we treat other rational beings as mere means, we contradict the fact that all rational beings are ends in themselves. In this case, our principles could not be universal laws, and we would violate the <a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> . Another way of stating the point that rational beings are ends in themselves is to say that rational beings are simultaneously the authors and the subjects of the principles they execute through their will. The <a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> may also be formulated as a requirement that we act only according to principles that could be laws in a &quot;kingdom of ends&quot;--that is, a legal community in which all rational beings are at once the makers and subjects of all laws. The argument so far has established what the moral law is, but has not demonstrated why we feel we should be moral. The basis for morality is the concept of freedom. Freedom is the ability to give your own law to your will. When we follow the demands of some need, desire, or circumstance, we are in a state of &quot;heteronomy&quot;; our will is determined by something outside of ourselves. When we follow the <a href="/keyword/categorical-imperative/" >categorical imperative</a> and chose maxims that could be universal laws, we are in a state of &quot;autonomy&quot;; we use reason to determine our own law for ourselves. In other words, we are free. Freedom of the will can never be demonstrated by experience. It is a principle of reason that everything we understand may be explained on the basis of prior conditions. In other words, the world we observe and understand is a world governed by the principle that every event was caused by another event. Yet this world is nothing more than the picture that reason develops in making sense of &quot;appearances.&quot; The world of &quot;things in themselves&quot;--the objects underlying appearances--may have different qualities, including freedom of the will. We can have no knowledge of things in themselves. Thus freedom of the will may be neither proven nor unproven. All that we may know is that we have a concept of freedom of the will, and that morality may be based on this concept.