39 Pages

# Econ 101_review_final [Compatibility Mode]

Course Number: ECON 101, Fall 2008

College/University: Wisconsin

Word Count: 1665

Rating:

###### Document Preview

ECON 101 REVIEW SESSION By Hiro Miyamoto December 16, 2007 Outline Monopoly Game Theory Monopolistic Competition Externality Public Goods Risk and Uncertainty Monopoly A monopoly is a market that has only one seller but many buyers. In other words, when there is only a single firm in an industry, we say that it is a monopoly. Unlike a competitive firm, the monopolist gets to choose its price. Thus, it is a price...

##### Unformatted Document Excerpt
Coursehero >> Wisconsin >> Wisconsin >> ECON 101

Course Hero has millions of student submitted documents similar to the one
below including study guides, practice problems, reference materials, practice exams, textbook help and tutor support.

Course Hero has millions of student submitted documents similar to the one below including study guides, practice problems, reference materials, practice exams, textbook help and tutor support.

101 ECON REVIEW SESSION By Hiro Miyamoto December 16, 2007 Outline Monopoly Game Theory Monopolistic Competition Externality Public Goods Risk and Uncertainty Monopoly A monopoly is a market that has only one seller but many buyers. In other words, when there is only a single firm in an industry, we say that it is a monopoly. Unlike a competitive firm, the monopolist gets to choose its price. Thus, it is a price maker. Market power: the ability of a producer to raise prices. Monopolist's problem The purpose of a monopolist is to maximize its profit. The monopolist determines not only the level of output q but also the level of price p. Solving the monopolist's problem Step 1: By using the profit maximizing condition, MR = MC, we can obtain the optimal output level. Step 2: By using the demand curve and the optimal level of output, we can get the optimal price. Marginal Revenue Marginal revenue: the change in revenue that results from a unit change in output. Marginal Revenue How can we get the MR curve? Step 1: Draw a demand-curve in the space where quantity is in horizontal. Step 2: Find the half point of Q-intercept. Step 3: Connect the half-point and Pintercept. MR Quantity Half-point Q-intercept Price, MR P-intercept Demand Curve Solving the monopolist's problem P X P* PC V W Y MC Z MR D Q* Step 1: By using the optimal condition MR=MC, we can find the optimal output. In the above picture, at the point W, MR crosses MC. Thus, Q* is optimal output. Step2: to find the monopoly price, you have to go up vertically from the point W to the demand curve. Thus, you find the point Y. The monopoly price is P*. Welfare Effects of Monopoly Price CSm DWL A B D PSm MC Pm PC C E MR Qm QC CS PS Welfare (W=CS+PS) Q/2 Demand Q Monopoly A B+D A+B+D Quantity Change -B-C B-E -C-E=DWL Competition A+B+C D+E A+B+C+D+E Price Discrimination When a firm charges different prices to different groups, they price discriminate. Perfect price discrimination In the extreme, the firm may be able to charge exactly the highest price each customer is willing to pay (reservation price). If so, the firm is able to perfectly price discriminate. P = WTP The perfectly discriminating firm maximizes profits by producing where demand equals marginal cost. As with perfect competition, the efficient level of output results. Unlike perfect competition, each customer pays exactly what he or she is willing to pay, and so there is no consumer surplus. Perfect price discrimination P MC A Pm B Pc D C CE E ME MR Qm Competition A+B+C D+E A+B+C+D+E 0 Demand Q Monopoly Perfect price discrimination 0 A+B+C+D+E A+B+C+D+E 0 Qc Single-price A B+D A+B+D C+E CS PS Welfare DWL Game Theory A game consists of Players Strategies available to those players Payoffs (the reward received by a player in a game) for each combination of strategies. A payoff matrix: a payoff matrix shows how the payoff to each of the participants in a two player game depends on the actions of both. Nash Equilibrium A combination of strategies where no player would unilaterally alter its behavior. The result when each player in a game chooses the action that maximizes his or her payoff given the action of other players, ignoring the effects of his or her action on the payoffs received by those other players. How to find Nash Equilibria "NE is combination of best responses". Best Responses: Given the opponent's strategy, the strategy that yields the highest payoff is best response. Find Nash equilibrium P2 L P1 U D (5, 5) (4, 8) R (7, 4) (8, 9) Dominant strategy An action is a dominant strategy when it is a player's best action regardless of the action taken by the other player. Prisoner 2 Confess Confess -1, -1 Prisoner 1 Not confess 0, -9 -6, -6 -9, 0 not confess Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic competition: Many competing producers Differentiated products Free entry and exit in the long-run The industry structure is monopolistic in that each firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its product. It therefore has some market power in the sense that it can set its own price. Monopolistic Competition Short-run equilibrium: an industry takes the number of firms as given. Long-run equilibrium: it is reached only after enough time has elapsed for firms to enter or exit the industry. Notice that in the long-run, a profit of a firm is zero!! Solving monopolistically competitive firm's problem Similar to the monopolist's problem. The monopolistically competitive firm tries to maximize its profit. The monopolistically competitive firm chooses output and price. Solving Procedure: Step 1: By using the profit maximizing condition, MR = MC, we can obtain the optimal output level. Step 2: By using the demand curve and the optimal level of output, we can get the optimal price. Monopolistic Competition Price, Cost, MR MC ATC P* Profit MR Q* D Quantity Monopolistic competition in the long run In the long run, a monopolistically industry competitive ends up in zero-profit equilibrium. Thus, each firm makes zero profit at its profit-maximizing quantity. This result comes from the free entry and free exit condition. Thus, in the long run equilibrium, we have p = ATC (Q ) * * and MR (Q*) = MC (Q*) Monopolistic competition in the long run Price, Cost, MR MC ATC P* MR Q* D Quantity Externalities Externalities: actions of an agent affect other agents. Positive externality: an action of an agent increases the benefits of other agents. (demand side) an action of an agent reduces the cost of other agents. (supply side) Negative externality: an action of an agent decreases the benefits of other agents. (demand side) an action of an agent increases the cost of other agents. (supply side) MSB and MSC Marginal social benefit (MSB): the additional gain to society caused by an additional unit of the externality. MSB=marginal benefit (MB) + external benefit Marginal social costs (MSC): the additional cost to society caused by an additional unit of the externality. MSC=marginal cost (MC) + external benefit External cost and benefit External cost: an uncompensated cost that an individual or firm imposes on others. External benefit: a benefit that an individual or firm confers on others without receiving compensation. society optimal quantity The society optimal quantity is the quantity level that society would choose if all the costs and benefits were fully accounted for. At the optimal q*, we have MSB(q*)=MSC(q*). Negative externality on supply-side MSB, MSC MSC A E B F C D GH MC MSB=Demand Quantity Qp Private A+B+C+D F+G+H C+D+E+G+H F-C-D-E A+B+F-E Change B+C+D H-B-C D+E+H -B-C-D-E -E=DWL Qs Social Optimum Consumer surplus Private producer surplus Externality cost Social producer surplus Welfare A B+C+F+G C+G B+F A+B+F Solutions to Externalities Pigouvian taxe is the tax designed to reduce external costs. Pigouvian subsidy is a payment designed to encourage activities that yields external benefits. Tax per unit = MSC(q*) - MC(q*) Subsidy = MSB(q*) MB(q*) Negative externality and Optimal Pigouvian tax MSB, MSC MSC Socially Optimal Price to consumers after tax Optimal Pigouvian tax Demand Price to producers after tax Q* Quantity Marginal external cost Supply Public Goods Public goods: a commodity or services whose consumption by one person does not preclude others from also consuming it. Demand for public goods: the demand for a public good is different from that for a private good. The social marginal benefit of a public good is the sum of the marginal benefit to each person who consumes the good. The social demand curve or willingness to pay curve for a public good is the vertical sum of the demand curves of each individual. Public Goods Price Social demand for the public goods Social optimum Supply, MC Market equilibrium Individual 2's demand curve Individual 1's demand curve Quantity Risk and Uncertainty Uncertainty: a situation in which more than one event can occur, but we cannot tell which event will occur. Probability: a number between 0 and 1 that indicates the likelihood that a particular outcome will occur. A random variable: a variable with an uncertain future value. Expected Value The expected value: the value of each possible outcome times the probability of that outcome. If there are n possible outcomes, the value of outcome i is Vi, and the probability of that outcome is Pi, then EV = P1 V1 + P2 V2 + + Pn Vn . Example If it rains, you can get \$100. If not, you can get \$200. The probability of rain is 30% and probability of no rain fine is 70%. Then your expected value is EV = 0.3 100 + 0.7 200 = 170. Expected Utility The expected utility: the probability-weighted average of the utility from each possible outcome. If there are n possible outcomes, the value of outcome i is Vi, and the probability of that outcome is Pi, then EU = P1 U (V1 ) + P2 U (V2 ) + + Pn U (Vn ). Risk Aversion, Neutral and Lover Risk averse: the expected utility of wealth < the utility of expected wealth Risk neutral: the expected utility of wealth = the utility of expected wealth EU (W ) < U ( EW ) EU (W ) = U ( EW ) EU (W ) > U ( EW ) Risk lover: the expected utility of wealth > the utility of expected wealth Marginal utility of wealth and risk aversion Utility of wealth: the amount of utility a person attaches to a given amount of wealth Diminishing marginal utility of wealth: the more wealth you have, the less you value each additional dollar of wealth Important Results: A person with a diminishing marginal utility of wealth is risk averse. A person with a constant marginal utility is risk neutral Example Utility function is u= w A person has wealth \$10000. There is possibility that he loses his wealth and wealth becomes \$100 with probability 0.25. The expected wealth is E ( w) = 0.25 100 + 0.75 10000. The expected utility is EU = 0.25 100 + 0.75 10000.

Find millions of documents on Course Hero - Study Guides, Lecture Notes, Reference Materials, Practice Exams and more. Course Hero has millions of course specific materials providing students with the best way to expand their education.

Below is a small sample set of documents:

Wisconsin - ECON - 101
Econ 101-Principles of Microeconomics (Fall 2007) By Hiro MiyamotoIndividual Valuations How does an individual make a decision? An Individual compares between benefit and cost.An Individual makes optimal choice by maximizing the following relati
Idaho - SGHCHEM - 112
Chemistry 112: Worksheet #2. 1. At 127C, the equilibrium constant, Kp, is 5500 for the reaction: 2 NO(g) + Cl2(g) 2 NOCl(g) a) What are the equilibrium constant expressions, Kp and Kc, for this reaction?b) What is the value (numeric) of Kc for thi
Wisconsin - SSC - 181
Center for Demography and EcologyUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonSexual Desire in Later LifeJohn DeLamater Morgan SillCDE Working Paper No. 2003-05Sexual Desire in Later LifeJohn DeLamater and Morgan Sill IntroductionAlthough human sexualit
Wisconsin - SSC - 294
Center for Demography and EcologyUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonAging and Health Status of Elderly in Latin America and the CaribbeanAlberto Palloni Mary McEniryCDE Working Paper No. 2004-09October 2004Aging and health status of elderly in
Berry College - CS - 320
Homework 2 Due: Friday, February 4, 2005Prof. Nadeem Abdul Hamid CSC 320 Spring 20051Typeset only the statements of problems (1.23), (1.24), and (1.25) in the Sipser A textbook using L TEX. You do not have to solve the problems just reproduce A
Iowa State - ANS - 352
Herd: 76 CALF CROP SUMMARY Herd: 76 Calf Crop: 4 Calf Crop: 4 HERD 76 NO MATINGS - HERD KEPT - NO MATINGS
Princeton - AST - 203
Math Tips for AST 203, Spring 2008Appendix C of our textbook, Cosmic Perspective, gives a primer of some of the basic mathematics techniques we will be using in this course. It covers powers of ten and scientific notation, and how to do arithmetic w
Princeton - A - 402
%!PS-Adobe-2.0 %Creator: dvips(k) 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software %Title: finalq.dvi %Pages: 6 %PageOrder: Ascend %BoundingBox: 0 0 596 842 %EndComments %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com) %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -f finalq.dvi %DVIPSParamet
Princeton - A - 403
Astro 403 Problem Set #2 Feb 12 2009. Due Tue Feb 24 2009 1. Derive the free-fall time of a sphere of initial density o , initial radius ro and mass M . Dimensional analysis gives 1 tf f = Go but the more accurate derivation gives tf f = Prove this.
IUPUI - ECE - 680
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;restart; # Discrete-Time Dynamic System # Zak, Example 5.17, pp. 276-277 # x(k+1) := 2*x(k)-3*u(k); J2 := (x2-10)^2;J2 := ( x2 10 )2 &gt; # J1 := (x1^2+u1^2)/2 + J2; &gt; J1 := (x1^2+u1^2)/2 + subs(x2=2*x1-3*u1,J2); x12 u12 J1 := + + ( 2 x1
Princeton - A - 403
An Introduction to the X Window SystemRobert LuptonThis is a limited and partisan introduction to `The X Window System', which is widely but improperly known as X-windows, specifically to version 11 (`X11'). The intention of the X-project has bee
Princeton - A - 402
V l k 9 V ! ec `u c a1 c &quot;ds u c US D) US jV ! S Q g F ec @ys Uwp#hWi D S f i 91 XV S Q g F a`YWUTp\$IHWg D hS f g 9 S Q H F \$! UTp\$hH\$S D S f e 91 qV S Q g F D 1 a`YWUwp\$hWi EdtS 9 S Q gH F D F F d1 YV UTp\$I\$S &quot;S ! V c S Q F ds u GU
Princeton - A - 402
%!PS-Adobe-2.0 %Creator: dvips(k) 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software %Title: constants.dvi %Pages: 1 %PageOrder: Ascend %BoundingBox: 0 0 596 842 %EndComments %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com) %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -f constants.dvi %DVIPSP
Princeton - A - 402
P qY b aS P abR B!@ P iaqS P wS P z R b c k P k'&amp; c b Se R 'aSep P ftyml qj u ` SU U W j h ` S U S w R P H F P i R P tS P ys#Xt0&amp;95dt9 R c 5a#kG5 b R 'f Bc z R &amp;!#S b R b 4&quot; Bc C b Q y{ u 7 &quot; @S @ j hq ` R W U uW Si ) S
Princeton - A - 402
%!PS-Adobe-2.0 %Creator: dvips(k) 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software %Title: problem1.dvi %Pages: 2 %PageOrder: Ascend %BoundingBox: 0 0 596 842 %EndComments %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com) %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -f problem1.dvi %DVIPSPar
Princeton - A - 402
A C 3 4 V a S S a S a S V 4 GB8T#B8c8TQ 1 TB8! 1 8!'3 1 BTS 1 s8tbB8'#3 1 b!azTBfB!aI 1 #8 1 'BIg#TB8!UjdT 1 8TTTS!8#a 1 'BQ'B#!3'B!aI 4 q a C 3 S S 4 W S &quot; d 4 CV S a S a S 3 3 d 4 dW a S S a S 3 C s 4 a 3 4 V x y &quot; x
Princeton - A - 402
%!PS-Adobe-2.0 %Creator: dvips(k) 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software %Title: problem2.dvi %Pages: 1 %PageOrder: Ascend %BoundingBox: 0 0 596 842 %EndComments %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com) %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -f problem2.dvi %DVIPSPar
Princeton - A - 402
c | D D D T d y a c | 6 D D T t D t d a R B b &quot; Ug9CU3!P543IUgX9&amp;F9CU3!P54'ii3YS'SQ9f#SUnw t k a 4 1 T a P 4 BT{ A PT 5As35P!4i'5t!`fTSS33 SUy'#e&amp;D Xm 7UYi7P D B T 1 &quot; t cj P m dj U35B3yUs#99) m 7!S3#3A o!
Princeton - A - 402
%!PS-Adobe-2.0 %Creator: dvips(k) 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software %Title: problem3.dvi %Pages: 2 %PageOrder: Ascend %BoundingBox: 0 0 596 842 %EndComments %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com) %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -f problem3.dvi %DVIPSPar
Princeton - A - 402
` q q D F f U i p 6W F 07@i @8G8 Rgpe W f P x 5 U @x hXU q q F e x w ef 5 y W U S F~ ef U i e c l W W h hU 5WU x 5 a 07@i D(u f 5 r U g e hf l vrhRp R0C eU 75 r Vts5 hgpe W gfRr W x 5 r eU Rh x RRXThXl f RgPCU u c BBB e yU U c f FW5 p f U i
Princeton - A - 402
%!PS-Adobe-2.0 %Creator: dvips(k) 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software %Title: ass1.dvi %Pages: 1 %PageOrder: Ascend %BoundingBox: 0 0 596 842 %EndComments %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com) %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -f ass1.dvi %DVIPSParameters:
Princeton - A - 402
q mF c sFD i y ` DF x s s P teF cD e P eH c F ieF `t c DF x F i e P P s 3GDfHIvGkrSWQWWuDfutfIjTUv@IG3efI2ff)IfvSv~w|3wffw WQWTvffvIdSf yDH c p D P ee `tt ttD st y x s D tD et c e n yDH yD sFeD F et cH sH W3STYdGo)dvTudvWy#
Princeton - A - 402
%!PS-Adobe-2.0 %Creator: dvips(k) 5.86 Copyright 1999 Radical Eye Software %Title: ass2.dvi %Pages: 4 %PageOrder: Ascend %BoundingBox: 0 0 596 842 %EndComments %DVIPSWebPage: (www.radicaleye.com) %DVIPSCommandLine: dvips -f ass2.dvi %DVIPSParameters:
Princeton - AST - 203
Homework #4, AST 203, Spring 2009Due in class (i.e., by 4:20 pm), Thursday April 2 To receive full credit, you must give the correct answer and show that you understand it. This requires writing your explanations in full, complete English sentences
Princeton - AST - 203
Midterm Exam Solutions, AST 203, Spring 2009 Thursday, March 12, 3:00-4:20 PM General grading rules for calculational problems: 4 points o for each arithmetic or algebraic error. Two points o per problem for excess signicant gures in a nal result (i.
Gordon MA - CS - 323
CS323 Lecture: Variables, Constants, Expressions and Assignment I . Variables and Constants - - - -2/9/09A . One o f the most familiar concepts t o most programmers i s the notion o f a &quot;variable&quot;. I n fact, i t i s hard t o conceive o f how one
IUPUI - CSC - 3501
Register File Design and Memory DesignDr. Arjan Durresi Louisiana State University Baton Rouge, LA 70810 Durresi@Csc.LSU.Edu These slides are available at: http:/www.csc.lsu.edu/~durresi/CSC3501_07/6- Register File Design and Memory Design - 1Ove
IUPUI - CS - 240
Department of Computer and Information Science, School of Science, IUPUICSCI 240Classes IntroductionDale Roberts, Lecturer Computer Science, IUPUI E-mail: droberts@cs.iupui.eduDale Roberts1ClassAn IMPORTANT FACET OF OOD and C+ A Set of Ho
St. Anselm - NR - 14108
Virginia Tech - AOE - 5244
AOE 5244 - E.M. Cliff961A Class of Optimal Control Problems Our control problem includes adynamic modelx(t) = f (t, x(t), u(t) where f : I I I R R Rn8mI Rn7AOE 5244 - E.M. Cliff962is smooth. A control constraint
Iowa State - CS - 544
Building PhylogeniesPhylogenetic (evolutionary) treesDescribe evolutionary relationships between speciesHuman Chimp Gorilla Orangutan Gibbon Human ChimporGorilla Orangutan Gibbon?Cannot be known with certainty! Nevertheless, phylogenies c
St. Anselm - NR - 12282
WV SL Women.txt U.S. SKI AND SNOWBOARD ASSOCIATION USCSA MACCONNELL DIVISION WATERVILLE SLALOM USSA RACE CODE No. U1018 ECSC JANUARY 27, 2008 WATERVILLE VALLEY EASTERN DIVISION -S L A L O M L A D I E S UNOFFICIAL RESULTS JURY TD REFEREE CHIEF OF RACE
St. Anselm - NR - 13163
POSITION TRANSFER REQUEST Name: Home Phone: Job Title: Date of original hire: Length of time in this position: Department: Department Supervisor: DESIRED POSITION Job Title: Can you perform the essential functions of the job for which you are
Allan Hancock College - MATH - 1011
THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY MATH1011 Life Sciences Calculus Semester 1 Tutorial questions 1. Plot, using the same axes, the graphs of y = sin(x) y = sin x + 2Tutorial Solutions Week 32009.Write down the period and amplitude of each graph and de
Central College - MATH - 485
Central College - MATH - 132
St. Anselm - NR - 12236
DAVISON HALL NEWSDECEMBER 2007Do you remember scraping the remnants of raw cookie dough from the mixing bowl? No matter how old you are, licking that sugary goodness off a plastic spatula is pure heaven. Well, thanks to Zuzzys, you dont have to wa
St. Anselm - NR - 6306
Damsels in Distress, Frustrated Old Women, and the Masculine Enterprise; A Feminist Interpretation of the Actions and Language of the Vietnam WarBy Betsy Beasley, University of Georgia On October 7, 1964, Walter Jenkins, one of President Lyndon John
Iowa State - MR - 0720
Des Moines Register 07-20-07 Nuclear power is far from 'benign' State Rep. Phil Wise's essay (&quot;Times Demand Democrats Take Another Look at Nuclear Energy,&quot; July 6) loses all credibility when it cites Iowa State University professor Carolyn Heising's
Iowa State - PUBLIC - 0720
Des Moines Register 07-20-07 Nuclear power is far from 'benign' State Rep. Phil Wise's essay (&quot;Times Demand Democrats Take Another Look at Nuclear Energy,&quot; July 6) loses all credibility when it cites Iowa State University professor Carolyn Heising's
Iowa State - MR - 1109
Voice of America 11-02-07 Clinton's US Presidential Rivals Step Up Attacks Jim Malone, Washington The race for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination is heating up. For the first time in the campaign, Hillary Clinton's Democratic rivals belie
Iowa State - PUBLIC - 1109
Voice of America 11-02-07 Clinton's US Presidential Rivals Step Up Attacks Jim Malone, Washington The race for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination is heating up. For the first time in the campaign, Hillary Clinton's Democratic rivals belie
Iowa State - MR - 0929
Des Moines Register 09-24-06 Letters Get to the root of lawn treatments Concerning Mike Kilen's piece, &quot;Defending My Turf, My Weeds,&quot; Sept. 3: While he makes some very valid points, I was disheartened that he made no mention of organic alternatives t
Iowa State - MR - 1005
Washington Post, U.S. 09-30-07 Subsidy payments continue with ethanol boom, record crop prices By Dan Morgan RADCLIFFE, Iowa - Corn farmer Jim Handsaker has found a slew of ways to ride the heartland boom in biofuels that is reshaping the economy of
Iowa State - PUBLIC - 1005
Washington Post, U.S. 09-30-07 Subsidy payments continue with ethanol boom, record crop prices By Dan Morgan RADCLIFFE, Iowa - Corn farmer Jim Handsaker has found a slew of ways to ride the heartland boom in biofuels that is reshaping the economy of
St. Anselm - NR - 12627
College Achievement Program (CAP)-Introduction: The objective of this non-credit, ten-week program is to help students make a successful transition from high school to college. Participants of the College Achievement Program meet once a week for a 7
Virginia Tech - CS - 2704
CS2704 Index 1372 Spring 2000 20 20 20 10 20 10 10 10 20 20 10 10 10 10 100 100 100 100 100 300 100 100 100 Code q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9 q10 q11 q12 q13 q14 quiz p1 p2 p3 p4 project hw1 hw2 hw3 XKOR 19 20 20 10 19 10 10 10 20 20 10 10 10 20 100 10
Princeton - AST - 513
%!PS-Adobe-3.0 %Creator: NASA Astrophysics Data System %Title: 1985ApJ.295.305V %CreationDate: Tue Sep 14 13:00:09 1999 %Origin: 0 0 %Orientation: Portrait %DocumentPaperSizes: Letter %LanguageLevel: 2 %PageBoundingBox: 0 0 612 792 %Pages: 1 %EndComm
Iowa State - MR - 0608
New York Times, NY 06-07-07 Giuliani and McCain to Skip Straw Poll in Iowa By MARC SANTORA NEW CASTLE, N.H., June 6 Bucking a ritual for Republican presidential candidates, Rudolph W. Giuliani and Senator John McCain announced Wednesday that they wo
Iowa State - PUBLIC - 0608
New York Times, NY 06-07-07 Giuliani and McCain to Skip Straw Poll in Iowa By MARC SANTORA NEW CASTLE, N.H., June 6 Bucking a ritual for Republican presidential candidates, Rudolph W. Giuliani and Senator John McCain announced Wednesday that they wo
Iowa State - MR - 1222
Quad City Times, IA 12-21-06 Iowa sets ethanol record By Dan Gearino DES MOINES Iowa ethanol production will set a record this year, passing last years previous record by 36 percent. The Iowa Renewable Fuels Association announced Wednesday that Iowa
Iowa State - MR - 1103
Cresco Times Plain Dealer, IA 10-27-06 Shekleton honored with state award NEW HAMPTON - The New Hampton Industrial Corporation (NHIC) entertained about 135 guests and honored local industries at a reception. The annual gathering was held at the Pinic
Iowa State - PUBLIC - 1103
Cresco Times Plain Dealer, IA 10-27-06 Shekleton honored with state award NEW HAMPTON - The New Hampton Industrial Corporation (NHIC) entertained about 135 guests and honored local industries at a reception. The annual gathering was held at the Pinic
St. Anselm - NR - 12805
Research Center Working Paper Series No. 14On the Idea of a Covenantal Moralityby Kevin A. McMahon Professor of Theology Saint Anselm College Manchester, N.H. 03102-1310 (603) 641-7057 kmcmahon@anselm.edu2&quot;[T]he Catholic novel,&quot; Flannery O'Con
St. Anselm - NR - 7997
Request for Payroll Direct Deposit Faculty and StaffToday's Date: process) 1. Your Name: _ (Please print) 2. Social Security Number: _ 3. Daytime Telephone Number: _ 4. Department Name: _ 5. Bank Name: _ _ (City, State) 6. Your Bank's Transit/ABA Nu
St. Anselm - NR - 13974
Parent Tax Non-Filing StatementPlease complete this form if you did not or will not file a federal tax return for 2008. Student's Name: _ Social Security Number: __Parent Information Parent Completing this Form: Mother _ Father: _ Both: _Mother'
St. Anselm - NR - 13971
Student Tax Non-Filing StatementPlease complete this form if you did not or will not file a federal tax return for 2008. Student's Name: _ Social Security Number: __2008 Income Information Please enter a \$0 amount for any source that does not appl
Iowa State - EE - 520
1Homework 2: Deriving gradient flows using Calculus of Variations1) Deriving Euler-Lagrange when E is a function of u = u(x, y), i.e. u is a function of 2 variables (Application: optical flow). Given thatb2 b1 x=a1E(u) =y=a2L(u, ux , uy )dx
St. Anselm - CL - 325
X.220-297 at conj.: but si conj.: if forte adv.: by chance rogo, -are, -avi, -atum: to ask fecundus, -a, -um: fertile, fruitful; rich, abundant Amathus, -untis, Gk. acc.-nta, f.:Amathus, town in Cyprus metallum, -i n.: metal an conj.: whether gigno,
St. Anselm - CL - 325
VI. 1-52 praebeo, -bere, -bui, -bitum: to offer, hold out; to provide, supply dictum, -i, n.: word, saying, remark Tritonius, -a, -um, f.: in connection with Minerva. talis, -e: of such kind, such auris, -is, f.: the ear carmen, -inis, n.: a song -qu
St. Anselm - CL - 325
IV.274-328 posco, poscere, poposci: to ask, beg Alcithoe, -es, f.: Alcithoe postquam adv.: after, when sileo, -ere, -ui: to be silent, still soror, -oris, f.: sister qui, quae, quod: who, which, what radius, -ii, m.: stake, stick; shuttle sto, stare,