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Course: POL SCI 172, Spring 2007
School: UCLA
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Word Count: 402

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Homework PS172 4: Repeated Games Due May 16, 2007 (Except Problem 3, Due May 14) 1. Find the condition on the discount factor under which the strategy pair in which each player uses the grim trigger strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the innitely repeated game of the Prisoners Dilemma stage game below. That is, nd the range of for which the grim trigger strategy is a best response to itself. The parameters x and...

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hw5.pdf

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS172 Homework 5: TournamentsDue May 23, 2007Consider an iterated prisoners dilemma setting, of the style of Axelrod, where each strategy plays every other strategy, plus itself, in a round-robin tournament. In this tournament every pairing lasts e

hw6.pdf

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS179: Homework 6Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory Due Thursday May 31, 20071. Consider the tness matrix: t 1,1 6,5 2,2 c 5,6 1,1 2,1 b 2,2 1,2 3,3top center bottom(a) Starting from the initial population prole x = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), and u

hw7.pdf

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS172: Homework 7Computing Evolutionary GamesDue Thursday May 7, 20071. In the previous homework we examined two games. One had two ESS and one had none. Follow the instructions handed out in class (or you can download them from the class website)

directions.doc

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS 179: Directions for Creating Flow Diagrams for Evolutionary Games1) Make a new folder (directory) on your machine. You might want to give it a short path. For example, here we will assume you made a directory called "c:\ps179". 2) Download the co

SectionSyllabus.pdf

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS 172: Strategies in Conflict TA section syllabusTeaching Associate: Koji Kagotani E-mail: kagotani@ucla.edu Office: 3269 Bunche hall Office hour: Mon 3:30-5:30pm or by appointment TA section website: http:/www.sscnet.ucla.edu/07S/polisci172-1/kago

PS172HW1.pdf

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS 172: Strategy and Conflict Homework 1: Review of PS 30 MaterialsDue date: April 18, 2007Q1: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and Pure Strategy Nash EquilibriumThe extensive form game below is a modified version of the crisis bargaining model descri

HW2.pdf

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS 172: Strategy and ConflictHomework 2: Utility TheoryDue date: April 25, 2007Q1: Utility Theory under the Condition of RiskQ1-1: a) Provide a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility for outcome C1, C2, C3, and C4 consistent with the following preferen

HW3.pdf

UCLA - POL SCI - 172

PS 172: Strategy and ConflictHomework 3: Models with Limited InformationDue Date: May 2, 2007Q1: The Beer-Quiche Game (Morrow, pp.244-248)The following game is a famous example of signaling, the Beer-Quiche game.1 shown in the extensive form, a

Homework-Sh1-Solutions.pdf