Strategic The Logic of Suicide Terrorism
Robert A. Pape From 1980 to 2001 suicide terrorism has become more common despite a general decrease in terrorist episodes. This study, unlike other studies that focus on the individual motives, looks at all of the recorded acts of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2001, "explains how terrorist organizations have assessed the effectiveness of these attacks, and evaluates the limits on their coercive utility." Five principle findings of the article1. Suicide terrorism is strategic 2. The strategic logic of suicide terrorism is designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions on national self-determination 3. During the past 20 years, suicide terrorism has been steadily rising because terrorists have learned that it pays 4. Although moderate suicide terrorism lead to moderate concessions, these more ambitions suicide terrorist campaigns are not likely to achieve still greater gains and may well fail completely. 5. The most promising way to contain suicide terrorism is to reduce terrorists' confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks on the target society. Pape's definition of terrorism (def. according to Dept. of State)The use of violence by an organization other than a national government to cause intimidations or fear among a target audience. Terrorism's two general purposes: 1. Gain supporters 2. Coerce opponents Three types of terrorism: 1. Demonstrative- mainly for publicity 2. Destructive- more aggressive, seeking to both gain support and coerce opponents 3. Suicide- most aggressive, distinguished by fact that the attacker does not expect to survive. Suicide terrorism exerts coercive influence through the initial panic of an attack and the fear that another will follow. Since terrorist organizations the are weaker party, the only coercive option is punishment. Suicide terrorism is more effective because: 1. Suicide attacks are generally more destructive 2. They are effective harbingers of more attacks to come because it suggests that the attack could not have been stopped by the threat of retaliation since the attacks had planned to die regardless.
3. Suicide terrorist organizations are better positioned to increase expectations about escalating future costs by deliberately violating norms in the use of violence. Three similar properties of all suicide terrorist attacks from 1980 to 20011. Timing 2. Nationalistic goals 3. Target selection Terrorists assess the success of suicide bombing by whether or not their political goals are achievedOut of the 11 completed terrorist campaigns that used suicide terrorism, half achieved some degree of concession by the opposing side. 3 were blatantly because of coercive pressure 3 were less clear Case of HamasIsrael was obligated by the Oslo accords to withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank. However, because Israel was stalling, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad organized suicide attacks to quicken the process. These attacks are perceived by terrorist leaders to have worked. Limits of Suicide Terrorism Suicide terrorism may achieve small goals but is unlikely to cause a modern state to concede large or important goals. Rather it will provoke more aggressive military response. Policy ImplicationsOffensive military action or concessions alone rarely work for long amount of time Concessions are tricky because they can undermine support for terrorist groups but can also encourage terrorist organizations to use suicide terrorism more often. Also, partial or incremental concession creates difficulties. Defense is the best policy