of Philosophy Mind I Course Handbook: Autumn 2008
Lecturer: Matthew Soteriou Email: [e-mail] Time and Place There will be one lecture a week Friday, 12-1, (S0.11) In addition, there will be one seminar a week. Group A: Wednesday 12-1, (H3.58) Group B: Thursday 1-2, (S1.69) Group C: Thursday 2-3, (S1.14) Plan of Lecture Topics Lecture 1: An Introduction to Physicalism and Mind-Body Problems Lecture 2: Identity Theories of Mind Lecture 3: Davidson's Anomalous Monism Lecture 4: Mental Causation Lecture 5: Causal Theories of Action Lecture 6: Functionalism Lecture 7: The Phenomenology of Experience and the Appeal to Introspection Lecture 8: The Content of Experience Lecture 9: Modal Arguments for Dualism
Seminar Topics and Reading Introductory Books Heil, J. Philosophy of Mind:A Contemporary Introduction McGinn, C. 1991. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1982.) Kim, J. 1996. The Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Westview Press. Anthologies Chalmers, D. Philosophy of Mind: Clasical and Contemporary Readings Rosenthal, D., ed. 1991. The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, W. ed. 1990. Mind and Cognition: a Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Guttenplan, S., ed. 1994. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell Reference. Week 2: Type Identity Physicalism Can type identity theories accommodate the apparent fact that mental states are variably or multiply `realisable' in creatures with different physical natures? D. Lewis, `An Argument for the Identity Theory', Journal of Philosophy 1966, repr. in his Philosophical Papers Volume I Place, U. T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47:44-50. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Also in Chalmers ed. Smart, J. J. C. 1959. Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68:141-56. (Also in Chalmers ed.) Putnam, H. 1979. `The Nature of Mental States', in Mind Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol.2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Lycan ed. Mind and Cognition. (Also in Chalmers ed.) Lewis, D. 1994. `Reduction of Mind', in S. Guttenplan, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Reprinted in D. Lewis. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Armstrong, D.M. 1977. `The Causal Theory of Mind'. Reprinted in Rosenhtal ed. The Nature of Mind (Also in Chalmers ed.) Week 3: Anomalous Monism Outline and assess Davidson's argument for Physicalism. `Mental Events', by Davidson, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Also in Chalmers ed. Evnine, S. 1991. Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Polity. Ch.4. `Philosophy as Psychology', by Davidson, in Essays on Actions and Events `Anomalous Monism and the Irreducability of the Mental', by McLaughlin, in Lepore and McLaughlin ed. Actions and Events `Psychophysical Laws', by Kim, in Lepore and McLaughlin ed. Week 4: Mental Causation Do states of mind have effects in the physical world? If so, how is this compatible with a physicalist or a naturalistic world view? T. Crane, `The Mental Causation Debate', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 1995 T. Honderich, `The Argument for Anomalous Monism', Analysis 1982 D. Davidson, `Thinking Causes', in Heil and Mele edd., Mental Causation J. Kim, `Epiphenomenal Supervenient and Causation', in his Supervenience and Mind S. Yablo, `Mental Causation', Philosophical Review 1992 Week 5: Causal Theories of Action Are actions are events that are caused by the mental states which rationalise them? A. Mele, The Philosophy of Action, Introduction, pp. 2-16 D. Davidson, `Actions, Reasons and Causes', in his Essays on Actions and Events
A. Melden, Free Action, Chs. 3-5 H. Frankfurt, `The Problem of Action', in Mele ed., The Philosophy of Action G.E.M. Anscombe, `The Causation of Behaviour', in Ginet and Shoemaker edd., Knowledge and Mind Week 7: Functionalism Can functionalism account for the qualitative character of mental states? N. Block, `What is Functionalism', and `Troubles with Functionalism' in Block ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (Also in Chalmers ed.) H. Putnam, `The Nature of Mental States', in his Mind, Language and Reality. Also in Chalmers ed. S. Shoemaker, `Some Varieties of Functionalism', and `Functionalism and Qualia' in his Identity, Cause and Mind D. Lewis, `Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1972 (Also in Chalmers ed.) Block, N. & Fodor, J. A. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81:159-81. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1980). Week 8: Theories of Perceptual Experience (i): The Objects of Experience Assess the arguments for the view that the direct objects of experience are not the ordinary material objects we take ourselves to be aware of when we have perceptual experiences? P. Snowdon, `How to Interpret Direct Perception', in Crane ed, The Contents of Experience J. Valberg, `The Puzzle of Experience', in Crane ed. H. Robinson, Perception, ch. II B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, ch. 1 Week 9: Theories of Perceptual Experience (ii): The Content of Experience To what extent is experience like belief? M.G.F Martin, `Perceptual Content' in Guttenplan ed. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind Crane, T. `Introd...