172, Philosophy Section 3 10/18/05 Simon Rippon Hobbes' first three laws of nature (39-40): 1. Seek peace, or if you cannot get it, use war to preserve yourself. 2. Lay down your right to all things, and be content with as much liberty as you will allow others (i.e. enter into a commonwealth), insofar as others are willing to do so as well, in order to make peace. 3. Keep your covenants. The first two Laws of Nature hold in the State of Nature, but not as "Laws". The others do not hold at all before the commonwealth is instituted. Some of Clarke's objections (219): A. Hobbes needs an antecedent obligation to keep our covenants, otherwise how could we be obligated to obey the sovereign? B. But if we're obligated to keep our contracts because this is conducive to our preservation, then why aren't we also originally obligated to peace and mutual benevolence? Beginning of a Hobbesian answer: Right of nature is liberty to use one's power as necessary for one's selfpreservation. Liberty is the absence of external impediments. So: In the State of Nature: everyone has a natural right to everything (Because there are no external impediments). When we transfer a natural right, we incur an obligation not to hinder the person it's been transferred to. So the social contract gives us an obligation to obey the sovereign. Why this is too quick. A further Objection (Clarke, 218): C. These natural rights could not be moral rights, because if I have a moral right to something others must have an obligation not to interfere with it. But our rights "to everything" in the S o N would be in conflict. Hobbesian response, as presented by Korsgaard: To (C): We should understand the S o N right "to everything" as a right to govern yourself for your own preservation (It's a right "to everything" in that in the S o N, we might need anything to protect this right.) To (B): Maybe we do have an antecedent obligation to govern ourselves for our own preservation in the S o N. This could be because it's individually rational, and/or because it's commanded by God or by self-legislation. This would not yet make keeping our contracts nor obligatory, benevolence in general. But it
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would make laws 1 and 2 obligatory. Law 2 tells us to enter into the commonwealth together. Pressing objection (A) again: Entering into the commonwealth requires us to enter into a binding covenant. But we have not yet established law 3, because covenants are not binding in the S o N. So how can the commonwealth be established? Hobbesian response to (A): When I give up my rights to the sovereign, I must be giving up my liberties. But giving up liberties is creating external impediments. When I transfer my rights to the sovereign, I also transfer my power, and this creates external impediments. So I lose my liberty to break the social contract. The act of creating the social contract is what makes covenants binding. The Free Rider Problem: Isn't it individually rational to break the social contract insofar as you can get away with it? How can we be motivated not to do this? Korsgaard takes Hobbes' distinction between command and counsel (57) to offer an answer. When you are commanded you are motivated by the fact that something is the commander's will, whereas when you are counseled you are motivated by your own good. If we obey the law not (i) because it is rational, nor (ii) because of our fear of punishment, but (iii) because it is ob...