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9 Pages

### Tkacik

Course: ECE 679, Fall 2008
School: Oregon State
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Word Count: 279

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Hardware A Random Number Generator Thomas Tkacik, Motorola TET 8/14/2002 CHES2002, Rev 0.1 MOTOROLA and the Stylized M Logo are registered in the US Patent &amp; Trademark Office. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. Motorola, Inc. 2002. Desired Properties of Random Numbers Unpredictable Lack of bias Bit Independence Nonrepeatable Long cycle length RNG...

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Hardware A Random Number Generator Thomas Tkacik, Motorola TET 8/14/2002 CHES2002, Rev 0.1 MOTOROLA and the Stylized M Logo are registered in the US Patent & Trademark Office. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. Motorola, Inc. 2002. Desired Properties of Random Numbers Unpredictable Lack of bias Bit Independence Nonrepeatable Long cycle length RNG Block Diagram Oscillator 1 43 bit LFSR 32 bit select 32 bit select Oscillator 2 37 bit CASR Linear Feedback Shift Register 43 bit LFSR Characteristic polynomial X43 + X41 + X 20 + X + 1 Cycle length = 243 - 1 Bias ~ 2-43 Oscillator 1 Maximal length There is a slight bias 43 bit LFSR 32 bit select 32 bit select Oscillator 2 37 bit CASR Cellular Automata Shift Register 37 bit CASR CA90 ai(t+1) = ai-1(t) ^ ai+1(t) CA150 ai(t+1) = ai-1(t) ^ ai(t) ^ ai+1(t) CA150 is at bit 28, CA90 used elsewhere Maximal length Cycle length = 237 - 1 Bias ~ 2-37 Oscillator bit 1 43 LFSR 32 bit select There is a slight bias 32 bit select Oscillator 2 37 bit CASR LFSR and CASR Combination Combination is formed by permuting and XORing 32 bits of LFSR and CASR The combination has a cycle length of Cycle length = 280 - 243 - 237 + 1 Bias ~ 2-80 Oscillator 1 The bias is reduced to 43 bit LFSR 32 bit select 32 bit select Oscillator 2 37 bit CASR State-Time Diagram for LFSR, CASR and Combined Generator Time Oscillator 1 43 bit LFSR 32 bit select 32 bit select LFSR CASR Combination 37 bit CASR DIEHARD Results for LFSR, CASR and Co...

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Oregon State - ECE - 679
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Oregon State - ECE - 679
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Oregon State - ECE - 679
Cryptography:StateoftheArt andCurrentTrendsetinKayaKo OregonStateUniversity,Professor http:/islab.oregonstate.edu/koc koc@ece.orst.edu OverviewCryptanalysisChallenge Encryption:DESAES MD5,SHA1SHA256,SHA384,SHA512 RSA,DSARSA,DSA,ECDSAMes
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Cryptography: State of the Art and Current Trends etin Kaya Ko Oregon State University, Professor Iik University, Adjunct Professor http:/islab.oregonstate.edu/koc koc@ece.orst.edu OverviewCryptanalysis Challenge Encryption: Message Di
Oregon State - ECE - 679
ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY AND IMPLEMENTATION ATTACKSMarc Joye Cryptographic Engineering Lausanne, Oct. 7-10, 2003AgendaPart I: Reminder Side-channel attacks Elliptic curves Elliptic curve cryptography Part II: SPA-like attacks/countermeasures U
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Key KKey KPseudorandom byte generator (key stream generator)Pseudorandom byte generator (key stream generator)Plaintext byte stream MENCRYPTIONkCiphertext byte stream CDECRYPTIONkPlaintext byte stream MFigure 6.8 Stream Ciph
Oregon State - ECE - 679
S K01234255 255 255keylen T (a) Initial state of S and TTT[i] j = j + S[i] + T[i]SiS[i] SwapS[j](b) Initial permutation of S j = j + S[i]SiS[i] Swap t = S[i] + S[j] (c) Stream GenerationS[j
Oregon State - ECE - 679
COUNTER-MEASURES FOR PREVENTING SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKSMarc Joye Cryptographic Engineering Lausanne, Oct. 7-10, 2003AgendaPart I: Basic algorithms Square-and-multiply algorithm Square-and-multiply always algorithm Safe-error attacks Montgomery power
Oregon State - ECE - 679
IMPLEMENTING THE RSAMarc Joye Cryptographic Engineering Lausanne, Oct. 7-10, 2003AgendaRSA cryptosystem Power attacks Fault attacksOct. 7-10, 20032/12Implementing the RSA Cryptographic EngineeringAgendaRSA cryptosystem Power attacks Faul
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Supercomputing Cryptographyetin K. Ko Oregon State University koc@ece.orst.eduSecure Computing &amp; CommunicationsIt is highly probable that every bit of information flowing through our networks will be encrypted and decrypted or signed and authen
Oregon State - ECE - 679
High-Speed RSA ImplementationCetin Kaya Ko cKoc@ece.orst.eduRSA Laboratories RSA Data Security, Inc. 100 Marine Parkway, Suite 500 Redwood City, CA 94065-1031Copyright c RSA Laboratories Version 2.0 November 1994ContentsPreface 1 The RSA C
Oregon State - ECE - 679
RSA Hardware ImplementationKoc@ece.orst.eduCetin Kaya Ko cRSA Laboratories RSA Data Security, Inc. 100 Marine Parkway, Suite 500 Redwood City, CA 94065-1031Copyright c RSA Laboratories Version 1.0 August 19951 2 3 4 5Contents5.1 5.2 5.3
Oregon State - ECE - 679
SAMPLE CHAPTERChapter 13AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY13.1IntroductionIn the usual sense of public-key cryptography, a key generation procedure invariantly contains the following step: public-key = F (private-key). (13
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Formal Reductionist Security Proof for Public-key CryptosystemsWenbo Mao Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, BristolOctober 31 2003Coverage- Foundations ABC for modern cryptography- Textbook crypto and attacks- Fit-for-application security and
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Divisors, Bilinear Pairings and Pairing Enabled Cryptographic ApplicationsWenbo MaoKeith HarrisonHewlett-Packard Laboratories, BristolDecember 3rd 2003Coverage Pairings in an abstract level of description Cryptanalysis and cryptographic
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Formal Reductionist Security Proof for Digital SignaturesWenbo Mao Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, BristolOctober 31 2003Coverage- Foundations ABC for modern cryptography- Fit-for-application security notion for digital signatures- Knowledg
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Secret Key Cryptography1Outline Conventional encryption Block ciphers DES, IDEA, Skipjack, RC5 Cryptanalysis Attacks Key Distribution2Conventional Encryption The original message, referred to as plaintext, is converted into random nons
Oregon State - ECE - 679
OutlineSecret Key Cryptography Conventional encryption Block ciphers DES, IDEA, Skipjack, RC5 Cryptanalysis Attacks Key Distribution12Conventional Encryption The original message, referred to as plaintext, is converted into random no
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Outline Foundations Merkle's puzzles, Diffie-HellmanPublic Key Cryptography Trapdoor function model Practical issues Examples Knapsacks, RSA, McEliece, Goldwasser-Micali, ElGamal1 2Foundations Two cryptographic problems privacy: Alice
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Key Establishment Protocols1Outline Key Establishment Problem Certificates Key Establishment Protocols Diffie-Hellman algorithm Algorithms based on elliptic curves Key pre-distribution Blom's Scheme Key distribution center Self-certifyin
Oregon State - ECE - 679
OutlineKey Establishment Protocols 1Key Establishment Problem Certificates Key Establishment Protocols Diffie-Hellman algorithm Algorithms based on elliptic curves Key pre-distribution Blom's Scheme Key distribution center Self-certifyi
Oregon State - ECE - 679
OutlineDigital Signatures and Authentication What is a digital signature ? General model Foundations of security RSA, DSA, ECDSA signatures Zero knowledge (Guillo-Quisquater) One-time signature Special signatures Message Authentication C
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Internet Security Protocols1Outline of Course1. Introduction 2. Secure TCP/IP Protocols (IPSec) 3. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS) 4. Secure HTTP 5. Basic WWW Security2Protocol Stack at Outset What we have to star
Oregon State - ECE - 679
NETWORK SECURITY FUNDAMENTALSSecurity Attacks and Security Services A Model of Network Security Network Management Security Access Policies Kerberos System Disaster Recovery PlanningSECURITY ATTACKS &amp; SECURITY SERVICESSecurity Threads Unauthori
Oregon State - ECE - 679
NETWORK SECURITY FUNDAMENTALSSECURITY ATTACKS &amp; SECURITY SERVICESSecurity Attacks and Security Services A Model of Network Security Network Management Security Access Policies Kerberos System Disaster Recovery PlanningSecurity Threads Unauthori
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Firewalls and Computer System Security1Outline of Course1. Introduction 2. Threats and Attacks 3. Firewall Building Blocks Authentication Servers, Screening Routers, Bastion Host, Application-level Gateways4. Firewall Architectures 5. Virtual
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Outline of Course1. IntroductionFirewalls and Computer System Security2. Threats and Attacks 3. Firewall Building Blocks Authentication Servers, Screening Routers, Bastion Host, Application-level Gateways4. Firewall Architectures 5. Virtual P
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Motivation Electronic Payment Systems The introduction of the internet solved the network problem In 1997 the number of users reached an estimate of 200 million users creating a huge market12Characteristics of Payment Systems 1 Cash payments
Oregon State - ECE - 679
What is SET?Secure Electronic TransactionsSET1 A technology not a product A flexibly defined protocol Ensures secure financial transactions Relies on cryptographic techniques2Motivation Growth of the internet and electronic commerce I
Oregon State - ECE - 679
OutlineSmart CardsSecurity &amp; Applications What is a smart card ? History &amp; Contemporary Usage of Smart Cards. Types of Smart Cards Advantages Smart Card &amp; System Components Biometrics Security Applications1 2What is a Smart Card ? A p
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Applications of Abstract Algebra: Discrete Fourier Transforms on GroupsJulijana Gjorgjieva November. 7, 2003When talking about a Discrete Fourier Transform, DFT, people usually think of engineering and signal processing. However, that is only a sma
Oregon State - ECE - 679
SecretKeyCryptography1Outline Conventional encryption Block ciphers DES, IDEA, Skipjack, RC5 Cryptanalysis Attacks Key Distribution2Conventional Encryption The original message, referred to as plaintext, is converted into random nonsen
Oregon State - ECE - 679
A Scalable Architecture for Montgomery MultiplicationAlexandre F. Tenca and Cetin K. Ko cElectrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon 97331 {tenca,koc}@ece.orst.eduAbstract. This paper describes the methodology an
Oregon State - ECE - 679
A Scalable and Unied Multiplier Architecture for Finite Fields GF (p) and GF (2m) E. Sava, A. F. Tenca, and C. K. Ko s c Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon 97331Abstract We describe a scalable and unied ar
Oregon State - ECE - 679
High-Radix Design of a Scalable Modular MultiplierAlexandre F. Tenca, Georgi Todorov, and Cetin K. Ko cDepartment of Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon 97331, USA {tenca,todorov,koc}@ece.orst.eduAbstract
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Scalable VLSI Architecture for GF(p) Montgomery Modular Inverse ComputationAdnan Abdul-Aziz Gutub, Alexandre Ferreira Tenca, and etin Kaya Ko Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon 97331, USA {gu
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Architectures for Unied Field Inversion with Applications in Elliptic Curve CryptographyE. Sava and C. K. Ko s c Department of Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon 97331 {savas,koc}@ece.orst.eduABSTRACT We p
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Efficient Unified Arithmetic with Hardware Implementationsetin Kaya Ko Information Security Laboratory Department of Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University Corvallis, ORSpring 20021Hardware ResearchHardware for CryptoSca
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Fast SignatureCryptographic operations Elliptic curve arithmetic Field arithmeticNew techniques in curve arithmeticEfficient field arithmeticFewer field operations5Elliptic curve cryptography requires Addition Inversion Multiplication
Oregon State - ECE - 679
IntroductionModular inverse is essential in publickey cryptography This work is targeted mainly toward the ECC utilization ECC is frequently defined over finite fields GF(p) or GF(2n)a basic operation in the elliptic curve cryptography
Oregon State - ECE - 679
MPC180E Security Processor Users ManualRev. 2.1, 11/2000PRELIMINARYSUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICEChapter 1 OverviewThis chapter gives an overview of the MPC180E security processor, including the key features, typical system architecture, and
Oregon State - ECE - 679
MPC180E Security Processor Users ManualRev. 2.1, 11/2000PRELIMINARYSUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICEDigitalDNA, Mfax, PowerQUICC, and PowerQUICC II are trademarks of Motorola, Inc. The PowerPC name, the PowerPC logotype, and PowerPC 603e are tra
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Public Key Cryptography1Outline Foundations Merkle's puzzles, Diffie-Hellman Trapdoor function model Practical issues Examples Knapsacks, RSA, McEliece, Goldwasser-Micali, ElGamal2Foundations Two cryptographic problems privacy: Alic
Oregon State - ECE - 679
KeyEstablishment Protocols1Outline Key Establishment Problem Certificates Key Establishment Protocols Diffie-Hellman algorithm Algorithms based on elliptic curves Key pre-distribution Bloms Scheme Key distribution center Self-certifying
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Digital Signatures and Authentication1Outline What is a digital signature ? General model Foundations of security RSA, DSA, ECDSA signatures Zero knowledge (Guillo-Quisquater) One-time signature Special signatures Message Authenticatio
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Internet Security Protocols1Outline of Course1. Introduction 2. Secure TCP/IP Protocols (IPSec) 3. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS) 4. Secure HTTP 5. Basic WWW Security2Protocol Stack at Outset What we have to star
Oregon State - ECE - 679
NETWORK SECURITY FUNDAMENTALSSecurity Attacks and Security Services A Model of Network Security Network Management Security Access Policies Kerberos System Disaster Recovery PlanningSECURITY ATTACKS &amp; SECURITY SERVICESSecurity Threads Unauthori
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Firewalls and Computer System Security1Outline of Course1. Introduction 2. Threats and Attacks 3. Firewall Building Blocks Authentication Servers, Screening Routers, Bastion Host, Application-level Gateways4. Firewall Architectures 5. Virtual
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Analyzing and Comparing Montgomery Multiplication AlgorithmsCetin Kaya Ko and Tolga Acar c Department of Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon 973311 1fkoc,acarg@ece.orst.eduBurton S. Kaliski Jr. RSA Labor
Oregon State - ECE - 679
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS, VOL. 49, NO. 7, JULY 2000763The Montgomery Modular Inverse - RevisitedE. Sava, C. K. Ko s cAbstract We modify an algorithm given by Kaliski to compute the Montgomery inverse of an integer modulo a prime number.
Oregon State - ECE - 679
High-Speed Implementation of an ECC-based Wireless Authentication Protocol on an ARM Microprocessor M. Aydos, T. Yank, and C. K. Ko c Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University, Owen Hall 220 Corvallis, Oregon 97331, USA Tel: +1 541
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Incomplete Reduction in Modular ArithmeticT. Yank, E. Sava, and C. K. Ko s c Electrical &amp; Computer Engineering Oregon State University Corvallis, Oregon 97331Abstract We describe a novel method for obtaining fast software implementations of the
SUNY Buffalo - CSE - 442
Software Development is a Risky Business!Whenever a computer program is to be built, there are areas of uncertainty.Software is a Risky Business!Why Uncertainty?Why Uncertainty?Are the needs of the customer really understood? n Can the functi
Oregon State - ECE - 679
Elliptic Curve CryptosystemsApplications: e-commerce, smart cards, digital money, secure communications, etc. Elliptic curve protocols: Diffie-Hellman, authentication protocols, etc. Elliptic curve primitives: Key-pair generation, Signing and Verifi
Stanford - EE - 282
Olukotun Autumn 98/99Handout #18 EE282HChapter 3 HomeworkDue October 22, 1998Question 1 (40 points): Pipeline HazardsExercise 3.3 p. 216Question 2 (30 points): Pipeline Branch PerformanceYou are analyzing the pipeline for a CISC processor,
FAU - COT - 4400
FAU - COT - 4400
COT 4400 Homework 5 (10 pts) Due date: April 27 (Firm) Question 1: Given the following directed graph G, starting from node 6, please list the order of the nodes visited for the first time by a depth-first search algorithm (if there is a tie, please
FAU - CAP - 4630
Multi-Layer Feedforward Neural NetworksCAP 4630 Intro. to Artificial Intelligence Xingquan (Hill) ZhuOutline Multi-layer Neural Networks Feedforward Neural Networks FF NN model Backpropogation (BP) Algorithm Practical Issues of FFNN FFNN f
N. Georgia - KMRYAL - 7911
MultimediaResearchProjectRubricMs.Ryals WorldHistoryClassStudentName:_Topic:_Date: _ SelfTeacher ResearchProcess:Level1Level2Level3Level4ScoreScore Gatheredinformationfromjournals, 012 345 678 910 books,CDs,andtheInternet Resourcesarecurrentandr
N. Georgia - KMRYAL - 7911
MATHEMATICS: Students willI just want to let you know that I am so excited about this school year. I am looking forward to getting to know each and every one of you, as well as each of my students. I like to invite all of my student's parents' to
N. Georgia - KMRYAL - 7911
Web-Based Lesson PlanLesson Plan Title: Developed by: Subject Area: Grade Level: Purpose of the Activity: Learning Objectives (include at least one Georgia QCC): Getting to Know Your Government! Kelly Ryals Civics 3rd Grade The purpose of this activ