NMSU - MATH - 683

Allan Hancock College - COMP - 5348

COMP5348 Service ProjectAssignment 3 - The ScenarioScenario! DHL Pracel Germany: automatic parcel machines (PackStation) service! ! ! ! ! Generalizes the P.O. Box principle to parcels Both ways: Parcels can be left and collected to avoid courier

NMSU - MATH - 683

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Homework #1(Due 10 Feb 2006 at 9:00 am) Note: The TA for this class is Parul Mathur. Please give completed assignments to her or place them in her mailbox. (1) A gourmet coee rm has shortrun cost function C(q) = 18 + 3q 1 q 2 + 3 (a) Find

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Homework #2(Due 24 Feb 2006) (1) A 2good pureexchange economy is made up of two consumers, Abe and Bea. Abe's preferences are represented by the utility function U A = (x1 x2 )1/2 , and his endowment is 16 units of good 1 and 2 units of go

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Homework #3(Due 31 March 2006) (1) An economy is made up of two consumers, Abe and Bea, two rms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, and three goods, x1 , x2 , and y. Both consumers and both rms are price takers in all markets. Abes and Beas preferences ar

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Homework #4(Not to be turned in) (1) A monopolist has the cost function c(Q) = 3Q. There are two types of consumers, highdemand types and lowdemand types; suppose for simplicity that there is one of each type. The highdemand types have dem

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Homework #5(Due 28 April 2006) (1) For each of the following games, nd all purestrategy Nash equilibria. (a) Player 2 A B 2,2 0,0 0,0 1,1Player 1A B(b) Player 2 A B 2,2 0,0 0,0 0,0Player 1A B(c) Player 2 B C 3,4 6,3 2,4 1,5 2,2

NMSU - MATH - 683

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Homework #6(Not to be turned in) (1) Consider the following variation on the rmlocation game discussed in class. Two rms sequentially choose locations: either A or B. Firm 1 chooses rst; its choice is observed by Firm 2 before Firm 2 choos

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Name:Econ 7342 Spring 2006 Midterm Exam #1(120 points total) Instructions: Answer all questions. You may write your answers on the backs of pages, as long as you make it clear which question you are answering. Scratch paper will be provided, but y

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Name:Econ 7342 Spring 2006 Midterm Exam #2(120 points total) Instructions: Answer all questions. You may write your answers on the backs of pages, as long as you make it clear which question you are answering. Scratch paper will be provided, but y

Allan Hancock College - COMP - 5348

Copyright warningCOMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING This material has been reproduced and communicated to you by or on behalf of the University of Sydney pursuant to Part VB of the Copyright Act 1968 (the Ac t ). The materi

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Spring 2006 Midterm Exam #2 Solutions(1) Demand is given by p = a bQ, costs by c(Q) = cQ, and the tax is t per unit sold. (a) The rms prot function is = [a bQ]Q cQ tQ. The rstorder condition for a maximum is = a b(1 + )Q c t. 0= Q

NMSU - MATH - 683

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Name:Econ 7342 Spring 2006 Midterm Exam #3(120 points total) Instructions: Answer all questions. You may write your answers on the backs of pages, as long as you make it clear which question you are answering. Scratch paper will be provided, but y

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Spring 2006 Midterm Exam #3 Solutions(1) (a) A payo matrix is shown below. Player 2 A B 6,6 20,12 12,20 2,2Player 1A B(b) Purestrategy Nash equilibria are (A,B) and (B,A). (c) The mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium is3 1 4, 4,3 1 4,

NMSU - MATH - 683

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U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Spring 2006 Homework #4 Solutions(1) The monopolists costs are given by c(Q) = 3Q (so that marginal cost and average cost are both 3), and inverse demand functions for the two types of consumer are pH = 30 QH and pL = 24 QL . (a) If the

U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Econ 7342 Spring 2006 Homework #6 Solutions(1) (a) A game tree is shown in Figure 1. (b) Subgame perfect equilibria can be found by backward induction. In Firm 2's left decision node, it will choose B (since 10000 > 4000), and in its right decision

NMSU - MATH - 683

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U. Houston - ECON - 7342

Syllabus: Microeconomic Theory II (Econ 7342-04571)Times of Class: Instructor: Office: MW 9-10:30 am Location of Class: McElhinney 104 Nick Feltovich McElhinney 202-C Phone: 743-3815 Email: nfelt@bayou.uh.edu Fax: 743-3798 WWW: www.uh.edu/~nfelt/ TT

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm exam #1Instructions: Answer all questions as precisely as possible. Answers that are incorrect, but show progress toward a correct answer, might receive partial credit. True but irrelevant information will receive no c

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Midterm #1 solutions1. (10 points) Player 2 Player 1 A B W 6,2 3,5 X 2,6 7,1 Y 1,7 0,8 Z 5,3 4,4a. (2 points) If Player 1 chooses A and Player 2 chooses X, Player 1s payoff will be 2. b. (2 points) If Player 1 chooses B and Player 2 choo

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm #2Instructions: Answer all questions as precisely as possible, and show your work. Incorrect answers that show progress toward a correct answer might receive partial credit. True but irrelevant information will receive

NMSU - MATH - 683

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U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Midterm #2 solutions1. (20 points) Let (p,1-p) be Player 1s mixed strategy in the game below, where p[0,1]. Player 2 Left Center Right Player Up 0,0 5,8 3,6 1 Down 8,5 2,2 1,1 a. (3 points) If Player 2 chooses Left, his expected payoff wil

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm #3Instructions: Answer all questions as precisely as possible, and show your work. Incorrect answers that show progress toward a correct answer might receive partial credit. True but irrelevant information will receive

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Midterm #3 solutions1. (10 points)a. (1 point) Player 1s available pure strategies are A, B, and C. b. (3 points) Player 2s available pure strategies are DD, DE, ED, and EE. c. (6 points) Player 3s available pure strategies are FFF, FFG,

NMSU - MATH - 683

Some Examples of CategoriesMathematics 683, Fall 2006In this short note we give examples to distinguish the notions of category, Ab-category, additive category, and Abelian category. Recall that an Ab-category is a category in which for each pair o

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm #4Instructions: Answer all questions as precisely as possible, and show your work. Incorrect answers that show progress toward a correct answer might receive partial credit. True but irrelevant information will receive

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Midterm #4 solutions1. (15 points)a. (5 points) Player 1 does know the result of the chance move; her decision nodes following Natures choice of either A or B belong to separate information sets. b. (5 points) Player 2 does not know the

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #1Consider a game with this payoff matrix. Player 2 X Y A 7,1 1,2 Player 1 B 5,8 8,7 Z 4,3 2,91. For all parts of this problem, suppose Player 1 chooses the mixed strategy (1/4,3/4) and Player 2 chooses the mixed strategy (1/2,1

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #1 solutionsPlayer 1 A B X 7,1 5,8 Player 2 Y 1,2 8,7 Z 4,3 2,91. For this problem, Player 1 chooses (1/4,3/4) and Player 2 chooses (1/2,1/6,1/3). a. The probability that Player 1 chooses B is 3/4. b. The probability that Player

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #2For each simultaneous-move game below, let Player 1s strategy be (p,1-p) and Player 2s strategy be (q,1-q), and find, if possible, a. a condition on q such that A is Player 1s best response, b. a condition on q such that B is Pl

NMSU - MATH - 683

Sheaf CohomologyIn this note we give the background needed to dene sheaf cohomology. In particular, we prove the following two facts. First, the category Ab(X) of sheaves on a topological space X has enough injectives. Second, if is the global fun

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #2 solutionsFor all problems, Player 1s strategy is (p,1-p) and Player 2s strategy is (q,1-q). Also, best-response diagrams are given for each problem; Player 1s best-response correspondence is shown as thick lines, and Player 2s

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #3For each simultaneous-move game below, let the players mixed strategies be (p,1-p) (for Player 1), (q,1-q) (for Player 2), and (r,1-r) (for Player 3), and find a. all three players expected payoffs to both of their available str

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #3 solutionsFor all problems, Player 1s strategy is (p,1-p), Player 2s is (q,1-q), and Player 3s is (r,1-r). Note that all three games are symmetric, so for a given game, all three players expected payoff calculations and best res

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #41. For each simultaneous-move game below, find i. Player 1s pure-strategy best-response function, ii. Player 2s pure-strategy best-response function, iii. the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of each game. In each game, x1 denotes

NMSU - MATH - 683

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GWU - ECE - 001

A Biomed CurriculumInterschool Working Group Summer 2001 Approved by the BOT February 2002Educational Objectives The BME Program is designed to ensure that eachstudent develops a strong educational foundation in the basic sciences, as well as i

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Homework #4 solutions1. a. Player 1s payoff is 1 = (60x1x2)x1 and Player 2s payoff is 2 = (60x1x2)x2. Player 1s payoff can be written as (60x2)x1x12, which fits the form A+Bx1+Cx12 (where A = 0, B = 60x2, and C= 1). So, the value of x1 tha

NMSU - MATH - 683

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U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm #1Answer all questions as completely as possible. Partial credit may be given for progress toward a solution. True but irrelevant information receives no credit. Unless stated otherwise, assume that a player's payoff i

Allan Hancock College - COMP - 5348

Scenario! DHL Pracel Germany: automatic parcel machines (PackStation) service! ! ! ! ! Generalizes the P.O. Box principle to parcels Both ways: Parcels can be left and collected to avoid courier costs in most German cities and public places (e.g. U

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm #2Answer all questions as completely as possible. Partial credit may be given for progress toward a solution. True but irrelevant information receives no credit. Unless stated otherwise, assume that a player's payoff i

NMSU - MATH - 683

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U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Midterm #2 solutions1. (16 points) Player 1 A B C D 4,0 2,6 3,2 Player 2 E 4,2 5,7 6,5 F 7,1 3,1 6,2a. (4 points) Player 1 has no dominant strategy. If Player 2 chooses D or F, Player 1's unique best response is A; if Player 2 chooses E,

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm #3Answer all questions as completely as possible. Partial credit may be given for progress toward a solution. True but irrelevant information receives no credit. You may write on the backs of these pages, as long as I

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Midterm #3 solutions1. (30 points) a. (10 points)b. (10 points)c. (10 points)2. (30 points) In the strategic form below, boldface payoffs correspond to pure-strategy best responses. Player 2 Player 1 A B A B 1,1,1 0,9,0 9,0,0 1,1,1 P

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Midterm #4Answer all questions as completely as possible. Partial credit may be given for progress toward a solution. True but irrelevant information receives no credit. You may write on the backs of these pages, as long as I

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Quiz #1Consider a game with this payoff matrix. Player 2 W 4,6 2,9 6,8Player 1A B CV 7,1 5,5 9,3X 3,2 8,7 1,4a. If Player 1 chooses A and Player 2 chooses X, what will Player 1s payoff be?b. If Player 1 chooses B a

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Quiz #10Due at beginning of class Nov. 29Consider the following two-player card game. First, Player 1 and Player 2 are each dealt one card, which can be either an A or a K. There is a chance that both are dealt As, a chance

NMSU - MATH - 683

Spectral SequencesIn this document we gather together facts and calculations about spectral sequences.1Motivation of Spectral Sequences by Double Complexes0 Let T be a rst quadrant double complex. We write Epq for the (p, q) term in T . We ha

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Quiz #10 Solutionsa. One acceptable game tree is shown below.b. This game has no proper subgames, so every Nash equilibrium is also a subgame perfect equilibrium. To find the Nash equilibria, we represent the game with a strategic form.

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Quiz #1 SolutionsPlayer 1 A B C V 7,1 5,5 9,3 Player 2 W 4,6 2,9 6,8 X 3,2 8,7 1,4a. If Player 1 chooses A and Player 2 chooses X, Player 1s payoff will be 3. b. If Player 1 chooses B and Player 2 chooses V, Player 2s payoff will be 5. c

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Quiz #2Consider a game with this payoff matrix. Player 2 Y 1,2 8,7 2,1Player 1A B CX 7,1 5,8 9,3Z 4,3 2,9 6,4a. Does Player 1 have a dominant strategy in this game? If so, which one(s)?b. Does Player 1 have a domin

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Quiz #2 SolutionsPlayer 1 A B C X 7,1 5,8 9,3 Player 2 Y 1,2 8,7 2,1 Z 4,3 2,9 6,4a. Player 1 has no dominant strategy. b. Player 1 has a dominated strategy, A (which is dominated by C). c. Player 2 has a dominant strategy, Z. d. Player

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Name:ID#:Econ 4349 Quiz #3Consider a game with this payoff matrix. Player 2 Player 1 A B W 6,1 4,4 X 1,0 2,3 Y 7,5 0,4 Z 2,6 2,5a. Write Player 1s best-response correspondence in the space below.b. Write Player 2s best-response correspondenc

U. Houston - ECON - 4349

Econ 4349 Quiz #3 SolutionsPlayer 2 Player 1 A B W 6,1 4,4 X 1,0 2,3 Y 7,5 0,4 Z 2,6 2,5a. Player 1s best-response correspondence is BR(W)=A BR(X)=B BR(Y)=A BR(Z)={A,B} b. Player 2s best-response correspondence is BR(A)=Z BR(B)=Z c. Nash equilibri