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- Title: Lecture
- Type: Notes
- School: Colorado
- Course: PHIL 1100
- Term: Spring
#10: Lecture Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue Emotivism Outline of ch. 2 3 Emotivism As a Moral Theory as a theory of the meaning of moral terms as a theory of the use of moral terms As Embodied in the Culture the characters that represent a culture the account of the self The Claims of Emotivism Thesis--all evaluative judgments (including moral judgments) are nothing but expressions of preferences, attitudes, or feelings. Consequence--There is a sharp distinction between factual judgments & evaluative judgments. Factual StatementsMoral Statements (Values) These are descriptive.These express attitudes & feelings. These are true or false.These are not true or false. There are rational criteria by which agreement can be secured.There are no rational criteria by which agreement can be secured; agreement comes from affecting the emotions of those who disagree. Factual statements are made: to express our own judgments & to convince others. Moral statements are made: to express our own feelings & to affect the feelings of others The Claims of Emotivism: What is Emotivism a Theory of? According to its proponents: Emotivism is a theory of meaning of moral statements According to MacIntyre: Emotivism as a theory of meaning is false. Emotivism is only plausible as a theory of the use of moral statements. But it is only plausible as a theory of how moral statements are used in particular societies, not as a theory of the only way in which moral statements can be used. Emotivism as a Theory of Meaning It tells us what moral statements mean Its thesis: Moral statements mean nothing but that the speaker has certain emotions. E.g., abortion is bad means nothing but I disapprove of (i.e., I dislike) abortion; do so as well! There are three problems with emotivism as a theory of meaning: It fails to identify the kind of approval which moral statements express. It obliterates the distinction between statements of personal preference and statements of moral evaluation. Expressing feelings is a matter of the use of language, not of its meaning. Emotivism as a Theory of Meaning Problem #1: Emotivism fails to identify the kind of approval which moral statements express. There are lots of kinds of approval. Whatever approval is expressed in moral statements is distinguishable from other kinds of approval. To say that they express moral approval is circular. Any other answer is implausible. Emotivism as a Theory of Meaning Problem #2 Emotivism obliterates the distinction between statements of personal preference and statements of moral evaluation. The distinction is evident from the following considerations: Contrast: I don't like people doing that; in fact, there ought to be a law against it! It's wrong of people to do that; in fact, there ought to be a law against it! Consider: Would it be an adequate reply to say (b) to (a): a.You can't say that doing something is wrong just because you don't like people doing it. b.Of course I can. What more reason could there be for saying something's wrong than that one dislikes it? Emotivism as a Theory of Meaning Problem #2 (cont'd.) [The distinction between statements of personal preference and statements of moral evaluation] What more is there than personal preference? Moral judgments, unlike statements of like or approval, are impersonal. Moral judgments, unlike statements of like or approval, make implicit appeal to objective standards. Emotivism as a Theory of Meaning Problem #3: Expressing feelings is a matter of the use of language, not of its meaning What are possible uses of language? To inform To entertain To annoy To promise, &c. Emotivism as a Theory of the Use of Moral Statements It tells us what moral statements are used for, what function they have Thesis: Speakers who use moral expressions are doing nothing but expressing their feelings. But it is only plausible as a theory of how moral statements are used in particular societies, not as a theory of the only way in which moral statements can be used. Emotivism is a theory about the use of moral statements in Cambridge, 1903-1939. To understand why, we need to understand the intellectual history of early 20th century Cambridge. History of Early C20 Cambridge: Stage I: Intuitionism (1903-1939) G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica appeared in 1903. Its central theses were: 1. Good is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property, recognized by intuition. 2. Right is productivity of goodness. 3. The greatest goods are personal affection & aesthetic enjoyment. Moral discourse (e.g., among Moore's disciples in the Bloomsbury Group) became disagreement about intuitions. Arguments involved nothing more than deployment of the psychological techniques of persuasion. [Photographs: G. E. Moore; Vanessa Bell, The Memoir Club, a portrait of the Bloomsbury Group] History of Early C20 Cambridge: Stage II: Emotivism A response to British intuitionism As a result of what moral discourse became, C. L. Stevenson (right) & others (emotivists) denied that there were facts that were being argued about. Emotivism might be a cogent theory of how these expressions were used in Cambridge in the first decades of the 20th century, but is it adequate as a general theory of the use of moral statements? Emotivism was a response to the failures of intuitionism. Disagreement among intuitionists led to the belief that moral statements were not expressing judgments of objective fact, so what were they doing? Maybe just expressing the speaker's subjective feelings. The Implications of Emotivism as a General Theory of the Use of Moral Statements If moral statements are only used to express emotions, then they are at best systematically misleading they are at worst manipulative (and dishonest) In that case, they should be given up. Their meaning is too much at variance with this use. Why should one say It's wrong when all one means is I don't like it.? So, we seem to be faced with the choice between two alternatives: 1.Giving up using moral expressions. 2.Denying that moral expressions are only used to express emotions. Facts to be ExplainedPossible ExplanationsVersions of Possible ExplanationEvaluation of that Version 1. Moral discourse is used to express disagreement (which is interminable) 2. Moral discourse a. shows conceptual incommensurability of rival positions b. purports to give impersonal reasons c. includes arguments with distinct historical origins Emotivism--all evaluative judgments (including moral judgments) are nothing but expressions of preferences, attitudes, or feelings As a theory of the meaning of moral terms--Moral statements mean only that the speaker has feelings of approval or disapproval This is not what moral terms mean: 1. It can't explain what kind of approval moral statements give. 2. It obliterates the distinction between statements of personal preference and statements of moral evaluation As a theory of the use of moral terms--Moral statements are only used to express certain feelings. This may be how moral statements have been used in a certain culture. If they were only used that way, it would be better not to use them at all. It is not true about the use of moral statements in all cultures. Historicism--Moral discourse in our culture has a history analogous to scientific discourse in the parable of ch. 1. [MacIntyre still needs to provide this] Emotivism vs. Historicism Historicism is an alternative account of why moral discourse has the features that it has. This alternative sees its current state as a state of disorder. This alternative requires seeing the history of moral discourse as a multi-stage history. (Compare this with the stages of the parable of Ch. 1) Stage 1: There was a time in which rational justification of moral judgments, &c. was possible. [A catastrophe occurs, but this is not mentioned here.] Stage 2: This is followed by a period which was committed to objectivity & impersonality of moral judgments, but in which the attempts to give rational justification continually broke down Stage 3: The repeated failures to provide a rational justification for ethics leads to emotivism, in which there is an implicit recognition that the claims of rational justifiability cannot be made good, that the postcatastrophe attempts to do moral philosophy are deeply incoherent. [That is what leads to emotivism.] Why is modern moral discourse interminable? There are two possible answers 1.The emotivist answer--because there is no rational basis for evaluative judgments 2.MacIntyre's answer--An intellectual catastrophe left everyone with fragmentary moral insights and without the resources necessary to understand or defend them. To defend this view, MacIntyre must describe the lost morality of the past, evaluating its claims to objectivity & authority show that ours is an emotivist culture by examining concepts & modes of behavior 1.Why don't we know all about this catastrophe? 1.Because only a history informed by evaluative standards can recognize catastrophes. 2.We don't, for the most part, do history that way. First Installment of the History that Note this story is going to be told backwards. Beginning with an account of the way things are now, we will move back into the past in search of the cause of the present state of affairs (a present state of disorder, according to MacIntyre). Two features of the present need explanation The disordered state of moral discourse The prevalence of emotivism, a view that virtually no serious moral philosopher or moral theologian embraced before the 1930's. The explanation of both is The prevalence of intuitionist moral philosophy in the first decades of C20. The inadequacy of intuitionism Its inability to explain why its principles are true Its inability to adjudicate conflicts between what intuition gives us Goodness only (from which rightness is derived), as for Moore Or both goodness & rightness as separate objects, as for Ross Its inability to show how to apply intuited principles to particular cases Maybe moral reasoning is not reasoning at all, but just emotion-expressing. Now will come the question: What caused the rise of intuitionism around 1900? MacIntyre's answer will be: The failure of the Enlightenment project of justifying morality. But first, he offers more on how emotivism is embodied in our culture. Emotivism as Embodied in the Culture Two Questions What would the social world look like through emotivist eyes? What would the social world be like if most people were emotivists? The Social World Through Emotivist Eyes Traditionally, three ways of influencing another's behavior are distinguished: 1.moral argument--giving them reasons for doing things the way we think they should be done. 2.coercion--but this is only legitimate in cases of authority (the government, parents, &c.) 3.manipulation--trying to cause them to do things the way we would like to have them done. Distinguishing Moral Argument & Manipulation In Moral ArgumentIn Manipulation One treats the other person as an end.One treats the other person as a means. One offers good reasons for acting in a certain way, but leaves it to them to evaluate those reasons. One seeks to make the other an instrument of one's own purposes, adducing whatever influences will in fact be effective. One is guided by the standards of normative rationality.One is guided by the sociology and psychology of persuasion. Emotivism Cannot Make That Distinction Emotivism denies that there are objectively good reasons. An emotivist could reply that emotivism leaves open the possibility of arguing from another person's principles against their conclusions. But why, if emotivism is true, should the other person not just give up the principle? An emotivist could always give personal reasons for another's acting differently, but moral argument presents itself precisely as impersonal. The implications of emotivism: No statements that really only state personal preferences can offer impersonal reasons for action. Moral discourse really only state personal preferences. So, Moral discourse does not offer impersonal reasons for action. All moral discourse purports to offer impersonal reasons for actions So, moral discourse purports to do what it cannot really do. Discourse which purports to do what it cannot really do is manipulative. So, moral discourse is manipulative. Emotivism's Three Social Contexts Characters Certain social roles stand as moral representatives of the culture. Moral & metaphysical ideas assume through them an embodied existence in the social world. Each culture has its own stock of characters. Victorian England The Explorer, The Engineer & The Headmaster Wilhelmine Prussia The Professor, The Social Democrat & the Military Officer Victorian Characters: The Explorer Famous explorers included David Livingstone (1813 1873), the Scottish missionary and explorer who spent the last thirty years of his life exploring Africa. His discoveries, including that of Victoria Falls in 1855 made him a national hero. Rumors of his death led the New York Herald to send Henry M. Stanley to Africa to find him. It was this expedition that led to the famous line, Dr. Livingstone, I presume. Livingstone was given the honor of burial in Westminster Abbey. Victorian Characters: The Engineer Samuel Smiles, in Lives of the Engineers (1862), presents his subjects as models of hard work and perseverence. Famous Victorian engineers included James Watt, inventor of the modern steam engine; Joseph Bazalgette (right), who built some 2100 km of tunnels and pipes to carry London sewage away from the city (1855-75); Fleeming Jenkin, who laid a telegraph cable across the Atlantic Ocean (1858). Victorian Characters: The Headmaster Honour the work and the work will honour you.--Edward Thring What we must look for here is, firstly, religious and moral principles; secondly, gentlemanly conduct; thirdly, intellectual ability.--Thomas Arnold The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing-fields of Eton.-- attributed to Lord Wellington The Common Element What do these three Victorian characters have in common? The centrality to a good life of facing great challenges. See Tennyson's Charge of the Light Brigade Alfred Lord Tennyson's The Charge of the Light Brigade Half a league half a league, Half a league onward, All in the valley of Death Rode the six hundred: 'Forward, the Light Brigade! Charge for the guns' he said: Into the valley of Death Rode the six hundred. ... When can their glory fade? O the wild charge they made! All the world wonder'd. Honour the charge they made! Honour the Light Brigade, Noble six hundred! A Social World full of Emotivists A world with no basis for actions except the arbitrary preference of the agents. In moral discourse no rational discussion of ends the choice in influencing the actions of others would be between personal appeal and manipulation Jack Welch, former CEO of GE The Characters of Our Emotivist Culture The Rich Aesthete For the Rich Aesthete, the means are readily available. The problem is to find ends that will stave off boredom. The Manager (Life in organizations) For the Manager ends are given (by the organization or the organizational culture). Rational discussion about them is not possible. The manager is concerned only with how to attain them (technique). Here alone rational discussion is possible. Paris Hilton The Characters of Our Emotivist Culture (cont'd.) The Therapist (Personal life) In therapy, ends are set by the patient. The therapist is concerned only with how to attain them (technique). Here alone rational discussion is possible. [Photograph: Dr. Drew Pinsky] The Characters of Our Emotivist Culture what these characters have in common--the ideas that Ends cannot be rationally discussed or evaluated. The only basis for accepting something as one's end is (emotionbased) personal preference. Once the ends are given, rational discussion can begin. The Emotivist Conception of the Self The question--how does one answer the question Who am I? The emotivist view The self lacks any necessary connection with any contingent state of affairs. Some moral philosophers even see this as the essence of moral agency. Jean-Paul Sartre (right) identifies the self as entirely distinct from any social role that it may happen to assume. Identifying the self with its roles is a fundamental error. Erving Goffman identifies the self as merely something on which roles are hung, something which has no existence of its own They agree on this: The self is entirely set over against the social world. The self lacks any ultimate criteria (only preferences, attitudes, &c., on the basis of which criteria are established). So, it has no moral history in its transitions from one moral commitment to another. It merely arbitrarily exchanges one commitment for another. An Alternative View of the Self The emotivist self results from a stripping away of elements of an earlier view of the self The kind of social identity that the self once had is no longer available The loss of a natural telos (a purpose, goal, or end, grounded in the nature of man) leaves the self criterionless and hence incapable of a rational history In traditional societies, one identifies oneself by one's social relations. These are not accidents, to be stripped away to discover the real self. They not only define who one is but set one's duties and goals. The modern self ... Is it freed from the bonds of social hierarchies and from the superstitions of teleology? or is it a self stripped of something essential to understanding our lives? Its natural home is a bifurcated world of bureaucratic individualism Characterization #1 the organizational--ends given (not available to rational scrutiny) the personal--ends open to choice, not given (but not susceptible to rational choice) Characterization #2--two alternative modes of social life one in which free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign one in which bureaucracy is sovereign MacIntyre's historicism: The emotivist self, like the emotivist theory of moral judgment, are intelligible only as the result of an historical process.
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