UC Irvine - ICS - 268

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

COMS W4995 Introduction to CryptographyNovember 13, 2003Lecture 21: Multiple Use Signature SchemesLecturer: Tal Malkin Scribes: M. Niccolai, M. RaibertSummaryIn this lecture, we use the one time secure signature schemes discussed in lecture 2

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

ICS 268: Cryptography and Communication SecuritySeptember 28, 2004Lecture 1: Crypto Overview, Perfect Secrecy, One-time PadLecturer: Stanislaw Jarecki (These notes incorporate material from Tal Malkin's Lecture 1-2 and Yevgeni Dodis's Lecture 1)

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

ICS 268: Cryptography and Communication Security10/28/2004Homework 4Due Tuesday, 11/09/200411.1Hash Function PropertiesExplain why the modular exponentiation function, Exp : {0, 1} Z where Exp(x) = p gx mod p for a large prime p and g ge

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

ICS 268: Cryptography and Communication Security10/14/2004Homework 3Due Thursday, 10/21/20041Shank's Discrete Logarithm Algorithm : ModificationDescribe how to modify Shank's "Baby Step - Giant Step" algorithm so that to compute the discre

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

ICS 268: Cryptography and Communication Security9/28/2004Homework 1Due Tuesday, 10/5/2004, at the beginning of the class1Substitution cipherHave a look at the substitution cipher in Lecture Notes 1 (section 3.3) and recall the definition o

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

COMS W4995 Introduction to CryptographyNovember 18, 2003Lecture 22: Message Authentication CodesLecturer: Tal Malkin Scribes: Gopal AnanthramanSummaryDigital Signature scheme summary.Definitions of Message Authentication Codes and security fo

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

COMS W4995 Introduction to CryptographyOctober 30, 2003Lecture 18: Digital Signature SchemesLecturer: Tal Malkin Scribes: Hua Shuo CaiSummaryDefinition of Digital Signature scheme. Brief description of Paradox. And construction of Lamport's O

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

ICS 268: Cryptography and Communication Security10/7/2004Homework 2Due Thursday, 10/14/20041Prime Modular ArithmeticsLet p be a prime. Recall groups Zp and Z from lecture and the handout on modular p arithmetics. Recall the fact that Z is

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

G22.3033-003 Introduction to CryptographySeptember 20, 2001Lecture 2Lecturer: Yevgeniy Dodis Scribe: Ofer H. GillThis lecture begins with a discussion on secret-key and public-key cryptography, and then discusses One-Way Functions (OWF), and t

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

l p " g m x wv yD"g Qggv & ulp tor QgHv & p zz ql onAQgtk l s " g k g g j Qs2g%Q6g2Q2Q"gsQgvVvQw%v i g f d 4ggQkf4 7s2gHgQgg2Q2Q"g Qg h"QHs% qg eQ)gg @!e

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

ICS 268: Cryptography and Communication Security11/21/2004Homework 5Due Tuesday, 12/2/20041Insecure Variant of the Schnorr Signature SchemeConsider the following variant of the Schnorr signature scheme (i.e. the discrete-log based signatur

UC Irvine - ICS - 268

ICS 268, Fall'04Lecture Summaries, Homeworks, Solutions, Handouts[+ a tentative schedule for what's to come] [back to course main page]Lectures 1-2 (lect1.pdf) Lectures 3-4 (h1-primes.pdf) , (h2-composites.pdf) , (Dana Angluin's notes on computa

UC Irvine - CS - 201

file:/C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Linda%20Grauer/My%20Documents/Dolores/UC%20Irvine-Harvest/CS%20201/hmw1.htmHomework 1: Due Monday, October 15 (or email me if you need time till Wednesday). First part: Chapter 2, problems 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.

UC Irvine - CS - 201

Homework 2Yanbin LU (+ some edits by Stanislaw Jarecki) Information and Computer Sciences University of California, Irvine yanbinl@uci.edu November 16, 20071Problem 1log2n (logn) n1/3 (logn)2/31/3 2/3 log(4 109 100 365 24 3600) 63.4517

UC Irvine - CS - 201

ICS 201: Cryptography and Communication Security10/19/2007Solutions to homework 1Problem 2.2If encryption is secure then by Definition 2.1 this condition implies that P r[M = m] = P r[M = m ] for all m, m in the message space, which is obvious

UC Irvine - CS - 201

ICS 201: Cryptography and Communication Security10/22/2007Homework 2Due Monday, Oct 29, in classProblem 1 and 2Do exercises 3.2 and 3.4.Problem 3Consider a stateful encryption scheme, e.g. a stream cipher. Here both the encryption and the

UC Irvine - CS - 201

3.3CS 201: Introduction to CryptographyFall Quarter, 2007Instructor: Stanislaw Jarecki M-W, 3:30-5 ICS 243 ICS 6A and ICS 161/261, also see below Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell,"Introduction to Modern Cryptography".Class time: Room: Prerequisite

SUNY Stony Brook - AMS - 310.01

AMS 310.01 FALL 2003 Homework #11 Solutions 7.56n 8In this problem, the alternative is two sided and 0.05 so we use Table 8(c) with(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)d 0.50 , d 0.75 , d 1.00 , d 1.25 , d 1.50 ,P(Type II error) 0.68 P(Type II error)

SUNY Stony Brook - AMS - 310.01

AMS 310.01 FALL 2003 Homework #10 Solutions 7.30(a) The probability of Type I error is the probability that X is less than 2.9960 or greater than 3.0040 when 3.0000 . Using a normal approximation to the distribution of the sample mean, this probab

LSU - MATH - 3355

SUNY Stony Brook - AMS - 310.01

AMS 310.01 Fall 2003Homework 2 Solution3.28 (a) There are 52 possible outcomes. Two of those are red kings. Thus, the probability of red king is 2/52 = 1/26. (b) Again, there are 52 possible outcomes. There are 4 possible 3's, 4's, 5's and 6's in

SUNY Stony Brook - AMS - 310.01

AMS 310.01 Fall 20034.30Homework 4 Solutions(a) The mean is given by 0(0.4) 1(0.3) 2(0.2) 3(0.1) 1(b) The variance 2 is given by 2 (0 1) 2 (0.4) (1 1) 2 (0.3) (2 1) 2 (0.2) (3 1) 2 (0.1) 14.34 Using the formula,1 n(n 1)

Berkeley - CS - 194

!"! " $ " % " ! & " # " # "!" #( ( 0 !) ""*+ " , -( ! -( ) ! . /! " / " " "! !!' 1-2'13 " -; # " -;4 # 56 7 8 " . " # # = " " ! < " >/$ /% !" <9% ; 6 !/ @ : " 1/ @6 ) %!67-" !"#" -A 6 %-; "

Berkeley - CS - 194

RootkitsCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph December 2, 2005Administrivia Final exam: 1 LeConte Hall Tuesday 12/13 12:30-3:30 Comprehensive Open books, notes, . No electronic devices No office hours for me next Mon/Tue Substitute hours: Th 12-

Berkeley - CS - 194

WatermarkingDoug TygarHow can we mark dataWe want to protect data: Video, sound, music (Digimarc, Intertrust, etc) Programs (Collberg, Thomborson) Statistical dataExamples of "traditional" protection methods: False entries in biographical d

Berkeley - CS - 194

Quantum CryptographyUmesh V. Vazirani CS 161/194-1 November 28, 2005Why Quantum Cryptography?Unconditional security - Quantum computers can solve certain tasks exponentially faster; including quantum factoring algorithm. - you can learn more ab

Berkeley - CS - 194

Outline History Network-based Host Compromise Host-based Network Intrusion Detection Signature-based Anomaly-basedIntrusion DetectionCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph September 14, 2005 Distributed Network Intrusion Detection Honeypots Tarpi

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161 Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/Wagner FinalComputer SecuritySolnProblem 1. [Defaults] (9 points)(a) Which is generally safer (from a security point of view), a firewall with a "default deny" policy or a firewall with a "default allow"

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161 Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerMTComputer Security1 SolnProblem 1. [Short answer] (30 points)Give brief answers (one or two sentences) to each of the following. (a) What is the principle of least privilege? Why is it important?

SUNY Stony Brook - AMS - 310.01

AMS 310.01Fall 2003Homework 3 Solution3.74 P( from agency F | bad tires ) = P (from agency F and bad tires) / P( bad tires ) = (0.60) * (0.04) / 0.068 = 0.353 < in 3.73 , P(car had bad tires) = (0.20)(0.10)+(0.20)(0.12) +(0.60)(0.04) = 0.068 >

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161 Fall 2005Computer Security Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerNotes 291 Operating System SecurityGoals: Protecting different applications running on the same machine at the same time from each other Keep malicious/buggy user programs from cr

Berkeley - CS - 194

Statistical Database SecurityLast lecture Covert channels Two types of leaked informationCovert channels (deliberate) Side channels (accidental)Doug Tygar (doug.tygar@gmail.com) November 2, 2005 cs161.orgNovember 2, 2005 Doug Tygar, 2005 (

Berkeley - CS - 194

Government models of securityMilitary models of security "Need to know" Three models of securityClassification unclassified, classified, secret, top secret Compartmentalization nuclear, crypto, weapons specificDoug Tygar (doug.tygar@gmail.com)

Berkeley - CS - 194

Web SecurityCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph November 21, 2005Outline Web Servers Static and Dynamic Content Firewall review Adding a DMZ Secure TopologiesNovember 21, 2005CS161 Fall 2005 Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/Wagner21Polls How man

Berkeley - CS - 194

Statistical Database Security (Part 2)Census bureau problem Wants to publish average statistics But how do they change when a new person joins?Doug Tygar (doug.tygar@gmail.com) November 4, 2005 cs161.orgNovember 4, 2005 Doug Tygar, 2005 (cs

Berkeley - CS - 194

Outline Large Botnets and Distributed Denial of Service AttacksCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph October 28, 2005 What is a botnet? How to create and use a botnet The money trail. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks ExamplesOctober 26, 2005C

Berkeley - CS - 194

Outline What is a Worm/Virus? Why are they created? Infection Vectors and Payloads How they propagate and what they doWorms and VirusesCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph October 26, 2005 Worm propagation rates Virus/Worm detection/prevention F

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161: E-commerce Stages in E-commerce purchaseOctober 24, 20052005 by J. D. Tygar , cs.161.org, 24 Oct 200512005 by J. D. Tygar , cs.161.org, 24 Oct 20052Stages in e-commerce purchase Advertising Solicitation Negotiation Purchase

Berkeley - CS - 194

Main Points Applying last week's lectures in practice Creating Secure Channels Example Applications PGP: Pretty Good Privacy TLS: Transport Layer Security VPN: Virtual Private NetworkSecure ChannelsCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph September 26

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 194-1 (CS 161) AuthenticationAuthentication Alice and Bob love each other, but they live far apart We've learned how they can encrypt their messages How can they make sure they are talking to each other? This is the question of authentication

Berkeley - CS - 194

Outline Communications Network TaxonomyBackground & Review of Communication FundamentalsCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph September 9, 2005 Packet Networks The Internet Transport Layer: UDP/IP, TCP/IP Network Service Examples P2P application

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 194-1 (CS 161) Access ControlRole of Access Control Before closing "back doors" we need to close "front doors" Access control: determines access to files & processes in OS We will return to these themes throughout the courseDoug Tygar (doug

Berkeley - CS - 194

Phone System Hackers: Phreaks Earliest phone hackers? 1870's teenagers 1920's (first automated switchboards) Mid-1950's saw deployment of automated direct-dial long distance switchesNetwork Security War StoriesCS 161/194-1 Anthony D. Joseph Se

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 194-1 (CS 161) Class IntroductionCS 161 (194-1) basic facts This is a class about computer security 4 units This is an experimental class if successful, it will become CS 161 To take this class, you need patience, an open mind, and willingn

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityHW 3Due Friday, December 2 at 11amPlease include the following at the top of the first page of your homework solution: Your full name Your login name The name of the homework assi

SUNY Stony Brook - AMS - 310.01

AMS 310.01 FALL 2003 Homework #8 Solutions2.48 Let xincuia . Thenxi 1xi n1 nnn(cuii 1n i 1a)ciui 1 nna na)2ncu a(cui cu ) 2 (n 1)nNow,n 2 sx i 1( xi x ) 2 (n 1)(cuia cu (n 1)c2i 1i 1(ui u ) 2 ( n 1)

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005 IsolationJoseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 301The topic for today is isolation. A program is isolated if it cannot affect other programs on the system. Thus, isolation refers to an inability to causally in

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 21"Anyone who uses software to produce random numbers is in a state of sin." -John von Neumann "The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance." -Robe

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 22Object Serialization in JavaJava's object serialization mechanism is a convenient way to store Java objects on disk. It is also tempting to use this mechanism as a buildin

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 20In this lecture we will explore some issues in implementing a digital form of cash - ecash. We normally think of cash as paper money or coins issued by the treasury or a ce

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Computer SecurityJoseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerNotes 18We will consider the following authentication scheme: the user selects a number N = P Q product of two large primes, and a number y = x2 mod N. The server is given N, y an

Berkeley - CS - 194

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 15Writing Secure CodeThis lecture discusses implementation techniques to avoid security holes when you write code. We will describe many good practices. Many of these have a

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 13Topic: Software security; Common implementation flawsThe purpose of the next few lectures is to teach you about software security. Even if we've got the perfect system des

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 14Principles of Secure SoftwareThis lecture will show you a number of principles for building secure systems. First, we will show one powerful concept, the notion of a trust

Berkeley - CS - 194

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 101One-way functionA one-way function is a fundamental notion in cryptography. It is a function on n bits such that given x it is easy to compute f (x) but on input f (x)

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 91Block Ciphers:In symmetric encryption schemes, Alice and Bob share a random key and use this single key to repeatedly exchange information securely despite the existenc

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 11The scope of this classOur goal in this class is to teach you the some of the most important and useful ideas in computer security. By the end of this course, we hope y

Berkeley - CS - 194

CS 161Fall 2005Joseph/Tygar/Vazirani/WagnerComputer SecurityNotes 21The Motivation for FirewallsSuppose you are given a machine, and asked to harden it against external attack. How do you do it? One starting point is to look at the netw