110: Philosophy Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology
Lecture Three: Epistemology - The Theory of Knowledge
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology Philosophy 110 Epistemology Using the techniques we have learned, and before reading the following material, answer either of the following questions: (1) What is knowledge, or (2) what is truth?
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology 3.1 Introduction: One of the three major divisions of philosophy is epistemology, the theory of knowledge. This division of philosophy investigates the concepts of knowledge and truth, belief, justification of belief and knowledge, and other related matters. We will limit ourselves to two main questions: 1. 2. What is knowledge? What makes a statement true?
We will look at two different ways of answering these questions, theories known as empiricism and rationalism. Each theory has its strengths and weaknesses, some of which we will examine shortly. It is important, however, to understand that we may not answer the two questions listed above to our satisfaction. One of the characteristics of philosophy is that in the attempt to answer one question, you may end up with several additional unanswered questions! The philosophers we will discuss express their theories in part by making what we call stipulative definitions, terms defined in special ways, in order to make an important distinction. Part of the plausibility (or implausibility) of their theories hinges upon the plausibility of these stipulative definitions. So, pay close attention to these terms.
3.2 Empiricism: The first epistemology we will examine is known as empiricism. Some of you, in your analysis of knowledge in Exercise 2.0, probably included the idea of sense experience, what we can see, feel, hear, taste, and smell, as part of your definition of
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology knowledge. That is the basic idea behind empiricism: all knowledge is based on sense experience. We will discuss the ideas of perhaps the most famous empiricist, David Hume.
David Hume: In his influential book, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), David Hume claims that all our knowledge of matters of fact comes from sense experience. Hume divides sense experience into two broad categories, impressions, and ideas. Impressions are all our stronger sense experiences, such as seeing a light, hearing a sound, or feeling a pain. Ideas are all our weaker sense experiences, such as imagining a light, remembering a sound, or pretending to feel a pain. Also, Hume claims that we have no ideas that do not come from sense experience. Specifically, he claims that all ideas we have must come from some sense impression. Even abstract ideas such as God can be traced back to sense impressions of human beings whose power, knowledge, moral sense are increased infinitely. Thus the abstract idea of God is simply the idea of a human with limitless power, knowledge, and moral sensitivity. To justify this claim, Hume uses two arguments, summarized below: The Blind Man Argument: P1 P2 C: If people who are blind or deaf from birth have no ideas of color or sound, then knowledge comes from sense experience. People who are blind or deaf from birth have no ideas of color or sound. Therefore, knowledge comes from sense experience.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology The Analysis Argument: P1 P2 C: If we are unable to find a single piece of knowledge not related to some sense experience, then all knowledge comes from sense experience. We are unable to find a single piece of knowledge not related to some sense experience. Therefore, all knowledge comes from sense experience.
Before reading further, you need to ask yourself if these ideas are clear? Are there any ambiguities or any vague expressions? Do the arguments pass both the validity and the evidence tests? Finally, are there any implications that seem false?
A Problem for Empiricism: At this point, empiricism seems to suffer from what we will call the incompleteness problem. Empiricism, as so far stated, seems unable to account for certain kinds of knowledge we clearly have, so it is therefore an incomplete theory. Specifically, we seem to know such things as (2 + 2) = 4, and that all triangles are threesided. If all knowledge comes from sense experience, how can an empiricist account for such knowledge? We cannot sense numbers. The symbol `2' is just that, a symbol for a number, and the symbol `2' is no more a two than the word `Tom' is me. Regarding triangles, since it is impossible to see all triangles, and count their sides, we cannot know that all triangles have three sides through sense experience alone. Yet we clearly know that they do. And we would consider insane anyone who devoted his life, or even a small part of it, to the search for a triangle with more or less than three sides, or an example in which (2+2) 4. In other words, the theory of empiricism seems to imply that there is no way to have such knowledge, though we clearly do.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology Hume solves the incompleteness problem in the following way. He makes a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, matters of fact, and relations of ideas. Matters of fact comprise our knowledge of the world, and come entirely from sense experience. Thus I know that I am in this room now, that this paper is in front of my face because I am currently having a sense experience of these facts. I know where I parked my car because I had a sense experience, which I can remember, of parking my car in a certain spot. Thus all knowledge about the world is based on sense perception, and is called a posteriori knowledge, or knowledge that is dependent upon sense experience. Furthermore, statements involving matters of fact are true only if they accurately reflect the facts as they appear to our senses, a theory known as the correspondence theory of truth. Relations of ideas, however, are not facts about the world, but, rather, methods of manipulating ideas. So the claims that all triangles are three-sided, or that (2 + 2) = 4 are not knowledge about the world, but rather ways of relating ideas to each other. Relations of ideas are not based on sense experience, and so they are said to be known a priori, or independently of sense perception. Relations of ideas, moreover, are true for different reasons than matters of fact. Relations of ideas are true because their denial results in a logical contradiction. To deny that a triangle has three sides results in a logical contradiction, and logical contradictions are false. So, any statement whose denial results in a logical contradiction must be true, an idea known as the principle of contradiction. All mathematical and logical truths are examples of knowledge of relations of ideas.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology So, Hume's empiricism claims that knowledge falls into two categories: a posteriori knowledge about the world called matters of fact which we get from sense experience, and a priori knowledge called relations of ideas, by which we manipulate the knowledge we get from sense experience. Hume claims that this analysis of knowledge can be used as a test for the meaningfulness of any philosophical claim. He says that any meaningful claim must be either a matter of fact, and thus traceable to some sense impression, or its denial must result in a logical contradiction. If a claim meets neither of these tests, then it is meaningless. This test is known as Hume's Fork.
Summary: The epistemology of empiricism, as we have discussed it, consists of the following claims:
1. 2.
Knowledge of the world is based entirely on sense experience, or to put it another way, all knowledge of the word is a posteriori. Statements about the world (matters of fact) are true or false in so far as at they accurately reflect sense experiences, a theory known as the correspondence theory of truth. Relations of ideas, such as mathematical and logical truths, are not knowledge of the world, but merely means by which we can manipulate knowledge. They are known a priori, and are true because their denial violates the principle of .
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One major problem with empiricism is the consistency problem, the question of whether empiricism can be stated in a consistent fashion. For example, empiricism
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology claims that all our factual knowledge about the world comes from sense experiences. However, most empiricists also make claims that seem to conflict with the idea that all knowledge comes from sense experience. For example, another famous empiricist, John Locke, claimed that our minds are blank slate (tabula rasa), empty of any knowledge until we have sense experiences. So Locke obviously seems to know that minds exist. But what sense experience of the mind do we have? Do we see it? Feel it? Hear it? Smell it? Taste it? Most people would say no. Thus it seems that Locke contradicts himself by claiming to know that minds exist, yet claiming that all knowledge is based on sense perception. Another example: Hume repeatedly uses such phrases as `perceptions of the mind' and `power of the mind,' clearly implying that there is an entity called a mind. Yet applying his own test for the meaningfulness of a claim yields interesting results when applied to the concept of mind. From what sense impression do we derive the idea of mind? What does it look like? Sound like? Feel like? Taste like? Smell like? It seems fairly clear that the idea of a mind does not come from sense experience. But if not, then if it is a meaningful idea at all, according to Hume, it must be an a priori idea whose denial results in a . But, does the idea that minds do not exist imply a ? Is the sentence "minds do not exist" contradictory, like the sentence, "this triangle is four-sided?" Another problem with empiricism is the skepticism problem, the fact that empiricism may lead to skepticism, the idea that our knowledge is much more limited than we think. If all our factual knowledge is based on sense experience, how can we extend any claim beyond our current sense experiences? For example, it is not odd to say that I know where my car is. I would say this based on two ideas, first, that I parked
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology it in a certain location, and second, that it usually stays put. But only the first of these ideas is a sense experience. The idea that the car usually stays put is not itself a sense experience, but a generalization based on many individual cases. My sense experiences in the past seem to justify a belief that my car will stay where I parked it, but not that I know it is there now. Only if I have a current sense experience can I claim to know something. Hume squarely faces this problem, and is classified as a skeptic, claiming that we know much less than we think we know.
A Comment on the Correspondence Theory of Truth: The correspondence theory of truth was characterized earlier as the claim that statements true only if they accurately reflect the facts as they appear to our senses. The correspondence theory of truth is popular among empiricists, but it is a bit vague and ambiguous. For example, how accurate does a statement have to be to be true? Consider the following statements: 1. 2. 3. 4. Tom is wearing a shirt. Tom is wearing a blue shirt. Tom is wearing a long-sleeved blue shirt. Tom is wearing a long-sleeved blue shirt with a button-down collar.
The statements are all accurate, but some are more precise, more accurate than others. Are they therefore more true? It is not at all clear that correspondence theory will work as a comprehensive theory of truth.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology Terms You Should Be Able to Define: stipulative definition empiricism the consistency problem the skepticism problem the incompleteness problem Locke tabula rasa Hume ideas impressions analysis argument blind man argument Hume's test matters of fact relations of ideas principle of cause and effect principle of a priori a posteriori correspondence theory of truth
Exercise 3-1: True/False 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas is an example of a stipulative definition. Hume is an empiricist. According to Hume, all knowledge is a posteriori. The principle behind relations of ideas is the principle of contradiction. According to Hume, some of our knowledge of matters of fact is known a priori. The principle behind our knowledge of matters of fact is the principle of causality, according to Hume. According to Hume, every impression comes from an idea. The term `a priori' means dependent upon sense experience.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. According to Hume, a mathematical truth is not a matter of fact. Hume was a skeptic. A pain is an idea according to Hume. Memory of a pain is an impression according to Hume. Some matters of fact are known a priori, according to Hume. The statement, "all dogs are canines" is an example of what Hume means by relations of ideas. The statement, "Tom Morrow has two dogs" is an example of what Hume means by matters of fact.
Exercise 3-2: Multiple Choice ___ 1. Which pair of terms did Hume use to express the difference between our more vivid sense experiences, and our weaker sense experiences? A B C D E ___ 2. sensations and reflections matters of fact and relations of ideas a posteriori and a priori truths of reason and truths of fact impressions and ideas
Which of the following is an example of an a priori claim? A B C D E My car is in the `A' parking lot. Tiger Woods is a famous golfer. All four sides of any square have the same length. Professor Morrow is wearing blue jeans today. none of the above
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Which of the following is not an example of a logical contradiction? A B C D E an apple growing on a banana tree a four-sided triangle (2 + 3) = 7 a married bachelor all of the above are logical contradictions
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology
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What theory defines true statements as those that accurately describe the facts? A B C D E rationalism coherence theory empiricism correspondence theory none of the above
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What sort of claim is known independently of sense experience? A B C D E empirical claims claims about impressions claims about matter of fact a posteriori claims a priori claims
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What term refers to the idea that every meaningful claim must either refer to some sense impression or its denial must result in a logical contradiction? A B C D E matters of fact relations of ideas tabula rasa correspondence theory of truth Hume's fork
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What phrase refers to the idea that most empiricists claim to know that minds exist, yet the theory of empiricism does not seem to justify such a claim? A B C D E the intuition problem the consistency problem the skepticism problem the incompleteness problem none of the above
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology ___ 8. What phrase refers to the claim that empiricists cannot explain mathematical truths? A B C D E ___ 9. the intuition problem the consistency problem the skepticism problem the incompleteness problem none of the above
Which of the following claims would Hume reject? A B C D E All factual knowledge is based on sense experience. There is no such thing as a priori knowledge. Mathematical knowledge is not a posteriori knowledge. We have some a priori ideas. He would reject none of the above ideas.
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What does the term tabula rasa mean? A B C D E blank slate empty table full table the same as a priori the same as a posteriori
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What phrase refers to the idea that a given empiricism implies that we know much less than we think we know? A B C D E the intuition problem the consistency problem the skepticism problem the incompleteness problem none of the above
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How would Hume classify the claim that "John Lennon was one of the Beatles?" A It would be a relation of ideas. B It would be a matter of fact. C It would be a tabula rasa. D It would be a priori. E none of the above.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology ___ 13. According to Hume, the principle of cause and effect is the basis for what sort of knowledge? A B C D E ___ 14. matters of fact relations of ideas tabula rasa a priori none of the above
According to Hume, the principle of contradiction is the basis for what sort of knowledge? A B C D E matters of fact relations of ideas tabula rasa a priori none of the above
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What does Hume try to prove using the blind man argument and the analysis argument? A B C D E that there is no a priori knowledge. that there is no a posteriori knowledge that every idea comes from an impression that skepticism is the correct epistemology that God exists
Exercise 3-3: Fill-in the Blank 1. 2. 3. What two categories of sense experiences does Hume distinguish? What two categories of knowledge does Hume distinguish? What two arguments does Hume use to show that all mpressions come from ideas? 4. 5. 6. 7. State the correspondence theory of truth: State Hume's fork: List three problems with empiricism: Explain the phrases: a priori and a posteriori.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology
Question for Discussion: If from birth a person had no sense experiences at all, would that person be able to think about anything? Could that person have any ideas to think about?
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology 3.3 Rationalism: Some philosophers have argued that knowledge cannot be based on sense perception. Often they argue that sense perceptions do not provide us with certainty, and that, since knowledge requires certainty, it follows that sense perception cannot provide us with knowledge. Instead, they argue that knowledge must be based on selfevident truths, truths that cannot be doubted. Such philosophers are called rationalists, and their epistemology is rationalism. One of the best examples of self-evident truths is the three laws of thought: 1. 2. 3. The Law of Identity: everything is what it is, A is A. The Law of Contradiction: no statement can be both true and false in the same context. The Law of the Excluded Middle: every statement is either true or false; there is no third (middle) alternative.
Most philosophers consider these claims to be self-evident. There is no evidence you can bring forward to prove them. Denying them leads to inconsistency and . Therefore, they cannot be rationally denied, and if they cannot be rationally denied, then they must be true. Beginning with such ideas, rationalists develop their own unique epistemology. We will discuss the rationalist epistemology of Rene Descartes.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology Rene Descartes: In 1637, Rene Descartes wrote his Discourse on Method, in which he explains the process by which an inquiring mind should proceed in seeking the truth. He identified four basic rules, the first three of which are summarized as follows:
1. 2. 3.
Rule of Clear and Distinct Perception: accept nothing as true unless you see its truth so clearly and distinctly that you cannot doubt it. Rule of Analysis: divide every question into its constituent ideas and examine each idea individually. Rule of Synthesis: work from the simplest ideas to the more complex ideas, applying the rule of clear and distinct perception in each case.
The first rule sounds very `empirical,' since it talks about `perception' and `seeing.' But what the rule talks about perceiving or seeing is truth, not sense perceptions or facts. The key to understanding how the first rule applies to a given claim is the last phrase: `you cannot doubt it.' If a claim cannot be doubted, no matter what, then you clearly and distinctly perceive its truth, and you can, therefore, accept it as true. The second rule simply tells us to break complex problems or questions into their smallest parts, and apply the test of clear and distinct perception to them. The third rule tells us to begin with those parts produced and verified by the process of analysis, and see what else we can clearly and distinctly perceive, thus adding to our knowledge. In a later work, called the Meditations, published in 1641, Descartes devised a project in which he would try to rid himself of all false belief, so that he could be certain that his knowledge was legitimate, and not subject to error. In carrying out this project,
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology he applied his method in a way that illustrates rationalist epistemology very well. He began by applying his first rule, doubting anything that he did not clearly and distinctly perceive to be true. Soon Descartes found that many of his beliefs were based on sense perception, but that when he applied his first rule to sense perception, he found a serious flaw. In a famous argument known as the dream argument, Descartes reasons as follows: P1. P2. C: If we cannot distinguish between waking and dreaming sense experience, then sense experience cannot provide a basis for knowledge. We cannot distinguish between waking and dreaming sense experience. Sense experience cannot provide a basis for knowledge.
Since we cannot reliably distinguish between dreaming experiences and waking experiences, we cannot rely on sense perceptions as a source of knowledge, especially about the world. Thus Descartes came to doubt, at least logically if not emotionally, whether or not he had a body, or whether the mountains, houses and trees were really out there. Next, he devised and even stronger argument, one that applies even to the a priori sort of knowledge we have of mathematics. Although mathematics is not based on sense experience, Descartes still thought mathematical truths could be doubted. His argument, known as the evil genius argument reasons as follows: P1. P2. C: If it is possible that an evil genius deceives us, regarding both mathematical truths and empirical truths, then we cannot claim to know them to be true. It is possible that an evil genius deceives us as to mathematical and empirical truths. Therefore, we cannot claim to know them to be true.
The argument the hypothesized existence of a evil genius who could deceive us into thinking not only that what we see exists outside our minds, but that (2 + 2) = 4 or that
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology every triangle has three sides. It is imaginable, though improbable, that we get the same answer each time we add (2 + 2) or count the sides of a triangle because this genius is deceiving us. If this is imaginable, even hypothetically, then the truth of both a priori and a posteriori claims can be doubted, and they must be put aside. All of this is the application of the first two rules, the rule of clear and distinct perception, and the rule of analysis. Descartes' application of the first rule is fairly clear. His application of the rule of analysis is more subtle. Descartes has divided or analyzed knowledge claims into two groups, a posteriori claims of sense experience, and a priori claims of mathematics and logic. Then he has applied the rule of clear and distinct perception and found both types of knowledge to be dubious. At this point in his meditations, Descartes has come to the conclusion that he does not know whether or not there is an external world beyond his mind, or whether (2 + 2) = 4. However, when he takes the next logical step, and tries to doubt his own existence he comes to a very interesting realization. He realizes that, no matter what, he cannot doubt his own existence. He must exist in order to doubt at all, even if he is deceived. This idea he expressed in a famous sentence: "I think; therefore, I exist," or in the famous Latin, Cogito; ergo, sum. After arriving at the conclusion that he cannot doubt his own existence, he again applies the rule of clear and distinct perception and the rule of analysis to his concept of self. First, he clearly and distinctly perceives that he is a thinking thing, and that thinking things have ideas. These are truths so obvious he cannot doubt them. Employing the rule of analysis, he asks himself how many kinds of ideas he might have, and see that he can divide his ideas into several categories, two of which are self-
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology caused ideas, and ideas caused by something else. This distinction is one that he clearly and distinctly perceives to be true: every idea he has must fall into one category or the other category; there is no third option. Now, if he can prove that there is at least one idea he could not have caused, then he will have proved that there is something that exists outside himself, namely whatever caused that idea. At this point, he begins an analysis of his ideas of cause and effect, and he clearly and distinctly perceives both that everything is caused, and that every quality in an effect must also be in its cause. These ideas we will call Descartes' principle of causality. The first idea is fairly simple to explain. Descartes believed he could not doubt the statement that every thing has a cause, so he believed he clearly and distinctly perceived its truth. The second idea is more complex. Take any cause and effect, say motion in a cue ball (cause) imparting motion to the eight-ball it strikes (effect). The effect, or the motion in the eight-ball, must resemble, be like, the cause. Thus the motion in the eight-ball must be like the motion in the cue ball. The eight ball must roll in the same basic direction, at roughly the same speed, or a little less. The eight ball cannot do something that is not `in' the cue ball, such as burst into a bouquet of flowers, or change into a mouse. So, Descartes is saying that whatever qualities are in the effect, they must also have been in the cause. Thus, the effect must `resemble' the cause. If Descartes is correct in saying that everything has a cause, and that every quality in an effect must be in its cause, then, if he can identify one of his ideas that does not resemble him in some way, he could not have caused that idea. And, if he
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology could not have caused that idea, his principle of causality implies that something like the idea caused it. But since that something could not be him, since he doesn't possess all the qualities of the idea, it must be something else, and thus there is something else in the universe besides Descartes. After some thought, Descartes comes up with the idea of God. God, as he clearly and distinctly perceives the idea, is a being who is perfect in every way. Descartes is quick to realize that he is not perfect. Thus he could not have caused the idea of God, since it includes the quality of perfection, a quality Descartes does not posses. Only a perfect being, namely God, could cause the idea of God. He further clearly and distinctly perceives that although God does allow Descartes to be deceived on occasion, God would not deceive Descartes about the existence of the external world. Thus, Descartes proves logically everything he originally doubted, and can claim he knows these ideas with certainty.
Problems with Rationalism There are at least two problems commonly associated with rationalism. The first problem, which we will call the intuition problem, involves the meaning of `selfevident.' By definition, you can't prove that a claim is or is not self-evident by using independent evidence. Since it is self- evident, it is its own evidence. Thus you simply have to `see' that it is true. But this amounts to some fundamental form of intuition, and there is no way to demonstrate which fundamental intuition is correct. We might choose, for example, the fundamental intuitions expressed by any one of the three laws of thought. We'll call it the `rational intuition.' There is no way to
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology prove their truth; you just have to see it somehow. But some philosophers apparently do not see it, such as pragmatists and existentialists. The fundamental intuition of pragmatists is that knowledge and truth are matters of a feeling of readiness to act and ability to make successful predictions. Existentialists make the fundamental intuition that we must accept the fact that there are no valid fundamental intuitions. Perhaps most interesting of all is the fact that some Asian philosophies, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism, seem to adopt a fundamental intuition embracing what rationalists call a contradiction as a higher form of truth. In the end, we have groups of philosophers who accept varying sets of "self-evident" truths. The intuition problem in its most fundamental form? How do we determine whose catalog of self-evident truths is the correct one? The second major problem with rationalism is the problem of skepticism. If rationalism is true, it may lead to a rather severe form of skepticism. For example, I do not know that my car is where I left it, since it is not self-evident that my car must still be where I left it. The same is true of many claims we ordinarily think we know. Descartes thinks that he can overcome at least this second objection by his rules of method. But this attempt backtracks to the intuition problem: how does he know his rules of method are the correct ones? How do I know that it is true that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true? [What would be wrong with answering: because I clearly and distinctly perceive it to be true that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is true?]
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology Coherence Theory of Truth: Rationalists claim that knowledge consists of self-evident truths. But what makes a statement self-evident, and therefore true? One theory, coherence theory, claims that true statements are those that are consistent with and logically implied by (follow necessarily from) other known truths. Thus the statement that `all dogs are vertebrates' is true because it is consistent with and implied by other known truths, including `all mammals are vertebrates,' and `all dogs are mammals.' The statement, `some dogs are cold blooded,' is false because it is not consistent with or implied by other known truths, including `all dogs are mammals,' and `all mammals are warm-blooded." Some form or other of this theory is favored by most rationalists. The main problem with the theory is the intuition problem discussed earlier regarding rationalism. How do we know that the `other known truths' are indeed true? We cannot follow the theory and say `because they are implied by and consistent with other known truths.' To do so merely pushes the problem back a step, and we must ask: what makes those `other truths true?' To pursue this approach results in an infinite regression, and we will never get a final answer. Another alternative is to say that statement A is true because it is implied by and consistent with statement C. Statement C is true because it is implied by and consistent with statement D. Statement D is true because it is implied by and consistent with statement A. Since we have already said that A is true, we don't have an infinite regression. But now we have gone in a circle, beginning and ending with A. Such a circular answer will not work.
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology Finally, we could claim that there are certain bedrock truths which can't be doubted. They are self-evident. This is the usual path taken, and is certainly consistent with rationalist epistemology. But it leaves us with the intuition problem discussed earlier.
Pragmatism: Both empiricism and rationalism seem to suffer from serious problems. They both seem to lead to some degree of skepticism beyond what is prudent. Empiricism suggests, for example, that I don't know that my car is where I parked it. Rationalism allows me to claim that I know that my car is where I parked it, but only at the cost of claiming that certain truths are self-evident, when in fact they may be dubious. Another epistemological theory, pragmatism, attempts to avoid the pitfalls of both empiricism and rationalism. Understanding pragmatism involves shifting the focus from facts and logic to feelings and behavior. Knowledge, according to pragmatists, is a feeling of readiness to act, a sense of comfort. Doubt, or the absence of knowledge, is a feeling of hesitation, and is uncomfortable. Consider the question of whether or not I know where my car is parked. A pragmatist would claim that you know where your car is parked if, when the time comes to leave, you have no hesitation about where to go to get into your car and drive away. It is the readiness to act that marks knowledge. On the other hand, you do no know where your car is if you have a feeling of hesitation about what to do. Pragmatic epistemology includes its own pragmatic theory of truth: a true statement, according to pragmatism, is one that works. More specifically, true
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology statements allow us to make successful predictions. For example, if it is true that my car is where I parked it, then I should be able to do certain things, like find it, unlock it, and drive away. If I can do these things, or others like them, then the statement is true. If I cannot successfully make such predictions, then the statement is false. However, the pragmatic solution to the skepticism problem comes with a cost. The main problem, which we will call the fact/reason problem, is that it is entirely possible for factually false beliefs to work, or for people to be very comfortable with a belief for the wrong reasons. For example, for many thousands of years, many people believed the earth to be flat. They were extremely comfortable with that idea, and it worked very well. Yet, just as clearly they were wrong. So, many philosophers think that pragmatism is wrong, since it suggests that people can be said to know something, when what they claim to know turns out later to be false. The pragmatists have a reply to this, however, the relativist reply. They claim that truth and knowledge are not absolute qualities about facts; they are relative qualities about statements. Knowledge and truth are dynamic qualities that develop and change according to our circumstances. Thus, if the belief that the earth is flat worked for people, then it was true. Now, it does not work and it is false. Here is another slant on the same issue. The standard approach of empiricism and rationalism is that of the two beliefs, (1) earth is flat, and (2) the earth is spherical, the latter is and has always been true and the former is and has always been false, regardless of what others believed at various times. The pragmatic reply to this claim is to ask what would have happened in ancient times had people believed that the earth was spherical, rather than that the earth is flat? What difference would the "true" belief
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Philosophy 110: Introduction to Philosophy Lecture Three: Epistemology have made to them? The answer, pragmatists claim, is "none." Pragmatists claim that a difference that doesn't make a difference isn't really a difference. Thus, for ancient people, the distinction between the two claims is meaningless. It only became meaningful when it made a difference. Circumnavigation of the globe, the need for more accurate maps, and the need for better explanation of astronomical phenomena eventually resulted in the shift from believing the earth to be flat, to the belief that it was spherical, because the lat...