Yakovlev, Alexander Memorandum for Gorbachev Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others), February 25, 1987 To Comrade Gorbachev M. S.
I. What does the fact of the visit signify? The main purpose of this groups visit is, to a minor degree, to analyze the state of current relations in the sphere of Soviet-American relations. The strategic basis rationale is to form an assessment of the prospects of our countrys future development on the basis of original sources in the light of the probable election in the United States in 1988 of a president who would represent the next generation of the U.S. governing elite. From here [the next step] is to study the possibility of [establishing] new substance and forms of relations with the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the 1980s, the grave miscalculation of American Sovietology, in all its divisions, became obvious. Two dominant scenarios of the future development of the USSR existed before the start of the current decade. According to the first one, the Soviet economy was approaching the brink of an avalanche-like crisis, which would lead to an open expression of social discontent (approximately following the Polish version). Open phases of such a crisis were predicted by the proponents of that concept for 1983-1984. It is precisely on the basis of these assessments that the Reagan policy in particular was built immediately after his coming to power in January 1981. According to the second one, the crisis in Soviet society would not assume open forms, at least in the current decade, due to a very high level of patience among the population, [the occurrence of] historical tragedies, and a powerful control apparatus. However, the Soviet economys development would slow down, and most importantly, the USSRs economic, scientific-technological, and social backwardness (lagging behind)not only in comparison to the West but also to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and in the future even to Chinawould grow. As a result, some time after 1993-1995, the Soviet Union would lose material prospects for development as a world power and its moral and political authority, and it would cease to represent a military, political and social threat to the West. In essence, beginning from 1975 after the signing of the Helsinki Act, all versions of U.S. long-term strategyboth those that constituted the basis of the administrations official course and those proposed as alternatives to that coursestarted from the assumption of the USSRs downward socio-economic development in the long-term perspective. In this case, such an approach is not simply a class-based denial that communism has a future. Such perceptions are not just routine exercises in propaganda. The actual
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assessments were based on data from the CIA, the Department of Commerce, and academic, financial and industrial research centers, supported by information from migrs arriving from the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. The latter source deserves special consideration. When a substantial wave of emigration started arriving from our country in the beginning of the 1970s, and when the migrs attributed quite negative characteristics to the internal processes in the USSR, such information was initially received in the United States with considerable qualification, even with mistrust. In essence, nothing but negative opinions about all things Soviet was expected from the migrs. However, when by the end of the last decade and at the turn of the 1980s Soviet official statistics and our own public assessments started, in the American view, to confirm the information provided by the migrs, the latter were given special credence. In a way, a certain mutual strengthening of the traditional negative perception of our country and the current intelligence took place. That resulted in [certain] evaluations of our countrys development prospects for the future up to the XXI century. That is why the shift in the development of Soviet society after the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee had a shocking effect on the American political elite. Events in the USSR shed bright light on the strategic mistakes of American Sovietology and policy, because the theoretical recommendations of the last decade did not even consider the abstract possibility of change in the USSRnot even as a hypothesis. It is precisely in this context that one should consider the intelligence-gathering political mission of the above-mentioned group, which consists of representatives of the highest echelon of the political elite. In the discussions, which they held after their conversations in Moscow, the following main directions could be identified. 1. Do developments in the USSR represent an explosion of idealism or are they a thought-out and conscious policy? Members of the group devoted special attention to trying to discover to what extent people in the USSR see the interconnectedness between economic, social and other aspects of the current course, and how they assess the essence of the problems and the prospects for development at the intersections of the social and economic, and social and political, and economic and military spheres. What they heard in Moscow led them to conclude that the policy of perestroika was based on a thought-out conception. They see the conflict between the demands for economic efficiency and the demands of the social sphere as the main contradiction in the development of Soviet society. Members of the group noted that judging by the discussions that had taken place, people in the USSR see and understand this contradiction (Peterson, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Jones, Kissinger). Diminishing the
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sharpness of this contradiction would change the face of the country, and would raise its social prestige. 2. How realistic are the plans of the Soviet leadership? Only one member of the groupHylandcalled these plans unrealistic. At the same time, one could clearly see in the reaction of this professional Sovietologist (a liberal one by American standards) deep irritation with the fact that the prognoses of Sovietology turned out to be completely overturned. He took part in developing those prognoses himself. The rest of the [participants] described the plans for socio-economic development in the USSR with varying degrees of optimism. Not one of them allowed for the possibility of fully realizing those plans. But at the same time, in their general assessments, there has been a shift toward greater optimism and a greater willingness to believe in the success of our initiatives. Such a reaction was especially noticeable in Vance and Peterson. 3. Is it good or bad for the USA if the USSR experiences upward development? Only Hyland expressed himself to the effect that strengthening the Soviet Union could be accompanied with problems for the USA, mainly from the perspective of foreign policy and relations with Western Europe. The rest of them think that a developing USSR would be more beneficial for U.S. interests than a possible [source] of any sort of shock in their country. (Jones said directlywe wish [them] luck.) Some members of the group expressed concern that both countries focus on competition with each other would lead to a mutual weakening, and thus simultaneously to a relative strengthening of third countries, above all Japan. In this connection, Kirkpatrick and certain others spoke in favor of reducing military expenditures in the light of domestic interest in the USSR and the USA. 4. To what extent has the new political thinking become a part of the Soviet Unions foreign policy? The spectrum of judgments played out as follows. Kirkpatrick, who believes that it was only a matter of Gorbachevs personal style, was at one pole. In her assessment, she did not expect that the Soviet Union could have such an open and democratically inclined leader. As far the content of USSR foreign policy, in her words, there were only limited new expressions with the old background. Vance represented the opposite pole within the group. In his opinion, a lot of new things had already been introduced as part of the content of USSR foreign policy, and it was especially important that the principal elements of that new [content] be confirmed in the decisions of the XXVII Congress, such as for example the concept of an interdependent world. One cannot fail to see, he noted, that the actions of the Soviet leadership are coordinated with those general principles; we are not just talking about propaganda. The subject of Afghanistan was in the very center of the discussion about new thinking among the groups members.
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Proponents of the point of view that the new thinking is nothing but words shared the position that there is no reason for the United States to help the Soviet Union get out of Afghanistan. At most, U.S. neutrality toward a political settlement in Afghanistan would be possible in exchange for cutting all USSR assistance to Nicaragua, including economic [assistance] (Hyland). Vance, Tarnoff, and Swing spoke to the effect that now the USA does not gain any real benefit from the war in Afghanistan, but more and more they are risking the likely collapse of Pakistan and the possibility of an American-Indian confrontation. Taking that into account, in their view, the USA should not interfere with a political settlement in Afghanistan, if the USSR finds a formula of such a settlement. 5. About joint venture enterprises. This concept drew a lot of interest both from the practical (Peterson) and the ideological (Kissinger) points of view. The main issue, which is still unresolved, in the opinion of the Americans, and which constrains the practical implementation of such projects, is how the contradiction between western companies focus on extracting profit, on purely business criteria, and the need to abide by the requirements of Soviet law would be resolved. All the practical issues, first of all those having to do with the share of joint venture enterprises in the USSRs domestic market, and those regarding procedures for repatriating the profitrequire more explanations. 6. What does the sphere of common Soviet and U.S. interests consist of today? All members of the group were united in the opinion that the principal sphere of common interests lies in preventing nuclear war, and creating and strengthening guarantees against its outbreak. Members of the group also considered the two countries reduction of military expenditures as a sphere of growing common interest. Peterson emphasized that in the last two or three years in U.S. business circles a serious concern has arisen about the consequences of the growth of military spending and the corresponding U.S. national budget deficit. He mentioned that fears of a deficit were very strong in business circles, especially because its impact could affect literally everythingU.S. internal life, relations with allies and with the third world, and so on. As a result of conversations in Moscow, the belief in the idea of exhausting the USSR with the arms race was undermined. Members of the group noted that in the face of the USSR, the way it is imaginable in the future, the USA would not be able to allow itself excessive military spending (Peterson, Tarnoff, Jones, Vance); otherwise, they would exhaust themselves. At the same time, members of the group essentially do not see any other spheres of common interest between the USSR and the USA. The idea of complete elimination of nuclear armaments is being received with alarm. There are three groups of arguments against this idea.
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the belief that nuclear weapons alone have preserved the peace for the last forty years, and would be capable of preserving it in the future. the concern that if nuclear weapons were eliminated, the USSR would attain great superiority in conventional weapons. that whereas thinking within the nuclear framework is sufficiently well developed, the liquidation of nuclear weapons would return foreign policy thinking in the U.S. to the level and concepts of the 1940s-1950s. Concerns about the prospect of eliminating nuclear weapons are so strong that according to the statements of some members of the group (Kissinger, Brown), the proponents of arms control in the U.S. have quieted down; they are frightened of both Soviet superiority in conventional armaments and of the possibility of an unprecedented arms race in this sphere on the basis of new technologies. The conclusion of the groups members: nuclear armaments should be considerably reduced on the basis of strategic stability, but not eliminated completely. 7. The prospects for Soviet-American relations, especially for the immediate future. This is the main [subject] that was analyzed and discussed. On this, members of the group expressed two opinions, which, strictly speaking, did not contradict each other. First: in principle, there exists an opportunity to achieve agreement on disarmament during this period, but only if we untie the Reykjavik package. In this case, an agreement on INF could be the easiest to achieve. An agreement on SDI/ABM is not impossible either, but it would require great effort. Second: even if Reagan wakes up in the remaining two years and wants to achieve agreement on something, nothing would come out of it due to the balance of forces in the administration and the power of the extreme right to counter such agreements with allegations to the effect that they would contradict the provisions officially accepted previously by the administration. It is telling that both the first and the second assessments were expressed by the same people (Kissinger, Vance, Brown, Tarnoff). However, they all emphasized the need in any case not to stop conducting an intensive policy toward the U.S., which would by virtue of its existence neutralize the threat of the extreme right. And this threat, according to the general assessment of the group, is real, and its scope is increasing along with the growing difficulties of the administration and with national elections in 1988 drawing closer. II. Conclusions and Suggestions.
The trip to Moscow, of course, did not lead the members of the group to change their general viewsnobody would have expected that anyway. The principal concepts of goals remained the same as well. One thing has changed noticeably, howeverthe opinion was confirmed that the USSR has started and will continue in the future the kinds
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of domestic reforms that might require deep corrections in American prognoses of the future development of Soviet societycorrections of a political, economic and international nature. Perestroika is not seen as threatening to the U.S. interests, apparently mainly because they are waiting to see how things progress here. U.S. Sovietologists obviously need more time for a deeper analysis of the interconnections between the USSRs domestic and foreign policies in the future. Judging by everything, members of the group have in mind to work out some kind of alternative to the Reagan course, but at this point they are still unable to present it convincingly to public opinion and to the political elite of the United States. There remains a certain lack of clarity after the mistakes [that have been made] in their theoretical blueprints and practical actions. Therefore, [we are facing] the task of [applying] incessant and effective political pressure on the United States with the objective of countering Reagans course and of providing support for those forces within the U.S. ruling class who stand against this course. It appears that the most effective step here in the present circumstances could be to untie the package that was proposed at the summit in Reykjavik, and to redefine the relationships between its constituent parts. Tactically, such untying could be either a one-time event, presented in some dramatic form, or more extended in time; either instantly and fully open and public, or containing both public and diplomatic forms. It would be most preferable to do it as a transformation of the package into a concept for a framework agreement on the 1974 Vladivostok model. A) The presentation of the package in Reykjavik was precise, right, and necessary. We needed a powerful initiative, which would have captured public opinion, conducted an assertive reconnaissance by fighting of the administrations positions, would have illuminated those positions, and would become a means of putting pressure on them. And a powerful initiative should have had reliable insurance. Our initiatives have fulfilled all those functions with distinction: a) Reagans positions as a proponent of a military-force approach were exposed to the maximum extent; b) In terms of domestic support, the SDI is now weaker in the U.S. than it was before Reykjavikit is not an accident that Weinberger and the far right are rushing with the decision to deploy [SDI]; in the Congress, the mood is predominantly against a full-scale SDI, because of financial considerations as well; c) The administration is weaker in terms of foreign policy: Irangate became possible only after and due to Reykjavik, it is a form of retribution against Reagan for Reykjavik (simultaneously from sides); several d) A deep split has occurred in public opinion in the West as a whole, which now is using multiple channels of access to all aspects of relations between East and West, as well as within NATO. This split is even more effective due to the fact that it came as a complete surprise to the West;
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e) The ideas expressed in the package are still at work now, almost half a year after Reykjavik, as a factor in mobilizing the elements of new political thinking worldwide, and in counteracting the line of the Reagan administration. But it is precisely the ideas [themselves], not the package as such. In short, we have created an extremely important and effective beachhead for our offensive against Reagan. Today, without losing any time, we should expand it, turn it into a beachhead for an offensive against the positions of the forces of the far right, and of the active proponents of the arms race in general, while at the same time ensuring opportunities for cooperation in this sphere with moderately conservative and liberal groups in the U.S. and Western Europe. Objective opportunities for this do exist. The Reagan administration stumbled backwards after Reykjavik. Having [now] taken positions on SDI that are even more aggressive than [those presented] during the summit itself, Washington, judging by everything, is now trying to exclude any possibility of a positive shift on any of the issues of our package beforehand, even as they state just the opposite publicly. It turns the package into a dead end. The White House, it seems, is deeply convinced that the package represents our final position. The responses to your latest statements show that they were waiting for new proposals or concessions from us. Not having received them, they must be thinking now in Washington that any serious progress on the Soviet position is unlikely. In these conditions, untying the package would become one more action that finally unmasks the genuine essence of the U.S. position on the issues of limitation and reduction of armaments. B) We should not let the next U.S. trick go unanswered. For us, the package as such is not a goal, but a means. The Soviet side should not allow Washington to sow doubts about our intentions, shift responsibility for the lack of progress in the negotiations to the USSR, [or] capture the political initiative by painting a prospect for fully realistic 50% cuts for public opinion, and so on. There is no guarantee that if we untie the package, the U.S. side would assent to balanced agreements with us. The facts suggest a completely different tendency in the development of Reagans position. But another point is equally truein the atmosphere of stagnation, one notices a dilution of borders in Western European public opinion, and partially even in American [public opinion]: both superpowers are being perceived as incapable of responding positively to the aspirations of the masses. In politics, maximum freedom of maneuver is always valuable. The package in its present form only ties our hands. We dont have likely grounds to expect that everything will work out on its own, that Reagan will have an epiphanyin Reykjavik, he missed his best change to go down in history not as a clown (litsedei), but as a statesman. For that, Reagan is not intelligent enough, and too limited in his freedom of choice.
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In [our] analysis of the situation, we should take one more aspect into account. Under the current correlation of forces, the USSR is confronting the USA not only in the international arena, but also inside the U.S. itself. Of course, we cannot elect a good President for ourselves, we cannot persuade him to make good policy for us. However, we can protect ourselves from the worst. Today this would mean: increasing pressure on Reagan and the circles standing behind him. Adding more flexibility and dynamism to the Soviet approach would strengthen such pressure. C) Are agreements on separate issues in our interest? I think yes. We never formulated the issue as all or nothing. We are not presenting it in such a form now either: we are not linking the package with nuclear testing, [or] chemical weapons. What kind of agreements are possible in principle? 1. INF, with a simultaneous discussion about tactical missiles. For us this would be tantamount to removal of a very serious threat. [It] would boost our reputation in Europe. In the end, [it] would make our relations with China easier. In any case, it is unlikely that we would have to penetrate SDI, if it is ever built, with intermediate-range missiles. Untying the package makes this agreement attainable; preserving the package blocks it. Here the benefit of untying is obvious. 2. A 50% reduction in strategic weapons, with a simultaneous emphasis on our readiness to proceed to full nuclear disarmament. If it were possible, the benefit of such a reduction would be unquestionable in all respects: political, economic, moral, and military. Building up strategic offensive weapons would make sense only in order to penetrate SDI, but we still have to undertake a comprehensive analysis of this issue. 3. The following model of a settlement also deserves considerationa 50% reduction in strategic weapons (the number of delivery vehicles and the number of warheads would be decreased by half in real terms, while each side would have the right to decide the relative proportion of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers); a simultaneous decrease by 50% in U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the European zone; and a reduction in U.S. forward-based systems by 50%. If the U.S. agrees to adequately reduce its forward-based systems in Japan and South Korea, [we should agree] to bring the number of [our] intermediate-range missiles in Asia (and respectively in the U.S. territory) down to 100 (warheads). At the same time, we take into account that the United States links the implementation of measures on INF in Europe with strict verification. Consequently, U.S. territory as such would be left outside of the verification regime, while inspections in England, the FRG, and other countries would require complicated coordinating procedures with the national governments. Will the U.S. go for such decisions? It is already clearnot under Reagan! Under these conditions, our readiness for an agreement outside the package would have the following pluses for us:
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[it would] uncover the true positions of the U.S., and become a powerful and long-term instrument of pressure on the Americans and their course; [it would] play the role of a stimulus to limit appropriations for SDI in the American Congress; the stimulus [would be] even more effective if we could preserve existing limits and cut at least some armaments, at least the INF. The political and psychological effect of such a step would be very significant, especially taking into account U.S. growing financial difficulties. 4. SDI proper. At this point, the Soviet Union stands by its position of a complete rejection of all military technologies that constitute the basis of this American program. If we want to be logical and persuasive in our struggle with SDI on this platform, we have to be ready to put forth the idea of not just limitation but full renunciation of ABM systems, i.e. of a toughening of the requirements of the 1972 ABM treaty. Any limitation is always misleading, it leaves loopholes for circumvention and misunderstandings. A ban on ABM [systems] would mean very little real change for us, because during the last decade systems have emerged against which there exist no effective counter-systems so far; and the quantitative limitations under the treaty are very poorly linked with the actual scale of possible massive strikes. Consequently, the Moscow ABM district has significance only as a research and testing ground for the contingency in the event the question arises about deploying a system of defense for the national territory. It appears that the U.S.at least up to the point of actual testing of the developing technologies on real targetsis not going to engage in negotiations with us on the subject of turning the ABM treaty into a treaty banning ABM [systems]. The latter would become possible only in case testing within the framework of SDI returns disappointing results, or if the systems themselves turn out to be so complicated and expensive that Washington would prefer to cut back the system. However, testing outside the framework of the existing treaty would mean the end of its existence, unless, understandably, the sides agree to something else before such testing. The issue of making a concession to the Americans in terms of a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty could be raised in practical terms only if there was appropriate compensation on Washingtons partfor example, finding an agreed upon modus on the legal status of space; [or,] further, developing regulations on certain kinds of activities in space, or even betterin relation to objects in space; and finally, formulating objective criteria to distinguish between the defensive and non-defensive character of systems allowed to be deployed in space, and the methodology for verifying implementation of the agreed-upon obligations. What is the point of putting forth this kind of consideration? First of all, it would not be expedient retrospectively to give our opponents a pretext for alleging that the USSR made success in Reykjavik impossible by linking nuclear disarmament to SDI. Secondly, by providing details of our approach (explaining terms, such as laboratory
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research, and so on.) we would demonstrate that a development of this kind was already possible at Reykjavik, had the United States wanted to bring our positions closer together. Thirdly, raising a number of questions for discussion would allow us to weaken the link between the ABM and SDI without any damage to our reputation, and to accept the principle of parallel negotiations. In general, partial agreementson SDI and on all other issuesare in our interest in terms of their potential content and by virtue of the fact that their existence as such would expand and strengthen the political and legal basis of Soviet-American relations. We need to clear the way for such agreements as much as possible. D. The initiative is in our hands now. We put forward far-reaching proposals, and took steps ...