20082ee131A_1_Class_Project_S08
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20082ee131A_1_Class_Project_S08

Course Number: ELECTRICAL EE131, Spring 2008

College/University: UCLA

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EE131A Class Project Due June 12th (noon) Spring 08 K. Yao Read and understand Wed_May_21_lecture.pdf Monte Carlo simulation lecture. 1. Analytically calculate the average error probability P(e) for Case A (Gaussian noise) and for Case B (Laplacian noise) for 0 dB and 6.06 dB. 2. Use the Monte Carlo simulation method as described in Wed_May_21_lecture.pdf to find the average error probability P(e) for Case A and...

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Class EE131A Project Due June 12th (noon) Spring 08 K. Yao Read and understand Wed_May_21_lecture.pdf Monte Carlo simulation lecture. 1. Analytically calculate the average error probability P(e) for Case A (Gaussian noise) and for Case B (Laplacian noise) for 0 dB and 6.06 dB. 2. Use the Monte Carlo simulation method as described in Wed_May_21_lecture.pdf to find the average error probability P(e) for Case A and Case B also for 0 dB and 6.06 dB. What values of M did you have to use to get comparable results for the analytical and methods? simulation Hint: To verify the PR sequences used in the MC simulation are correct, you may want to find their means (i.e., use the Matlab mean(.) function) and their standard deviation (i.e., use the Matlab std(.) function) to verify they are reasonably close to the theoretical values. For the class project, you need to turn in an informal report of 5-10 pages describing what the problem you are solving and the results. Any detailed information (including listing of your programming codes) can be placed in the Appendix.

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