Dairo
Interpretation Olubunmi and Argument 76-101: The Politics of Genocide
Kristin Shimmin
Argument Analysis: Lemkins Genocide
March 2010
Whats in a Name: The Debate over the Redefinition of the term Genocide
Introduction
In the city of the Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, the tension between the two social
groups, the Hutus and Tutsis sparked an uprising. In the blink of an eye, this uprising had
become a full blown genocide. Bands of Hutu militia attacked innocent Tutsi people for the
simple reason that they belonged that to this ethnic group. Thousands lay dead in the street and
yet no one seemed to be able to put an end to it. Through the whole incident, governments
around the world had full knowledge about that was happening but still there was no
intervention. What this left people thinking was how could such an atrocity occur in this day and
age. In trying to figure out what truly caused the inefficiency, people have found themselves
trying to decide what or who is truly to blame for the unresponsive public.
Many cases like Rwanda have happened before and in each of these cases scholars and
authors are often torn over what caused the genocide and why quicker response was not taken.
There are scholars that argue that the definition is causing the lack of timely response during
genocide while others say it is the faulty leadership that is truly the problem. Those that say the
definition is the problem argue that the definition first coined by Lemkin is sufficient needs to reevaluated. The definition is important to genocidal research because it is impossible to prosecute
a crime without a name or status. Those say that leadership accounts for the failure in response
feel that time can be better spent elsewhere. In this essay I have split these researchers into two
camps, camp Definition, those who think there is a lack of adequate response due to the
ineffectiveness of the current definition of genocide and Camp Action, those who think that the
definition is adequate but it is rather the lack of action is what is hindering the response to
genocide.
In the essay I will first discuss camp Definition, who feels that current definition needs to
be changed if there is to be a resolution in the area of response. The camp is split into two
positions, one that feels that the ambiguities of the definition need to be addressed and the other
that calls for the legal definition to be separate from other any other definitions. After that I will
address camp Action, who unlike the camp Definition, feel that the definition is not the problem
but rather it is the lack of action that hinders response. In this camp the two positions are one that
calls for better leadership and one that calls for better prosecution.
Camp Definition
The main belief of camp Definition is that the response to genocide is greatly impaired by
the definition of genocide. The authors that support this belief are David Scheffer, Jacques
Semelin, and Martin Shaw. They think that the definition coined by Raphael Lemkin leaves too
many unanswered questions and only further confuses people. The problem the term poses is an
apparently inextricable one of taxonomy, stemming from the various and sundry meaning
invested in this term, (Semelin 309). Though the term was originated so that there could be a
way to label crimes of a certain nature, the members of camp its too vague believe that it has
failed in this area. Instead of facilitating the process of defining crimes, the current definition it
only makes it harder to label crimes. Camp Action feels that it is necessary to modify the
definition genocide to aid the process of prosecution and prevention of genocide.
Position 1 of Camp Definition, is that the definition needs to be altered in order to reduce
the ambiguities in it. By doing so, a new more precise definition can be created and this can help
reduce the amount of time it takes before a response is taken. Shaw proposes that the best way to
do this is to change what is constitutes a social group and a perpetrator. The missing link of
genocide studies is the core social distinction between combatants and civilians (or noncombatants) (Shaw 112). Shaw believes that by addressing these ambiguities it increases the
strength of the current term. In the original definition of genocide theses distinctions were not
made, instead Lemkin listed what counted as a social group. However by doing this it left out
groups that experience genocide that do not necessarily fall into these groupings. In the case of
Rwanda, Shaws new term allows for the Tutsis to be recognized as a social group which could
not have happened with the original term. Shaw, like others in Camp Definition, feels that
without this change in the definition any form of action during genocides is hindered and without
that no legal action can be taken.
Some authors of Camp Definition also believe that the original definition is legal in
nature and as a result of this it impairs proper action from being taken. Their belief is that
because the definition was originally made to be used under legal circumstances it doesnt allow
expansion in other fields. So it is a necessity to change the term so that there can be development
in other areas apart from law such as social science and politics. Without expansion in other
areas we prevent further understanding of genocides.
In order to improve the response to genocide, Scheffer feels that we need to separate the
political and legal definitions of genocide. The political use of the term should be separated
from its legal definition as a crime of individual responsibility (Scheffer 229). By separating the
two it frees governments from the constraints of the legal definition. Scheffer believes that the
features of the legal definition forces governments to wait until a crime truly meets the legal
standards before it can be labeled genocide. This causes problems because in the time that the
governments are deliberating over the label to give the crime, thousands are being killed and no
one is stopping it. Scheffer also argues that the legal definition also makes governments even
more reluctant to step in when crimes are finally labeled as genocide. In many cases of genocide
many governments have been reluctant to intervene because of the weight the legal definition
carries. They feel that once they label a situation, genocide they will have to contribute all the
soldiers and money needed to fully see the problem through. Scheffer insists that instead there
should be a political definition that allows governments the ability to label a situation genocide
without being compelled to fully see the problem through. By separating these two definitions,
Scheffer believes that governments will be more willing to intervene because there is pressure on
them to commit to anything. If this had been the case in Rwanda, there would have been more
people calling the acts committed a genocide and perhaps there were would have been a different
outcome.
Semelin believes that the term genocide should move more into a social science approach
and away from the legal approach. I believe it is crucial for genocide research to disengage
itself from the legal approach in order to come into its own in the field of the social sciences,
(Semelin 310). This is crucial because today the current term of the genocide is endemic to all
kinds of identitarian, humanitarian and political rhetorics (Semelin 310) and this causes the
word to lose its true meaning. Semelin proposes that a new term be employed for his budding
social science approach, the word being massacre. Massacre is his choice word because unlike
the word genocide we can distinguish between various morphologies of massacre by their
scope, (Semelin 323). With the term genocide Semelin asserts, it is impossible to distinguish
between small scale and large scale. Employing this in Rwanda would have given the ongoing
killings there a name and perhaps maybe more attention would have been paid attention to.
Semelin argues that by severing the connections between the legal approach and the social
science approach, we can expand our understanding of the people that commit genocide be and
thereby able to implement action in the places where it is most needed.
Camp Action
The authors of Camp Action, Martha Minow, Samantha Power, Kingsley Moghalu,
Madeleine Albright and William Cohen, believe that there need not be a re-evaluation of the
term genocide but instead this time should be spent to better improve both leadership and
prosecution. The focus on names is understandable, but it is too limited to meet the underlying
concerns (Minow 38). It seems natural for people to want to focus on the definition of the
genocide, however the members of this camp argue that this misdirected interest and instead we
should focus on improvement in other areas.
Position one of Camp Leadership, is that more attention needs to be paid to leadership
instead of on trying to reword the definition. The members that support this position feel that
currently there is lack of proper leadership and this is what is truly causing the delay in response.
If we were to address this issue many of the challenges we face in our response to genocide
would be eliminated and in doing so, the prevention and prosecution of genocide will increase.
Minow asserts that continually changing the original definition of genocide does not add at all to
the understanding of the term. The cure will not come from new words, (Minow 38). The term
itself is sufficient but instead it was people do with the term that they are given. Minnow
suggests that the time spent evaluating the definition could be better spent on trying improve the
leadership. The necessary energy would be better spend pursuing better leadership, better media
and educational efforts to mobilize sustained public responsiveness, (Minow 37). She argues
that by doing this we will be able to reduce the time it takes before action is taken. The debate
makes me think we need to spend more time understanding the sources of resistanceby
individuals, by nations, by international organizationsif we are to devise more meaningful and
timely responses to mass atrocities, (Minow 40). In Rwanda, many countries resisted stepping
in to stop the fighting and this is what truly allowed the massacres to develop into a genocide.
Minow argues that if we are able to address this issue then we can improve leadership as a whole
and by addressing the issue of leadership we would improve action.
Power supports the idea that leadership needs to be improved. In her book, Power makes
it vehemently clear that she feels that governments have failed to properly deal with genocide. In
the examples she has in the book, Power highlights where the American government has failed to
intervene even when it had full knowledge of the occurrence of a genocide, Even though she
doesnt mention that redefining genocide is a waste of time, it can be inferred that she feels that
energy could be better placed in the other areas mainly leadership. According to the coldblooded legalities of the situation, the treatment of Turkish subjects by the Turkish Government
was purely a domestic affair; unless it directly affected American lives and American interest, it
was outside the concern of the American Government, (Power 8). Power felt that this lack of
interest in the affairs of other countries is exactly what needed to be changed if there were to be
any breakthrough in the prevention and prosecution of genocide. The issue of changing the
current definition of genocide never came up in Powers book it is evident that she thinks that
addressing leadership is the more pertinent issue.
Albright and Cohen, like Minow and Power, agree that there needs to be change in the
current state of leadership. A lack of dedicated resources for prevention and the absence of
bureaucratic mechanisms allowing rapid analysis and response have impeded timely action,
(Albright and Cohen). In their eyes the issue of what really causes lack of effective action is truly
the poorly structured planning for these events. The genocide in Rwanda is a great example of
poor planning. The soldiers that were there were not prepared for genocide and were not well
versed in the history of the country. This coupled with the reluctance of the international
governments to intervene is what cause the situation in Rwanda to escalate. The need for
restructuring of the definition never comes into their argument for what causes the lack of timely
action in response to genocide. Albright and Cohen feel that what is needed is a national
blueprint to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, (Albright and Cohen) and better leadership.
Position two of the Camp Action, states that prosecution should be the main focus instead
of the redefinition of the term. Moghalu believes that through the continued prosecution of those
that commit the genocidal crimes, we will increase the prevention and prosecution of genocide.
In his essay he shows how the Arusha tribunal has impacted the international community. The
tribunal which prosecuted many of the perpetrators behind the Rwandan genocide, paved ways in
the area of international law and the prosecution of genocide. From the normative perspective
of international humanitarian law laying down the law, punishing its transgressors, and setting
new standards the Arusha tribunals impact has been huge (Moghalu 75). Though Moghalu
does not argue against the changing the current definition, from his essay it is evident that the
believes that increasing prosecution is the most effective way to make sure
This essay discusses the arguments of two camps; Definition and Action. The two camps
feel that there needs to be a change in the way the response to genocide is addressed; however
what they differ on is the manner in which they want to achieve this. Camp Definition calls for a
change in the definition of the term genocide to allow for expansion in new areas. On the other
hand Camp Definition, believes that the time used to redefine the term could be used to improve
leadership and the prosecution of genocide. Rwanda is an area where both of these two camps
have succeeded, without a combination of the two the tribunals wouldnt have been as
successful. Although the two sides make a good argument I have to agree with Camp Definition,
I feel that the definition although it may cause ambiguities is not the main source of the problem,
it is the inept government that further exasperates the existing problem. If government were able
to intervene when the appearance of a genocide occurred, there would be no need to redefine the
term because the term genocide would never be used seeing as the situation would never escalate
to that level. Governments need to be willing and able to commit the necessary forces needed to
see that genocides like that of Rwanda never happen again and it is impossible to do so with
proper planning and leadership. In the end, theres need to be a combination of refining the
current definition of genocide and increased leadership and prosecution if there is to be any
change in the way genocide is presently dealt with.
Works Cited
Albright, Madeleine K., and William S. Cohen. "Never Again, For Real." New York Times [New
York] 21 Dec. 2008. Print.
Minow, Martha. Naming Horror: Legal and Political Words for Mass Atrocities.
Genocide Studies and Prevention 2.1 (2007): 37-42. Web. 1 July 2009
Moghalu, Kingsley. Uncharted Waters: Judging Genocide. Rwandas Genocide: The Politics
of Global Justice. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005. 75-100. Print.
Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New
York: Perennial, 2002. Print.
Scheffer, David. Genocide and Atrocity Crimes. Genocide Studies and Prevention 1.3
(2006): 229-250. Web. 1 July 2009.
Semelin, Jacques. Excerpt from The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. Purify and
Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. Trans. Cynthia Schoch. New York:
Columbia UP, 2007. 308-361. Print. (In class we will only require 308-327.)
Shaw, Martin. Excerpts from The Missing Concept: The Civilian Category and Its Social
Meaning and from The Relevance of Conceptual Analysis: Genocide in Twenty-First Century
Politics. What is Genocide? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. 113-115; 153-171. Print.