and Denition Purpose
(Based on Pape 1996)
Form of third-party intervention:
Aimed at persuading a party to stop an ongoing action
or start a new course of action by changing its costs
and benets
Often involves helping one of the participants win
Disputant(s) need not agree to this type of intervention
Disputant(s) expected to accept third partys ideas
Frequently takes place under the guise of mediation
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Who Coerces?
Any actor enjoying an advantage of power over its target(s)
States (mostly major powers)
Groups and organizations (e.g. UN, EU)
Individuals (limited in coercive power)
2
Two Types
(Based on Pape 1996)
Military coercion
Coercion by punishment
Coercion by denial
Economic coercion
3
Military Coercion
(Pape 1996)
Calculation: R = B p(B ) C p(C )
Strategies:
1. Raise C : Third party can increase the costs of resistance
by exploiting civilian vulnerabilities
2. Raise p(C ): Third party can signal the credibility to
inict damage
3. Reduce p(B ): Third party can reduce the probability
that resistance will bring the target state any benets
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Economic Sanctions in Theory
Economic deprivations:
1. Induce compliance either because
(a) Leader faces hardships, personal or
(b) Core supporters of leader face hardships and threaten to withdraw support
2. Lead to overthrow of government due to popular discontent
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Economic Sanctions in Practice
Economic eects:
1. Incentives for proteers to
(a) Supply scarce goods at premium prices
(b) Transship exports
2. Target state often gains control over
(a) Underground trade (smuggling)
(b) Distribution of goods (rationing)
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Economic Sanctions in Practice
Political eects:
1. Rally eect in target state
2. External threat justies greater state repression, including media
censorship
3. Ruling elite shifts burden onto opponents or disenfranchised groups
4. Hardships hurt export sectors and middle class, the natural constituency for democracy
5. Choice of economic over military coercion might make coercer look
unresolved to employ military force if coercion fails
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Economic Sanctions in Practice
(Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott)
Overall success rate: 34 percent
Factors that increase success:
1. Minor goal
2. Target is small, economically weak, and politically unstable
3. Sender and target conduct substantial trade
4. Impose high costs on target
5. Impose low costs on sender
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