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Lec16a

Course: COMP 3400, Fall 2010
School: Auburn
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Hierarchy: Memory Introduction Dr. Xiao Qin Auburn University http://www.eng.auburn.edu/~xqin xqin@auburn.edu Fall, 2010 1 Memory Systems - the Big Picture with Memory provides processor Instructions Data Problem: memory is too slow and too small Processor Input Control Memory Data Datapath Instructions Five Classics Components Picture 2 Output Technology Trends Logic: DRAM: Disk: Capacity Speed...

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Hierarchy: Memory Introduction Dr. Xiao Qin Auburn University http://www.eng.auburn.edu/~xqin xqin@auburn.edu Fall, 2010 1 Memory Systems - the Big Picture with Memory provides processor Instructions Data Problem: memory is too slow and too small Processor Input Control Memory Data Datapath Instructions Five Classics Components Picture 2 Output Technology Trends Logic: DRAM: Disk: Capacity Speed (latency) 2x in 3 years 2x in 3 years 4x in 3 years 2x in 10 years 4x in 3 years 2x in 10 years DRAM Year Size Cycle Time 1980 64 Kb 250 ns 1983 256 Kb 220 ns 1986 1 Mb 190 ns 1989 4 Mb 165 ns 1992 16 Mb 145 ns 1995 64 Mb 120 ns 1000:1! 3 2:1! Why Cares About Memory Hierarchy? Processor-DRAM Memory Gap (latency) Performance 1000 CPU Moores Law 100 4 Processor-Memory Performance Gap: (grows 50% / year) 10 DRAM 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1 Proc 60%/yr. (2X/1.5yr) Time DRAM 9%/yr. (2X/10 yrs) Memory Hierarchy - the Big Picture Problem: memory is too slow and too small Solution: memory hierarchy Processor Control Size (bytes): 5 L1 On-Chip Cache Speed (ns): Registers Datapath 0.25-0.5 <1K L2 Off-Chip Cache Main Memory (DRAM) 0.5-25 80-250 <16M <16G Secondary Storage (Disk) 5,000,000 (5ms) >100G Memory Configuration in Current PCs Static RAM (SRAM) - used for L1, L2 cache Processor L1 Cache L2/L3 Cache (SRAM) System Controller (I/O Bus) 6 Fast - 0.5-25ns access time (less for on-chip) Larger, More Expensive Higher power consumption Main Memory (DRAM) Dynamic RAM (DRAM) - used for PC main memory Slower - 80-250ns access time* Smaller, Cheaper Lower power consumption CPU Core 1 GHz - 3.6 GHz 4-way Superscaler RISC or RISC-core (x86): Deep Instruction Pipelines Dynamic scheduling Multiple FP, integer FUs Dynamic branch prediction Hardware speculation SDRAM (possibly PC100/PC133 on-chip) 100-133MHz 64-128 bits wide 2-way inteleaved ~ 900 MBYTES/SEC )64bit) Double Date Rate (DDR) SDRAM PC3200 200 MHz DDR 64-128 bits wide 4-way interleaved ~3.2 GBYTES/SEC (64bit) DDR2 SDRAM 667MHZ 8~16 bit wide System Components L1 CPU L2 L3 Caches All Non-blocking caches L1 16-128K 1-2 way set associative (on chip), separate or unified L2 256K- 2M 4-32 way set associative (on chip) unified L3 2-16M 8-32 way set associative (on or off chip) unified (FSB) System Bus Bus Adapter Memory Controller Memory Bus I/O Controllers Memory Chipset North Bridge Examples: Alpha, AMD K7: EV6, 200-400 MHz Intel PII, PIII: GTL+ 133 MHz Intel P4 800 MHz NICs Disks Displays Keyboards Chipset South Bridge I/O Devices Main I/O Bus Example: PCI, 33-66MHz 32-64 bits wide 133-528 MB/s PCI-X 133MHz 64-bits wide 1066 MB/s Networks I/O Subsystem Important issue: Which component creates a system performance bottleneck? 7 Levels of Memory Hierarchy Upper Level Capacity Access Time Cost CPU Registers 100s Bytes 1s ns Cache K Bytes 4 ns 1-0.1 cents/bit Main Memory M Bytes 100ns- 300ns $.0001-.00001 cents /bit Disk G Bytes, 10 ms (10,000,000 ns) -5 -6 10 - 10 cents/bit Tape infinite sec-min -8 10 8 Staging Xfer Unit faster Registers Instr. Operands prog./compiler 1-8 bytes Cache Blocks cache cntl 8-128 bytes Memory Pages OS 512-4K bytes Files user/operator Mbytes Disk Tape Larger Lower Level COMP 4300 Computer Architecture Block Placement Dr. Xiao Qin Auburn University http://www.eng.auburn.edu/~xqin xqin@auburn.edu Fall, 2010 9 The Principle of Locality The Principle of Locality: Program access a relatively small portion of the address space at any instant of time. Two Different Types of Locality: Temporal Locality (Locality in Time): If an item is referenced, it will tend to be referenced again soon (e.g., loops, reuse) Spatial Locality (Locality in Space): If an item is referenced, items whose addresses are close by tend to be referenced soon (e.g., straightline code, array access) Last 15 years, HW relied on locality for speed 10 Why Hierarchy Works The principle of locality Programs access a relatively small portion of the address space at any instant of time. Probability of reference 0 Address Space 2n - 1 Temporal locality: recently accessed data is likely to be used again Spatial locality: data near recently accessed data is likely to be used soon Result: the illusion of large, fast memory 11 Cache Operation Insert between CPU, Main Mem. Implement with fast Static RAM Holds some of a programs data instructions Operation: Hit: Data in Cache (no penalty) Miss: Data not in Cache (miss penalty) 12 CPU addr Processor data Cache Memory addr data DRAM Memory Cache Performance Measures Hit rate: fraction found in the cache high So that we usually talk about Miss rate = 1 - Hit Rate Hit time: time to access the cache Miss penalty: time to replace a block from lower level, including time to replace in CPU access time: time to acccess lower level transfer time: time to transfer block Average memory-access time (AMAT) = Hit time + Miss rate x Miss penalty (ns or clocks) 13 Fundamental Questions Q1: Where can a block be placed in the upper level? (Block placement) Q2: How is a block found if it is in the upper level? (Block identification) Q3: Which block should be replaced on a miss? (Block replacement) Q4: What happens on a write? (Write strategy) 14 Q1: Block Placement Where can block be placed in cache? In one predetermined place - direct-mapped Use fragment of address to calculate block location in cache Compare cache block with tag to test if block present Anywhere in cache - fully associative Compare tag to every block in cache In a limited set of places - set-associative Use address fragment to calculate set (like directmapped) Place in any block in the set Compare tag to every block in set Hybrid of direct mapped and fully associative 15 Direct Mapped Block Placement Cache *0 *4 *8 *C address maps to block: location = (block address MOD # blocks in cache) 00 04 08 0C 10 14 18 1C 20 24 28 2C 30 34 38 3C 40 44 48 4C Memory 16 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DM Memory Access 1: Mapping: 0 modulo 4 = 0 Mem Block 0 17 DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DM Memory DM Hit/Miss Mapping: 0 mod 4 = 0 Access 1: Mem Block 0 miss Block 0 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Mem[0] Set 0 is empty: write Mem[0] 18 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DM Memory Access 2: Mapping: 8 mod 4 = 0 Mem Block DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[0] 0 miss Block 1 8 Block 2 Block 3 19 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DMMem Block Access 2: Mapping: 8 mod 4 = 0 Memory DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[8] 0 miss Block 1 8 miss Block 2 Block 3 Set 0 contains Mem[0]. Overwrite with Mem[8] 20 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DMMem Block Access 3: Mapping: 0 mod 4 = 0 Memory DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[8] 0 miss Block 1 8 miss 0 Block 2 Block 3 21 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DMMem Block Access 3: Mapping: 0 mod 4 = 0 Memory DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[0] 0 miss Block 1 8 miss 0 miss Block 2 Block 3 Set 0 contains Mem[8]. Overwrite with Mem[0] 22 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DMMem Block Access 4: Mapping: 6 mod 4 = 2 Memory DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[0] 0 miss Block 1 8 miss 0 miss Block 2 6 Block 3 23 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DMMem Block Access 4: Mapping: 6 mod 4 = 2 Memory DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[0] 0 miss Block 1 8 miss 0 miss Block 2 Mem[6] 6 miss Block 3 Set 2 empty. Write Mem[6] 24 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DMMem Block Access 5: Mapping: 8 mod 4 = 0 Memory DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[0] 0 miss Block 1 8 miss 0 miss Block 2 Mem[6] 6 miss Block 3 8 25 Example: Accessing A Direct-Mapped Cache DM cache contains 4 1-word blocks. Find the # Misses for each cache given this sequence of memory block accesses: 0, 8, 0, 6, 8 DMMem Block Access 5: Mapping: 8 mod 4 = 0 Memory DM Hit/Miss Block 0 Mem[8] 0 miss Block 1 8 miss 0 miss Block 2 Mem[6] 6 miss Block 3 8 miss Set 0 contains Mem[0]. Overwrite with Mem[8] 26 Direct-Mapped Cache with n one-word blocks Pros: find data fast Con: What if access 00001 and 10001 repeatedly? We always miss 00 00 1 0 0101 0100 1 0 1101 10 00 1 Me m ory 27 11 1 10 1 11 0 10 0 01 1 00 1 01 0 00 0 Ca ch e 1 01 01 1 1 00 1 11 1 01
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61. E. I, II, and III62. B. goodness does not persist indefinitely63. E. Paradox64. B. The king says that no place indeed should murther sanctuarize right after Laertes says he wants tocutHamlets throat in a church so no place, not even a church, sho
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