12
R WEEK 11/17
LN&N (CH 9) Questions
1. What is economic voting or the economic vote?
Evaluating the incumbencys performance with incumbency; reward incumbent
for good economic performance or punish for bad (and vote for opposition)
Microeconomic: pocketbook - how am I doing
***Macroeconomic: sociotropic - how is the country doing; affect voter opinion
2. What are some of the debates about economic voting?
Voters in US usually blame themselves for personal economic problems, but when
others are affected, blame is placed on government
Economists are highly skeptical that anything government does affects economy
3. When does economic voting seem to happen?
4. What role can parties and candidates play in shaping economic voting?
Incumbents take credit for good economic conditions and blame bad one on their
policies not being in effect yet.
Candidates blame other party for inefficient policy, bad economy
Media plays huge role financial news (unemployment, debt)
Wantchekon Questions
Experiment random assignment (no bias in results), control group, treatment
1. Why does Benin present a good "laboratory" for an experiment on clientelism & its
effects on voting behavior?
Some areas that really strong and always vote the same; other areas that are very
competitive for votes
6 set parties, variation of competitiveness, set field of competitors
2. What is the goal of Wantchekon's experiment? How does he set it up (in terms of district
selection and platform design)?
Effects of clientelism on voting behavior
Picks different villages to practice programmatic/patronage campaigning
(randomly assigned)
o To avoid bias of voting based on ethnicity, gender, religion, party
Gets candidates to change up campaign promises
Looks at gender/ ethnicity/overall villages responses/reactions to different
promises (I will improve your wellbeing/I will improve education)
3. What individual voter and candidate features does he try to account for in his study?
The types of promises targeted versus policy
Gender, religion, ethnicity, party
4. What is the difference between "redistributive transfers" and "public goods provision"?
Redistributive transfers: clientelism, patronage
Public goods provision: programmatic
5. How were the experimental platforms communicated to voters?
The campaign workers set up events/meetings with voters, to promote message
depending on clientelism or programmatic (not even necessariliy politician)
6. What does Wantchekon find about the effectiveness of clientelism vs. promises of public
goods provision?
Pork wins preferred that message over public goods
Candidates likely to promise pork after results of this study
7. Where do public policy messages tend to be more effective? Less effective? How does
Wantchekon explain this?
Gender and occupational difference: Women preferred programmatic because
they do the trading with other areas/see effects of public spending
o Men receive government jobs - in exchange for vote
8. Does the type of candidate who delivers the message make a difference? How and why?
Incumbent has more of an impact and receives more support when making
promies can deliver state resources right away, can point out effective past
policies
9. How do women respond to the various types of campaign platforms?
***what is difference in the north? Controlled by regional parties, south controlled by opposition
parties (more credible with nationwide promises because regional promises NOT
NATIONWIDE)
**how voters in a democracy SHOULD decide who they vote for?
Here in Benin vote buying
Ideally voters must be educated on policies, intentions in office, idea of what country will be like
under candidate
Pacek Questions
While the economic voting literature is extensive, scholars have paid relatively little attention to the question of how or whether
the economy affects voting behavior in non- Western democracies. I address this issue by examining national elections in three
recent East Central European democracies: Bulgaria, the former Czech and Slovak Federated Republic, and Poland. Using
aggregate interregional data, the macroeconomic impact on turnout and voter choice is assessed in elections held from 1990 to
1992. I argue that the effect of economic adversity on turnout is withdrawal and that the effect on party choice is punishment for
incumbents held responsible for economic reform and reward for both mainstream and extremist challengers. Implications for the
study of elections and the future of electoral politics in East Central Europe are discussed.
1. What proposition is this article trying to test?
Do voters blame incumbent for bad economic conditions or do they just check out
of voting process?
If it was possible, command economy and free elections = economic voting
sensible
Command authority = closed authoritarian regime
2. Where is the study based?
US
3. What relationship does the author find between economic conditions and voter turnout?
Are any particular economic conditions related to voter turnout?
When unemployment goes up, voting goes down back to blaming self for own
conditions what difference does it make if I vote?;
4. What effects do economic conditions have on vote choice? In Poland? Bulgaira?
Czechoslovakia?
Less turnout, still punishing incumbent if economy is doing poorly
WEEK 13
T 11/22
LN&N (CH 8) Questions
1. What has been the general, global trend in voter turnout in recent decades?
Declining
2. Why is voter turnout lower in some countries?
When countries move voting age from 21 to 18 creating more young voters
decreases turnout because of different values
o Alternatives for participation rioting, boycotting, protesting
3. Why does anyone vote?
Paradox of voting self interest why anyone bothers to vote?
o No compelling answer can answer why people dont vote
o Cost-benefit analysis, will my energy to vote actually make a difference?
o Party states ex. KY red state
Feel good helping democracy, so everyone knows you voted (sticker); out of
habit
4. If citizens arent voting, what other means of participation are available? Are these
alternatives potentially better or worse than voting?
Alternatives for participation rioting, boycotting, protesting
Addonizio, Green & Glaser Questions
Experiment of putting party back into politics election day used to be fun, drunk,
treating now illegal to serve in KY on election day; creating more of a
benefit today
1. Historically, why might turnout have been higher in the US than it is today?
A century and a half ago, casting a vote in the United States was an engaging social experience, as voters at the polls talked with
friends, threw down shots of free whiskey, listened to lively entertainment, and generally had a good time (McGerr 1986). According
to Alt schuler and Blumin (2000, 75) [M]en went to the elections to talk, to conduct some business or another, or simply to take a
break, knowing that others would be doing so as well.... [E]lections were not the silent and single-purpose events that they would
become in the era of secret ballots and voting machines, and voters did not at tend them just to vote and depart for work or home.
They came, in Pomeroy's words, 'to meet each other and to vote,' and in many cases to remain for hours in the first of these pursuits,
availing them selves or not of the parties' inducements to cast a particular ballot.
2. Why might festivals increase turnout?
Why might one suppose that festivals would increase turnout? One reason, as mentioned earlier, is the historical corre lation between
festival activity and voter turnout. Another is the powerful role of personal influence evident in recent ex perimental research. Dozens
of field ex periments conducted since 1998 suggest that impersonal modes of communica tion-direct mail, automatic phone calls,
routinized calls made by telemarketing firms, electronic mail-have a negligible effect on tumout (Green and Gerber 2004). Much more
effective are personal appeals, such as those delivered face-to face by political canvassers. If festivals can draw people to the polling
location, face-to-face encouragement can be ex pected to impel party-goers to cast ballots.
3. How did the authors design their research to test the impact of festivals?
Finally, we wish to underscore the importance of exploring broad historical questions through randomized experi mentation. Granted,
one cannot easily recreate the atmosphere surrounding nineteenth-century elections, because even if one were to hand out whiskey and
cigars, these blandishments are no longer part of a voting process that wel comes and emphasizes them. As Lieber son (1987) has
argued, causal processes may work in an asymmetrical fashion; the decline in turnout that accompanies the disappearance of selective
benefits may exceed the rise in turnout associated with their reintroduction. Nevertheless, until one performed experiments of the kind
described in this essay, one would have had no idea whether festivals in crease turnout by 0.5%, 5%, or 50%.
4. What were the festivals like?
Suburban - On Election Day, the festival took place immediately outside the polling place, on the front lawn of the local mid dle
school. A large tent was set up sur rounded by signs encouraging people to enjoy free snacks, drinks, and raffles. A cotton candy
machine attracted a steady stream of children, and a professional DJ played upbeat, family-friendly music. People of all ages milled
about the party tent.
Crime neighborhood As in Hooksett, a large tent was set up surrounded by signs en couraging people to enjoy free hamburg ers,
hotdogs, and hot chocolate, and to participate in the raffle. Again, cotton candy and popcorn drew crowds of chil dren. A popular local
DJ played family friendly music while he doubled as a clown. At points during the party, he trolled through the neighborhood with his
wife, also dressed as a clown, call ing for neighbors to join the party and to vote.
5. Controlling for past turnout, what did the authors find the impact of their festivals to be?
The 2005 and 2006 festivals cost a total of $26,630.
This ratio implies that festivals generate votes at an average rate of $28 per vote.
The 2005-2006 Election Day festivals experiments have broad-ranging implica tions. For campaigns, the pattern of sta tistically and
substantively significant findings means that social gatherings represent a potentially valuable voter mobilization tactic. Just as voter
mobili zation experiments demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of door-to-door can vassing helped encourage political cam paigns to
invest more resources in this activity (Bai 2004), research showing the effectiveness of festivals may revive the kind of benefitsoriented approach to voter mobilization that prevailed a cen tury and a half ago.
First, they shed new light on how institutional changes in the late nineteenth century may have brought about a decline in voter
turnout. Much has been said about the introduction of the secret ballot and the way in which secrecy disrupted vote-buying (Rusk
1974). Relatively little attention has been paid to other reforms, such as the re quirement that candidates and campaign workers remain
a certain distance (often 100 feet) from voting places, a rule that not only disrupts surveillance of voting activity but also dramatically
alters the social ambiance surrounding the polling station. As Bensel (2004) points out, prior to these reforms the act of casting a ballot
put the voter at the center of a public spectacle played out in front of an often raucous crowd. The second implication concerns the
paradox of political participation. Schol ars have long observed that elections create a collective action problem. From the standpoint
of the rational self interested voter, voting is time consuming, and the chances of casting a pivotal vote are remote. One theoretical
answer to this paradox has been to posit psychic benefits that voters receive when they vote (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), and one
interpretation of the effect pre sented here is that festivals provide so cial approbation for and from those who perform their civic duty.
Another theoret ical answer is that the cost of voting is so small that even minor material in ducements are sufficient to draw nonvot
ers to the polls.
6. What are the potential implications of their findings for elections in developing
countries?
Misplaced in developing country resources could be better allocated to persuade
voters; although people in poverty could enjoy the free food because of free time; not a
civic duty to participate in festivals in developing countries
Kostadinova & Power Questions
Scholarsa ndp olicym akersh avea dvancedco nflictingh ypotheses aboutt hed ynamicso f voterp articipationin nascent democraticre
gimes. The authorsa dvancet he researchp rogramb y examining1 08p arliamentaryele ctionsi n postau-thoritarian LatinA mericaa ndp
ost-CommunistEu ropef rom 1978 through2 Institutional,po 003. litical,a ndd emo-graphicv ariabless hapet urnoutin new democracies,
but therei s also a strongt emporal effect:v otert urnout drops sharplya fterf oundinge lectionsa ndc ontinuest o fall throughth e fourthe
lectoralc ycle. Moreover, aftera ppropriate controls, rateso f turnoutin EasternE uropea rec onsistentlyh ighert hant he equivalentra tesf
or LatinA merica. The authorsa ttributeth esed ifferencesto historicalle gaciesa ndt he modeo f transitionto democracy.
1. What are the authors hoping to explain in this article?
In this article, we advance the research program on turnout dynamics in new democracies by
comparing electoral participation in post transition Eastern Europe and Latin America. By
examining more than one hun-dred elections in twenty-seven new regimes spread across two
world regions during the global Third Wave of democratization, we are able to subject both the
"founding election" hypothesis and the "disengage-ment" hypothesis to more rigorous empirical
testing. In the first section of the article, we describe our case selection, our data set, and our
dependent variable. In the next section, we revisit some previous cross-national studies of
electoral participation, and from these studies we derive a roster of well-established con-trol
variables that are crucial to our multivariate analy-ses. We then review the empirical evidence on
turnout dynamics in new democracies. Finally, we place our findings in theoretical and
comparative perspective.
Our con-clusions concerning this phenomenon focus on three aspects of turnout: (1) enduring
differences between LatinA mericaa nd EasternE urope,( 2) performanceo f the traditionalp
redictorso f turnouti n our respective analyses, and (3) the importance of posttransition dynamics.
2. What country cases do the authors use? Why?
To test disputed hypotheses about voter turnout in new democracies, we collected data on 108
parliamen-tary elections in postauthoritarian Latin America and post-Communist Europe in the
period from 1978 through 2003.2 Some 48 of these elections occurred in Latin America, while 60
took place in Eastern and Central Europe. The relatively large N allows for a more fully specified
model of turnout patterns in new democracies,i ncorporatinga much widerr angeo f his-torical,
social, institutional,a nd political-processv ari-ables than could be achieved in a single-region
study.
3. What control variables do the authors include? What existing theories/studies are these
variables meant to account for?
Comparativest udieso f voter turnouth ave tendedt o emphasize institutional, socioeconomic, or
political process variables. Each of these three rival approaches to explainingc ross-national
differencesi n turnouth as highlighteda numbero f well-establishedp redictorsth at we employ as
controlv ariablesi n our analysis.
Institutional accountso f electoralp articipationw ere launched in the mid-1980s by the seminal
articles of Powell (1986) and Jackman (1987), and twenty years later institutionalismr emains the
dominanta pproach to turnout (Blais 2006). Powell argued that single-member district plurality
(SMDP) electoral rules do not provide parties with incentives to run candidates everywhere,
meaning that some districts are simply "written off" and parties do not mobilize voters uni-formly
across the national territory;i n contrast,p ro-portional representations ystems with higher district
magnitudesa re conducivet o broad-basedm obilization on the ground. Jackman examined
nineteen industrial-ized democracies, regressing voter turnout on five institutional variables:
nationally competitive districts (following Powell), multipartyism, electoral dispro-portionality,
unicameralism, and compulsory voting laws. Jackman's institutionalist approach generates strong
results, with his model he was able to explain up to 75 percent of cross-national variation in
turnout (Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995). In our analysis below, we include the first
four of Jackman's key variables in all models; the fifth, mandatory vot-ing, is included only in the
model for Latin America. All of our Latin American cases use compulsory vot-ing and none of
our Eastern European cases do.
Add institutional variable concurrent elections. In presi-dential systems, turnout in parliamentary
elections should naturally be higher when there are simultane-ous elections for the national
executive and lower when legislative elections are held alone. Concurrence periodicallyr aisest he level
of electorals aliencef or par-liamentarye lection
4. What does their study find?
***concurrent elections sig socioeconomic variables not significant
A striking finding of this article concerns the con-sistently lower turnout rates in Latin
America as com-pared to Eastern Europe. Comparingt he democratizatione xperienceso f the
two regions, we see at least four reasons that could explain the relatively higher rates of voter
participa-tion in Eastern Europe PAGE 371
Electoral concurrence is an institutional device that has strong positive effects on voter
turnout in both Eastern Europe and Latin America.
In terms of socioeconomic predictors, our Latin American results support the finding by Fornos,
Power, and Garand (2004) that social and demographic variablesa re overwhelmedb y
institutionalv ariablesi n explaining turnout.
In terms of political factors, we find that "closeness of elections" is a wash--everywhere, all the
time.
Finally, we now turn to dynamic factors, the central focus of our approacht o ThirdW avet urnout.
This arti-cle has found persuasive evidence that the "founding election" hypothesis (that turnout
should soar in the inaugural electiono f a new democracy)a ndi ts corollary (that turnout should
gradually decline thereafter) are both essentially correct for Latin America and Eastern Europe
between 1978 and 2003.
5. What does this study tell us about the relationship between voter turnout and democracy?
Turning to more traditional arguments about voter turnout, this article has examined four
clusters of independent variables (institutional, socioeconomic, political, and temporal)
thought to predict voter turnout in nascent democracies. In terms of institu-tional factors,
we have found that electoral dispro-portionality and unicameralism are important
predictors of voter turnout in Latin America, whereas multipartyism appears to be more
important in Eastern Europe.
Historical legacy
**institutional design most affects rates of turnout, specifically concurrent elections
A somewhat more promising political factor is the level of political rights and civil
liberties as measured by Freedom House. But the performance of this vari-able is not
consistent: the level of democracy has a strong positive effect on turnout in Latin
America and a strong negative effect in post-Communist Europe.
Our research shows that in the new Third Wave democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin
America, foundinge lectionsa re dramaticc ontestso f greath istor-ical import-but that voter
disengagement from elec-toralp articipationb eginsa lmosti mmediatelyt hereafter.
WEEK 14
Chandra
1) Consequently, limited information settings bias observerstoward schemes of ethnic
categorization. What does the author mean by this?
2) What is an information shortcut?
3) What do most studies of information shortcuts emphasize? How is Chandras study
different?
4) How does Chandra characterize ethnic groups? What distinguishes one ethnic group
from another?
5) Why is information about ethnicity costless?
6) What are some examples of costless data sources associated with ethnicity?
7) The Authors own features provide an example of ethnic sorting, how does this relate to
the issue of ethnic voting?
8) What is a patronage democracy?
Patronage-democracies include observers/voters who are forced to distinguish between
recipients of past patronage transactions making the voting decision with little
information. This limited information connects to ethnic favoritism, in that candidates
expect those ethnically-similar to vote for them based on ethnicity and voters expectation
that they will receive state benefits from voting for those ethnically-similar candidates.
9) How does the author connect ethnic voting and patronage democracies? (hint: there are
10 steps to the argument)
1. Politicians in patronage-democracies have an incentive to collect rents on policy
implementation
Elected officials may seek private wealth as rents, such as in patronage-driven states, but
may also seek votes to continue controlling the state. Therefore, black markets for state
resources should be expected wherever patronage-democracies are, with currency being
votes and buyers being the voters.
10) What conditions might disrupt the connection between patronage and ethnic voting?
11) What are some competing arguments to explain ethnic voting?
McDermott Questions
1. What two changes have taken place in American elections since WWII?
2. How do stereotypes, of political parties for example, work as information shortcuts? When
are voters likely to use such information shortcuts?
3. What kinds of demographic stereotypes might influence voters assessments of candidates?
How do voters learn the demographic characteristics of candidates?
4. How are belief and trait stereotypes different? How will belief and trait stereotypes influence
voting behavior?
5. What are some belief stereotypes associated with female candidates? With Black candidates?
6. What are some trait stereotypes associated with female candidates? Black candidates?
7. How does the author test the effects of candidate characteristics on voting behavior?
8. How do candidate characteristics affect vote choice?
9. What other factors influence how candidate characteristics affect vote choice?
***In developed world, voters consider policies, ideological preferences (shortcuts) more
abstract/less concrete, more access to info but is info necessarily good? Unbiased?
In developing world, voters look for stuff/patronage society
McDermott stereotypes of shortcuts (political partisanship)
Chandra ethnic shortcuts (is this person like me)
When going to the polls, want voters to consider the good of everybody/who will do the best job,
LN&N (CH 11) Questions
What necessary feature(s) must elections possess to be truly democratic?
Possibility of throwing out incumbent; must be meaningful competition & voters must
have civil liberties (choice) FREE&FAIR
How does the ability to change incumbent leaders change depending on the electoral
system or nature of the executive (president vs. PM)?
Whether it is parliamentary or presidential winner-take-all: presidency/1 seat clear
way incumbent can be replaced; parliamentary: clear turnover is still possible
When we have PR and parliamentary, no clear winner and loser, gov looks like coalitions
multiple parties making up gov, clear replacement of incumbent doesnt happen
How do elections facilitate citizen representation? What is the best way to think about
representation?
Politicians are possible advocates of citizens representation
How much do elections really affect government policy?
Even if politicians have to compromise original policy views, they still have a voice to an
extent
Are elections good or bad for stability?
Ties into if elections are free&fair, if citizens can believe it is can be good for stability
Can be bad if losers dont/and realize they dont have chance of winning next time
Bratton Questions
How do we understand the relationship between elections and the consolidation of
democracy?
How do we assess the quantity of second elections in Africa? The quality?
The 2nd round of elections since the most recent wave of democratization;
What do second elections mean? How do different actors try to influence the meaning of
these elections?
Describe founding elections in Africa in the 1990s. How did early founding elections
differ from later founding elections? Why?
What did the pattern of 2nd elections and democratic reversals in Africa look like?
They were not as free and fair as the first round
Describe the quality of 2nd elections in Africa. What do they mean for democracy in
Africa?
High levels of democracy and civil liberties after subsequent elections; but not incumbent
turnover
Carothers Questions
What does Carothers think has happened recently that indicates a backlash against
democracy promotion?
What new tactics are countries employing in response to western democracy aid?
(exemplified by Russia)
What has caused this backlash?
Since the Bush era, democracy promotion in other countries is not welcomed when
pushed by the U.S.; election observers are unwelcome.
Do leaders in developing countries really see western interference as a threat?
What does Carothers think democracy promotion came to mean during the Bush
administration?
What should the US do in response to the backlash against democracy promotion?