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Course: ECON 332, Fall 2011
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and . Federalism Environmental Protection: Theory There are three key theoretical questions: 1. Choosing the extent of environmental control 2. Deciding on the methods of pollution control to use 3. Determining and funding the basic research agenda for an environmental problem Choosing the extent of environmental control -- which level of government will choose the most efficient level of environmental...

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and . Federalism Environmental Protection: Theory There are three key theoretical questions: 1. Choosing the extent of environmental control 2. Deciding on the methods of pollution control to use 3. Determining and funding the basic research agenda for an environmental problem Choosing the extent of environmental control -- which level of government will choose the most efficient level of environmental protection? Some key considerations are: 1. Externalities do the costs and benefits extend beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of a state or local government? If so, centralized would be better. The answer is clear when there are no externalities, or when externalities are significant (e.g. SO2 and acid rain), but what about when externalities are small (e.g. how much space should a town give to a new park some people from outside the town will enjoy it)? Advantages of localized decision making when externalities are small: Localities can take advantage of unique factors. Because tastes differ, the end result is different types of communities, so that individuals can sort themselves by preferences. Most standards set minimum, not maximum, levels of control. Therefore, welfare losses occur in communities with preferences for less control. Other types of externalities: Intergenerational ability of local government to consider future generations depends on whether future benefits affect property values or whether government thinks local residents might move before enjoying benefits. Safety externality if people are paternalistic, they might want to protect citizens in other jurisdictions. 2. Information which level of government has the most information about the costs and benefits of reducing pollution? In general, federal government has better information about basic health and environmental effects of pollution. Local governments have better information about unique local conditions. Preferences Demographic characteristics (e.g. number of elderly or children who will suffer more from air pollution) Factors affecting costs of compliance (e.g. local labor rates) Geographic or biophysical concerns (e.g. type of fish in local water) However, the federal government can transmit general information to local governments, giving local governments an advantage. When externalities are present, there is a tradeoff, since the federal government better for dealing with externalities, but local governments have more information. 3. The costs of decision making Does choosing a standard entail large decision making costs? If so, centralized solution better. The federal government can take advantage of economies of scale. However, the federal government can lower decision making costs for local governments by providing information: e.g. guidelines or suggested standards based on technical information. 4. Interjurisdictional competition Will a lack of federal standards lead lower levels of government to engage in competition to attract industry, and will that in turn lead to standards that are less than optimal? If so, centralized solution better. There is no empirical evidence on whether governments choose less than optimal levels of protection. Also, firms will still choose to locate in areas with lower control costs. These are likely to be areas with low initial levels of pollution. Alternatively, note that Adler argues that competition among jurisdictions is a good thing. States act as "laboratories," demonstrating which policy options work best. 5. Government objectives and capabilities Are all levels of government trying to achieve the maximum welfare of constituents? Do all levels of government have the resources and expertise to carry out the standard they choose? Even if local governments set the standards, enforcement may be left to state or federal governments. Deciding on the Methods of Pollution Control -- Having set a standard, what level of government is most likely to choose an efficient method of pollution control in order to achieve it? Some key considerations are: 1. Information which level of government has the most information to evaluate cost-effectiveness? Local governments have more information on specialized conditions. Composition of local industry Atmospheric and geological conditions Federal government likely to have better information about technologies. 2. Economies of scale in production when control devices are needed for widespread use, manufacturers can take advantage of economies of scale. Example: better to have one standard for recycled newsprint than different standards in every state. 3. Externalities are there externalities from selecting certain controls? Examples: Reducing emissions by raising the height of a smokestack affects neighboring regions. Job losses from regulation, such as coal miners in West Virginia Effects on future generations (e.g. hazardous waste) 4. The costs of decision making Federal government can lower costs to local governments by providing information. 5. Government objectives and capabilities Will lower levels of government put too much emphasis on attracting or protecting business? Consider, for example, Illinois requirement that utilities burn coal from Illinois, which has a high sulfur content. Determining and Funding the Basic Research Agenda 1. Information is a public good. Thus, the federal government is best suited to carry out the research agenda. Local government could be best suited for problems with a limited geographic scope, because the free rider problem is not as large. II. Case I Drinking Water Protection Background o The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), passed in 1974, established the first set of federally enforceable standards for drinking water. Prior to 1974, the Public Health service published standards, but compliance was voluntary. o Congress strengthened the SDWA in 1986 The EPA now issues standards for 86 contaminants, and has specific treatment requirements, o 1996 amendments to the SDWA provide the EPA with more flexibility to consider costs and benefits in setting standards and allow for exceptions for localities that find it costly to meet the standards. o Setting the standards The EPA sets maximum contaminant level goals (MCLGs) that are nonenforceable, but represent the level at which no known or anticipated health affects occur. Then, the EPA sets the maximum contaminant level (MCL), which is an enforceable standard set as close to the MCLG as is affordable to large water systems with relatively clean water. Systems serving 10,000 people or less are eligible for variances if unable to afford to meet MCLs and health will still be adequately protected. Some variances also allowed for places with very dirty water, if not able to meet standards even with best technology available. In practice, variances rarely used. Considering costs was not allowed until 1996. o Estimates of cost of compliance: From EPA: $1.4 billion From American Water Works Association (a group of major private suppliers of drinking water): more than $4 billion. Choosing Drinking Water Standards is federal control appropriate? o Because of economies of scale, costs per-household are greater for small systems. However, benefits per-household do not vary. Therefore, standards can pass an aggregate cost-benefit test but be inefficient for small systems. o Externalities Most costs and benefits are local Some pathogens affect people after short exposure, and thus benefit visitors. However, areas depending on visitors, such as for tourism, have incentive to protect them anyway. The main externality is the safety concern. o Information Differences among communities: Cost per household varies greatly across communities. Preferences vary Federal government has better information on the basic science o Government objectives Would local government protect drinking water without federal standards? The case provides a history of drinking water. Federal government traditionally played the role of providing information. In the 1960s, 130 outbreaks of waterborne diseases were reported. One explanation was negligence of local communities. In addition, there was concern that technology was not keeping up with new chemicals being emitted into water. Moreover, enforcement is an issue Not all states have adequate enforcement What are the welfare losses from uniform national standards of radionuclides called adjusted gross alpha emitters? o The CBO calculated the difference between net benefits under optimal treatment and net benefits under uniform standards. See Table 2 for complete results. Households served by small systems lose the most ($651-$774 per year) Cost per cancer case avoided in the smallest systems is $480 million. Welfare losses drop as size of system increases Due to economies of scale Total welfare loss: $12 million Even if assume no treatment without federal standards, only one system has positive net benefits with uniform federal How standard o applicable are the results to other drinking water standards? Economies of scale are relevant to other standards. Many affected pollutants found in groundwater, and thus likely to affect small and medium sized facilities. Deciding on the Methods of Treatment Least-cost method varies by system. Factors include: Size of system Initial level of contamination Existing equipment o How treatment methods are chosen: EPA only judges compliance based on whether standards are met. Treatment method does not matter. However, local water systems need state approval for control technology, which often limits the use of less conventional technologies. To help alleviate this problem, the 1996 amendments require the EPA to list feasible and affordable treatment technologies for four sizes of systems, not just large ones. This provides state regulators with more information. Determining and Funding the Basic Research Agenda o Most contaminants are found in several states, so that research is a public good. As a result, the federal government has primary responsibility for research. o In addition, New Jersey does additional research. NJ is the only state where mercury has been typically found in drinking water. III. Case II Ground-Level Ozone Control Background o Ground-level ozone has significant impact on respiratory health, crops, vegetation, soil, water, materials, animals, and visibility. Health concerns include interference with normal activity, especially for people with impaired respiratory systems, episodic and incapacitating illnesses, such asthma, and progressive respiratory impairment. o Ground-level ozone results from a combination of nitrogen oxides (NOX) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the presence of sunlight. Highway vehicles and utilities generate the most NOX. Local businesses (e.g. dry cleaners and bakeries) and vehicles emit the most VOCs. o Standards: Before July 18, 1997, standard was a one-hour measurement of 0.12 parts per million (ppm). In violation if exceed standard more than three times in a threeyear period. After July 18, 1997, EPA raised standard to 0.08 ppm. In violation if the three-year average of the fourth-highest daily maximum eight hour average ozone concentration exceeds this level. Still have to meet 0.12 ppm one-hour standard. Once meet the standard, it is revoked for the area, and then the area must make progress towards the new standard. o The 1990 Clean Air Act recognized that ground-level ozone was a regional pollutant. It established the Ozone Transport Commission for Northeastern states to address violations associated with the entire region. Choosing the Extent of Ozone Control o Externalities play a large role. Studies show that ozone flows from the Midwest and Southeast to affect the Northeast. Therefore, regional or federal control is needed. However, current regulations measure violations in an area, and do not account for movements across regions. Although the 1990 CAA has a provision requiring state plans to address emissions that contribute significantly to nonattainment areas, this phrase is not defined. The case notes that the EPA plans to enact a final rule to deal with ozone in the Northeast by September 1998. The final rule published in Federal Register on December 17, 1999. For those interested, information on the final rule can be found on the EPA's web site at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t1/fact_sheets/126fs.pdf. Also, a benefit-cost comparison of the rule can be found at: http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t1ria.html. See, in particular, chapter 4 on this page. To address regional externalities and take advantage of localized information, the 1990 CAA authorized regional organizations o Created the Ozone Transport Region (OTR) for the Northeast (list of states on page 41). The Ozone Transport Commission has a representative from each of the 12 member states, appointed by the governor, and one from the District of Columbia. The commission has the authority to assess the degree of interstate movement of ozone pollutants and to recommend strategies to the EPA. EPA will approve if it finds that individual state plans do not address violations caused in other states. For example, the commission recommended, and the EPA approved, that each state participate in the California Low Emission Vehicle program. Three challenges faced by the commission: Cannot alter the uniform standards passed by the EPA Relies on member states to accept legitimacy Even the additional controls recommended might not be sufficient to bring the region into compliance. The commission is not large enough to address all movement of ozone pollutants. o In 1995, the EPA formed the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (OTAG) o Included the EPA, the Environmental Council of States, and various industry and environmental groups. Included all states east of and including ND, SD, NE, KS, OK, TX However, unlike OTC, had no legislative authority and no decision making rule. Thus, it depends on consensus. Consensus more difficult, because states had varying interests. Many of the non-OTR states would receive few benefits for the costs they would entail. Thus, they had little to gain by cooperating with the northeast. (see, for ex., figure 2) Transactions costs also higher, since OTAG is larger than OTR. o Concern over interjurisdictional competition led Congress to establish minimum standards for new stationary sources. Because of relocation costs, environmental regulations more likely to affect new sources than existing sources. Standards include some regional variation. Concerns: No empirical evidence of interjurisdictional competition. Restrictions on new sources might cause old sources to stay online longer. Deciding on Methods of Control o In general, local control has the advantage of information, but economies of scale and concern over government objectives can give the federal government advantages. What applies here? o EPA sets technology standards (e.g. BACT, RACT), but allows states to decide on specific technologies. However, EPA regulations limit the number of choices available to the states. For example, states need EPA permission to deviate from RACT (reasonably achievable control technology for high polluting sources). o The 1990 CAA set new requirements for ozone pollutants, but required no specific technology. However, states tend to choose similar technologies that the EPA allows them to count towards their reasonable further progress requirements milestones for required reductions of overall emissions set by the EPA. o Are economies of scale an issue? During the 1960s, US auto industry successfully opposed federal emission standards for cars. However, by mid-1960s, state legislation was beginning, and California had already adopted a program. To avoid having different standards, the industry pushed for federal standards. If states want higher standards, the 1990 CAA only allows them to adopt the California Low-Emission Vehicle program. o Will local governments select efficient controls? Despite EPA requirements for inspection and maintenance programs for motor vehicles, many states have not complied. Why? States may disagree with the federal standards. States may argue different factors should be considered to analyze cost effectiveness. States may be reluctant to commit to spending money on federal programs not perceived to be permanent. Determining and Funding the Basic Research Agenda o Once again, the federal government plays a leading role. o States are required to use Urban Airshed Models (UAM) for their State Implementation Plans (SIPs) IV. Federalism and Climate Change We ended class with a discussion of Adler's article on federalism and environmental policy, relating the issues to the problem of climate change. Adler notes that state and local governments have often acted before the federal government. He cites the following pattern: 1. Period of perception 2. State and local governments address the problem 3. Federal regulations come last The response to climate change, with states such as California and the northeastern states taking the lead, fits this pattern. Adler cites the following advantages to decentralization: 1. Regional variation Not only differences in costs, but differences in environmental preferences, can be addressed to fit local needs. 2. Local knowledge 3. Innovation States can act as laboratories for new polices. For example, California's climate change initiatives include many smaller programs (e.g. the million solar roofs program) designed to reduce emissions. This allows other states to see what works and what doesn't. 4. Increased accountability for local politicians 5. "Ecologies of scale" Problems may be local, regional, or international, but they are rarely national. However, in the case of climate change, does this mean that state action on an international problem is preferred to a national solution?
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Rutgers - ECON - 332
I. What is Environmental Economics? Economics is the study of the allocation of scarce resources.o Note that the theories of economics can be applied to any scarce resource, not justtraditional commodities.o Economics is not simply about profits or mo
Rutgers - ECON - 332
I. The Invisible Hand The goal of today's lecture is to discuss why the free market may fail, and to discuss theconsequences when that happens. To begin, we must consider how the market should function. Adam Smith, who coined the phrase "The Invisible
Rutgers - ECON - 421
1. You are forecasting future commodity prices, like gold and silver prices. Describe a goodmethod to check the accuracy of your forecast.2. What is autocorrelation in terms of a linear regression model?How can you detect an AR(1) process?How do you c
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 21. Review of MatricesThe ability to manipulate matrices is critical in economics.1. Matrix a rectangular array of numbers, parameters, or variablesplaced in rows and columns.Matrices are associated with linear equations.Elements aij d
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 31. Types of economic variables(i) Continuous variable takes on a continuum in the sample space,such as all points on a line or all real numbersExample: GDP, Pollution concentration, etc.(ii) Discrete variables finite number of elements
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 41. Confidence IntervalsPoint estimate is a single number, like To calculate a confidence interval, we start with the following equation:j j t Pr tc 1 cstd .error jwhere Pr denotes probabilitytc the critical value from the t-dist
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 51. Goodness-of-FitThe goodness-of-fit measure is, R2.R2 1SSESSTIf R2 = 0, then no fitIf R2 = 1, then a perfect linear fitAlso, n = k which is algebraic systemProblem As the number of x variables increases, R2 always getslargerAdj
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 61. Autocorrelation (or Serial Correlation)1. DefinitionA problem usually for time series dataThe error terms, ut, are supposed to be randomHowever, they are related by timeThe error terms are correlatedUsing the covariance term, then
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 81. Trend Forecasting (or Trend Extrapolation)1. PolynomialsYt 1 2 t 32 t 2 u tYt is the series you want to forecastt is the trend variableStart t =1ut is the noise termNote then you use adjusted R2, AIC, or SIC to choose the bestmo
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 91. Time Series Analysis1. Examine data collected over time.Models are simpleNo independent variables, i.e. no xsModels are mechanicalTime series is both(i)Data(ii)A processObservations are related to each other over time, i.e. co
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 101. Stationary f ancy word1. Stationary time series does not depend on time.Does not vary with timeWeakly stationary the mean and variance of a time series doesnot vary with timeExamplesI means integrativeIntegration is the branch o
Rutgers - ECON - 421
Lecture Notes 11. Economic Forecasting1. Forecasting the process of estimating or predicting unknownsituationsExample usually economists predict future economic variablesForecasting applies to a variety of data(1) time series data predicting future
Rutgers - ECON - 421
1. What is an unbiased estimator?How do econometricians measure an estimator's bias?What do econometricians mean by efficiency?What does Mean Squared Error do for us?2. What are time-series, cross-sectional, and panel data?Does the type of data matte
Rutgers - ECON - 406
(Lecture 1)Game Theory is a misnomer for Multiperson Decision Theory, analyzing the decisionmakingprocess when there are more than one decision-makers where each agents payoffpossibly depends on the actions taken by the other agents. Since an agents pr
Rutgers - ECON - 406
1 The basic theory of choiceWe consider a set X of alternatives. Alternatives are mutually exclusive in the sensethat one cannot choose two distinct alternatives at the same time. We also take the setof feasible alternatives exhaustive so that a player
Rutgers - ECON - 406
We will formally define the games and some solution concepts, such as Nash Equilibrium,and discuss the assumptions behind these solution concepts.In order to analyze a game, we need to know who the players are, which actions are available to them, ho
Rutgers - ECON - 406
Howtoplay?We will now describe the most common solution concepts for normal-form games. Wewill first describe the concept of dominant strategy equilibrium, which is implied bythe rationality of the players. We then discuss rationalizability which corre
Rutgers - ECON - 406
Nash EquilibriumConsider the battle of the sexesMan\Woman opera balletopera 1,4 0,0ballet 0,0 4,1In this game, there is no dominant strategy. But suppose W is playing opera. Then,the best thing M can do is to play opera, too. Thus opera is a best-re
Rutgers - ECON - 406
What are the implications of rationality and players knowledge of payoffs? Whatcan we infer more if we also assume that players know that the other players are rational?What is the limit of predictive power we obtain as we make more and more assumptions
Rutgers - ECON - 406
Many relationships can be taken as a partnership in which two partners provide an inputtowards an outcome that they will share. For example, in a firm, the employer and theworker provide capital, know-how, and effort to produce a good that will generate
Rutgers - ECON - 406
Backwards inductionThe concept of backwards induction corresponds to the assumption that it is commonknowledge that each player will act rationally at each node where he moves even ifhis rationality would imply that such a node will not be reached.1 Me
Rutgers - ECON - 406
ExampleIn order to see the basic idea, consider the following game.S 0,0 1,3B 3,1 0,0BS1Out In(2,2)In this game, player 1 has option of staying out and getting the payoff of 2, ratherthan playing the battle of sexes game with player 2. Now the ba
Rutgers - ECON - 406
Repeated GamesIn these notes, well discuss the repeated games, the games where a particular smaller game isrepeated; the small game is called the stage game. The stage game is repeated regardless ofwhat has been played in the previous games. For our an
Rutgers - ECON - 406
Static Games with Incomplete InformationAn incomplete information game is a game where a party knows something that some otherparty does not know. For instance, a player may not know another players utility function,while the player himself knows his u
Rutgers - ECON - 406
Dynamic Games with Incomplete InformationIn these lectures, we analyze the issues arise in a dynamics context in the presence ofincomplete information, such as how agents should interpret the actions the other partiestake. We define perfect Bayesian Na
Rutgers - ECON - 406
ReputationConsider a game in which a player i has two types, say A and B. Imagine that if theother players believe that i is of type A, then is equilibrium payoff will be much higherthan his equilibrium payoff when the other players believe that he is
Rutgers - ECON - 406
strategic interactions, a party often knows something that is relevant to the problembut is not known by some other party. In that case, we say that players have asymmetricinformation. When you are interacting with parties that have private information,
Rutgers - ECON - 395
I. Externalities: The conventional analysisA. The simple argument for efficiency:ooooB. The problem:oooooooo1. The EPA or equivalent decides who can pollute how much where, whatmethods of pollution reduction have to be used, etc.2. The p
Rutgers - ECON - 395
I. Insurance: why it is interesting:o A. Because one recurring legal issue is who will bear the costs ifsomething goes wrong-i.e. who is insuring whom. For example:1. Contracts. Something changes, so either I don't want to produce what Iagreed to or
Rutgers - ECON - 395
I. Strategic behavior:o A. Bilateral monopoly.o1. Economic example: I have the only apple, worth $1 to me. You are theonly customer, and value it at $2. If we can agree on a price, there is a netgain of $1 to be divided between us, with the division
Rutgers - ECON - 395
I: What is property?o A. we take the institution for granted-for familiar thingso B. But it is a specific kind of rule and concept, as you can see byapplying it in less familiar contexts. My obligations to you are good onlyagainst me, but your owners
Rutgers - ECON - 395
Digression on simplified pictures.o A. In thinking through the logic of a problem, whether in physics,mathematics, or economics, we frequently use simplified pictures,designed to bring out the particular issue we are interested in.o B. For example, w
Rutgers - ECON - 395
If we do want to enforce the contract, how do you fill in the details?o A. By what would be efficient, eitheroB. Who should bear risks? We've been here beforeo1. Because we want efficient law, or2. Because that predicts what they would have agreed
Rutgers - ECON - 395
It is often claimed that, when I have a child, I impose net costs on others,so that leaving people free to decide how many children they have willresult in overpopulation.o A. But it is not clear what the sign of the net externalities from myhaving a
Rutgers - ECON - 395
Summary of implications:A. Assume one dimension (care) is observable by the court, another (activitylevel) is unobservable.oo1. Note that "care" and "activity level" are merely convenient examples.2. The real categories are "activities with regard
Rutgers - ECON - 395
Criminal Law: A. Like tort law, someone does a wrong, we impose a cost on him, but .oooooB. Note that the Tort/Crime distinction may be less clear than we usually think.ooooooo1. Optimal level of some offenses is close to zero2. Most obvio
Rutgers - ECON - 395
Why benefits to criminals count:A. The lost hunter problem.oooB. Even if you want to deter it, how much do you want to deter it?ooooo1. If a hunter is lost and starving and comes to a locked, empty cabin containingfood and a telephone, it is
Rutgers - ECON - 395
I. Antitrust Lawo A. Monopoly produces an inefficient outcomeoB. One approach to eliminating the inefficient outcome is to preventmonopolies from existing.o1. Not workable for a real natural monopoly.2. But perhaps for preventing monopoly-by-merge
Rutgers - ECON - 395
Summary before First MidtermI. What is economics, what does it have to do with law?II. What is economic efficiency (aka "wealth maximization")?o A. Important to L&E for two reasons:oB. Judging rules, outcomes by the summed effect on everyone, whereo
Rutgers - ECON - 395
Review before the Second Midterm I: Determining property rules involves a set of questions:A. How rights should be bundled (Coase article, our earlier discussion)B. How should you be allowed to defend your property rights (property vsliability)C. Wh
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Structure and Bonding in Organic MoleculesChapter 1Sections: Preface, 0-9Exercises: 1a, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18Problems: 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44,47, 48, 49, 50Mode
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Structure and ReactivityChapter 2Sections: 0, 1, 2, Table 2, 3, Table 3, 4, Table 5, Table 6, [Nomenclature: Besure that you can draw the correct structure from a molecule's name. For 140Ayou need not learn how to provide the correct name from a struc
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Reactions of AlkanesUnderstanding the basic reactivity of simple alkanes will allow us to discusssome of the physical properties of organic molecules such as the strength ofbondsThis allows us to predict something about the products one might expectf
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
1Chapter 4 - CycloalkanesNames follow the same set of rules as linear alkanes. Alkane names aresimply preceded by the word: CYCLO.General formula is CnH2n.Stereoisomers same connectivity but different spatial arrangementRing Strain and torsional str
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter 5 - Stereochemistry1Non-superimposable mirror imagesLeft and right hands are mirror images of each other. Molecules can berelated to each other in the same manner. They are chiral molecules, calledenantiomers.2Methane as an introduction to
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter 6WhenNucleophilesA/ackC-X Bond Strength and X SizeP orbital from the halogen overlaps with the sp3 orbital on the carbon centerThe larger and more diffuse the p orbital in question, the weaker the bondbecause the poorer the overlap.C-X Bon
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter 7 Further Reactions of HaloalkanesJust when you thought it was over1SolvolysisWe learned that SN2 reaction rates diminish going from primary tosecondary to tertiary carbons at the reacting center.These kinds of carbons do undergo reactions b
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter 8 AlcoholsEthanol is the alcohol contained in alcoholic beverages like this one being enjoyedby a small child. Whilst there is no accounting for poor parenting, there is accountingfor great wine like the one made in these old school basket pres
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Final Examination: Chem 140AImportant InformationThe Final Examination will be held next week - Either Monday or Fridaydepending on the class.The exam will cover all the material from lectures, problem sets, chapters,midterm questions (including Bonu
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Organic Chemistry 140A Winter, 2012Professor Nathan C. Gianneschingianneschi@ucsd.edu - Contact by WebCTPacific Hall 6224AOffice Hours: Monday 4-5pm, Pacific Hall 6224A.Wednesday, 3-4pm, HSS 1128AFriday, 3-4pm, HSS 1128AMary Noe A01, A02, A03, mnoe
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter 1 Practice P roblems Answer KeyChallenge Problem #4:a. A structure with a positive charge on a carbon immediately adjacent to an alkene is termed anallylic carbocation. Shifting the electrons gives us the only other reasonable resonance structu
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter 2 Discussion Section Problems Key1.2.3. .a. So is positive; one molecule became two smaller molecules that have greater freedom in motionb. So is negative; two small molecules produced a single molecule that has less freedom of motionc. So c
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter2DiscussionSectionProblemsThermodynamicsProblems1. The following reaction has a value of Go = -2.1 kJ/mol (-0.5kCal/mol)CH3Br + H2S CH3SH + HBra. Calculate the Keq value at T=25C for the reactionb. Starting with a 1M solution of CH3Br and H2S
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter3:ReactionsofAlkanesDiscussionSectionProblems1. Rank the following radicals in decreasing order of stability2. For each of the following alkanes:a. Draw all the possible monochlorinated derivatives.b. Determine whether free radical chlorination
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter4:CycloalkanesDiscussionSectionProblems1. Draw the two chair conformations of cis-1,3-dimethylcyclohexane and label allthe positions as axial or equatorial.a. Label the higher energy and lower energy conformationb. The energy difference between
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter 5 Problem Set Answer Key1.2. 3. Your drawings may look different from this. Check by assigning R and S.4.a.b.c.d.5.a.6.a.7.sameenantiomersenantiomersenantiomersi.j.e.f.g.h.enantiomersdiastereomersenantiomerssame compound
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter6DiscussionSectionProblems1. Predict the compound in each pair that will undergo the SN2 reaction faster.2. Show how each compound might be synthesized by the SN2 displacement of an alkyl halide.3. Predict the products of the following SN2 react
UCSD - CHEM - 140A
Chapter6ProblemSetAnswerKey1. .a.b.c.d.e.f.2. .3. .4.Left structureRight structureRight structureRight structureRight structureLeft structure