appointedofficials,andmorethan100executiveboardsandcommissions.(Executivebranchisdivided)
Sig:LimitsthepoweroftheGovernorinTexasbydistributingitamongmanyelectedofficials.Butthis ExamTwoReviewSheet
1.PluralExecutivePoweroftheexecutivebranchdividedamongseveralindependentlyelected,
arrangementproducesanexecutivebranchthatlackscohesion,withdifferentexecutivesandtheir
agenciespursuingdifferentgoalsEx.ThreetimesTexashashadagovernorandlieutenantgovernor
fromdifferingparties.
2.BiennialLegislatureTexashasregularsessionsthatmeeteverytwoyearsfor140daysandspecial
sessionsthatlast30days.
Sig:Thisrestrictsthelegislaturefromplanningreallyfarinadvance,whichhelpscontrolthepowerofthe
government.Thetwoyearsgivelegislatorsmoretimetorenewrelationswithconstituents,tomend
politicalfencesandtocampaignforreelection. (Texasistheonlylarge,urbanstatethatusesbiennial
sessions.)
3.JohnBoehnerRepublicanSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesfromOhio.
Sig:HeissecondinlinetothepresidencyoftheUnitedStatesfollowingtheVP(PresidentialSuccession
Act)Speakerisaleadershippositioninthemajoritypartyandactivelyworkstosetthatparty'slegislative
agenda.Importantbecauseitgivesthespeakeraconsiderableamountofpower.
4.HomeStyleIdeathatamemberofCongressmustmaintainclosetieswiththeirdistrictsinordertobe
reelectedandprogresstobeasuccessfulmemberofCongress.
RichardFennostudiestherelationshipbetweenmembersofCongressandtheirdistrict:Congress
districtsaretheonesthatelectthem.Congressplaceofficesandstaffintheirdistrictstoshowthatthey
areactive.NewermembersofCongresshavelargerstaffsintheirhomedistricts.Thestaffmusthelpto
establishthepoliticianinthemindsoftheconstituentsbyinstillingtrustthroughtheprotectionoftheir
interests.(Contradictionofhomestyle:thebetterapersondoesinherdistrict,themoreshewillbe
elected,andthemorepowerandinfluenceshecangaininCongress.Themorepowerandinfluenceshe
gainsinCongressthelesstimeshehastopayattentiontoherdistrict)
Sig:MembersofCongressmustbesuccessfulinCongresswhilemaintainingclosetiestohome.
Congressneedstoshowthattheycareandthattheyhaveastrongconnectiontotheirdistrict.Congress
needstoensuretrustfromconstituentsbecausetheywillbetheoneselectingcongressofficials.
5.LineItemVetoPresidentialauthoritytonegateparticularprovisionsofalawwhilelettingtheremainder
stand.In1996Congresspassedlegislationenactingaformoflineitemveto,butitwasstruckdownby
theSupremeCourtasunconstitutionalin1998.OnlytheConstitutioncangrantthispower,notCongress.
Sig:Thepowerofanexecutiveauthoritytonullifyorcancelspecificprovisionsofabill,usuallyabudget
appropriationsbill,withoutvetoingtheentirelegislativepackage.TheTexasGovernordoeshavethe
powertolineitemveto.Beforethelineitemveto,Congresswouldoftenincorporatepoliciesthat
presidentsopposeintolargebillsthatcontainitemspresidentsfeeltheymustapprove.Whenfacedwith
suchapackage,thepresidentfindsitdifficulttocastaveto.
6.InstitutionalConstraintsAninstitutionalconstraintwouldbewhenanorganizationdoesnothave,or
arenotabletoutilizealltheresourcesthatitmightwanttouse.Theyareexclusionaryanddifficultto
changeorovercome.Institutionscanbecomestuckinaparticularwayofdoingthingsduetopast
precedence.
Sig:Forexample,theGeneralMotorsunionisaninstitutionthathasmadehavingalotofbenefitsapart
oftheircorevaluesbecausetheycouldgetthembackinthe60s.Howeverinthe21stcenturyglobal
economythisisimpractical.Duetoinstitutionalconstraintstheywillprobablybeveryslowtochangetheir
position.Canovercomeconstraintsbyworkingwithintheinstitutionuntilyoucanchangeit.
7.JudicialDecisionsAruling,orderjudgmentorotherdeterminationbycourtafterconsideringthefacts
inthecasebeforeitandapplyingthelawtothosefacts.(TheUnitedStatesJudicialSystemisaCommon
Lawsystem,JudicialdecisionsintheUnitedStatesaremadeinaccordancewithStareDecisisand
JudicialPrecedent.)
Sig:Basically,thedecisionsthatthejudiciarymakesisbasedonolderdecisions;theylookforsimilar
casesdecidedinthepastanddecideaccordingly.JudicialdecisionsintheUnitedStatesNEEDtobe
consistentinordertoprovideasolidbaseoflawpeopleneedtoknowwhattoobey.
8.PrivateLawRightsandobligationsbetweenprivateindividuals(ex.Families)/corporations(business
orgroups),whichdonotdirectlyconcernthestate.
Sig:ForexampledivorceorTheContractLawthatgovernsoralandunwrittenagreementsassociated
withexchangeofgoodsandservices,moneyandproperties.(Somebodygettingsuedisagoodexample.
Justrememberthisisnotlikepubliclawthatcontrolssomethinglikecrime.)
9.JudicialReviewThepowerofthecourtstodeclarenullandvoidlawsifcongressandstatelegislatures
thattheyfindunconstitutional.NotprovidedforintheConstitution,butajudgemadetool(Marburyv.
Madison(1803).AsmallnumberofunelectedjudgescanoverrulethePresidentandCongress
Sig:Givesjudgesappointedforlifethepowertonegatelawspassedbytheelectedrepresentativesof
thepeople.Ex.Marburyvs.Madison.Allowsasmallnumberofjudgestooverrulepresidentand
congress.
10.WritofCertiorari(cert)TobeinformedofinLatin.Courtsgranttohavecasesreviewbythe
SupremeCourtMeansthecourthasagreedtoconsiderthecase .Awritofcertiorariordersalowercourt
todeliveritsrecordinacasesothatthehighercourtmayreviewit.TheU.S.SupremeCourtuses
certioraritopickthecasesthatithears.
Sig:(VerydifficultfortheSupremecourttohearalowercourtscase)AsaResultoftheworkloadthe
SupremeCourtusedtohave,whenitwasrequiredbylawtoreviewmanyappeals,congressgavethe
SupremeCourtpowertodenycases.TheCourtrejectsmostcertpetitionsAbout8,000to10,000
certiorariayear.
11.CertPoolamechanismbywhichtheUSSupremeCourtmanagestheinfluxofpetitionsfor
certioraritothecourt.
Sig:Certpoolhelpsmakethewritofcertiorariamoreorganizedprocess.
12.ChiefJusticeJohnMarshallChiefjusticeheadsthecourtandisresponsiblefororganizingitswork.
Inthecomplexcaseof,Marburyv.Madison,SupremeCourtChiefJusticeJohnMarshallusedadispute
overpatronageasanoccasiontoasserttheCourtspowertodeclaretheactsofCongressnullandvoid.
Sig:hereinforcedtheprinciplethatfederalcourtsareobligatedtoexercisejudicialreview,by
disregardingpurportedlawsiftheyviolatetheConstitution. Assertedthepowerofjudicialreviewby
sayingthatanynewlawoverridesolderlawsonthesamesubject,exceptwhentheolderlawhasbeen
issuedbyahighergovernmentalentity.MarshallbelievesthehighestlawofthelandistheConstitution.
HiscourtopinionshelpedlaythebasisforAmericanconstitutionallawandmadetheSupremeCourtof
theUnitedStatesacoequalbranchofgovernmentalongwiththelegislativeandexecutivebranches.
13.RehearingEnBancRequestforreview.Asessioninthecourtwheretheentiremembershipofthe
courtparticipatesratherthantheregularquorum.TheCircuitCourtsofAppealusuallysitinpanelsof3
judgesbutforimportantcasesmayexpandtoall28,whenthejudgesaresaidtobesitting enbanc.
Sig:Typicallyenbancisusedforextremelyimportantcasesthatrequirereview.(veryunusual)
14.JudicialTenureProvidedforinArticleIIIoftheConstitution.Thejudicialpowershallbevestedin
onesupremecourt,andinsuchinferiorcourtsasthecongressmayfromtimetotimeordainand
establishMeaningJudgesareappointedforlife,unlessimpeached.AppointedbythePresident,
confirmedbytheSenate.Lifetimeappointments.
Sig:Framersbelieveditwasessentialtothesystemofseparationofpowersbecauseitkeepsthe
officialsfromhavingtoworryaboutwhateffectsthedecisionstheymakecouldhave.Ex.Judgesdonot
havetofeeloppressionoftherepresentativebody.(Itgivestheappointeesthefreedomtodecidecases
andmakerulingsaccordingtotheruleoflawandjudicialdiscretion,evenifthosedecisionsarepolitically
unpopularoropposedbypowerfulinterests.Basically,theywonthavetoworryaboutbeingfiredfor
decidingtherulingofacourtcasebasedonthelaw.)
15.Originalism/OriginalIntentAtheoryofconstitutionalinterpretationthatdetermineswhetheralawis
constitutionalbyascertainingtheintentionsofthosewhowroteandratifiedtheConstitution.Interpretthe
Constitutionbasedonwhattheframersoriginallymeantorintended.
Sig:Ex.ClarenceThomasreliesmostfrequentlyontheoryoriginalintent.HefavorsoverturningtheRoe
vs.Wadedecisiontolegalizeabortionbecause,hefindsnothingintheconstitutionthatgiveswomenthe
righttochooseanabortion.But,hepointsoutthatwhentheconstitutionwasratifiedmanystates
outlawedabortionatthetimeofratification.Suggestingthatframershadnointentofdenyingthestates
thisauthority.
16.JudiciaryActof1789Acourtordertoforcegrantingofappointments.DecidingthatSupremeCourt
hasoriginaljurisdictioninthesecases.Jiltedappointeescouldrequestacourtordertoforcethe
Jeffersonianstogranttheappointments,Furthermore,theactsaysthattheSupremeCourtwouldhave
originaljurisdictioninsuchcasesthatis,itwouldbethefirstandonlycourttowhichsuchcaseswouldbe
brought.(Looktopg.435inbookifconfused)
Sig:Onthebasisofthislaw,oneappointee,WilliamMarbury,filedsuitwiththeSupremeCourt,
demandingthattheyorderMadison(SecretaryofstatetoThomasJefferson)togranthimthejob.
JudiciaryActisalsoimportantbecauseitestablishesmuchofthecourtsystem.
17.LivingConstitution:AtheoryofconstitutionalinterpretationthatplacesthemeaningoftheConstitution
inthecontextofthetotalhistoryoftheUS.TheConstitutionisanevolvingdocument.Theviewsof
modernsocietyshouldbetakenintoaccountwheninterpretingit.
Sig:Whileviewschangeandevolveovertime,theLivingConstitutionfitstoincludepresentandfuture
generations.ThishelpstoavoidmakingnewAmendmentstotheConstitutiontofitspecificissues,and
leavesroomforsomeinterpretation.Though,itmakestheseinterpretationshighlysubjectivesinceitis
leftuptothejudgetodecide.Anexampleofthisisthedevelopmentoftechnology:themeaningof
searchincludedinvasionsofprivacythatdontinvolveaphysicaltrespass.Powertomaintainthe
nationslandandnavalforcesseenasauthorizinganairforce.ContraststhestrictviewsofOriginal
Intent.
18.Barronv.CityofBaltimore(1833)BarronsuedBaltimorecitybecauseBaltimore'scity
improvementsseverelydamagedhisharborbusinessconstitutingatakingofpropertywithoutjust
compensationinviolationoftheFifthAmendment.CourtRuledinfavorofBaltimorebyfindingthatthe
SupremeCourthasnojurisdictioninthecasebecausetheFifthAmendmentonlyappliestofederal
governmentactionsandnotstatedisputes.
Sig:ItwasacasewheretheUSSupremeCourtheldthattheBillofRightsappliedonlytotheactionsof
thefederalgovernment,nottheindividualstategovernments.AftertheCivilWar,the14thamendment
waspassedwhichhassubsequentlybeenusedtoapplyConstitutionalamendmentsandrestrictionsto
thestategovernmentsaswell.ItisimportanttoAmericangovernmentbecauseitstatedthatthe
freedomsguaranteedbytheBillofRightsdidnotrestrictthestategovernments.AccordingtoChief
JusticeJohnMarshall,theBillofRightscontainsnoexpressionindicatinganintentiontoapplythemto
thestategovernments.Thiscourtcannotsoapplythem.
19.FourthAmendmentguardsagainstunreasonable searchesandseizures,alongwithrequiringany
warranttobejudiciallysanctionedandsupportedbyprobablecause
Sig:Everycitizenhastherighttodenyasearchintotheirandproperty.Awarrantmustbeissuedwith
evidencethatasearchneedstobeconducted.Thisprotectseachcitizensindividualrightsfromthe
government.Controlsthepowerofgovernment.Thefourthamendmentisexpandedwiththe
ExclusionaryRule,whichstatesthatillegallyobtainedevidencecannotbeusedincourt.
20.Mirandav.ArizonaSupremeCourtdecisionstatingthataccusedpersonsmustbetoldbypolicethat
theyhavetherighttoremainsilentandthattheymayrequestanattorney.Theyneedtobetoldabout
theirMirandaRights.IfsuspectsarenotsoMirandized,thenanyinformationobtainedmaynotbe
presentedincourt.
Sig:ComesfromErnestoMiranda,fromwhichtheSupremeCourtruledthatMirandasconfessionwas
inadmissibleincourtbecausehehadnotbeenadvisedofhisrightnottoanswerquestions.Protects
individualsfromtortureandcoercedconfessionsbysayingthatpersonscannotbeforcedtotestify
againstthemselves.Youhavetherighttoremainsilent.Anythingyousayordocanandwillbe
heldagainstyouinacourtoflaw.Youhavetherighttospeaktoanattorney.Ifyoucannotafford
anattorney,onewillbeappointedforyou.Doyouunderstandtheserightsastheyhavebeenread
toyou?
21.ExclusionaryRuleLegalstandardthatsaysillegallyobtainedevidencecannotbeadmittedincourt.
Sig:Iflawenforcementofficersillegallysearchasuspectsbelongingsanddiscoverincriminating
evidence,theexclusionaryruleprohibitsthatillegallyobtainedevidencefrombeingadmittedinacourtof
law
RelatedTo:4thAmendment
Example:InMappvOhio,ClevelandpoliceofficershadsearchedMappspropertywithoutaproper
warrantandhadarrestedherforpossessionofcertainlewdandlasciviousbooks,picturesand
photographsthattheyfoundthere.Thecourtruledshecouldnotbeconvictedonthebasisofsuch
illegallyobtainedevidence.
22.JudicialActivismDoctrinethatsaystheprincipleofstaredecisisshouldsometimesbesacrificedin
ordertoadapttheConstitutiontochangingconditions.
Sig:Inthe1970sand80s,conservativecriticsoftheliberaljusticesapproachdecriedsuchjusticesas
practitionersofjudicialactivism.ThetermfounditswayintocampaignsinwhichRepublicanpresidential
candidatesvowednottoappointsuchactivistjudges.
RelatedTo:StareDecisis:Incourtrulings,relianceonconsistencywithprecedents
Example:OppositeofJudicialRestraintadoctrinethatsaysthecourtsshould,ifatallpossible,rule
narrowlyandavoidoverturningpriorcourtdecisions
23.Marburyv.MadisonSupremeCourtdecision(1803)inwhichthecourtfirstexercisedthepowerof
judicialreview.Inthiscomplexcase,SupremeCourtJusticeJohnMarshallusedadisputeoverpatronage
asanoccasiontoasserttheCourtspowertodeclaretheactsofCongressnullandvoid.
Sig:FirsttimeforSupremeCourttoexerciseitspoweraspartofitsdivisionofpowers RelatedTo:
JudicialReview:ThepowerofthecourtstodeclarenullandvoidlawsofCongressandofstate
legislaturesthattheyfindunconstitutional/JudiciaryActof1789:EstablishedaU.S.federaljudiciary
24.PublicLawLawgoverningrelationsbetweenthestateanditscitizens,anddealingwiththestructure
andoperationofthegovernment.
Sig:Ex.Gettingaticketforspeedingorcommittingacrimeagainstthestate(breakingthelaw)
25.CitizensUnitedv.FEC(FederalElectionCommission)Holdsthatthegovernmentcannotregulate
ourFirstAmendmentrighttopoliticalspeechwhetheritisindividualspeechorcorporatespeech.The
FirstAmendmentprohibitsgovernmentfromcensoringpoliticalbroadcastsincandidateelectionswhen
thosebroadcastsarefundedbycorporationsorunions.FromWikipedia
Tobetterunderstand:
CitizensUnitedv.FederalElectionCommissiongavecorporationstheright,presentlysecuredbypeople,tospendunlimited
amountsofmoneyonindependentcampaignexpenditures.ThelawsuitsurfacedwhenCitizensUnion,anonprofitorganization,
createdacriticalfilmaboutHilaryClinton.However,theBipartisanCampaignReformActof2002prohibits,anycompanyfrom
usingcorporatefundstoinfluenceanelectionwithin60daysofthatelection(Lessig).CitizensUnitedbelievedthiswasan
abridgmentoftheirFirstAmendmentright,freedomofspeech.
Sig:Struckdownabanoncorporateandunionexpendituresinpoliticalcampaigns RelatedTo:1st
AmendmentExample:Thegovernmentmayregulatecorporatepoliticalspeechthroughdisclaimerand
disclosurerequirementsbutitmaynotsuppressthatspeechaltogether.
26.JudicialElectionsTheselectionofstatejudgestostatecourtsisvariable.Statesreservetherightto
allowtheelectionofjudges.Federaljudgesareappointedwithlifetenureandstatejudgescanbe
electedforshortterms.
Sig.Asjudicialraceshavebecomemorecompetitive,campaigncostshaverisendramatically.Judicial
candidatesneedthesubstantialresourcesofferedbyinterestgroupstowin.Theresultcanbean
unhealthydependencebetweenjudicialcandidatesandinterestgroupswhereinterestgroupsback
judicialcandidatestosecuretheirpoliticalagendasandcandidatesrelyoninterestgroupbackingto
achieveandtoretainjudicialoffice.Unquestionably,thosecontributionsareunderminingpublic
confidenceinfairandimpartialcourts.
27.ArticleV,Section1oftheTexasConstitutionThejudicialpowerofthisStateshallbevestedinone
SupremeCourt,inoneCourtofCriminalAppeals,inCourtsofAppeals,inDistrictCourts,inCounty
Courts,inCommissionersCourts,inCourtsofJusticesofthePeace,andinsuchothercourtsasmaybe
providedbylaw.TheLegislaturemayestablishsuchothercourtsasitmaydeemnecessaryand
prescribethejurisdictionandorganizationthereof,andmayconformthejurisdictionofthedistrictand
otherinferiorcourtsthereto.TheTexasLegislaturehascreatedadditionalcourtstohandleitsgrowing
population.
Sig.UndertheauthoritygranteditbySection1ofArticleV,theLegislaturehasallowedforthecreationof
municipalcourtsineachincorporatedcityinTexas,byvoterapprovalcreatingsuchcourt.Municipal
courtsinTexascomeintocontactwithmoredefendantsthanallotherTexascourtscombined.The
subjectmatterofmunicipalcourtsrelatestocrimesrelatingtopublicsafetyandqualityoflifeissues.
28.VapidandHollowCharadesElenaKaganwroteanarticleforthelawreviewoftheUniversityof
Chicagoin1995inwhichshecalledforsubstantivequestionsfromsenatorsandsimilarlysubstantive
answersfromSupremeCourtnomineesinordertosavetheconfirmationprocessfromthevapidand
hollowcharadethatithasbecome.
Sig.Thepositionofajusticeisbothaseatofpowerandapublictrust,shewrote,addingthatjustices
votesoftenhavelittletodowithtechnicallegalabilityandmuchtodowithconceptionsofvalue.A
confirmationhearingshoulduncoveranomineesvisionofthecourtinspecifics,notgeneralities.
Privacyrights,freespeech,raceandgenderdiscriminationeverythingshouldbeplacedonthetable
foranalysis,ProfessorKaganwrote.Nomineesshouldbeforcedtosaywhattheythinkabout
controversialissuessuchasabortionoraffirmativeactioninordertorevealwhatkindofjusticethey
wouldmake.Kaganbelievedthatajusticespersonalviewsoftenaffectedtheirinterpretationofthelaw
thereforetheirviewsonparticularconstitutionalissuesshouldbemadeknowntothepublicandtothe
senatecommittee.Whenaskedspecificquestionsaboutviews,manynomineesrefusedtodiscusstheir
viewsonlegalcontroversies,insistingthatdoingsowouldundercuttheirimpartiality.Manynominees
alsorefusetodiscusstheirviewsontheseissuesbecausetheybelieveitgreatlyaffectswhethertheyget
appointedornot.
29.CollectiveActionProblem:Thebestwaytoovercomethecollectiveactionproblemistoprovidesome
typeofincentivethatwillmakepeoplecontribute.Difficultyinorganizinggroupswhosemembershave
nothingmoreincommonthananideaoracause.Thekeytosuccessintheseeffortsusuallyistheability
ofgrouporganizerstosecurebothstartupfundsandreliablesourcesofcontinuingfinancialsupportfrom
patronsofpoliticalaction.
Sig:Becausethebenefitsforspecialinterestsarentaswidespread,therearegreaterincentivestoform
interestgroupstoprotecttheirinterests.WhatsgoodforGMisbestforthecountry
30.ArticleII,Section3ThepresidentshalltakeCarethattheLawsbefaithfullyexecuted
Sig:DiscussesPresidentialDuties...Thepresidentmayrunthecountrybyenforcingthelawsandmust
reporttothecountryinhisStateoftheUnionspeechwhatisgoingonwiththepublic RelatedTo:
BureaucraciesthePresidentcannotaccomplisheverythingbyhimselfBureaucraciesimplementlaws
&haveclearlydefinedtaskstheycantjustdoanything!
31.NeutralCompetenceHughHeclodefinesNeutralCompetenceas:Givingonescooperationand
bestindependentjudgmentoftheissuestopartisanbossesandofbeingsufficientlyuncommittedtobe
abletodosoforasuccessionofpartisanleaders
Sig:Agenciesrecognizethepotentialofapartisanshiftincontrol,theydonotstronglycommit
themselvestothewishesofthepartyincontrol.HughHeclosaiditsmoothescommunicationandthus
improvesthecapacityofelectedleadershiptogetwhatitwantsoutofthegovernmentmachine.AndIt
isastrangeamalgamofloyaltythatarguesback,partisanshipthatshiftswiththechangingpartisans.
Also,neutralcompetenceallowsbureaucratstocommitthemselvestothepresidentinpower,butnot
overcommitthemselvessothattheycannothaveashiftinopinion/powerifthereisadrasticchange,
suchasastrongliberalpresident,thenastrongconservativepresident.Ifyouoverlycommityourself,
whenanewgroupcomesintopower,itmakesyouunabletodoanythingforthenewgroupinpower
(easiertogofrom47thanfrom110)
32.SenateJudiciaryCommittee:AstandingcommitteeoftheUSSenatecomprisedof18members;part
ofthejudicialconfirmationprocess.
Sig:ThecommitteeconductshearingspriortotheSenatesvoteonconfirmationoffederaljudges
nominatedbythePresident.
33.InterestGroups:Organizationsorassociationsofpeoplewithcommonintereststhatengagein
politicsonbehalfofitsmembers.
Sig:Thesuccessorfailureofagroupwasbasedupontheamountofsupportthattheycouldgain.
Thesegroupsdontnecessarilybuyvotestheyjustbuyaccesstoelectedofficials.
34.FreeRiderProblem:Problemthatariseswhenpeoplecanenjoythebenefitsofgroupactivitywithout
bearinganyofthecosts.Withpublicgoodsyourunintoafreeriderproblem,butwithprivategoodsyou
canavoidthefreeriderproblem(membershipperksandexclusiveoffers)Privategoodsaregoodsyou
mustpurchasetoenjoyandtheyourconsumptionofwhichmeansthatotherscannotconsumethem.
Sig:Withoutclosedshopsandmandatorypaymentofduesthroughpayrolldeduction,union
membershipwouldalmostcertainlyplummetasmanyworkersdroppedouttobecomefreeriders,fully
expectingtoreceivethesamebenefitsfromtheiremployersthatweregrantedtounionmembers.An
exampleissomeonewhodoesnotpaytheirtaxes.Taxeshelppayforpublicgoodsthatallcitizens
benefitfrom,suchasroads,watertreatmentplants,andfireservices.
35.PrisonersDilemma:Isanaspectofgametheorythatshowswhytwoindividualsmightnotagree,
evenifitappearsthatitisbesttodoso.2suspectsforacrime,sittingin2interrogationrooms.They
eachhave2choices:Cooperatewitheachotherandstayquietoropposeeachotherandconfess.Ifthey
bothstayquiet,theywillbothget1yearinprison.Iftheybothconfess,theywillendupwith5yearsin
prison.Ifoneconfessesandtheotherstaysquiet,onewillget10yearsandtheotherwillget0years.
Theworstoutcomeis10years.Bestthingtodoistoconfess,sotheyshouldnotworktogether.
Sig:Itisintheinterestofbothsuspectstoconfessandtestifyagainsttheotherprisoner/suspect,evenif
eachisinnocentoftheallegedcrime.
36.SelectiveBenefits:Specificprivategoodsthatanorganizationprovidesonlytoitscontributing
members.Sidebenefitsofbelongingtoanorganizationthatarelimitedtocontributingmembersofthe
organization.Onlygiventothosewhocontributetotheorganization.
Sig:Helpsovercomethecollectiveactionproblembyprovidinganincentive.Anexcellentexampleofthe
isistheAARP,whichhasloadsofbenefitsforitsmembers,suchasdecreasedprescriptioncostsand
traveldiscounts.Infact,selectivebenefitsaresopowerfulinthiscasethatpeoplejointheAARPthat
mightnotevensupportwhatitstandsforlikehowitsupportedthehealthcarebill,eventhoughmanyofits
membersdidnt.
37.MaterialIncentivesTangiblerewards;money,orthingsandservicesreadilypricedinmonetary
terms;somethingyoucanhold.Thisissomethingthatyoucanactuallyholdandprovethatyoureceived
forbeingamemberofthegroup.Thechiefconsequenceoftheuseofmaterialincentivesisthatthe
organizationanditsexecutivepayrelativelylittleattentiontostatepurposesoreventothesubstantive
goalsimpliedbytheiractivities.
Sig:theorganizationpayslittleattentiontostatepurposesoreventothesubstantivegoalsimpliedby
theiractivities.AnExample:AARP(AmericanAssociationofRetiredPersons)
38.PurposiveIncentivesIntangiblerewardthatderivesfromthesenseofsatisfactionofhaving
itsmembersInternalreward
39.SpecialInterestsInterestssharedonlybyafewpeople.Onlyaffectasmallsectionofthepopulation.
contributedtotheattainmentofaworthwhilecause
Sig.Worksexplicitlyforthebenefitofsomelargerpublicandnotonethatworkschieflyforthebenefitsof
Specialinterestscouldhaveanadverseeffectonthepopulation.Frametheirinterestsaspublicinterests.
Sig.FrametheirinterestsaspublicinterestWhatsgoodforGeneralMotorsisgoodforyou.
40.LobbyingInterestgroupactivitiesintendedtoinfluencedirectlythedecisionsthatpublicofficials
make
Sig.Contrastsgrassrootslobbyingwherelobbyistsdonothavedirectcontactwiththepolicymakers,but
throughconstituentswhoputpressureonthepolicymakers indirectly
41.PAC(PoliticalActionCommittee)Specializedorganizationforraisingandcontributingcampaign
funds
Sig.Morelikelytobeheardthroughcontribution
Providingmoneygetsthosewhosupportyourintereststoworkharder,andthosewhoopposeyour
intereststonotworkashard
Bygivingthemoney,youfindthatpeoplearemorewillingtolisten getsyourfootinthedoor
42.GroupFormationGroupsariseinresponsetofeelingsofcommoninterestamongindividuals
experiencingdeprivationorfrustration.Economicorpoliticalchangesdisturbthelivesofpotentialgroup
members,promptingthemtointeractandbecomeincreasinglyawareortheirsharedinterests.Ifthis
awarenessgrowsandtheirconcernsbecomesufficientlyintense,theymayformanassociation,orgroup,
toserveastheirrepresentative.However,thisneworganizationmayitselfconstituteasocialdisturbance
thataffectstheinterestsofotherpotentialgroups,andthesegroupsmaybestimulated,inturn,toform
associationsthatwillrepresentthem.
Sig.Thegroupsorassociationswillstayatsocialequilibriumuntilanotherdisturbanceoccurs,whichin
turnwillsetoffanotherroundofgroupformation.Thisisimportantbecauseitallowscitizenstoexpress
concernandattentiontowardsissuestheyseemostsignificant,inefforttopassthoseopinionsonto
politicalgroups/personsofhigherpower.
43.CitizenGroupsGroupswithnooccupationalprerequisitesformembership
Sig.Thetypeofgroupmostaffectedbythecollectivegoodsdilemma
ExampleNRTAaNationalRetiredTeachersAssociationandtheAARPaAmericanAssociationofthe
RetiredPersons
44.InterestGroupPatronsBothgovernmentagenciesandprivatefoundationshavesteadilybecome
moreimportantpatronsofinterestgroupsinthemixed,nonprofit,andcitizensectorsbybeingactivein
sponsoringgroupsbuiltaroundprofessionalspecialtiesinareaslikehealthcare,education,welfare
administration,masstransportation,scientificresearch,andotherprogramareasthatdependheavilyon
federalfunds.
Sig.Theyaidinthemaintenanceofgroupsbecauseoncegroupshavebeenbroughtintobeingwiththe
aidofapatron,inmostcasesthepatroncontinuestosupportthegrouponceitisagoingconcern.
45.Proportionalrepresentationanelectoralsystemwherelegislativeseatsareallocatedonthebasisof
eachpartyspercentageofthenationalvote.Inasystemthatuses proportionalrepresentation(usedin
mostEuropeancountries),legislativeseatsareallocatedroughlyaccordingtoeachpartyspercentageof
thenationwidevote.Asmallpartymayuseitsseatstocombinewithoneofthelargerpartiestoforma
coalitiongovernment.
46.AdministrativeDiscretionThepowerofabureaucracytointerpretalegislativemandate
Sig.Congresscanmakethepolicy,butdoesntdeterminethefactorsofeligibilityofwhowill
receive/benefitfromthepolicy
Example:Congressmaydecidetogivebenefitstothedisabled;however,itisuptotheSocialSecurity
Administrationofficialtomaketherulesthatdecidewhetheraspecificdisabilityprohibitsemploymenta
determineseligibility
47.CriticalElectionElectionthatmarkstheemergenceofanew,lastingalignmentofpartisansupport
withintheelectorate.Itdecisivelymarkstheendofonepartysystemandthebeginningofanother.
Sig.Canbeanticipatedbyunderlyingsocialchangesthatgraduallymaketheoldalignmentlessrelevant
causingrealignmentandisusuallytriggeredbyacrisisthatdividestheexistingpartiesandincreases
popularinterestandparticipationinpolitics.
48.RecessAppointmentPresidentialappointmentmadewithoutSenateconfirmationwhiletheSenate
isinrecessRecessappointeesmayserveuntiltheendofthenextsessionofCongressatwhichthey
mustresignifnotconfirmed
Sig.ConstitutionstopsPresidentsfromusingtherecessappointmentrepeatedlyforthesameperson,
evenifthepersonisneverconfirmed
49.
EarmarksInanagencysbudget,aspecificcongressionaldesignationofthewaymoneyistobe
spent.Itensuresthatagenciesspendmoniesinwaysconsistentwithcongressionalpreferences.They
areapartofbudgetarycontrol.
Sig.Earmarksareimportantbecausetheyoftenprovidesupportforporkbarrelprojects,whichboosts
publicopinionofrepresentativesofcertainareas.Tohelpthemselvesgetreelected,membersof
Congresstrytogetwhattheywantoutofbureaucraciesthroughtheprocessofearmarking.Anexample
wouldbetheTarletonStateUniversityRuralLawEnforcementprojectinTexasthatreceived1.5million
asapartofthe2010Commerce,Justice,andScienceappropriationsbill.
50.
IssueNetworksAloosecollectionofinterestgroups,politicians,bureaucrats,andpolicyexpertswho
haveaparticularinterestinorresponsibilityforapolicyarea.Inotherwordsitisan
allianceofvarious
interest
groupsandindividualswhouniteinordertopromoteasingleissuein
government
policy
SigAnexampleincludesthewiderangingnetworkofenvironmentalgroupsandindividualswhopushfor
moreenvironmentalregulationingovernmentpolicy.Otherissuenetworksrevolvearoundsuch
controversialissuesasabortion,gunownershiprights,anddruglaws.
51.BorkingPoliticizingthenominationprocessthroughanorganizedpubliccampaignthatportraysthe
nomineeasadangerousextremist.Presidentsmayavoidborkingbychoosinganomineewhoseviews
areunknownbecauseitcreatesconflictavoidancewherewedontreallyknowwho(inasenseofwho
theyareandtheirbeliefs)theyareelecting.
Sig.Borkingislesslikelywhenthepresidentpartyalsocontrolsthesenate,asinthecaseofGeorgeW.
BushnomineeSamAlito,orBarackObamanominnesesSotomayorendElenKagan.Evenifthesenate
iscontrolledbytheopposition,presidentsmayavoidborkingbychoosinganomineewhoseviewsare
unknown,astealthstrategynamedafterthebomberthatcannoteasilybedetectedbyradar.
52.JudicialRestraintDoctrinethatsayscourtsshould,ifatallpossible,rulenarrowlyandavoid
overturningapriorcourtdecision.Itencourages
judgestolimittheexerciseoftheirownpowerand
assertsthatjudgesshouldhesitatetostrikedownlawsunlesstheyareobviouslyunconstitutional.Itis
sometimesregardedastheoppositeofjudicialactivism .
Sig.Thisgoesalongwiththeideaofstaredecisiswhichsaysthatofficialsshouldnotaltertheirprevious
decisionsbasedonchangingconditions.
53.AARP(AmericanAssociationofRetiredPersons)Anonprofit,nonpartisanmembershiporganization
forpeopleage50andover...dedicatedtoenhancingqualityoflifeforallasweage.Thelargest
voluntaryassociationeverwith40+millionmembers.AmajorplayerwheneverSocialSecurityor
Medicareisonthepoliticalagenda.
Sig.Theyareanexampleofaninterestgroupthatusesmaterialincentivessuchashealthinsuranceand
discountsonprescriptiondrugstogetpeopletojointheirgroup.
54.PartyMachinesAhighlyorganizedpartyunderthecontrolofabossandbasedonpatronageand
controlofgovernmentactivities.Machineswerecommoninmanycitiesinthelate19thandearly20th
centuries.
Sig.BittermemoriesoftheCivilWarleftmanypeoplecommittedtoeithertheUnion(republicans)orthe
rebels(democrats),andanintenseelectoralcompetitionencouragesdthesecitizenstovoteastraight
partyline.Independentswereviewedastraitors.Withfeelingssostrong,thepartiesexertedalotofeffort
incampaignsanddevotedtheirefforttothemobilizationofthefaithfulratherthantheconversionor
persuasionoftheundecided.Thehighorganizationledtopartiestobecomemachines.
55.ProgressivesLooseaggregationofpoliticians,politicalactivists,andintellectualsofthelate19thand
early20thcenturieswhopromotedpoliticalreformsinanefforttocleanupelectionsandgovernment.
Sig:CreatedcivilservicereformssuchasthePendletonCivilServiceActof1883,whichdiminishedthe
corruptionbehindthespoilssystem.LeadersoftheProgressiveMovementandsucceededinmany
politicalreforms,includingthecreatingofadirectprimary.
56.DirectPrimaryanelectionthatallowsvoterstoelectacandidatefromtheirpoliticalpartythatwill
thengoontoageneralelection.Or,Amethodofchoosingpartycandidatesthatallowvoters,insteadof
partyleaders,tochoosenomineesforoffice.Itweakenedpartycontrolofnominationsandtheinfluence
thatpartiescouldexerciseoverofficeholders.Thismethodofnominationcandidatesisvirtuallyunknown
outsidetheUS.
57.PlatformAstatementofapartyspositionsonthemajorissuesoftheday.
Sig:historiansandpoliticalscientistshavefoundplatformstobegoodsummariesoftheissuepositions
thepartiesemphasizedintheircampaigns.
58.TicketsplittingVoterselectionofcandidatesfromdifferentpartiesatthesameelectionforexample,
aRepublicanpresidentialcandidatebutaDemocraticcandidatefortheHouseofReps.
Sig:Thiscancauseadividedgovernment.
59.DemocratinTexas,RepublicantotheNationatalocalleveltexascitizensidentifiedasdemocratic,
butatanationalleveltheyidentifiedasrepublican.
Sig.thewaythepartieswereshapedatthelocallevelaredifferentthenhowtheoveralltwopartysystem
wasdevelopedatthenationallevel.Texascitizenhadabadviewoftherepublicanpartyduetothe
periodofreconstructionwherethegovernmentwascontrollingmuchofthesouth.Duetothismany
southernstatesidentifiedwiththedemocraticpartyandthereducedcontrolofthefederalgovt.
60.AgendaSettingthemediaaffecttheissuesandproblemspeoplethinkabout,evenifthemediado
notdeterminewhatpositionspeopleadopt.
Sig:adevastatingEthiopianfaminefailedtogainattentionofAmericansinthe1980suntiltelevision
showedthefootageinthepublicslivingrooms.
61.EqualTimeRuleLicensingconditionpromulgatedbytheFCCrequiringanystationthatgaveorsold
timetoalegallyqualifiedcandidateforpublicofficetomakeequaltimeavailabletoallsuchcandidateson
equalterms.
Sig:Thishelpsmakeradiotimefairforallcandidates.
62.FairnessDoctrineFCCregulation,enforcedbetween19491987,thatrequiredstationstoair
contrastingviewpointsonmattersofpublicimportanceandtogivepublicfigureswhohadbeencriticized
onanyofthestationsprogramsafreeopportunitytoreply.
Sig:Enforcedtomakesuretheywerenotpresentingbiasedinformationtotheirlistners.Shows
governmentinterventionintomediatoregulatesoitrunssmoothlyandwithaslittleconflictaspossible.
63.PrimingOccurswhenthemediaaffectthestandardspeopleusetoevaluatepoliticalfiguresorthe
severityofaproblem.Settingdifferingstandardsforevaluation.
Sig:Bywhattheychoosetocover,themediacanprimecitizenstousesomestandardsratherthan
others.
64.MinimalEffectsThesisTheorythatmassmediahavelittleornoeffectonpublicopinion,either
directlyorindirectly.
Sig:Agendasettingofthemediaprovesthistheorytobewrongbecausethemediadoesestablishthe
importantissuestothepublic.
66.Fergusonismwasidentifiedwithdemagogueryandcorruption.JamesPaFergusoncametothe
Texaspoliticalstagein1914andwontwotermsasgovernor.PaandMaFergusonwouldserveasliberal
leadersinthestateofTexas.TheybothservedasgovernorinthestateofTexas. FormerTXgovernor
JamesFergusonwhowasimpeached,convicted,andremovedfromoffice,heldofficefrom19251927.
FergusonismistheFergusonsbrandofpopulism."Fergusonism,"astheFergusons'brandofpopulism
wascalled,isstillacontroversialsubjectinTexas.Asgovernor,hetackledsomeofthetougherissuesof
theday.MiriamA.Ferguson.FergusonismistheFergusonsbrandofpopulism."Fergusonism,"asthe
Fergusons'brandofpopulismwascalled,isstillacontroversialsubjectinTexas.Asgovernor,she
tackledsomeofthetougherissuesoftheday.Thougha teetotaler,whichreferstoeitherthepracticeofor
thepromotionofcomplete
abstinencefrom
alcoholic
beverages,shealignedherselfwiththe"wets"inthe
battleover
prohibitionandtookafirmstandagainstthe .MaandPafergusonwould
Ku Klux Klan
advancetocauseofliberaldemocratsfor20years.
Sig:TheywereagainstprohibitionandtheKuKluxKlan.Theyadvancedthecauseoftheliberal
Democrats.Duringtwononconsecutivetermsinoffice,Mrs.Fergusonissuedalmost4,000pardons,
manyofthemtofreethoseconvictedofviolatingprohibitionlaws.In1936,voterspassedanamendment
tothestateconstitutionstrippingthegovernorofthepowertoissuepardonsandgrantingthatpowertoa
politicallyindependentTexasBoardofPardonsandParoles.MaandPaFergusonwheresupportersof
theNewDeal,theirsupportfortheLiberalDemocratsledtoalotofsplinteringbetweenconservativeand
liberaldemocrats.
67.TexasDemocratsTexasDemocratsheldastrongpositionofpowerformuchofTexasshistory,took
controlafterreconstruction.TheDemocraticPartyhasbeenthedominantpartyforthemajorityofTexass
history.Thereisagreatdealofinfightingliberaldemocrats(farmers)vs.Conservativedemocrats
(corporations).JamesStephenHoggwasthe1stliberaldemocrattoserveasgovernor(anticorporation).
TheliberalDemocraticPartysplitandformedtheirowngroup>nowknownasthedemocratsofTexas
(formedasarefugeforliberaldemocratsinTexas).TexasDemocratswereformedbyLiberalandwas
formedasarefugeforliberalDemocratsinTexasbecausetheywerelosingpower.Theliberalstookover
thestatepartyin1976,afterthismanyconservativedemocratsjoinedtheRepublicanParty.
Sig:DespiteincreasingRepublicanstrengthinnationalelections,afterthe1990
census,Texas
DemocratsstillcontrolledbothhousesoftheStateLegislatureandmoststatewideoffices.Asaresult,
theywereabletodirecttheredistrictingprocess.AlthoughCongressionalTexasDemocratsonlyreceived
anaverageof40percentofthevotes,Democratsconsistentlyhadamajorityinthestatedelegation,as
theyhadineveryelectionsinceatleasttheendof
Reconstruction.Theeconomicissuesraisedbythe
NewDealsplittheTexasDemocrats,butthissplitwoulditeventuallyleadtodeeperphilosophical
differencesbetweenTexas'liberalsandconservativesEventually,thesplitbetweentheTexasfactions
hadaneffectonnationalpolitics,withthestate'sconservativeforcesrevoltingagainstthenationalparty's
presidentialnomineein1952and1956andsupportingRepublicanDwightD.Eisenhower.Bythe1960S
and1970s,aspilloverofconservativescontributedtoanemergingRepublicanresurgenceinTexas
politicsandcreatedatrulytwopartysystemwithinthestate,whichmaybethegreatestlegacyofthe
Democratsintrapartyfightinthe1940sand1950s.
68.PoliticalSymbolsEachofthetwomajorpartiesareassociatedwithpoliticalsymbolspolicies,
candidates,andconstituenciesthatgivemeaningtotheseorganizationsformembersoftheAmerican
electorate.Politicalpartiescanmanipulatethesymbolswithwhichtheyareconnectedandthemeaning
individualsassigntothesesymbolsinordertogainfavorableevaluationswhichleadstoelectoralvictory.
Politicalsymbolsrivetourattentionandevokestrongemotion.Theseemotionsaredominatedbya
simplegoodbad,likedislikeevaluativedimension.
Sig:Politicalpartiesmanipulatethesymbolswithwhichtheyareconnectedinordertogainfavorable
evaluationsandultimatelyelectoralvictory.Partiesnotonlyseektomanipulatewhichsymbolsget
associatedwiththeirparty,butalsothemeaningindividualsassigntothesesymbols.Symbolsinthis
casedonotsimplydenotemascotsandinsigniasbutalsocandidates,issuepositions,andhistorical
eventsthatexemplifyapoliticalparty.Interactionswithpoliticalpartiesshapenotonlythepolitical
symbolspeopleassociatewithagivenparty,butalsotheinterpretationpeoplelendtothosesymbols.
Further,anindividualsexperientialknowledgealsoguidestheaffectiveweightanindividualplaceson
thosepoliticalsymbols.Theaffectivevalence,thesalience,andtheinterpretationindividualsassigntothe
symbols(i.e.,theframesindividualsusetomakesenseofthesymbols)thenguidepartypreferences.A
partycanusedifferentsymbolstoconveytovotersthattheyhavechangedwithoutmakingany
substantivechangestothepartysplatform.
69.SchematicMemoryIfweconsiderapartyimageakindofstereotype,thensocialpsychology
researchsuggeststhatpartyimagesmaybeupdatedinthefaceofinconsistentinformation.Partisan
stereotypes,aswellasstereotypesingeneral,canbethoughtofasaschematicstructureAschemaisa
cognitivestructurethatorganizespriorinformationandexperiencearoundacentralvalueoridea,and
guidestheinterpretationofnewinformationandexperienceThus,schemataallowustointerpretwhatis
ambiguous,uncertain,orunknownbyapplyingittoastanding,knownframeworkthatexistsinourheads.
Schematacanbeusedinmakinginferencesaboutevents,otherpeople,andourselves.Forinstance,
whenweencounternewpeople,weuseeitherascribed(e.g.,age,race,sex)orachieved(e.g.,
experienceortraining)characteristicsaboutthatpersontoactivateasetofrolebasedexpectationsabout
thatperson.
Sig:onceanindividualhasassociatedanevent,issue,orpersonwithaparticularstereotype,hethen
ascribesthestereotypiccontenttothatsituation,regardlessofhowmuchorhowlittlethesituationmay
actuallyresemblethestereotype.Themainprincipleofschematicmemoryisthattheusualcase
overridesdetailsofthespecicinstanceForinstance,whenanindividualhasidentiedacandidateasa
Republicanintheabsenceofadditionalinformation,hewillattributeallthefeaturesofwhatheimagines
tobeaRepublicantothatcandidate,regardlessofwhetherthatcandidateisamoderateorideologically
attheextremeright.Whenanindividualreceivesnewinformation,updatingthestereotypedependson
whetherornotthenewlypresentedinformationconictswithexistingknowledge.Iftheinformation
presentedinthestimulusisconsistentwithanindividualsexistingschematicinformation,hewillencode
thatinformationandstoreitinhismemorywiththerestoftherelevantconsiderations.
70.RacialSymbolismcitizenssupportpoliticalpartiesinlargepart(althoughnotnecessarilyexclusively)
basedontheirperceptionofapartysracialsymbolismorthepartysreputationwithrespecttorace.
Racialsymbolismistheinterpretationanindividualassignstoapoliticalpartysactivitiesbasedonallof
theracial,political,andsocialsymbolsthathavecometobeassociatedwiththatparty.Itistheframe
individualsusetogivemeaningtoapartysracerelatedactivities.Racialsymbolismistheproductofthe
symbolsinapartysimage,theracialvalenceofthosesymbols,andtheweightofeachsymbol.
Sig:Thewaythatacitizenviewsapartiesreputationwithrespecttoracecanhaveamajorimpactofthe
supportthecitizenshaveforthatparty.Therefore,ifpeopledonobelievethatapartyisdoingafairjob
withracerelatedactivities,thenthatpartywillmorethanlikelyloosetheirpoweringovernment.
71.
Cloturemotiontoenddebateinthesenate;requires60votestopass
Sig.theonlywaytosilenceafilibusterisforthesenatetoadoptacloture.
Strengthenedthepowerofthemajority,andallowedittopassmanybillsthatwouldotherwisehave
beenfilibustered
72.StenyHoyerandKevinMcCarthyHoyerDem.Maryland/McCarthyRep.California
partywhipsmembersofcongresswhoserveasinformationchannelslinkingtheleadershipandtherank
andfile,communicatingtheleadership'sviewsandintentionstothemembersandviceversa.
Sig.Largeparties(25+democratic&20republican)Persuasionandappealstopartyloyaltyimportant
daytodaytoolsforwhipsMembersareabletoparticipateinleadershiprolesthroughwhiporganization
73.PartyImagesThetotalityofthepoliticalsymbolsoneassociateswithapoliticalparty.Theyform
because,atsomepoint,politicalpartiesbecomesynonymouswithcertainpolicypositionsandgroupsin
society.Theycanvaryfromindividualtoindividual.Thepartyimageisinessencehowthepartyisviewed
bythepublic.Forexample,therepublican
party
's platformgenerallyreflects
American
conservatismin
the
U.S.political
spectrumandisconsidered
center ,incontrasttothe
right
center DemocraticParty.
left
ThismeansthatwhenpeoplelookattheRepublicanParty,thisishowitisviewed.Partyimages,
however,canvaryfrompersontopersonbecauseallpeoplehavedifferentviewsabouthowtheparties
shouldwork.
Sig:Partyimageisnotthesameaspartyidentication.Whilethetwoconceptsarerelated,partyimage
isdifferentinthattwopeoplemayidentifywiththesamepartybuthaveverydifferentmentalpicturesof
itandevaluatethesepicturesindifferentways.Onespartyimageconsistsofallthesubstantive
componentsheassociateswithagivenpoliticalparty.Thesymbolsandthemeaningassignedtothese
symbolsbyanindividualcanpotentiallybeusedinevaluationsofpartyactivity.Consequently,
evaluationsofapartyarenotonlydependentonwhatexistsinanindividualspartyimage,butalsowhat
isabsent.Informationusedtoformpartyimagescancomefromthepartiesthemselvesorfrom
competingsourcesofpoliticalinformationsuchasthemediaorotherpoliticalorganizations.
Understandingpartyimagesisimportantbecauseoftheroletheseimagesplayinthepoliticalprocess.
Partyimagesshapehowindividualsperceivepoliticalparties.Theycanaffectnotonlyhowpeoplevote,
butalsowhethertheychoosetoengageinthepoliticalprocessatall.Asaresult,partyimagescanaffect
whowinsandloseselections,whichultimatelyaffectswhichinterestsarerepresentedinthepolitical
arena.
74.EdmundJ.DavisDaviswasthefirstrepublicanelectedasGovernorofTexas.Heepitomizedthe
Reconstructionera14thgovernorofTX,SouthernUnionistandservedasaUnionGeneralinthe
AmericanCivilWar.DaviswasthelastRepublicanGovernorofTexasuntil
Bill Clementstookoffice104
yearslater.
Sig:EdmundJ.DaviswasnotonlyapartofthepoliticaleliteduringtheCivilWar,buthealsoopposed
secession.DavissadministrationplayedanintegralroleintheDemocraticPartysmonopolyofTexas
Politics.
75.BullyPulpitapublicofficeorotherpositionofauthorityofsufficientlyhighrankthatprovidesthe
holderwithanopportunitytospeakoutandbelistenedtoonanymatter.
Sig.thebullypulpitcanbringissuestotheforefrontthatwerenotinitiallyindebatebecauseofthestature
andpublicityoftheofficeposition.
76.Quorumtheminimumnumberofmembersofadeliberativeassembly(i.e.,thelegislature)
necessarytoconductthebusinessofthatgroup.
Sig.Aquorumalsomeansthemajority,soinorderforsomethingtobepassed,youneedtheaquorum
(whichisthemajority.)
77.ElectoralMarginalityThemarginalityhypothesismaintainsthatmembersofCongressfrom
marginaldistrictswilldisplaymoremoderationintheirvotingbehaviorthanwillthosefromsafedistricts.
Thisconceptbearssignificancebecauseitisbelievedthatelectoralmarginalitypredisposesalegislator
towardspartyloyaltyinrollcallvoting,therebycontributinganelementofuncertaintyandunpredictability
oflegislativereform.
Candidatesfrommoremarginaldistrictswill1)tendtoconvergetothepositionsoftheirconstituentsand
2)tendtoconvergetothepositionsoftheiropponents
78.InternetandPoliticalInterestInternetallowspeopletopostcontentthatcanbeviewedalloverthe
worldinanincreasingarrayofdevices.
Sig.LupiaandPhilpot:"Anindividualspoliticalinterestcanbeaffectedbyviewingasiteiftheviewer
findsitinteresting."
79.HandicapsofThirdPartiesNotadominantpartysotheymustpetitiontogetontheelectionballot.
TheyalsoreceivemuchlessmediaattentionthanRepublicanandDemocraticparties.
Sig.Explainswhythere'sanincentivetojoinmajorpoliticalpartiesratherthanathird.Alsoisthereason
whySingleMemberSimplePluralitysystemexistsinAmerica.
80.CooptationToelectasafellowmemberofagroup.Also,toneutralizeorwinoverthrough
assimilationintoagrouporculture.
Sig.Thismayrefertoanelectioninwhichmembersofaparticularcommitteevoteinordertofilla
vacancywithinit.