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HR595_YOU DECIDE WORKSHEET

Course: HUMAN RESO HR 595, Winter 2012
School: DeVry Cincinnati
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Decide You Worksheet Name _____Carey Thrasher____________ Course Section ___________ Date ___12/7/11_______ Scenario Summary: A supervisor in a large accounting firm is scheduled to interview a job candidate who comes highly recommended and has excellent qualifications. Jim has an accounting degree (bachelors) from a prestigious Ivy League school and has been working on his MBA by attending an online program for...

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Decide You Worksheet Name _____Carey Thrasher____________ Course Section ___________ Date ___12/7/11_______ Scenario Summary: A supervisor in a large accounting firm is scheduled to interview a job candidate who comes highly recommended and has excellent qualifications. Jim has an accounting degree (bachelors) from a prestigious Ivy League school and has been working on his MBA by attending an online program for the last 18 months and is close to earning his degree. In addition he has been working for one of your competitors for several years and has excellent references attesting to his ability. Your payroll budget has recently been reduced significantly as a result of a declining client base and your manager has the final authority in establishing salaries for the new hires but generally is responsive to what his supervisors propose to a job candidate. In addition, the HR Director has published salary ranges for new hires that are to be adhered to, unless there are extenuating circumstances such as the candidate having special expertise, the ability to bring in additional clients, or excellent credentials including having the CPA certification. Your Role/Assignment: Your role is to determine whether distributive or integrative negotiations will be preferred in this scenario between the job applicant and the supervisor, and respond to the questions regarding the other parties who have an interest in hiring the job applicant. Use the Worksheet to answer the questions related to this scenario. Each question is worth 20 points. Once you are finished, submit your assignment to the Dropbox. Questions: 1. What is the appropriate negotiation strategy that would be most advantageous for Sharon and Jim in this scenario, distributive or integrative bargaining? What are the factors that should be considered in making this determination? There are two bargaining strategies that you can employ during negotiations: (1) Distributive Bargaining or the negotiation that seeks to divide up a fixed amount of resources; a win-lose situation and; (2) Integrative Bargaining or the negotiation that seeks one or more settlements that can create a win-win solution. In this case it would be most advantageous for Sharon and Jim to use an integrative bargaining approach. Sharon and Jim need to focus on each gaining from an offer being extended to Jim. Factors to consider in the decision making process should focus on Sharons need of Jims previous experience and the client contacts in the industry he has cultivated. 2. What factors do you feel will contribute to the Accounting Supervisor and her Manager in determining the salary that Jim should be offered as a new hire? What are some other considerations that could be made to entice Jim to accept the job assuming that his salary demands could not be met? What are Jims and the Accounting Supervisors interests? To extend an offer exceeding Sharons allowed budget she will need to sell Helen on Jims strongest asset in order to sway Helens current opinion of not to allowing a total compensation offer that exceeds $50,000. Jim is asking for a 10% increase above his current salary of $60,000, his salary desires far exceed the compensation guidelines put in place by the HR director. Jims strongest asset lies in the client contacts has he cultivated in the industry. The company has recently lost customers and Jims reputation and contacts may bring new business to the company. If Sharon can focus on his potential ability to increase sales this may offset the increase amount of salary $50,000 they would have to pay Jim to bring him on board. In order to help justify a lower offer to Jim, Sharon can focus on what the company has to offer Jim in lieu of monetary compensation. Jim has stated that the company has a great reputation and he could benefit from the best practices he could learn if employed there. Additionally the company is known for providing excellent advancement opportunities within the organization. 3. What are HRs interests in this scenario, and what would be the potential negotiation strategy between the Accounting Manager and HR assuming that there is a decision that the published salary range for attracting Jim will have to be exceeded in order to hire him? Richard the HR director wants the supervisor to be successful in obtaining Jim for the budgeted amount. He needs the offer to be reasonable and not break the bank just to hire a rising star although Richard concedes that the supervisor and the company can benefit from Jims expertise. Since the Accounting manager refuses to ask HR for any amount over the budgeted $50,000 the HR Director and Helen need to construct a firm counter-opinion to help Sharon sell Jim on the benefits he can gain to his career from working for them instead of focusing solely on monetary compensation. Highlight the advancement opportunities that may exist in the future for a junior account executive that works hard, brings in new clients and focuses on success and the high caliber of industry practices he will learn from working for Sharon. 4. Propose a negotiating outcome for each of the possible negotiations that could occur in this scenario and defend your responses. Negotiations between: Supervisor and Job Applicant: Integrative bargaining is also known as interest-based bargaining or win-win bargaining would be the best approach for Sharon and Jim. This strategy solely focuses on creating mutually beneficial agreements based on the interests of the parties for example; needs, desires, and concerns. Sharon and Jim have a mutual need for one another, Sharon needs a qualified new hire and Jim is looking for new employment opportunities; Jim has a desire to excel in the industry and wants the experience ha can gain from working for Sharon. The concern between the two will lie in negotiating a salary both parties can accept; which will require Jim to more than likely take considerably less in salary than hed like to become a part of the organization. Supervisor and Accounting Manager: Unfortunately I see Sharon put in a distributive bargaining approach with Helen. The accounting manager seems determined not to allow Sharon to make an offer above budgeted guidelines, however if Sharon is aggressive in proving that Jim comes highly recommended, has an Ivy league educational background and the clients he has cultivated while working for the companys competitor could lead to potential new clients, may be enough to convince Helen that an increase the monetary offer to Jim is in the companys best interest an investment worth making.
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Final ExaminationEcon 409: Game Theory, Fall 2006Department of EconomicsUniversity of MichiganDaisuke NakajimaDo NOT turn this page until instructed to do so.Any kind of cheating shall result in severe penalties. Anyone who isfound cheating shall a
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Michigan - ECON - 409
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Michigan - ECON - 409
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