352 COM - Media Law
Libel Cases: Constitutional Considerations
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
Page (1/3)
418 U.S. 323
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------No. 72-617 Argued: November 14, 1973 --- Decided: June 25, 1974
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1968, a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities
prosecuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained a conviction for murder in the second degree. The
Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against
Nuccio.
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. [Note to
COM class: The John Birch Society was an ultra-conservative political organization active during this time period.]
In March, 1969, respondent published the resulting article under the title FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And
The War On Police. The article purports to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at his criminal trial
was false, and that his prosecution was part of the Communist campaign against the police.
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroners inquest
into the boys death and initiated actions for damages, but he neither discussed Officer Nuccio with the press nor
played any part in the criminal proceeding. Notwithstanding petitioners remote connection with the prosecution of Nuccio, respondents magazine portrayed him as an architect of the frame-up. According to the article,
the police file on petitioner took a big, Irish cop to lift. The article stated that petitioner had been an official of
the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, which has
advocated the violent seizure of our government.
It labeled Gertz a Leninist and a Communist-fronter. It also stated that Gertz had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described as a Communist organization that probably did more than any other outfit to
plan the Communist attack on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention.
These statements contained serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had a criminal record was false.
Petitioner had been a member and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 years earlier, but there was no
evidence that he or that organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 demonstrations in Chicago. There
was also no basis for the charge that petitioner was a Leninist or a Communist-fronter. And he had never
been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society.
Petitioner claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen.
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Libel Cases: Constitutional Considerations
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
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The principal issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods
about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege
against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements.
We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries,
but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances societys interest in uninhibited, robust and wideopen debate on public issues.
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable
in free debate. And punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is,
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this Court would have embraced long ago the view that
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation.
Such a rule would, indeed, obviate the fear that the prospect of civil for liability injurious falsehood might dissuade a timorous press from the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for the
communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation.
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted
on them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to abandon this purpose.
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury. This Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory
falsehood.
The New York Times standard defines the level of constitutional protection appropriate to the context of defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success
with which they seek the publics attention, are properly classed as public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.
For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of
private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them.
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help -- using available opportunities to contradict the lie or
correct the error, and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures
usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication, and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals
are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
More important than the likelihood that private individuals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there is
a compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. Those
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Libel Cases: Constitutional Considerations
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
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classed as public figures stand in a similar position. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must
be exceedingly rare. For the most part, those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence
in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment.
A private individual has not accepted public office or assumed an influential role in ordering society. He has
relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals
are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of
recovery.
For these reasons, we conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal
remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual.
The New York Times standard is inapplicable to this case, and that the trial court erred in entering judgment for
respondent. Because the jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and was permitted to presume damages without proof of injury, a new trial is necessary. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accord
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.