# Register now to access 7 million high quality study materials (What's Course Hero?) Course Hero is the premier provider of high quality online educational resources. With millions of study documents, online tutors, digital flashcards and free courseware, Course Hero is helping students learn more efficiently and effectively. Whether you're interested in exploring new subjects or mastering key topics for your next exam, Course Hero has the tools you need to achieve your goals.

15 Pages

### lec25

Course: ECON 134A 62360, Spring 2012
School: UC Irvine
Rating:

Word Count: 937

#### Document Preview

happens What in experiments? Dominant strategies are robust. In simple games, subjects pick the dominant strategy more 90% of the time. One problem is fairness concerns, such as in the dictator games. What happens in experiments? Iterated dominant strategies are much less robust. Nagel (95) Each player picks a number from 0 to 100. The guess closest to half of the mean wins the prize. Then x&gt;50 never wins...

Register Now

#### Unformatted Document Excerpt

Coursehero >> California >> UC Irvine >> ECON 134A 62360

Course Hero has millions of student submitted documents similar to the one
below including study guides, practice problems, reference materials, practice exams, textbook help and tutor support.

Course Hero has millions of student submitted documents similar to the one below including study guides, practice problems, reference materials, practice exams, textbook help and tutor support.
happens What in experiments? Dominant strategies are robust. In simple games, subjects pick the dominant strategy more 90% of the time. One problem is fairness concerns, such as in the dictator games. What happens in experiments? Iterated dominant strategies are much less robust. Nagel (95) Each player picks a number from 0 to 100. The guess closest to half of the mean wins the prize. Then x>50 never wins and is dominated. If nobody plays x> 50, then x>25 never wins and is dominated. If nobody plays x>25 then x>12.5 never wins and is dominated . So the only iterated dominant strategy equilibrium is x = 0. Yet most people give positive answers. Iterated Dominant Strategy Equilibrium Here the only iterated dominant strategy equilibrium is for each player to stop the game at any round when they get to move. Yet most people cooperate for a while, especially in longer games. Here the motivation can be both altruism and uncertainty about other agents rationality. Nash equilibria in experiments Subjects do not randomize very well. they alternate strategies too often (Rapoport and Budescu, 92) they generate samples that are too balanced People tend to generate balanced sequences far too often. Walker and Wooders (01) observe that players alternate too often between strategies in tennis matches. Nash equilibrium in Mixed Strategies Suppose that DRIVER pay The parking costs \$2 DRIVER Do not pay The ticket is \$30 The cost of checking is \$0.1 PARKING D: -2 SERVICE PS: 1.9 check Then there is no NE in pure strategies. Accordingly, there are no iterated PARKING D: -2 equilibria or dominant SERVICE PS: 2 strategies. Do not check D: -30 PS: 29.9 D: 0 PS: 0 Nash equilibrium in Mixed Strategies Key idea: if an agent randomizes, then he has the same expected utility from both strategies. DRIVER pay DRIVER Do not pay Let p be probability of paying. PARKING D: -2 In order to randomize, the parking service must have equal SERVICE PS: 1.9 expected payoffs check D: -30 PS: 29.9 1.9p +29.9(1-p) = 2p p = 29.9/30 = 99.7% PARKING D: -2 SERVICE PS: 2 Do not check D: 0 PS: 0 Nash equilibrium in Mixed Strategies DRIVER pay Key idea: if an agent randomizes, then he has the same expected utility from both strategies. DRIVER Do not pay Let q be the probability of checking. In order to randomize, the driver must have equal expected payoffs -2 = -30q q= 1/15 = 6.6% PARKING D: -2 SERVICE PS: 1.9 check So in equilibrium, the parking service checks with probability 6.6%, and PARKING D: -2 the driver pays with probability SERVICE PS: 2 99.7%. Do not check D: -30 PS: 29.9 D: 0 PS: 0 Nash equilibrium in Mixed Strategies So in equilibrium, the parking service checks with probability 6.6%, and the driver pays with probability 99.7%. In real life, many drivers do not randomize: they either pay all time, or they do not pay. Note that if the parking service checks with probability 6.6%, then both groups will do just the same. Bloomfield Shachat (94), (02) some players do not randomize at all, and still do fairly well in a population of agents who do randomize. DRIVER pay DRIVER Do not pay PARKING D: -2 SERVICE PS: 1.9 check D: -30 PS: 29.9 PARKING D: -2 SERVICE PS: 2 Do not check D: 0 PS: 0 Q3: Behavioral Models of Randomization Feature Matching Heuristic: Rapoport and Budescu (97) Subjects have memory of length m and they are more likely to pick a strategy at step (m+1) that balances the previous sequence of length m. For example, if CCCFFCCF have been previously chosen, and m= 5, then the next choice is more likely to be C If m =7, then the next choice is more likely to be F. Empirical data: m = 7 on average Answer: D Q4 and 5 Each player picks a number from 0 to 80. The only iterated dominant strategy equilibrium is x = 0. This is also the only Nash equilibrium. K-Level Thinking: People operate on different levels: Level 0: picks a random strategy, or pick some status quo Level 1: picks the best response against Level 0 agents Level 2: picks the best response against Level 1 agents Level 3: picks the best response against Level 2 agents This model can explain why some subjects choose 20 and 10: these guys operate on Level 2 and 3 respectively. Answer: B More on Signaling ALICE: stag Alice and Bob go hunting. Stag requires cooperation. ALICE: rabbit Rabbit does not. What equilibrium will occur? BOB: stag Alice:1.25 Alice: 1 Bob: 1.25 Bob: 0 BOB: rabbit Alice: 0 Bob: 1 Cooper et al (90) 97% play the inefficient equilibrium and go for the rabbit Alice: 1 Bob: 1 More on Signaling Suppose that one of the players can signal that he is going for stag. The signal is cheap talk, that is, it does not cost anything and does not impose any monetary costs if violated Cooper et al (90) With one signal, the efficient equilibrium occurred 55% of the time. When both players could signal, the fraction increased to 91%. ALICE: stag ALICE: rabbit BOB: stag Alice:1.25 Alice: 1 Bob: 1.25 Bob: 0 BOB: rabbit Alice: 0 Bob: 1 Alice: 1 Bob: 1 More on Signaling ALICE: ballet Battle of the Sexes game Cooper et al (90) ALICE: box Without signaling, players mismatched 59% of the time. With one signal, they mismatched 4% of the time. BOB: ballet Alice:5 Bob: 1 Alice: 0 Bob: 0 When both players could signal, . the fraction went back up to 42%. BOB: box Alice: 0 Bob: 0 Alice: 1 Bob: 5 Learning Learning can occur in games, but the actual dynamics of learning is very hard to describe and model. Some models include fictitious play (Brown 51): people keep track of the relative frequencies of strategies and play best response Bayesian learning (Jordan 91): people have prior beliefs about the structure of the game and adjust their beliefs by the Bayes rule. Experience weighted adjusted learning (EWA) Camerer and Ho (99) takes into account lost of factors such as foregone payoffs, decay of previous attractions, strength of initial attractions.
Find millions of documents on Course Hero - Study Guides, Lecture Notes, Reference Materials, Practice Exams and more. Course Hero has millions of course specific materials providing students with the best way to expand their education.

Below is a small sample set of documents:

UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Final Exam Wed, Dec 11, 4-6pm multiple choice , 50-55 questions, two hours, less timepressure bring your own scantron F-288-PAR-L two pages of handwritten notes no cooperation! office hours: Tue 12-1:30 SSPA 3177 please, submit your electronic eva
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Second Midterm, Behavioral Economics 115You have 50 minutes to 30 multiple choice questions. Good luck.1. The empirical evidence in the dictator games shows that people are typically willing to shareabout \$2 out of a \$10 endowment. This behavior can be
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Midterm 1You have 50 minutes to answer 35 questions.1. Ann prefers x to y , and y to z . Then the function u(x) = 3, u(y ) = 1, u(z ) = 10000 is her(A) experienced utility; (B) decision utility; (C) anticipatory utility; (D) real-time utility.Answer:
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIESPSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS:EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELDStefano DellaVignaWorking Paper 13420http:/www.nber.org/papers/w13420NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH1050 Massachusetts AvenueCambridge, MA 02138September 2007I would l
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
QuizThe objective of this quiz is to help you evaluate your progress, and to provide a starting pointfor further discussion. This quiz will not aect your grade, and your answers need not be submitted.You have 15 minutes.1. Ann maximizes discounted uti
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Quiz #1 Answers, Econ 115 Fall 2009This solution guide was written by Andy C. Chang. Any remaining errors aremy responsibility. Please direct any corrections to achang19@uci.edu1)Under the discounted utility model, Ann will try to maximize her utility
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Quiz 2You have 20 minutes to answer the following questions.1. Ann prefers an improving sequence of annual wages 25K, 30K, 35K to the decreasing sequence35K, 30K, 25K. Her behavior can be explained by(A) discounted utility model with positive discount
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Quiz 3You have 20 minutes to answer the following questions.1. Ann prefers to commit today to do a project tomorrow rather than to decide tomorrow. Herpreference for commitment can be explained by(A) discounted utility model;(B) hyperbolic discountin
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Quiz 5You have 15 minutes to answer the following questions.1. The prospect theory accommodates(A) risk loving behavior over moderate losses;(B) loss aversion;(C) accommodates buying lottery tickets together with expensive product insurance;(D) all
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
Quiz 6You have 20 minutes to answer the following questions.1. Which of the following concepts of equilibrium in game theory is most robust in experiments(i.e. most accurately describes relevant empirical data)(A) dominant strategy equilibrium;(B) it
UC Irvine - ECON 134A - 62360
American Economic AssociationPsychology and EconomicsAuthor(s): Matthew RabinSource: Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 11-46Published by: American Economic AssociationStable URL: http:/www.jstor.org/stable/2564950Acces
Aarhus Universitet - N - n
42Click to edit Master subtitle style1/5/11MUCUTHHINMC ] CH,TCDNGvitrt[V F S ) * 5 N1/5/11(s dng) vo vic g / (c li) cho vic g* V ` o)SF N1. N V 8 * L VD: n W+ se 2 . ( N )V 8 * L : nh gi * C y * 3. (N * V y* ton Cn W+ sg1/5/11: Cch s dng / / /:
Aarhus Universitet - ECONOMICS - 101
Assignment 1 (v2009b)Vietnam Income Tax Calculator (VITC)Due - Wednesday June 10 at 11:59 p.m.In this assignment, you are required to write a C program to calculate the income tax following theVietnamese tax specifications.A. Learning OutcomeUpon su
Aarhus Universitet - ECONOMICS - 101
ProgrammingFundamental UsingCSE0421, Summer 2009Lecturer: Dao Trong Nghianghia@ieee.orgCourse Objectives At the completion of this course, you willbe familiar with: The fundamentals of computer programming. Subset of the C language is used as th
Keller Graduate School of Management - ISM - IS535
Week 2 : Organization, Management, and Strategy of the Digital Firm - OL HomeworkGrading SummaryThese are the automatically computed results of your exam. Grades for essayquestions, and comments from your instructor, are in the &quot;Details&quot; section below.
City University of Hong Kong - MATH - 101
Portfolio Task 1Type I Infinite Surds* Add headings* Name figures and refer to them where necessaryIn this portfolio, I will find the general statement that represents all the values of k forwhich the exact value of the infinite surdis an integer. T
UNSW - ACTL - 2002
Australian School of BusinessSchool of Risk and Actuarial StudiesSchool of Risk and Actuarial StudiesACTL2002/5101 Assignment2012 Session 1Home insuranceIn cooperation with:Suncorp11Suncorp has been involved in creating the data and will hold a g
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter FourConsolidatedConsolidatedFinancialStatements andOutsideOwnershipOwnershipMcGrawHill/IrwinCopyright2009byTheMcGrawHillCompanies,Inc.Allrightsreserved.Noncontrolling Interest Noncontrollinginterest isthe portion of thesubsidiary tha
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
3/28/2012 11:34:00 PMChapter Two ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS Learning Objectives: 1. Describe the two major changes in the accounting for business combinations approved by the FASB in 2001, as well as the reasons for those changes. 2. Discuss th
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Electronic Presentations in Microsoft PowerPointPrepared byJames Myers, C.A. University of Toronto 2010 McGraw-Hill Ryerson LimitedChapter 3, Slide 1 2010 McGrawHill Ryerson LimitedChapter 3Business CombinationsChapter 3, Slide 2 2010 McGrawHill
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 8Materiality and RiskReview Questions8-1Materiality is defined as: A misstatement or the aggregate of all misstatements infinancial statements is considered material if, in light of the surrounding circumstances,it is probable that the decis
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 7Audit Planning and DocumentationReview Questions7-1There are three primary benefits from planning audits: it helps the auditor obtainsufficient appropriate audit evidence for the circumstances, helps keep audit costsreasonable, and helps av
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 5Audit Responsibilities and ObjectivesReview Questions5-1The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by theindependent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which thefinancial statements present f
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 4Legal LiabilityReview Questions4-1Several factors that have changed the legal environment in which publicaccountants in Canada operate are:1.2.3.4.5.6.The growing awareness of the responsibilities of public accountants on thepart of
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 3Professional EthicsReview Questions3-1A code of professional ethics is needed for public accountants to gain publicconfidence in the quality of the service provided, regardless of the individual providing it.A public accountant's code of pr
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 6: Audit EvidenceChapter 6Audit EvidenceOpening Vignette: Sometimes the Most Important Evidence is Not Found in theAccounting Rrecords1.Other factors include the extent of competition in the market, the ability of the companyto cut costs wh
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 9The Study of Internal Control and Assessment of Control RiskReview Questions9-1There are seven parts of the planning phase of audits: preplan, obtainbackground information, obtain information about the client's legal obligations, performpre
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 10Overall Audit Plan and Audit ProgramReview Questions10-1 The four types of tests used by auditors to determine whether financialstatements are fairly stated are;1.2.3.4.procedures to obtain an understanding of internal controltests of
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 1: The Demand for an Auditing and Assurance ProfessionChapter 1The Demand for an Auditing and Assurance ProfessionAudit Challenge 1-1: Assessing Privacy Practices1.Hospital data could be obtained from numerous sources: for example, unshredded
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Chapter 2: The Public Accounting ProfessionChapter 2The Public Accounting ProfessionAudit Challenge 2-1: Top-Quality Service East and West1.They would be looking for members that are current in their field, have good qualitycontrol practices, have a
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
MA2: Advanced Management AccountingRevised ContentsLesson 2Variance and customer profitability analysis2.12.22.32.42.52.6Activity-based costing and variance analysis . 2:1Revenue allocation . 2:3Sales-volume variance . 2:5Mix-and-yield varian
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
Lesson 1: Strategy,management accounting,and decision makingAMAUnit controller: Dr. junming Yin LOGOContents1What is strategy?2SWOT analysis3Implementing strategy4Planning and control5Different kinds of costswww.themegallery.comLOGO6D
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
LESSON 2:Varianceand customerprofitability analysisUnit controller:Dr.Yin junming ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? www.themegallery.comLOGOAdd your company sloganContents1Revenue allocation2Sales-volume variance3Mix-and-yield variances forsubstitutable i
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 102
LOGOLESSON3:QualityandtimeUnitcontroller:Dr.Yinjunming Learning objectives Aftercompletingthislesson,youshouldbeableto: Explainhowqualityisusedasacompetitivenesstool. Evaluateacostofqualityprogrambycalculatingcategoriesofcostandanalyzingnonfinanc
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
139-210.ch04rev.qxd 12/2/03 2:57 PM Page 139CHAPTER4INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTIONSLEARNING OBJECTIVESAfter reading this chapter, you should be able to:I Understand the different types of intercompany transactions that can occur.I Understand why intercom
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
F A 4 C la s s n o te sB a r b a r a W y n tje s , C G A , M B A , B .S c .H a n d o u t 1 : M o d u le 5 : I n t e r c o m p a n y t r a n s a c t io n sP art 1:The impact of intercompany revenues and expenses on consolidated net income: The purpose
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
ACG4201 Exam I (Chapters1, 2, 3, and 4)Name:_. ID:_. Answer the following Questions: [Only 55 Questions are required the remaining 5 questions are bonus questions] 1. Gaw Company owns 15% of the common stock of Trace Corporation and used the fair-value m
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Intercorporate Transfers Chapter 6 A parent company and its subsidiaries often engage in a variety of transactions among themselves. For example, manufacturing companies often have subsidiaries that develop raw materials or produce components to be inclu
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Intercompany Inventory Transactions Chapter 7 Inventory transactions are the most common form of intercorporate exchange. Significantly, the consolidation procedures relating to inventory transfers are quite similar to those discussed in Chapter 6 relati
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Chapter FiveConsolidated Financial Statements Intra-Entity Asset TransactionsMcGrawHill/Irwin Copyright 2011 by The McGrawHill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.2Intra-entity TransactionsTransactions between the parent and subsidiary are considered
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
02 Chapter - Consolidation of Financial Information Chapter 02 Consolidation of Financial Information Multiple Choice Questions 1. At the date of an acquisition which is not a bargain purchase, the acquisition method A. consolidates the subsidiary's asset
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Chapter 09 - Foreign Currency Transactions and Hedging Foreign Exchange RiskCHAPTER 9 FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS AND HEDGING FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISKChapter OutlineI. In today's global economy, a great many companies deal in currencies other than their
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Chapter 1The Equity Method of Accounting for InvestmentsChapter Outline I. Reporting Investments in Corporate Equity Securities - The method used to account for a particular investment depends on the degree of influence the investor (stockholder) is abl
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Chapter 5 Business CombinationsMcGraw-Hill/IrwinThe McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2006Scope of the Chapter Definitionof &quot;Business Combinations.&quot; Reasons for the popularity of business combinations. Techniques for arranging a business combination. The a
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Chapter 6Consolidated Financial Statements: On Date of Business CombinationMcGraw-Hill/IrwinThe McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. 2006Scope of Chapter Nature of Financial Statements The concept of control versus Ownership as the basis for such financial s
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Updated Sixth EditionChapter 3Consolidations Subsequent to the Date of AcquisitionChapter OutlineI.Consolidation the Effects Created by the Passage of TimeA.The present chapter examines the consolidation procedures that must be followed insubseque
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Chapter9- 199IntercompanyIntercompanyBond Holdings andMiscellaneous TopicsMiscellaneousConsolidated FinancialConsolidatedStatementsStatementsAdvanced Accounting, Third EditionChapter9-2Learning ObjectivesLearning Objectives1.Describethe
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Advanced AccountingAdvancedSemester 22011-2012Introduction -TeacherXu HanyouPHD of managementEmail: xhy1993@tom.comOffice: Building Weiyu Room 510Student consultation times are: Make an appointment ahead of time, please. Introduction to unitTe
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Lesson 1LessonAccounting standardsetting environmentsTextsHoyle Schaefer Doupnik, Advanced Accounting,Tenth Edition, McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2010International Accounting Standards Board,International Financial Reporting Standards, fulltext as of January
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
NAULesson 2LessonFinancial instrumentsand income tax allocationTopic outline and required readingU2.1 Financial instrumentsIAS 32: Financial Instruments:PresentationIAS 32: Financial Instruments:PresentationIFRS 7: Financial Instruments:Disc
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
Quiz II(Chapters 3 and 4)Name:_.ID:_.Answer the following Questions:1. Which of the following internal record-keeping methods can a parent choose to account for asubsidiary acquired in a business combination?A. Initial value or book valueB. Initia
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
About CGA-CanadaMissionThe Certified General Accountants Association of Canada advances the interests of itsmembers and the public through national and international representation and theestablishment of professional standards, practices, and service
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
www.themegallery.comLOGOLESSON 5Kaizen, activity-based, and capitalbudgetingContents13Kaizen budgeting andactivity-based budgeting2Capital budgeting stages3Time value of money453Complexities in capitalbudgeting applicationsCapital budge
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101
LOGOLESSON 9Balanced Scorecardwww.themegallery.comContentsClick to edit text stylesEdit your company slogan1. Implementation of strategyand the Balanced Scorecard2. Evaluating success of astrategy3. Strategic analysis ofoperating income4. Dow
Audencia Nantes Ecole de Management - ECON - 101