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PLATO
ARISTOTLE PLATO AND RELATION TO SOCRATES: Aristotle, Metaphysics I.6 (987a32-b7): After the systems we have named came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers [i.e., the Italian school] but had pecularities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians. For, having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind-for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they. PLATO'S DIALOGUES: Early: Apology, Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor and Major, Protagoras, Gorgias, Ion Meno, Phaedo, Republic, Menexenus, Cratylus Symposium, Phraedus, Euthydemus,
Middle:
Late:
Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, Laws
REFERENCES TO PLATO: The universally standard way to refer to Plato's works is by `Stephanus numbers'. These refer to the page numbers of the first complete and critical edition of Plato's works made in the Renaissance by the famed printer and humanist Henri Estienne (1528-1598) and published in 1578. (Stephanus is the Latinized form of `Estienne', as all scholarly writing at the time was in Latin.) This complete edition of Plato's works was in three volumes, whose pages were continuously numbered from the beginning to the end of each volume. Each page has two columns, the right one providing the Greek text and the left one a Latin translation (by Jean de Serres). In between the two columns are printed letters from A to E dividing the column into five sections. Hence, 94B refers to page 94 section B in the Stephanus edition. All translations and subsequent editions carry these numbers in the margins.
2 R. E. Allen, Socrates and Legal Obligation, p. 3:
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Definition of piety from Euthyphro 9E-11B: (Literature: Socrates, ed. Gregory Vlastos) The main point is to show that `being loved by or dear to the gods' (theophiles) and `piety' (hosion) are not identical. Rather, theophiles is a property (pathos) of piety. The overall point in the dialogue seems to be that the various definitions up to now have been either not universal (first definition is an instance of piety) or too univeral (second definition applies to both the pious and impious). Here the definition is coextensive with piety, for everything pious is loved by the gods and everything loved by the gods is pious, but there are different. Therefore, cannot be definition. Also, a property does not reveal the nature. Argument: 10D: Conclusion: Pious and theophiles not the same. Something is theophiles because it is loved by the gods. General arg. From 10B-D. Something is being seen because someone sees it, someone does not see it because it is being seen. So too, something is being loved because someone loves it; someone does not love it because it is being loved. But something is loved by the gods because it is pious. Admitted by E. at 10D, 10E. Therefore theophiles and pious stand in opposed relationships to the gods: something is theophiles because the gods love it, but the gods love something because it is pious. Therefore, different. Therefore, theophiles is property of piety, not the nature of piety.
4 THE ISLAND OF MELOS AND THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
5 THE MELIAN DIALOGUE Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War Book V ATHENIANS (89): Then we for our part will use no fine phrases saying that because we conquered the Persians we have a right to empire, or that because we have been injured we are now coming against you; we do not intend to offer in a long speech words that no one would believe. Nor do we want you to think that you will persuade us by saying that though a colony from Sparta you did not march with her in the [present Peloponnesian] war, or that you have never harmed us. Instead we urge you to take what you can get, keeping in mind our real sentiments, since you know that in their relations human beings pay more attention to justice only when both sides start from the same basis of compulsion, and that the strong do what they have the power to do, while the weak accept what they must. ... MELIANS (104): It is difficult (and be assured that we know it) for us to oppose your power unless we are on equal terms. But we trust that the gods will give us equally good fortune, because we who are in the right stand against you who are in the wrong. As for our lack of power, we trust that it will be compensated by our alliance with the Spartans, who are bound by honor and kinship (if for no other reason) to help us. our So confidence is not so irrational as you suppose. ATHENIANS (105): We think we will enjoy as much of the gods' favor as do you. Our aims and actions depart in no respect from men's beliefs about the gods or from the principles governing men's purposes in the conduct of their own lives. In the case of the gods we believe, and with men we can see for ourselves, that both gods and men must obey nature's law to rule wherever one can. We did not establish this law, nor were we the first to follow it, once established. But having found it in existence, we will leave it in existence for all time; we merely availed ourselves of it, and we know that if you or others were as powerful, you would do the same. So as far as divine favor is concerned we see no reason why we should worry about being at a disadvantage. But with regard to your views about Sparta: you are confident she will come to your aid out of a sense of honor. Congratulations on your blissful ignorance, but we do not envy your folly. Where they themselves or their institutions are concerned, the Spartans really are remarkably good. As for their relations with everybody else, we could go on about that at great length; suffice it to say that of all the people we know the Spartans are the most notorious for believing that what they like is honorable and what suits their self interest is just. Such an attitude will not help you in your present unreasonable hope for safety.
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THRASYMACHUS: JUSTICE AND INTEREST OR ADVANTAGE I. Justice is advantage of stronger. Socrates: Not literary true II. Justice is the advantage of the stronger, i.e., the ruler. Socrates: Not true if ruler mistaken. III. Justice is advantage of ruler taken precisely, i.e., insofar as decrees what is to his advantage. Socrates: Justice is a skill or craft (techne), and every skill or craft is exercised to the advantage of its subject over which it governs, not that of the one exercising it, .e.g, medicine. IV. Justice is the advantage of another, namely, the ruler, who is in reality unjust but called just by convention. Socrates: No ruler, precisely as ruler, seeks own advantage, since then would rule willingly. But no ruler taken precisely as ruler rules willingly.
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I. II.
THREE TYPES OF GOOD REFORMULATION OF THRASYMACHUS' VIEW
1. Glaucon
a) Nature and Origin of Justice b) Justice is Involuntary c) Unjust Life is Better
2. Adeimantus
a) Why is justice praised
III. IV. V.
QUESTION OF JUSTICE PLAN: JUSTICE IN INDIVIDUAL AND CITY CONSTRUCTION OF CITY
1. Origin of City 2. City of Pigs
a) Where is justice?
3. Inflammed City
a) Origin of War (373e)
VI.
EMERGENCE OF GUARDIAN CLASS
1. Spirited (thumos) and Wisdom Loving (philosophia)
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VII. EDUCATION AND REVISION OF THE PAIDEIA
1. Mousike
a) Stories
(1) Subject Matter Theology
(a) (b) (c) (d) Gods should not hate or war Gods not cause of evil only good Gods cannot change Gods canot lie
(2) Subject Matter Morals
(a) Instill bravery but not fear of death (b) Moderation in grief and joy
(3) Form
(a) Rejection of imitation mimesis
b) Music
(1) Modes (2) Instruments
c) Conclusion: Harmony (402c)
2. Gymnastike 3. Conclusion (411e-412e)
a) End of mousike b) End of gymnastike
VIII. EMERGENCE OF RULERS vs. AUXILIARIES
1. Natural traits 2. Life of the Guardians
IX. X.
NOBLE LIE LOCATION OF JUSTICE IN THE CITY
1. 2. 3. 4. Wisdom Courage Moderation Justice
XI.
JUSTICE IN THE INDIVIDUAL
1. Form of Justice Same in City and Individual 2. Does City and Individual Have Same Parts? IV.436A
1. Parts of city arise from from the soul -- we desire, get angry and learn -- but are these accomplished by parts of the soul? If not, cannot find virtues in the soul.
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RATIONAL APPETITIVE SPIRITED
LOGISTIKON ALOGISTIKON and EPITHUMETIKON THUMOS
2. Law of non-contradiction: the same thing cannot undergo opposites in the same part, in relation to the same object, and at the same time. 3. The rational and appetitive are different parts. 4. The spirited differs from the appetitive. 5. But spirited differs from rational.
3. Definition of Virtues in the Individual
XII. ANSWER TO THE ORIGINAL QUESTION XIII. THREE WAVES OF CRITICISM
1. Role of Women (449a) 2. Nature of the Family (457c) 3. Rulers are Philosophers (471c)
XIV. DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION
1. Distinction betweeen Knowledge and Ignorance
a) Knowledge is of what is, ignorance of what is not
2. Definition of Capacity (dynamis)
a) A capacity is a power to do something b) If different capacities, then different objects.
3. Knowledge and Opinion are Different Capacities
a) Knowledge is infallible, opinion fallible. b) Therefore, knowledge and opinion have different objects.
4. Opinion is between Knowledge and Ignorance
a) The object of opinion neither is nor is not b) Opinion does not exceed knowledge or ignorance
(1) Does not exceed knowledge in clarity (2) Does not exceed ignorance in obscurity
c) Since opinion is not identical to either knowledge of ignorance and does not exceed them, must be between them
5. How Can Something both Be and not Be?
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XV. THE GOOD: IMAGES OF THE SUN, LINE AND CAVE
Understanding nous; noesis
THE INTELLIGIBLE KNOWLEDGE
Thought dianoia
Belief pistis THE VISIBLE OPINION
Imagination eikasia