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Cornell | ECON 3580
Behavioral Economics
Professors
• E O'donoghue,
• ,
• Stefan Penczynski

#### 21 sample documents related to ECON 3580

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, October 1st 2010 Preliminary Exam 1 Exercise 1 (10 points) a) Dene causal eect. b) What does it mean for a study to be internally valid? c) Use the all-causes model to show how selection is threatening internal validity.

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, October 1st 2010 Preliminary Exam 1 Exercise 1 (10 points) a) Dene causal eect. The causal eect of X1 on Y is the eect of varying X1 holding xed X = (X2 , . . . , XN ) b) What does it mean for a study to be internally val

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, November 12th, 2010 Preliminary Exam 2 Exercise 1 (12 points) Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium play has been studied by Palacios-Huerta (2003) in the context of soccer penalty shots. The following game can be one represent

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, November 12th, 2010 Preliminary Exam 2 Exercise 1 (12 points) Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium play has been studied by Palacios-Huerta (2003) in the context of soccer penalty shots. The following game can be one represent

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, May 20th Final Exam Exercise 1 (18 points) Consider the following Trust Game: The Investor (I) has \$20 and the possibility to either keep it all (and the game ends) or to invest it all in the Trustee (T). If he invests al

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, May 20th, 2010 Final Exam In total, 120 points can be obtained. You should be able to nish within 2 hours. The points per question can be an indication about your time allocation in minutes. Exercise 1 (18 points) Conside

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, March 1st 2010 Preliminary Exam 1 Exercise 1 Tp B1p Player A Player B Lq R1q 7,3 3,2 5,2 4,7 a) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure and mixed strategies of this game. 2 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria: (T, L) and (B, R). 1 Mix

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, March 1st 2010 Preliminary Exam 1 Exercise 1 (13 points) Player A T B Player B L R 7,3 3,2 5,2 4,7 a) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure and mixed strategies of this game. b) Under a level of reasoning model with uniform le

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Problem Set 1 Exercise 1 1. What does it mean for a study to be externally valid ? An externally valid study presents results that can be taken fr

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Please hand in your answers by Friday, September 10, before class. Problem Set 1 Exercise 1 1. What does it mean for results of a study to be exte

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Problem Set 2 Solutions Exercise 1 1 SPNE: AS B C after S, C after C (denoted (CC) in the following) Player A SS 0,0 1,1 S C Player B CC SC 2,1 0,

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Please hand in your answers by Friday, September 24th, before class. Problem Set 2 Exercise 1 Find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the foll

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Problem Set 3 Exercise 2 Each of the following boxes, identied uniquely by a number, can be chosen in a coordination game. i) A = cfw_2, 5, 11, 17

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Please hand in your answers by Friday, October 22nd, before class. Problem Set 3 Exercise 1 Pages 338-340 in the textbook by Camerer give coordina

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Problem Set 4 Exercise 1 a) One player in the study by ONeill (1987) chose 19 times to play the Joker in 105 games. The mixed strategy Nash Equili

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Please hand in your answers by Wednesday, November 3rd, before class. Problem Set 4 Exercise 1 a) One player in the study by ONeill (1987) chose 1

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Please hand in your answers by email by Wednesday, November 17th, noon. Problem Set 5 There have been many studies on social preferences. Some of

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590: Experiments and Games Problem Set 6 Solutions Exercise 1 Indicate the choice predictions by the theory of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) for the following

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, April 7th 2010 Preliminary Exam 2 Exercise 1 (10 points) a) Dene Primary, Secondary, and Schelling salience. b) Comment on the following results of the classroom experiment with respect to the predictions of the three typ

• Cornell ECON 3580
Econ 3590: Experiments and Games, April 7th 2010 Preliminary Exam 2 Name: Exercise 1 (10 points) a) Dene Primary, Secondary, and Schelling salience. b) Comment on the following results of the classroom experiment with respect to the predictions of the thr

• Cornell ECON 3580
Dr. Stefan Penczynski, 446 Uris Hall, Cornell University, spp45@cornell.edu Econ 3590 Experiments and Games This course consists of 14 weeks of lectures. Requirements are 6 homeworks (25%), 2 preliminary exams (20% each) and one nal exam (35%). Oce hours

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