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Caltech  CS 147
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School: Caltech
Eciency and Revenue in Certain Nash Equilibria of Keyword Auctions Sbastien Lahaie e lahaies@yahooinc.com Yahoo Research New York, NY 10018 SISHOO 2007 p.1 Sponsored Search SISHOO 2007 p.2 Outline Model for keyword auctions. Eciency in purestrategy Nas

Search2
School: Caltech
Internet Advertising and the Generalized SecondPrice Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords By BENJAMIN EDELMAN, MICHAEL OSTROVSKY, AND MICHAEL SCHWARZ* We investigate the generalized secondprice (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by se

Search3
School: Caltech
Revenue Analysis of a Family of Ranking Rules for Keyword Auctions Sebastien Lahaie David M. Pennock School of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 Yahoo! Research New York, NY 10011 slahaie@eecs.harvard.edu pennockd@ya

Smartepssigmetrics
School: Caltech
Scheduling despite inexact jobsize information Adam Wierman Misja Nuyens California Institute of Technology 1200 E. California Blvd. Pasadena, CA 91125 Statkraft Lilleakerveien 6 Lilleaker, 0216 Oslo acw@caltech.edu misjanuyens@gmail.com ABSTRACT Motivat

Thesisproposal
School: Caltech
THESIS PROPOSAL A Theoretical Scheduling Toolbox Adam Wierman CMUCS05? School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Abstract Scheduling policies are fundamental components of a majority of modern computer systems. However,

VT_gittins
School: Caltech
Optimal scheduling of jobs with a DHR tail in the M/G/1 queue TKK Helsinki University of Technology Department of Communications and Networking P.O.Box 3000 02015 TKK Finland Samuli Aalto samuli.aalto@tkk.fi LAASCNRS Universit de Toulouse 7 Avenue Colone

Learnings
School: Caltech
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play Sherwin Doroudi "Adapted" from J. R. Marden, G. Arslan, J. S. Shamma, "Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games," in Proceedings of the 44th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, December 2005, pp.

Predd
School: Caltech
Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey Journal of Economic Thoery,1982 Motivation Model I Model II There are L commodities in each state of the world. Assume consumption set is RL+. a Each trader i is described by: his endowment, ei: RL+ his utility function, Ui

Searchc
School: Caltech
Sponsored Search Cory Pender Sherwin Doroudi Optimal Delivery of Sponsored Search Advertisements Subject to Budget Constraints Zoe Abrams Ofer Mendelevitch John A. Tomlin Introduction Search engines (Google, Yahoo!, MSN) auction off advertisement slots o

Queueing Copy
School: Caltech
Queueing Theory Ivo Adan and Jacques Resing Department of Mathematics and Computing Science Eindhoven University of Technology P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands February 28, 2002 Contents 1 Introduction 1.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hw7
School: Caltech
CS/EE 147 Assigned: 05/25/10 HW 7: Scheduling Guru: Raga Due: 06/04/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the top of your homework sheet, list all the people

DeeperInsidePR
School: Caltech
Deeper Inside PageRank Amy N. Langville and Carl D. Meyer October 20, 2004 Abstract This paper serves as a companion or extension to the "Inside PageRank" paper by Bianchini et al. [19]. It is a comprehensive survey of all issues associated with Pag

Fairnesssurvey
School: Caltech
Fairness and Classications Adam Wierman Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15217 acw@cs.cmu.edu ABSTRACT The growing trend in computer systems towards using scheduling policies that prioritize jobs with small service req

Fbsurvey
School: Caltech
The ForegroundBackground queue: a survey Misja Nuyens Adam Wierman September 12, 2007 Abstract Computer systems researchers have begun to apply the ForegroundBackground (FB) scheduling discipline to a variety of applications, and as a result, there has

Hw1
School: Caltech
CS/EE 147 Assigned: 03/30/10 HW 1: Probability Refresher Guru: Raga Due: 04/09/10, Ragas mailbox1 , 1pm We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the top of your homework sheet, list al

Hw2
School: Caltech
HW 2: Practice with DTMCs CS/EE 147 Assigned: 04/06/10 Guru: Lina Due: 04/16/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the top of your homework sheet, list all th

Hw3
School: Caltech
CS/EE 147 Assigned: 4/13/10 HW 3: Practice with CTMCs Guru: Raga Due: 4/28/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the top of your homework sheet, list all the

Hw4
School: Caltech
CS/EE 147 Assigned: 04/27/10 HW 4: Queueing games Guru: Lina Due: 05/07/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the top of your homework sheet, list all the peo

Hw5
School: Caltech
CS/EE 147 Assigned: 05/06/10 HW 5: Queueing networks and PH distributions Guru: Raga Due: 05/14/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the top of your homework

Hw6
School: Caltech
CS/EE 147 Assigned: 05/13/10 HW 6: Transform world Guru: Lina Due: 05/26/10, Ragas mailbox, 1pm We encourage you to discuss these problems with others, but you need to write up the actual solutions alone. At the top of your homework sheet, list all the pe

Searchs
School: Caltech
Mediators Slides by Sherwin Doroudi Adapted from Mediators in Position Auctions by Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz Bayesian & PreBayesian Games Consider a game where every player has private information regarding his/her type A player