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ECON 398 - University Of Michigan Study Resources
  • 1 Page Econ398_HW2Solutions
    Econ398_HW2Solutions

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 2 Sketchy Solutions 1. There are four Nash Equilibria; each one involves one of the four writing down $3, while the other three each write down $10. Notice that in a strategy profile where two players, say Alice and Bertha, write do

  • 7 Pages homework6
    Homework6

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    I; NotM.R.: '-uq () M I 0" 0 l, '1. ", 0 H '110.: C( S h. ~ 1'1"L '133~ C(<'1/ tcfw_ oN 3qg HoM wOf( K 0 q, I-t.t IJ ( ffo 0,0 1. I ( J, .2, ! tS )'/ I ,:ts 0,0 (j) v V\L \, "1 ( I I 1., ,1-5 ~-+rvvJ-jJ 'T/ NA(L I CL1t ~ J-fro;1 ) I (. fV1L,.A- ( It I ~ (

  • 4 Pages Strategy11Handout
    Strategy11Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/9/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies In Matching Pennies, we found there was no Nash Equilibrium Guildenstern Heads Rosencrantz Heads Tails 1, -1 -1, 1 Tails -1, 1 1,-1 Why Mixed Strategies? If you were to play the same opponent repeatedly, you wou

  • 5 Pages Strategy12Handout
    Strategy12Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/14/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bi-matrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1-p Heads H d Tails 1 , -1 1 -1 , 1 1-q Tails -1 , 1 1 1 , -1 Preferences Involving Gambles We revisit our description of pa

  • 4 Pages Strategy1Handout
    Strategy1Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/10/2008 Personnel for Econ 398: Strategy Econ 398: Strategy A Study of Strategic Interaction in Games Chris Proulx Lorch Hall M107 rabbit@umich.edu Office Hours: Tu, Th 10:30-11:30 Instructor: Chris Proulx, rabbit@umich.edu Office Hours: TuTh 10:30-11:3

  • 4 Pages Strategy2Handout
    Strategy2Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/10/2008 Analyzing Games We need three things to specify a game Players Possible strategies for each player Payoffs for eac p aye o e ou co es ayo s o each player over outcomes Analyzing Games Players have well-defined and well-behaved preferences over o

  • 3 Pages Strategy15Handout
    Strategy15Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/29/2008 Expert Advice We often rely on professionals to diagnose problems and recommend and carry out fixes Doctors Auto Mechanics and Repair Technicians p Lawyers Financial Advisors and Real Estate Agents Teachers and Researchers Expert Advice A custo

  • 5 Pages Strategy13Handout
    Strategy13Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/16/2008 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bi-matrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1-p Heads H d Tails 1 , -1 1 -1 , 1 1-q Tails -1 , 1 1 1 , -1 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies Rosencrantz's & Guildenstern

  • 3 Pages Strategy14Handout
    Strategy14Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/23/2008 Your Choice of Gambles A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 Your Choice of Gambles $3000 $0 $3000 $0 B1= B2= .25 .75 1 0 A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 B1= B2= $0 .25 .75 1 0 $3000 $0 $3000 $0 .75 It turns out that if you preferred A1 t

  • 3 Pages Strategy16Handout
    Strategy16Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/30/2008 Midterm 2: Next Tuesday Exam focuses on new material Chapter 5 to beginning of Chapter 9 Lectures 8-16, HW 4-6 Signaling with Strategic Uncertainty Otto Stag Ludwig Stag Hare 2,2 1,0 Hare 0,1 1,1 Come early and bring a UMID No cellphones or i-p

  • 3 Pages Strategy17Handout
    Strategy17Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/10/2008 Spence: Education as a Screen Education does not affect productivity Two types of people Able types worth $150,000 Challenged types worth $100,000 $100 000 Types are indistinguishable, can't be tested Spence: Education as a Screen Self-Selectin

  • 3 Pages Strategy10Handout
    Strategy10Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/2/2008 Midterm 1: Next Tuesday Covers up through Chpt. 5 & HW 3 Come early and bring a UMID No cellphones or i-pods allowed Calculators must be simple non-graphing simple, non-graphing, non-complex, non-computer-like calculators with one memory registe

  • 3 Pages Strategy9Handout
    Strategy9Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    10/1/2008 Simultaneous/Sequential Mix Up We might wish to model situations involving both sequential and simultaneous moves We can combine the concepts of Nash Equilibrium with Rollback to analyze such q y games Consider a somewhat complex relationship be

  • 3 Pages Strategy8Handout
    Strategy8Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/24/2008 Upheaval in Financial Markets A panel of distinguished alumni from the Department of Economics will discuss the ongoing crisis in financial markets. Speakers include: David Berson MPP `79; PhD `82 econ D id B Peter Borish, P t B i h AB `81; MPP

  • 1 Page HW3
    HW3

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 3 Due Sept. 26, 2008 1) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problems 2b, 2c. 2) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problems 3b, 3c. 3) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 4, problem 10. 4) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 5, problem 3. 5) Alice and Bob are each considering c

  • 1 Page HW6Sol
    HW6Sol

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 6 Suggested Solutions 1) Use the characterization from class to check for mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria. First note that there are four pure strategy equilibria, each where one person drives Straight, and the other person either swerves

  • 8 Pages roywchen_12608_1534Econ_398_Practice_Exam_3
    Roywchen_12608_1534Econ_398_Practice_Exam_3

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Practice Exam 3 (1 3) Mckouwski & Miller, a consulting firm wants to hire some workers for its vacant positions. There are 2 types of jobs: challenging and mundane and two types of workers: highly productive and less productive. In a challenging job, the

  • 1 Page roywchen_103108_17308Eco...ummary_of_topics_Midterm_2
    Roywchen_103108_17308Eco...ummary_of_topics_Midterm_2

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398: Summary of topics relevant to Midterm 2 Simultaneous and sequential games Changing the rules/order of play Portraying games in different forms o Sequential games strategic/normal form o Simultaneous games extensive form Subgames Subgame-perfect

  • 3 Pages Strategy3Handout
    Strategy3Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/10/2008 Homework Due Friday 4PM Hand homework into your GSI during discussion section OR Turn in homework to the specially marked box outside Lorch Hall 109 by 4PM Extensive Form Games - Strategies A strategy is a complete plan of action Tells a player

  • 3 Pages Strategy4Handout
    Strategy4Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/11/2008 Simultaneous Move Games Extensive form games capture the timing structure of sequential move games Often games are simultaneous, or the sequential nature doesn't matter q Tennis serve Production planning Bidding for a contract Voting Example Was

  • 3 Pages Strategy5Handout
    Strategy5Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/15/2008 Finding Nash Equilibria We'd like a method for finding NE Player 2 1 A Player 1 B C D 5,7 2,6 3,9 0,0 2 6,4 15 , 3 2,6 0,1 3 11 , 12 1,0 19 , 9 9 , 17 4 8 , 22 7,2 6,5 17 , 12 Example Attributed to A.W. Tucker Two Prisoner's brought in for inter

  • 3 Pages Strategy6Handout
    Strategy6Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/18/2008 MAXIMIN MINIMAX 9 soldiers, three are 5 feet tall, three are 6 feet tall, three are 7 feet tall 5 7 6 6 5 7 7 6 5 Min = 5 Min = 5 Min = 5 A Note About Equilibria Some games Get feel for what an equilibrium might be Show that if everyone does it

  • 3 Pages Strategy7Handout
    Strategy7Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    9/23/2008 Imperfect Competition We consider competition in a market with a linear demand curve: Q = D( P) = 302 P Inverse demand: P = 302 Q First think of a monopolist with cost C (Q) = 2Q Monopolist seeks to maximize profit: Imperfect Competition: Courno

  • 4 Pages Strategy18Handout
    Strategy18Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/11/2008 Bayes Rule Bayes Rule A B A B Universe of Possibility P[A&B] = P[B|A]P[A] = P[A|B]P[B] P[B|A] = P[A|B]P[B] / P[A] -Bayes' Rule Bayes' Rule P[B|A] = P[A|B]P[B] / P[A] = P[A|B]P[B] / (P[A|B]P[B] + P[A|B]P[B] ) Bayes Rule Consider testing for a pa

  • 3 Pages Strategy19Handout
    Strategy19Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/13/2008 Strategic Moves Change the rules of the game to benefit yourself Usually involves making a pre-game move 1st Actions must be Observable Irreversible Strategic Moves Strategic moves are to deter or compel Unconditional commitments Try to change

  • 3 Pages ch18_solutions_solved edit
    Ch18_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 18 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. The father and daughter were implicitly negotiating about how much freedom from parental control she would have. The fathers BATNA was low: breakdown of negotiation would lead to a tantrum or a scene

  • 2 Pages ch19_solutions_solved edit
    Ch19_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 19 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) The existence of buyer B2 means that buyer B1 will not be able to buy at any price below 200. If B1 tried to strike a deal at (for example) 190, B2 could offer to pay 191; if B2 bought at that pri

  • 2 Pages ch02_solutions_solved edit
    Ch02_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 2 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) Assuming a sufficient supply of yogurt is available for all shoppers, each shopper is simply making a decision. If some flavors of yogurt were in short supply, then it would be a game, because shop

  • 10 Pages ch03_solutions_solved edit
    Ch03_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 3 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) There is one initial node (I) for Hansel making the first move; three decision nodes (D) including the initial node, which represent the points where either Hansel or Gretel make a decision; and si

  • 7 Pages ch04_solutions_solved edit
    Ch04_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 4 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. False. A dominant strategy yields you the highest payoff available to you against each of your opponents strategies. Playing a dominant strategy does not guarantee that you end up with the highest of a

  • 11 Pages ch05_solutions_solved edit
    Ch05_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 5 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) Rs best-response rule is given by y = 10x x. L spends $16 million, so x = 16. Then Rs best response is y = 1016 16 = 10(4) 16 = 40 16 = 24, or $24 million. (b) simultaneously: x = 10(10x x)1/2 10x

  • 14 Pages ch06_solutions_S11 correx
    Ch06_solutions_S11 Correx

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 6 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. Second-mover advantage. In a sequential game of tennis, the second mover will be able to respond best to the first movers chosen action. Put another way, the second mover will be able to exploit the in

  • 6 Pages ch07_solutions_solved edit
    Ch07_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 7 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. False. A players equilibrium mixture is devised in order to keep her opponent indifferent among all of her (the opponents) possible mixed strategies; thus, a players equilibrium mixture yields the oppo

  • 17 Pages ch08_solutions_solved edit
    Ch08_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 8 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. False. A players equilibrium mixture is devised in order to keep her opponent indifferent among all of her (the opponents) possible mixed strategies; thus, a players equilibrium mixture yields the oppo

  • 18 Pages ch09_solutions_solved edit
    Ch09_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 9 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) Your neighbor has a sure income of $100,000. In addition, under the insurance contract, he will receive x when you have a good year and pay you $60,000 when you have a bad year. The lowest value of

  • 4 Pages ch17_solutions_solved edit
    Ch17_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 17 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. The painter can compare her estimated cost to a jobs true cost only when she does the job. But the painter does a job only when she agrees (through the bidding process) to do it for less than anybody

  • 4 Pages ch16_solutions_solved edit
    Ch16_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 16 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. Under truthful voting, A should match Geology and Sociology in the first vote, with the winner (Geology) to face Philosophy in the second round. Under strategic voting, A should match Philosophy and S

  • 3 Pages Strategy20Handout
    Strategy20Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/20/2008 The Entry Game (-200,-100) Fight Burning Money I E Challenger F A (-200, -100) (100, 100) INCUMBENT SO Don t Don't Invest Acquiesce (0, (0 300) (100,100) Incumbent I Invest E A Challenger (100, 0) F (-200, 10) CHALLENGER Enter Stay Out (0,300)

  • 4 Pages Strategy21Handout
    Strategy21Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    11/20/2008 The Prisoner's Dilemma It's so famous, the payoffs have names! T>R>P>S Clyde Barrow Cooperate Bonnie Parker Cooperate Defect R,R T,S Defect S,T P, P Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Clyde Barrow Cooperate Bonnie Parker Cooperate Defect 3,3

  • 4 Pages Strategy22Handout
    Strategy22Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    12/2/2008 Collective Action Problems Often, the welfare of society is best served if individuals take a particular "socially responsible" action. On the other hand, individuals may not find it in their interest to take the "socially socially responsible"

  • 5 Pages Strategy23Handout
    Strategy23Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    12/2/2008 Collective Action Games N = population n = # of participants who take an action N-n = # of shirkers who do not take the action Participant g p gets: p( ) p(n) Shirker gets: s(n) Collective Action Games Suppose there are n participants and N-n-1

  • 4 Pages Strategy24Handout
    Strategy24Handout

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    12/4/2008 Evolutionary Game Theory Darwin's Origin of Species explained evolution of organisms Certain members of a species are better adapted to their environment (more fit) The traits that make those members more fit are embedded in genes More fit membe

  • 5 Pages ch11_solutions_solved edit
    Ch11_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 11 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. False. The players are not assured that they will reach the cooperative outcome. Rollback reasoning shows that the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a finitely played repeated prisoners dilemma will enta

  • 4 Pages ch12_solutions_solved edit
    Ch12_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 12 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) (b) The number choosing X should decrease to move the population division between X and Because the line for action X is above the line for action Y when 100 people choose X, Y away from the unsta

  • 10 Pages ch13_solutions_solved edit
    Ch13_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 13 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) The payoff table for the two types of travelers is: High High Low 100, 100 70, 30 Low 30, 70 50, 50 (b) The graph is: (c) There are three possible equilibria: a stable monomorphic equilibrium of a

  • 21 Pages ch14_solutions_solved edit
    Ch14_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 14 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. Some examples of incentive schemes that help induce more care on the part of policy holders: 1. The insurer can provide a multiyear contract or otherwise establishes an ongoing relationship in which f

  • 11 Pages ch15_solutions_solved edit
    Ch15_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 15 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. (a) In the pure-threat case, the unions expected payoff is 50(1 p) 100p = 50 150p. The unions expected payoff goes to zero for p = 1/3 and is negative for p > 1/3. Thus the pure threat is too big from

  • 5 Pages ch10_solutions_solved edit
    Ch10_solutions_solved Edit

    School: University Of Michigan

    Solutions to Chapter 10 Exercises SOLVED EXERCISES S1. The statement is true because promises, when successfully used as strategic moves, require that you follow through on the promised action; you will not promise an arbitrarily large reward. You may thr

  • 6 Pages econpexam
    Econpexam

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Practice Exam 2 1. Take the following gambles: A1 = A2 = 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.4 $10 $0 $10 $0 B1 = B2 = 0.1 0.9 x y $5 $0 $5 $0 Assume that you prefer A1 to B1, and that you prefer B2 to A2. Your preferences can be summarized by some von-Neumann/Morgenstern util

  • 2 Pages Answers to Midterm 1 Practice Problems fall 06
    Answers To Midterm 1 Practice Problems Fall 06

    School: University Of Michigan

    Answers to Midterm 1 Practice Problems 1) b 2) d (When x>2 (L,H) is the unique NE. When x<2 (H,H) is the unique NE. When x=2, both (H,H) and (L,H) are pure strategy equilibria.) 3) d (Martin maximizes (100-PM+2/3 PE)( PM-10) with respect to PM. The b

  • 9 Pages midterm 1 practice1
    Midterm 1 Practice1

    School: University Of Michigan

    ECON 398 Fall 2006 Midterm 1 Practice Exam 1 Professor Ozdenoren INSTRUCTIONS You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. There are 16 questions. 1. Consider the following simultaneous game, which has a variable x for two of the payoffs. High High Lo

  • 8 Pages midterm 1 practice2
    Midterm 1 Practice2

    School: University Of Michigan

    ECON 398 Fall 2006 Midterm 1 Practice Exam 2 Professor Ozdenoren INSTRUCTIONS You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. There are 16 questions. 1. Notice that there is a variable x in the payoffs of the following game: Carrie R U 3,4 D 1,3 Rhonda

  • 8 Pages midterm 1 practice3
    Midterm 1 Practice3

    School: University Of Michigan

    ECON 398 Fall 2006 Midterm 1 Practice Exam 3 Professor Ozdenoren INSTRUCTIONS You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. There are 16 questions. Wonder Cloak Inc. (C) and Scary Mask Inc. (M) are two shops situated on the opposite side of State Stree

  • 8 Pages midterm 1 practice4
    Midterm 1 Practice4

    School: University Of Michigan

    ECON 398 Fall 2006 Midterm 1 Practice Exam 4 Professor Ozdenoren INSTRUCTIONS You have 80 minutes to complete the exam. There are 16 questions. Elbonia and Sylvonia are two neighboring countries where Elbonia is much larger in size and it is more i

  • 2 Pages Econ398_HW1Solutions
    Econ398_HW1Solutions

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 1 Sketch of Solutions 1. For Olaf and Phil, it is handy to number the nodes like this: Then Olafs strategies specify what he does at node 1 and what he does at node 5. His strategy set is {(U,T), (M,T), (D,T), (U,B), (M,B), (D,B)}.

  • 1 Page Econ398_HW3
    Econ398_HW3

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 3 Due Feb 6, 2009 1. Alice and Bob are each considering contributing to a public park which will be enjoyed by all. Alice has $24, of which shell contribute $a. Bob has $15 of which hell contribute $b. Alices payoff depends on the t

  • 1 Page Econ398_HW3Solutions
    Econ398_HW3Solutions

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 3 Sketchy Solutions 1. You can calculate the best response functions and then solve the two functions simultaneously to get a*=11, b*=2. Show that if each person adds one dollar to their own contribution, each persons utility level

  • 1 Page Econ398_HW4
    Econ398_HW4

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 4 Due Friday, February 20, 2009 1) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 6, problem 1 2) This is a variant on the War of Attrition discussed in class. In this example, each player places no value on the time spent waiting for the other player to

  • 2 Pages Econ398_HW5
    Econ398_HW5

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 5 Due Friday, March 6, 2009 1) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 6, problem 4 2) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 6, problem 5 3) In the game depicted above, suppose that firm 2 operates both in Kalamazoo and in Toledo. Firm 1 is a potential entrant

  • 1 Page econ398win08hw5sol
    Econ398win08hw5sol

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 SOLUTIONS FOR HOMEWORK 5 Professor Ozdenoren a) Firm 1 has 8 strategies, examples are: (Player 1 plays West Coast, plays A if East Coast, plays A if West Coast) or (Player 1 plays West Coast, plays F if East Coast, plays A if West Coast) et

  • 2 Pages econ398win08hw4sol
    Econ398win08hw4sol

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 HOMEWORK 4 SOLUTIONS Professor Ozdenoren 1. For each of the following sequential games, write the equivalent strategic form and solve for all pure strategy Nash equilibria. Indicate which one is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (i.e. th

  • 2 Pages econ398win08hw3sol
    Econ398win08hw3sol

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 HOMEWORK 3 Professor Ozdenoren 1. In a small town called Ham Harbour there are two shops. Wingerman's has great cheese and Trader Moe's has good wine. Demand for Wingerman's cheese is given by QW = 32 - 2PW - PM and demand for Trader Moe's

  • 20 Pages midterm 2 practice problems fall06
    Midterm 2 Practice Problems Fall06

    School: University Of Michigan

    Midterm 2 Practice Problems The new generation of i-pod has just been introduced and every student at the U of M is deciding whether to buy it or not. The net benefit of buying the new i-pod depends on what percentage of U of M students also buy it a

  • 2 Pages Homework 1
    Homework 1

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 HOMEWORK 1 Professor Ozdenoren 1) For the following games. List the strategies available to all players. What is the equilibrium outcome? What are the equilibrium strategies? a) 0,4 Out 1 In Accomodate 2,2 2 Price War -1,-1 b) 1,4 5,2 1

  • 1 Page homework 1 answers
    Homework 1 Answers

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    SOLUTIONS FOR ECON 398 HOMEWORK 1 Professor Ozdenoren 1) a) For player 1 available strategies are {Out, In}. For player 2 available strategies are {Accommodate, Price War}. Equilibrium outcome is (2,2) and equilibrium strategies are In for player 1

  • 2 Pages homework 2
    Homework 2

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 HOMEWORK 2 Professor Ozdenoren 1. In the following game between Donna's and Pierce's find the equilibrium using iterated elimination of dominated strategies. PIERCE'S High High DONNA'S Medium 36,20 50,30 35,30 Low 36,35 30,25 25,55 60,6

  • 2 Pages homework 2 answers
    Homework 2 Answers

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 HOMEWORK 2 SOLUTIONS Professor Ozdenoren 1. In the following game between Donna's and Pierce's find the equilibrium using iterated elimination of dominated strategies. PIERCE'S High High DONNA'S Medium 36,20 50,30 35,30 Low 36,35 30,25 2

  • 2 Pages homework 3
    Homework 3

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 HOMEWORK 3 Professor Ozdenoren 1. In a small town called Ham Harbour there are two shops. Wingerman's has great cheese and Trader Moe's has good wine. Demand for Wingerman's cheese is given by QW = 32 - 2PW - PM and demand for Trader Moe's

  • 6 Pages Econ 398 Syllabus Winter 2008
    Econ 398 Syllabus Winter 2008

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Economics 398: Strategy Class Syllabus and Policies Winter 2008 Professor: Class Time: Emre Ozdenoren Tuesday and Thursday 2:30 4 pm Class Location: 1120 Weill Office: Phone: E-mail: Office Hours: Course Page: Course GSI's: 341 Lorch Hall 647-560

  • 1 Page econ398win08hw1sol
    Econ398win08hw1sol

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    SOLUTIONS FOR ECON 398 HOMEWORK 1 Professor Ozdenoren 1) a) For player 1 available strategies are {Out, In}. For player 2 available strategies are {Accommodate, Price War}. Equilibrium outcome is (2,2) and equilibrium strategies are In for player 1

  • 2 Pages econ398win08hw2sol
    Econ398win08hw2sol

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    ECON 398 HOMEWORK 2 SOLUTIONS Professor Ozdenoren 1. In the following game between Donna's and Pierce's find the equilibrium using iterated elimination of dominated strategies. PIERCE'S High High DONNA'S Medium 36,20 50,30 35,30 Low 36,35 30,25 2

  • 1 Page Econ398_HW6
    Econ398_HW6

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 6 Due Friday, March 13, 2009 1) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 8, problem 4 2) Dixit & Skeath, Chapter 8, problem 6 3) Recall the game discussed in lecture called Glorified Chicken: Daisy Duke Billy Jo Bob Left Left Straight Right 1,1 2

  • 4 Pages Econ398_PracticeQuestionsExam1
    Econ398_PracticeQuestionsExam1

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Practice Questions for Exam 1 1. The following game has exactly one Nash equilibrium if COLUMN Down Right 4,5 9,y x,6 10,2 ROW a. b. c. d. e. x = 4, y = 2 x = 5, y = 2 x = 3, y = 6 x = 2, y = 7 None of the above Up Left 2. Suppose there are 10 peo

  • 6 Pages Econ398_PracticeQuestionsExam2
    Econ398_PracticeQuestionsExam2

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Practice Exam 2 1. Take the following gambles: A1 = 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.4 $10 $0 $10 $0 B1 = 0.1 0.9 x y $5 $0 $5 $0 A2 = B2 = Assume that you prefer A1 to B1, and that you prefer B2 to A2. Your preferences can be summarized by some von-Neumann/Morgenst

  • 5 Pages Lecture12
    Lecture12

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    3/3/2009 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bi-matrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1-p Heads Hd Tails 1 , -1 1 -1 , 1 1-q Tails -1 , 1 1 1 , -1 Preferences Involving Gambles We revisit our description

  • 5 Pages Lecture13
    Lecture13

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    3/3/2009 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies We denote the strategies on the game bi-matrix Guildenstern q Heads Rosencrantz R t p 1-p Heads Hd Tails 1 , -1 1 -1 , 1 1-q Tails -1 , 1 1 1 , -1 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies Rosencrantzs & Guilden

  • 3 Pages Lecture14
    Lecture14

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    3/5/2009 Your Choice of Gambles A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 Your Choice of Gambles $3000 $0 $3000 $0 B1= B2= .25 .75 1 0 A1= A2= .2 .8 .8 .2 $4000 $0 $4000 $0 B1= B2= .25 .75 1 0 $3000 $0 $3000 $0 Suppose you prefer A1 to B1, but

  • 4 Pages Lecture15
    Lecture15

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    3/10/2009 Expert Advice We often rely on professionals to diagnose problems and recommend and carry out fixes Doctors Auto Mechanics and Repair Technicians p Lawyers Financial Advisors and Real Estate Agents Teachers and Researchers Expert Advice A

  • 4 Pages Lecture 1
    Lecture 1

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    1/13/2009 Strategic Situations Econ 398: Strategy A Study of Strategic Interaction in Games Chris Proulx Lorch Hall M107 rabbit@umich.edu Office Hours: Tu, Th 4:15-5:15 Many (2) people Each has many possible actions Different actions yield differe

  • 4 Pages Lecture 5
    Lecture 5

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    1/22/2009 Homework Due Friday 4:15PM Hand homework in to your GSI during discussion section OR Turn in homework to the specially marked box outside Lorch Hall 109 by 4:15PM Today: Chapter 4, Next Week: Chapter 5 Homework Due Friday 4:15PM Dixit & S

  • 8 Pages Test1
    Test1

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Multiple-Choice Questions: Select the best answer. Each correct answer is worth 5 points. Each wrong answer is worth zero points. Answers left blank are worth 1 point. Use the following to answer questions 1-2: Michigan and OSU are playing a footbal

  • 6 Pages econchap4-5
    Econchap4-5

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

  • 17 Pages econchap6-9
    Econchap6-9

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

  • 4 Pages Lecture11
    Lecture11

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    2/17/2009 Mixed Strategies Matching Pennies In Matching Pennies, we found there was no Nash Equilibrium Guildenstern Heads Rosencrantz Heads Tails 1, -1 -1, 1 Tails -1, 1 1,-1 Why Mixed Strategies? If you were to play the same opponent repeatedly,

  • 4 Pages Lecture10
    Lecture10

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    2/17/2009 Grading Policy You have two weeks after homework is handed back to seek a grading correction Please check the C-Tools gradebook to make C Tools sure we have no recording errors Simultaneous/Sequential Mix Up We might wish to model situati

  • 4 Pages Lecture9
    Lecture9

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    2/5/2009 Midterm 1: Next Tuesday Covers up through Chpt. 5 & HW 3 Bring a UMID for check-in No cellphones or i-pods allowed Calculators must be simple non-graphing simple, non-graphing, non-complex, non-computer-like calculators with one memory regi

  • 10 Pages Econ398_Test2
    Econ398_Test2

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    True-False Questions: Answer A for "True" and B for "False". Each correct answer is worth 2 points. Each wrong answer is worth zero points. Answers left blank are worth 1 point. Multiple-Choice Questions: Select the best answer. Each correct answer

  • 1 Page HW1
    HW1

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 1 Due Jan 23, 2009 1. For the following game involving Olaf and Phil, list each players available strategies. Find the rollback equilibria. 2. Michigan and OSU are playing a football game, and it is early in the first half. Michiga

  • 1 Page HW2
    HW2

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    Econ 398 Homework 2 Due Jan 30, 2009 1. Four players, Alice, Bertha, Cora, and Delores are put into separate rooms so they cannot communicate with one another. They have to write either $3 or $10 on a piece of paper, and then the papers are collected

  • 4 Pages Lecture2
    Lecture2

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    1/13/2009 Analyzing Games We need three things to specify a game Players Possible strategies for each player Payoffs for eac p aye o e ou co es ayo s o each player over outcomes Analyzing Games Players have well-defined and well-behaved preferences

  • 4 Pages Lecture3
    Lecture3

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    1/15/2009 Example George and Hiromi (2,0) R Example The Smoking Decision Carmen wants to try smoking, and then quit GEORGE 1 S T HIROMI 2 U (3,1) 3 GEORGE V (0,0) W (1,2) Example The Smoking Decision Addiction creates a Future Carmen w

  • 4 Pages Lecture4
    Lecture4

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    1/20/2009 Homework Due Friday 4PM Hand homework in to your GSI during discussion section OR Turn in homework to the specially marked box outside Lorch Hall 109 by 4:15 PM This week: Dixit and Skeath, Chapter 4 Simultaneous Move Games Extensive form

  • 4 Pages Lecture6
    Lecture6

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    1/27/2009 Homework Due Friday 4:15PM Hand homework in to your GSI during discussion section OR Turn in homework to the specially marked box outside Lorch Hall 109 by 4:15PM Be Reading Chapter 5 A Note About Equilibria Some games Get feel for what

  • 5 Pages Lecture7
    Lecture7

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    1/29/2009 Imperfect Competition We consider competition in a market with a linear demand curve: Q = D( P) = 302 P Inverse demand: P = 302 Q First think of a monopolist with cost C (Q) = 2Q Monopolist seeks to maximize profit: Imperfect Competitio

  • 7 Pages Lecture8
    Lecture8

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

    2/5/2009 A Note About Equilibria Some games Get feel for what an equilibrium might be Show that if everyone does it, nobody has an incentive to change Show everything else isnt equilibrium: for each other possible strategy profile, somebody has an

  • 23 Pages econchap10-18
    Econchap10-18

    School: University Of Michigan

    Course: Strategy

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