The Ethics of Belief – Clifford:
•
It is wrong to believe anything upon:
o
merely sincere conviction
o
insufficient evidence (acquired through patient investigation) (What about Santa
Claus?)
o
stifled doubts
•
“When an action is once done, it is right or wrong for ever; no accidental failure of its
good or evil fruits can possibly alter that.”
(Ends do not justify the means.
If you do
something wrong and aren’t caught, you still did something wrong.) because: “when a
man’s belief is so fixed that he cannot think otherwise, he still has a choice in the action
suggested by it” (so we still have free will in manifesting our thoughts and beliefs—you
don’t always have to act on what you believe)
•
It is difficult to investigate a strong belief with fairness and completeness as if the belief-
holder were really in doubt and unbiased.
•
Beliefs are the basis for our actions
and the way we make sense of things, so that is
impossible to separate belief from action.
•
Beliefs aren’t absolutely personal.
Lives are guided by social norms.
•
Our truths are more or less based on long-established beliefs
.
•
Common belief strengthens communities and directs collective action.
(But this could
be dangerous if the belief is wrong; i.e. Nazis)
•
Difficult to accept doubt because “it leaves us bare and powerless where we thought that
we were safe and strong.”
(Our minds seek order and new thoughts are usually
accommodated to our existing schema.
Doubts would weaken this order, thereby
creating chaos.)
Sense of knowledge (understanding) gives us power (security); doubt
gives us a sense of ignorance (we feel stupid).
•
Evil arises when we an incorrect belief is maintained and supported.
•
If one argues that he does not have the time to inquire about his beliefs, then he should
have no time to believe.
•
Acknowledged flaws with this system:
o
The system suggests that we become universal skeptics.
o
Some beliefs (i.e. in law and science) don’t need to be investigated.
o
Sometimes accepted beliefs aren’t always based on evidence but probabilities.
•
A belief that is comfortable and pleasant may still not be true.
•
“The goodness and greatness (Appeal to Reputation, Appeal to Popularity) of a man do
not justify us in accepting a belief upon the warrant of his authority, unless there are
reasonable grounds for supposing that he knew the truth of what he was saying.”
Similarly: “No eminence of character and genius can give a man authority enough to
justify us in believing him when he makes statements implying exact or universal
knowledge.”
•
“We may believe the statement of another person, when there is reasonable ground for
supposing that he knows the matter of which he speaks, and that he is speaking the truth
so far as he knows it.
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- Fall '07
- Bobonich,C;Safran,G
- Epistemology, The Death of Ivan Ilych, Belief, Mikhail Bakhtin, Ivan Ilych
-
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