Incontinence and Ignorance in Nicomachean Ethics

Incontinence and Ignorance in Nicomachean Ethics - Kyle...

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Kyle Caputo Professor Rosen History of Ancient Philosophy December 8, 2007 Incontinence and Ignorance in Nicomachean Ethics In Chapter 7 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , he begins anew to address the character traits of continence and incontinence, and firmly resolve Socrates’ paradox concerning the possibility of acting contrary to one’s knowledge of what it would be best to do. Aristotle delves into the subject of incontinence, or akrasia (literally “not in self-control”), to arrive at some meaningful distinctions in the realm of knowledge. Aristotle distinguishes between “potential” knowledge, or knowledge which one has but is not necessarily being used or exercised , and “actualized” knowledge, or knowledge which one is using currently. He also differentiates the premises necessary to come up with a decision or conclusion on a matter of action, namely the universal and particular premises. Additionally, Aristotle stresses the “internalization” of knowledge and the difference between merely saying and meaning and in turn superficial and
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This note was uploaded on 04/14/2008 for the course PHIL V83.0040 taught by Professor Rosenkoetter during the Spring '07 term at NYU.

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Incontinence and Ignorance in Nicomachean Ethics - Kyle...

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