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Ch. 2 and 3 Axelrod---Prisoner

Ch. 2 and 3 Axelrod---Prisoner - Phil 104 secs 2-12...

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March 19, 2008 Phil 104 secs 2-12 Prisoner’s Dilemma page 1 I Hobbes’ State of Nature as a Prisoners’ Dilemma Prisoners’ Dilemma: you and a friend have committed a crime police suspect you, but don’t have proof . deal: If you confess and your buddy does not-> you’ll get off free, he gets 15 years. If both confess, both get 10 years. If neither confess, you both get three-years. your buddy has been offered the same deal. So, what do you do? B quiet B confesses A quiet ║ A B A B ║ - 3, - 3 -15, 0 ___________________________ A confesses ║ A B A B 0, -15 -10, -10 whether or not B confesses, A is better off confessing = confessing is the DOMINANT strategy. the same is true of B =confessing is the DOMINANT strategy for B But by confessing they are both worse off than if neither confessed.
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March 19, 2008 Phil 104 secs 2-12 Prisoner’s Dilemma page 2 Promising: B keeps B breaks A keeps A B A B ║ - 3, - 3 -15, 0 ___________________________ A breaks A B A B 0, -15 -10, -10 Enforcer: changes payoffs B keeps B breaks A keeps A B A B ║ - 3, - 3 -15, -30 ___________________________ A breaks A B A B ║ -30, -15 -10, -10
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