Strat 1 and 2 (Revised)

Strat 1 and 2 - March 24 Phil 104 sec 2-12 overhead Strategy page 1 I Why Use Abstract Games II Kinds of Abstract"Games III Characteristics of

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March 24 and 26, 2008 Phil 104 sec 2-12 overhead Strategy page 1 I Why Use Abstract Games? II Kinds of Abstract “Games” III Characteristics of Prisoner’s Dilemma Situations IV Complications of iterated prisoner’s dilemma situations a) discount parameters b) ? indefinite number of encounters V Strategies VI Invasions by Strategies VII Ethics and Cooperation
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March 24 and 26, 2008 Phil 104 sec 2-12 overhead Strategy page 2 I Why use abstract games? early physics and theory of falling bodies in a vacuum II Kinds of Abstract “Games” a) “zero sum” games: examples: basketball, matching, chess matching quarters: suppose A wins when coins match B heads B tails A heads A B A B 1, -1 -1, 1 ___________________________ A tails ║ A B A B -1, 1 1, -1 Net benefit of any cell = 0
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March 24 and 26, 2008 Phil 104 sec 2-12 overhead Strategy page 3 b) “chicken”: “irrational” threats B swerves B straight A swerves A B A B 2, 2 1, 10 ___________________________ A straight A B A B 10, 1 -20, -20 T>R>S>P Two “equilibria”: cells such that, given the other person’s action, you could not have done better labor negotiations and international affairs Suppose A thinks B is crazy or suicidal. Then swerving is rational.
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March 24 and 26, 2008 Phil 104 sec 2-12 overhead Strategy page 4 c) “stag hunt”: B stag B rabbits A stag A B A B 8, 8 0, 3 _______________________ A rabbit A B A B || 3, 0 3, 3 R>T P > S Two equilibria: given what the other did, you could not have done better small projects: personal trust very large projects: river containment: government needed: China, Egypt, and Iraq. d) “prisoner’s dilemma”
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This note was uploaded on 04/14/2008 for the course PHIL 104 taught by Professor Bontly during the Spring '08 term at UConn.

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Strat 1 and 2 - March 24 Phil 104 sec 2-12 overhead Strategy page 1 I Why Use Abstract Games II Kinds of Abstract"Games III Characteristics of

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