INTL4260_Apr8 - Tuesday, 8 April 2008 Deterrence Credible...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Tuesday, 8 April 2008 Deterrence Credible deterrence threats keep countries in (CC 3,3) Both sides convince each other that the probability they will respond are very high Two conditions for credible deterrence o Acceptable status quo, making self better with small probability of failing o Moderate deterrence threats Implications: o If you’re confronting a state that sees all outcomes as losses, then to get deterrence, you need to involve incentives so they no longer see all their outcomes as negative Ex: Trip wire – increase credibility to Korea by having 40,000 troops in S. Korea, means we’re willing to sacrifice those many people and then citizens will demand leaders to retaliate o US has credibility from Tonkin resolution – started war over submarine attack Risk exceptive behavior – even when credibility of deterrence threat is strong, and small chance it is acceptable, they still attack Alexander Went What drives politics is human cognition not the world
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Page1 / 3

INTL4260_Apr8 - Tuesday, 8 April 2008 Deterrence Credible...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online