PS_16 - 18 Elizabeth Wood Reading for week 4 Making Robust Settlements to Civil War Invisible Stakes and distributional compromises This article is

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18. Elizabeth Wood Reading for week 4 Making Robust Settlements to Civil War: Invisible Stakes and distributional compromises This article is about how civil war settlements sometimes fail and sometimes succeed. Wood shows how her model of a civil war settlement and how it is optimal for building a country. She says that there are many types of civil wars and there are certain aspects of civil wars that bring about long lasting peace. The types of agreements they are resolved with are either self-enforcing, third party interventions, and where one party surrenders in war. She states that the negotiations that foster peace are the ones that share power and resources equally and it is increased with third party negotiations. She states that it must be in best interest of both parties for a post civil war civilization to be robust. She specifically focuses on three concepts, divisible stakes, robust settlements and invisible stakes. Her divisible stakes section is essentially applying game theory to a quantitative approach to post war
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This note was uploaded on 04/15/2008 for the course INTL 4680 taught by Professor Bloom during the Fall '07 term at University of Georgia Athens.

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