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Frances Moulder

Frances Moulder - C/zz'na and’Ja/Jan Search For Balance...

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Unformatted text preview: C/zz'na and’Ja/Jan: Search For Balance Since World War I Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy, Editors ABC-Clio, Inc. an II".. \“II .E. CLIO SANTA BARBARA, CALIF. OXFORD, ENGLAND W Copyright © 1978 by Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy All rights reserved. This book or any part thereof may not be reproduced in any form without prior written permission of the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: China and Japan. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. China—Foreign relations~Japan—Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Japan—Foreign rela— tions—China~Addresses. essays, lectures. I. Coox, Alvin D. II. Conroy, Francis Hilary, 19197 DS740.5.J3C3975 327.51'052 77-10006 ISBN 0-87436—275—X Clio Books American Bibliographical Center—Clio Press 2040 Alameda Padre Serra Santa Barbara. California 93103 European Bibliographical Center‘Clio Press Woodside House. Hinksey Hill Oxford OX1 SBE, England Manufactured in the United States of America Contents List of Photographs Foreword A cknawlea’gments Introduction ROBERT A. SCALAPINO I. Overview 1. How China and Japan See Each Other CHALMERS JOHNSON II. Administration, Government, Diplomacy to 1931 2. The Japanese Intervention in Shantung during World War I Tsmo YUAN 3. From the Twenty~one Demands to the Sino-Japanese Military Agreements. 1915—1918: Ambivalent Relations st-PiNG SHAO 4. From the Paris Peace Conference to the Manchurian Incident: The Beginnings of China’s Diplomacy of Resistance against Japan PAO~CHIN CHU III. Japanese Attitudes and Chinese Resistance 5. Comparing Japan and China: Some Theoretical and Methrodological Issues FRANCES V. MOULDER 6. China in Japanese Textbooks HARRY WRAY Notes on the Cultural Relationship between Japan and China RYOzo KURAI 11 13 Comparing Japan and China: Some Theoretical and Methodological Issues Frances V. Moulder The case of Japan is of critical importance to theories of economic development and underdevelopment, for several reasons. Japan was thefimt non-Western nation to achieve the position of a major industrial power. Japan’s industrialization was almost contemporaneous with the industrial- ization of Western nations such as the United States, Germany, and France. “Takeoff” occurred in the late nineteenth century, and industrialization was well under way by World War I. Today, Japan is still the onlynon- Western society to have become a major industrial state. Although consid- erable economic progress has been made in several other non—Western nations since World War II (for instance, China, India, Brazil), none is highly industrialized, and only China can be regarded as a major world power. Moreover, Japan was the first so-called Third World nation to become an industrial power. The term “Third World” refers to those countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that have been economically and politi- cally dominated by the industrial capitalist nations. Today it is often forgotten (at least outside Japan) thatJapan was partially controlled by the Western capitalist nations during the nineteenth century. Although Japan never became a formal colony, a set of treaties reduced national autonomy and blocked industrial development. Western observers during the nine teenth century were as confident oftheir sway overJapan as any ofthe other areas of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. “The Japanese are a happy race and being content with little, are not likely to achieve much,” wrote the japan Heraldin 1881.1 37 88 Frances V. Moulder How is it possible that Japan became an important industrial state? Why do other nations of the Third World remain underdeveloped? Any theory of development must provide a framework for answering these interlocked questions. Since ,World War II, the sociology of economic development in America and Western Europe has been dominated by a concern with the way “traditional” social, cultural, and personality factors affect economic development and underdevelopmegnt. The case of._Jap\an has generally been studied from this point of view. ‘viTraditiqnal society’jltheorists regard the ‘ poverty and underdevelopment prevailing among Third World countries as a result of “traditional” sociocultural forces. According to these theorists, the industrial nations have supplied a stimulus to economic growth in the non-Western world. Underdevelopment persists because Third World‘ to encourage change and innovation. Traditional society theorists have seen the case of Japan as the exception that proves the rule, as the only non- Western society with a tradition that promoted rather than hindered change. The “traditional society” view of Japan’s unique development has often been buttressed through comparative study—primarily ofJapan and Imperial China. Japan’s nineteenth-century development and China’s spectacular decline and misery have been interpreted as a result of the divergent traditional societies of the two nations on the eve of the Western impact. For example,:it has been popular to contrast dynamic economic transformation of “feudal” Japan with economic stagnation in “bureau- cratic” Chinafl Such theories have been challenged in recent years by another perspective which emphasizes the relationship of Third World societies to , the world political economy. “World economy” theorists argue that West- I a fit ern nations have provided not a stimulus to development but a knockout i blow. Underdevelopment has been caused by the forcible incorporation of ii Third World nations into a world economy that disproportionately benefits athe industrial capitalist nations. The non-Western nations have become agrarian satellites ElipthlthCl as sources of raw materials, while their own lieconomic development has been thwarted and neglected. Any industrial lidevelopment has been backward and dependent, and a gap remains which is never closed. ‘ “World economy” theorists have paid little attention to the case of Japan. But to the few who have discussed Japan, Japan is again the exception that proves the rule; in this case, the only Third World nation to have escaped pressures to become a satellite of the industrial capitalist nations.3 The “world economy” perspective raises important issues, and it 1 l societies are basically “traditional” rather than “modem”; that is, they failf in“: v44... \ A 4 "w ' Ma»; "an a ‘ amzmsfifiz Comparing Japan and China 89 requires us to rethink many of the assumptions we have shared about Japanese and Chinese development. The purpose of this paper is to 1consider some of those issues. The comparative studies ofJapan and China have, above all, failed to consider systematically whether there might have been differences in the relationships of China and Japan to the world economy, and the probable effects of these differences on Chinese and Japanese economic development. After the presentation of evidence that . such differences did exist—that Japan enjoyed relatively greater autonomy within the world economy than did China—and their probable effects. attention will be given to the implications for the interpretations made by ‘ “traditional society” scholars of Japanese versus Chinese development. 11. For some authors, excluding the question of China and Japan in the world economy is a matter of emphasis. For others, however, the exclusion is explicit. Levy, for instance, says, “Infibgtmh‘Chin‘a and [Japanwllie (Ii/mm! sources were virtuoléy jde/nptzigql. They were the factors involved in modern industrialization.”4 In the words of Fairbank and Reischauer: One cannot but be struck by the great differences among the various countries of East Asia in the speed and nature of their responses to the West in the past century. . . . These variations in response must be attributed mainly to the differences in the traditional societies ofthe countri‘es'of East Asia. Only such differences can explain why a basically szmzlar impact could have brought such varied initial results. . .why relatively smallJapan, for example, soon became a wo'rld power, while China sank to the status of an international problem. 5 Occasionally, authors point out that the Western impact on Japan was much smaller than on China, but they deny that this has any analytic significance: As compared with the Chinese experience, the initial impact of the West on Japan in the middle of the nineteenth century was gentle. No wars were fought, no smuggling trade developed, no territory was forfeited. . . . And yet, Japan’s response was far quicker and greater than that of China. . . . This startling paradox—that Japan’s greater response followed a less violent impact than in China—has posed difficult questions of historical interpretation. What forces at work in Japan produced so great a ferment? Obviously,Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, even though it had derived a large part ofits higher culture from China, was a very different country, capable ofvery different responses to the Western challenge.6 Are these assumptions valid? Did Japan and China stand in the same 90 Frances V. Moulder -..relationship to the world economy and the Western powers during the nineteenth century? Or was Japan more autonomous than China? And if so, did Japan’s greater autonomy contribute to development, in contrast to China’s underdevelopment? Let us first consider how we might define and measure a society’s “incorporation” as a satellite into the world political economy, then discuss whether Japan and China were incorporated to the same degree. “Incorporation” has two basic dimensions. an economic and a politi- cal dimension. The world political economy that has emerged since the sixteenth century constitutes, first ofall, a world division oflabor: advanced industrial nations (the “metropoles”) and their primary producing and industrially dependent satellites. Second, there is an accompanying politi- cal division: dominant industrial metropoles and their satellites, in which sovereign powers have been reduced or eliminated. The degree to which a Third World country is incorporated as a satellite depends on its importance to the metropolitan countries in terms of the extent and nature of their trade and investments there. The larger and \_ more staple the trade. the larger and more interrelated the investments, the ore pronounced is the country’s satellite status. Trade. The size of the trade is important, as is its nature—above all, whether the objects traded are important staple items or not. Staple goods can be defined as commodities that are either consumed or produced on a large scale in the Western nations, or are otherwise vital in some way to the functioning of their economies. Staples are distinct from “precicosities,” luxury items of less significance in those economies. % The exchange of staples rather than precicosities has formed the foundation of the world division oflabor and the basis for imperialist efforts lgto subordinate satellite nations politically. The mere existence of trade relations with the West has never meant that a non-Western area was significant in the world political economy. For example, in the sixteenth century the nations of the West traded with many countries around the . world, but only a small part of the globe (the Mediterranean islands and parts of the Caribbean) became satellite areas, producing a large trade in staple products. Trade with the rest of the world was still an exchange of precious and luxury items, not yet of vital importance to the Western economies, and did not lead to efiorts at political incorporation.7 Investments. Again, the size is important, and so is the character, especially whether the investments form an interrelated complex, or large “stake,” as opposed to random, isolated ventures. For example, investments in oil fields, in refineries in nearby seaports, in shipping from the seaports to the metropole, and in docking and repair facilities in the port constitute an interrelated investment complex of considerable significance, as compared, v ease .z 9-? < .- 3m: . Comparing Japan and China 91 let us say, to investment in an oil well here and a factory there. The existence of significant and interconnected investments is the hallmark of a strongly incorporated satellite. “World economy” theorists have noted that political incorporation usually accompanies, and promotes, economic incorporation. Two aspects of political incorporation seem to have been important in the nineteenth _ century. Political encroachment. This means the degree to which the industrial capitalist nations assumed rulership of or otherwise encroached on the t fiscal, administrative, legal, and military powers ofnative governments, and ,1 includes the territory proper of the country as well as colonies and ' hinterlands that the government of the country has historically claimed to rule. This aspect is sometimes considered irrelevant to a discussion of economic development in the country proper; but since the concept of an obligation to defend or expand national territory has internal political and economic consequences, it cannot be neglected, Missionary encroachment. This refers to the degree to which the area was penetrated by Catholic or Protestant missionaries, those “pickets or advance guards for the . . significant indicator of the economic and political importance ofa satellite, . phalanx ofnational power.”8 Missionaries are a Nineteenth—century European governments provided military protection only when they thought missionary influence would further their political economic aims. Having defined somewhat more precisely the concept of incorpora— tion, let us now consider some of the evidence that Japan was less 4 ‘incor 9%” than China as a satellite in the nineteenth-century world pmgl economy. V The initial Western interest in China was in trade. The China trade, of course, was very large and lucrative; for the nations concerned, it was also a staple trade, and was soon followed by the emergence ofa large investment complex. In contrast, the initial Western interest in Japan was not in trade. Westerners saw Japan as a way station for naval, whaling, and merchant ships going elsewhere, especially to China. When trade of any significance did develop with Japan, it was small by comparison to.the China trade. and was not ofa staple nature for the nations involved. Western investments in Japan similarly lagged behind investments in China throughout the nineteenth century. . The story of China’s incorporation has often been told, and the details need only be summarized here, Chinese-Western trade during the seven— teenth and eighteenth centuries was primarily an exchange of precicositics. Western gold, silver, and “sing-songs" (cg, fancy clocks) were exchanged for Chinese goods regarded as luxuries in the West, such as silk. porcelains, Ill l a \ v V in, 92 Frances V. Moulder Comparing Japan and China 93 tea, and cotton fabrics. The trade was small and grew slowly prior to the its output—by the late nineteenth century, almost 90 percent of it. “From late eighteenth century. Western merchants were restricted by the Chinese time t0 time, it broke into the rewarding markets ofEurope and the USA. government to the frontiers of the country—to the seaports of Canton and hUt wars and the YlSC 0t native COmPetlttOD PM a brake On such expansion, Macao, and to the “landports” of Kiakhta and Nerchinsk on the Russian and the industry returned time and time again to some old or new region of frontier—and their activities were supervised closely in order to ensure a the undeveloped World-lllend the East, especially India and China, came steady flow of revenue and to prevent the Westerners from doing anything 3 to consume a large part of the industry’s exports. that might endanger the government’s economic policies or infringe upon 1, The VlSiOh 0f many Western manufacturersxof the entire Chinese its sovereignty. ‘ population dressed in Western textiles—never materialized. The Chinese In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, China’s trade 7' handicraft industry continued to supply the bulk ofChina’s needs. Even so. relations with the West were transformed totally: the trade became a staple China’s consumption Of Western SOOdS was hardly small; it expanded trade, it expanded quickly, and government restrictions were overcome. greatly during the century, and Western merchants never gave up their This transformation, primarily on the initiative of Great Britain. had two * dreams 0f China’s potential. aspects. First, tea consumption in Britain was such that tea became a staple FOllOWlhg the expansion 0f trade, a considerable complex of Western commodity. In the seventeenth century, beer was the staple drink of the (and, latenjapanese) investments developed in China, primarily surround- poor. By the mid-eighteenth century, however. tea “was not uncommon in ing the needs of China’s commerce with the West. Westerners invested in the countryside, even among labourers,” and about a pound was consumed ‘ shipping, not only in the export-import area but also in China’s domestic each year per capita.9 In the nineteenth century, tea became the national commerce, WhiCh W35 “one Of the chief foreign stakes in China?” and in drink: the East India Company was required by an act of Parliament shipbuilding and repairs in the treaty ports. There were also investments in always to keep a year’s supply in stock.10 Consumption reached almost 5 the processing of exports and in the manufacturing of goods, at first for the pounds per capita in the 18605, 6 pounds in the 18805. and nearly 11 Western residents ofthe treaty ports, and later also forthe domestic market. pounds in the 19205.11 In addition, Western-owned banks funded the export-import trade. han— As is well known, the establishment ofa mass market for Chinese tea in clled foreign—exchange deals, and also lSSUCCl banknotes, Wthh enjoyed Great Britain posed a large problem for the mercantilistioriented British , WldCSPFCEld Uee in the latter part ef "the century. Finally, investments government—how to avoid a continual drain of specie to China to pay for occurred 1“ tallWaYS and ”fines: and in'loans t0 the Chlnes: government, a the tea, a problem solved by linking the China trade to the interests of the good part OtWIthh were used to fUhd rallway construction. . . emerging British colony in India. It was discovered that there was a market Thus Chlha came to be strongly Incorporated as an agrarian satellite in China for Indian raw cotton and, above all, opium. Once the British ‘ of the Western nations, espec1ally Great Britain. The story ofjapan is very , lgained control ofthe opium-producing territories ofIndia in the 17503, they " different. Unimportant to th‘? West lh the seventeenth and eighteenth fapplied themselves vigorously to increasing the output of opium in India, ; ,centuriles 3'3 compared to China, Japan remained so after the WeStel‘h simultaneously preventing its consumption by the Indian producers and - » expans1on lhto EaSt ASla m the hlhfiteehth CChtUtY- The second aspect concerned China’s imports of British textiles and Western halthS was much more llmlth than Chlha’s- Early lh the ' 5 .‘ was related directly to British industrialization in the late eighteenth and Tokugawa PCthda Japan 5 rulers closed the country to all traders bUt »1 increasing the market for it in China. l \? On the eve of the Western drive into Asia, Japan’s trade with the ‘3 early nineteenth centuries. As Britain industrialized, there was a strong . Chinese and Dutch, and severely restricted their operations. However, drive to find foreign markets for her products, particularly for cotton . trading Wlth Japan had thS been regarded by the Western hathhS as of A textiles. Eyes fell upon China with its population of“400 million” as a vast llttle consequence. ThC'BtltlSh East lhdla Cempany, for example, estab- potential market. Moreover, after the 18705, France, the United S...
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