ps121lec16newosloandafter

ps121lec16newosloandafter - 1 The "Peace Process:" from...

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1 The “Peace Process:” from Oslo (1993) to the Roadmap (2002) to the Rise of Hamas, Unilateral Disengagement (2005) and the Renewal of Peace Talks (2007) 1. Pressures for Resolution 2. The 1991 Madrid Conference Ends in Stalemate 3. But then comes a great back-channel breakthrough: the 1993 Oslo Accords 4. Backlash: Rabin is assassinated by a Jewish extremist in 1995 . 5. Barak is elected PM, adopts a “Syria First” strategy (1999). 6. Barak orders unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon 7. Partial Implementation of Oslo and then Breakdown 8. Final Status Negotiations Break Down at Camp David in 2000 and afterward 9. The “Clinton Parameters” 10. Why did Violence Erupt from September 2000 until the Present?
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2 11. The 2002 “Road map” (2002-2005) and the Role of the “Quartet” (the US, USSR, EU, and UN) 12. Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) succeeds Arafat and Israel withdraws unilaterally from Gaza; Ehud Olmert succeeds Sharon as PM of Israel, leader of new Kadima Party 13. The Rise of Hamas 14. Conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon (2007) 15. The renewal of Talks
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3 Appendix A. Interview with Ambassador Dennis Ross Appendix B. How the Settlements Grew Appendix C. The Quartet’s Roadmap A number of factors led to the Oslo Accords, the apparent 1993 breakthrough that produced an agreement for progress in resolving the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. 1. The end of the Cold War left the US the sole superpower and enabled it to play “honest broker.” The Arab states could no longer play off the USSR against the US. It was obvious to their leaders and the Palestinians that only the US could help them achieve their goals. 2. The intifada that broke out in 1987 influenced both sides. It persuaded most Israelis that the price of effectively annexing the West Bank and Gaza—and with them their Arab population of some 3.5 million—was too high, in casualties and morale. It also made the PLO fearful of losing control of developments in the territories. 3. The Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1990 indirectly affected the Arab-Israeli conflict. The PLO leader, Yasser Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein, angering the Arab Gulf rulers, who cut off contributions to the PLO. The US, in order to win the support of the Arab states for expelling Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait, promised to convene a conference that would start negotiations for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was done in Madrid in 1991. 4. The Israeli military strategists—especially Yitzhak Rabin, a highly respected general and Labor Party leader—concluded that technological advances in warfare made the possession of territorial buffers less advantageous now that tanks and infantry were not as important as missiles and air-borne weapons. They worried that in the absence of peace, Israel’s adversaries—Syria, Iraq, and Iran— would develop weapons of mass destruction that could be delivered by air and would pose a serious threat. That made Rabin willing to consider the return of the
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This note was uploaded on 04/16/2008 for the course POLS 121 taught by Professor Lackoff during the Winter '08 term at UCSD.

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ps121lec16newosloandafter - 1 The "Peace Process:" from...

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