Late in sem notes

Late in sem notes - -Folk theorem-with no known endpoint,...

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-1General Will -bring together what right permits with what interest prescribes -Rousseau -notion of a common self between a group of people Voting paradox -different orders of A,B,C -when there are 3 choices, majority rule can provide no clear winner -we have individual preferences, and practical preferences Jury theorm -linear choice -all have greater than .5 chance of being correct -the more you add, the greater the probability -why education is needed in a democracy Wisdom of crowds -experiment with the weight of an ox -even those who were not experts averaged out to a very close guess -shows why the free market works, even those w/ little education have common sense ~Social learning rules -we learn from parents and from experience what works and what doesn’t, in terms of game theory -copy people we view as successful ~Folk theorem/Traveler’s dilemma -Traveler’s dilemma-get little rather than be a sucker
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Unformatted text preview: -Folk theorem-with no known endpoint, cooperation will most likely emerge, explains group behavior over a long period of time ~Social contract-Hobbes-we submit ourselves to a Leviathan and pay with rights of property and liberty in order for protection-Expect Leviathan to protect us from those who would defect and punish defectors ~Anger-according to Plato, we are angry when we feel we do not get that which we are entitled to-reason for aligning society ~Ultimatum game/Dictator game-how much would you give-is determined by fairness or calculation ~Nash Equilibrium-your success in game theory is not based solely on own strategy but on how others react to that strategy ~Tragedy of commons-delay of gratification-benefit of individual vs group ~Stag hunt/pris dilemma ~4 Models Rationality Voting rules...
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This note was uploaded on 04/17/2008 for the course POLS 200 taught by Professor Collins during the Spring '08 term at Samford.

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Late in sem notes - -Folk theorem-with no known endpoint,...

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