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Unformatted text preview: -Folk theorem-with no known endpoint, cooperation will most likely emerge, explains group behavior over a long period of time ~Social contract-Hobbes-we submit ourselves to a Leviathan and pay with rights of property and liberty in order for protection-Expect Leviathan to protect us from those who would defect and punish defectors ~Anger-according to Plato, we are angry when we feel we do not get that which we are entitled to-reason for aligning society ~Ultimatum game/Dictator game-how much would you give-is determined by fairness or calculation ~Nash Equilibrium-your success in game theory is not based solely on own strategy but on how others react to that strategy ~Tragedy of commons-delay of gratification-benefit of individual vs group ~Stag hunt/pris dilemma ~4 Models Rationality Voting rules...
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This note was uploaded on 04/17/2008 for the course POLS 200 taught by Professor Collins during the Spring '08 term at Samford.
- Spring '08
- Political Science