201 15 F07 Timaeus 101607

201 15 F07 Timaeus 101607 - Philo 201 Lecture 15 October...

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Philo 201 Lecture 15 October 18, 2007: Third Man Argument, Receptacle. P. 1 Philo 201 Lecture 15: October 18, 2007 Plato’s Parmenides : “Third Man Argument” Plato’s Timaeus (to 52d) Parmenides: Third Man Argument *Self-criticism or student criticism? Objections to methexis *Dilemma: a thing can contain neither the whole nor the part of the form: *Day analogy ignored *Sail analogy: only part over each but remains one sail * “Something would be large in virtue of something smaller than largeness itself, equal because of something less than equal, smaller because of something smaller than smallness itself” *Note: self-predication, non-identity Methexis: 3 rd man 1 *If several things appear large, there seems a single character the same in all cases, so largeness appears to be a single thing, but when largeness itself and the large things are taken together a single things appears in all of them – another largeness, and taking those as a group, yet another largeness. *Infinite regress. Can the form be a noema? *A noema must have an object; if the forms are noemata, and participation holds, things are composed of thoughts(!) Mimesis (paradeigmata) *Mimesis requires reciprocal resemblance (if x resembles y then y resembles x) *But the character in virtue of which x and y resemble each other is separable (z). This generates TMA 2. Unknowability of the forms *Forms are interrelated, and phenomena are interrelated, but no relationship between forms and phenomena: Master - Slave: no one is a slave of the form of Master. Knowledge itself is K of forms, Phenomenal K is K of phenomena; we have phen K, so we don’t have form K. If anything has form K, it is a god; a god cannot have phen K. Comment *TMA operates by a combination of “self-predication” and “non-identity.” The forms have the qualities of which they are forms; the forms are separate from the phenomenal qualities. If Plato keeps NI but rejects SP, the forms appear incomprehensible; if he keeps SP but rejects NI he loses transcendence. *If forms and phenomena are separate, the forms do not make phenomena intelligible; any metaphor (participation, imitation) connecting the worlds breaks down their separation.
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Philo 201 Lecture 15 October 18, 2007: Third Man Argument, Receptacle. P. 2 Defenses of Plato *R. Patterson, Image and Reality in Plato’s Metaphysics, 1985 *R. Turnbull in Anton & Preus III: Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Plato , 1989 *Ken Sayre, Parmenides’ Lesson , 1996 Timaeus: Dramatic context *Dramatic date: 429? See Nails, p. 107. Relation to Republic?
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This note was uploaded on 04/09/2008 for the course PHIL 201 taught by Professor Preuss during the Spring '08 term at Binghamton University.

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201 15 F07 Timaeus 101607 - Philo 201 Lecture 15 October...

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