Phil10100-Part3 - Phil 10100 Introduction to Philosophy...

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Phil 10100 Introduction to Philosophy Fall 2011 Part 3 Professor Marian David Friday Sections with TAs
2 Body and Mind in Descartes Body Life “Soul” Mind Aristotelian notion of soul combined aspects of life with aspects of mind/intellect. Descartes separates the two aspects: The living body is a machine: body & life are purely mechanical, material phenomena Mind is purely immaterial Soul = Mind Nonhuman animals (no intellect) are mere machines.
3 Mind/Matter Theories Mind-Body Dualism , a.k.a Substance Dualism : Minds and bodies are two fundamentally different kinds of beings; minds are immaterial beings, bodies are material beings. Materialism : Everything is matter (i) Mind is matter → Reductive Materialism (ii) There is no mind → Eliminative Materialism Idealism : Everything is mind (i) Matter is mind (ii) There is no matter Materialism and Idealism are versions of Monism . What about abstract “things” (numbers, Platonic forms, etc.): neither mind nor matter?
4 Cartesian Dualism (CD): (a) Minds are immaterial beings: no mind is identical with a body or with any material thing. (b) Persons are minds: I am a mind. It follows immediately that: (c) Persons are immaterial beings. Note that (b) and (c) are specifically about persons (b) is argued for in Med II (a) is more general, not argued for in Med II (a) is part of Substance Dualism . CD combines Substance Dualism with Monism about Persons Persons are immaterial thinking things.
5 Descartes’ Substance Dualism (= Thesis (a)) There are two fundamentally different kinds of substances (things, beings): minds and bodies , with two fundamentally different, defining attributes, thinking and extension . Minds are immaterial (non-extended) thinking things. Bodies are non-thinking material (extended) things. Minds and bodies have very little in common: only substance, number, and duration. Minds are not in space. Science and laws appropriate for one are very different from science and laws appropriate for the other. Note: Substance Dualism, by itself, says nothing about persons. A substance: a genuine being, bearer of attributes, remains self-identical through change.
6 Readings for Thursday, October 13 Descartes, Meditations Synopsis: marg. 12-16 Meditation VI: the one longish paragraph at margin 78 (p. 51) Concourse Item 8, David on Dualism Item 9, Taylor: “Persons and Bodies”, pp. 9-17 From Plato’s Phaedo Marg. 63e (top p. 101) to 84c Phaedo reports conversation between Socrates and friends; “he” is Socrates
7 Arguments for Substance Dualism Cartesian Argument 1 : I cannot doubt that I exists. I can doubt that this body exists. I am not this body.

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