naftali.intrepids-last-deception

naftali.intrepids-last-deception - Intrepid’s Last...

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Unformatted text preview: Intrepid’s Last Deception: Documenting the Career of: Sir William Stephenson Notice: This material may be protected by copvr'sdm) HY J. NAFTALI (Title 17 US. Code) On 17 September 1989 under the headline ‘Britain’s War in America’, The Washington Post reported its discovery of a top secret British document that revealed Sir William Stephenson’s alleged manipulation of the US media during the Second World War. The story seemed to confirm a claim made in the best—sellingA Man Called Intrepid that there existed a major private archive of materials detailing British intelligence activities in America in the 19405. The document in question was described as the official history of Stephenson’s wartime organization, British Security Co—ordination (BSC), which Operated from New York as the directorate of all forms of British clandestine activities in the Western Hemisphere — covert operations, counterespionage and intelligence collection —- between 1940 and 1946. The Post quoted a British intelligence expert, who asserted that this 423-page report was ‘one of the most astounding documents in history’.1 Ironically, it turns out that the Post was itself a deceived party in a much larger story of media manipulation. The alleged exclusive was some 30 years old. Almost every detail of clandestine British support for American interventionists described by the Post could be found in a biography of Stephenson by H. Montgomery Hyde published in England in 1962 as The Quiet Canadian and in the United States a year later as Room 3603.2 Moreover, several of the passages quoted directly by the Post from the ‘top secret’ document appeared verbatim in Hyde’s work three decades ago. ’ The specific cause of The Washington Post’s mistake was the belief that Sir William had left a trove of highly secret documents that provided the basis for the most sensational of his biographies, the book A Man Called Intrepid, which in paperback is in its 25th printing with over two million copies sold.3 Sir William Stephenson and his wartime deputy C.H. ‘Dick’ Ellis had founded their endorsements of the book A Man Called Intrepid on the assertion that the BSC history contained much that H. Montgomery Hyde had been enjoined from recounting in 1962 because of the strictures of state secrecy.4 Yet when this BSC history — or the ‘BSC Papers’ as they had called this source — came to light it INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 73 proved quite the opposite. The publication of The Quiet Canadian had in fact left few secrets about Stephenson. This made inescapable the conclusion that the 1976 book, A Man Called Intrepid, may have been unnecessary, even harmful to an historical interpretation of Sir William Stephenson. The allegation that there existed an archive of ‘BSC Papers’ has long complicated any assessment of the version of Stephenson’s life found in A Man Called Intrepid. From the moment it appeared in 1976, the book drew heated criticism. While most American reviewers embraced the book, revealing a general tendency to believe most legends about British intel- ligence, the book’s publication induced strong rebuttals from the other side of the Atlantic.5 Two veterans of British Intelligence, Lord Dacre (Hugh Trevor—Roper) and Sir David Hunt, sounded an alarm as to the accuracy of the book’s essential claims. For the outside observer it was difficult to know whom to believe. With the bulk of Allied intelligence records still classified in the 19705, the only people claiming to have documents were supporters of Sir William Stephenson. A decade later the first documented study of a BSC operation, David Stafford’s Camp X, admirably began the march away from mythology.6 Unfortunately, though a strong presentation of the existing evidence, Stafford’s work was equally vulnerable to criticism that he had not seen the vaunted ‘BSC Papers’. Despite many years of controversy, the life of Sir William Stephenson thus remains a thicket of claims and counterclaims. Was he Winston Churchill’s personal representative in the Americas, or not? Did he materially contribute to the success of the assault on German enciphered signals, or not? What role, if any, did he play in the assassination of Heinrich Himmler’s righthand man, Reinhard Heydrich‘?7 The controversy over the legendary versus authentic dimensions of Sir William Stephenson’s life is of essential importance for the history of wartime intelligence, but is also played out on the canvas of Canadian history. Canada has few heroes to compete with Sir William, recipient of the US Medal for Merit, the French Croix de Guerre with Palm and the Order of Canada.8 Defendants of Stephenson are quick to decry any assault on his stature as a disguised attack on a Canadian ‘great man’. While some of the points of dispute may appear picayune, because Sir William publicly identified himself with the most grandiose of the claims about his career, confirmation or refutation of them has the potential of supporting or discrediting much of what was written about the man in the last 20 years. Although some of the mysteries surrounding this figure remain, many of the puzzles dissolve when the various iterations of the Stephenson 74 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? biography and the forces that brought them about are examined. Instead of a mess of contradictions they present a more or less linear progression from histories based on documents and recent memory to apotheosis. ‘ David Stafford made the first important contribution to reconstructing Stephenson’s relationship to his biographers.9 With the BSC history as a guide, more can now be confidently said about the extent of the mythology that grew up around Stephenson, both created by him and in his name. In an effort to explode those myths, this article will relate the entire biographical process from the earliest wartime histories, commissioned in 1942—43, to The Washington Post’s discovery in 1989 of the so-called ‘BSC Papers’, which symbolized how far the public conception of Intrepid had diverged from anything that could be termed a reliable biography of Sir William Stephenson. The first encounter between William Stephenson and Biography came after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attack was a dual-edged sword for Britain’s chief intelligence officer in the United States. It brought America’s entry into the Second World War, the event for which Stephenson had worked since his arrival in April 1940; but it had its costs. The US declara- tion of war led to a multiplication of contacts between the US and British governments, thus reducing the comparative advantage of Stephenson’s special channel through New York. At the same time all of the neutrality legislation that had hampered American intelligence officials was swept away with the result that British help was no longer required to intercept letters or survey the activities of merchant ships. Similarly, though the American agencies had turned a blind eye to British secret activities in the United States and Latin America in 1940~4l, with the start of the Pacific War, they successfully put pressure on Stephenson to stop his independent operations. ‘0 As the post of Director of British Security Co—ordination increasingly involved liaison responsibilities and with the focus of Anglo-American relations shifting away from New York, Stephenson became concerned that London might dismantle his organization.11 Twice within a year, Stephenson ordered that a survey of his activities be written to demonstrate the value of centralizing all forms of secret activity under one command. The first document was completed in June 1942, the second in March 1943}.12 The timing of each report seems to have coincided with a moment of bureaucratic danger for the BSC. ‘3 The first appeared as the organiza- tion was adjusting to its transition away from independent operations in the United States.“ The second came when it appeared likely that London would seize the opportunity presented by the waning of the German threat in Latin America to strip Stephenson of his responsibilities for co-ordinating the main elements of British intelligence in the Western Hemisphere.” INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 75 Stephenson relied on the head of his counter-espionage section, H. Montgomery Hyde, to write the second survey, which was longer and more detailed than the first. Hyde, who may have also written the first survey, though this cannot be determined, produced the most complete wartime study of the BSC.16 Although short on operational details, the v ZOO-page ‘Report on British Security Co—Ordination in the United States of America’ described at length the extent of Stephenson’s activities and the institutional context within which they occurred. The Hyde document laid the foundations for evaluating the role of Stephenson himself. Explicitly or implicitly, it would be the reference point for all future studies of the man, including the document revisited by The Washington Post in 1989. The Hyde report argued the following about Stephenson: the 44-year- old Canadian businessman had been picked for his American mission by the head of the British foreign intelligence service, M16, Sir Stewart Menzies.17 Although his initial assignment was as head of M16 in the United States, over the course of three years Stephenson became the representative of all British secret agencies in the Western Hemisphere. In the year befOre Pearl Harbor, Stephenson had interpreted as one of his responsibilities the use of American contacts to further the British 7 war effort. Using in particular Colonel William Donovan, the future head of the Office of Strategic Services, Stephenson added his voice to those emanating from other sections of the British government in favor of a deal fOr 50 overage destroyers. In the last year of peace for the United States, Stephenson used British resources to encourage US interventionist opinion and to nurse along Washington’s first efforts at foreign intelligence * and counter-intelligence. Finally, once his mission became primarily liaison, Stephenson left a legacy in the high degree of co-ordination that existed among the American, British and Canadian secret services concerned with Axis subversion and espionage in the Americas.” ' When the war ended, Stephenson, who had remained at his post, ordered an updating of the Hyde report. The Second World War had seen the 7’ coming of age of the intelligence bureaucracy, and like all of the major' ’5' intelligence chiefs of the war, Stephenson wanted a full account of the innovations brought about by his organization. He asked BSC officers Gilbert Highet, Roald Dahl and Tom Hill to stay on at Camp X, the BSC : training installation, to write this document. Two of these men were to enjoy post-war fame in the world of letters; but it was the third man, Hill, who did most of the work on the first draft of the BSC history. ‘9 A fourth hand shaped the history before it left Camp X. In what would become a recurrent theme in the Stephenson historiography, the Hill draft was rejected because William Stephenson considered it too dry. Stephenson 76 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? f [NTREPID’S LAST DECEpTioN 77 asked Giles Playfair, a former radio broadcaster who had been a BSC Stephenson story these administrative historie counter-espionage officer in New York, to revise the entire manuscript.20 mark, for at least they had been based on doe“ It was this report, as revised by Giles Playfair, that The Washington Post ' ' recollectionzé quoted in 1989, and is known as the ‘BSC I-Iistory’.2x What these reports did not reveal was that Stephenson held a different Playfaif and the Camp X team Produced an unusual report- A hybrid view of his own contribution to the war. Or, at least by the early 19505 Ofaspy thriller and anadnlinistrfltiVe history, the document was remarkath he had come to View himself as a top-level player in Anglo-Americari eloquent and strikingly dramatic for an Offteial Publication Very few Teal . relations during the war; instead of the significant, though second-tier agents are fully identified in the text. though one of them, ‘Cynthia’, now figure that he had been. In 1952, he collaborated with journalist McKen: known to have been Betty Paek, had everything else about her revealed: 1; T zie Porter on a long, sensational article about himself for Maclean’s Magazine that brimmed with revelations of hitherto secret operations.27 Entitled ‘The Biggest Private Eye of All’, the piece not only focused - attention upon Stephenson’s secret life but recast some of the basic facts to ' give the entire BSC operation the allure of major historical importance.28 Stephenson’s change of heart in his treatment of wartime secrets had come abruptly. * Robert Sherwood, Franklin Roosevelt’s speechwriter, had In addition to its entertainment value, the Playfair document had a Dilbtic TEIationS Purpose Within the small community permitted to read it: called him ‘a quiet Canadian’ because of his characteristic discretion.29 _ As late as 1949, when Time magazine interviewed him for a story about It placed Stephenson at the center of the most efficient binational intel- ,: ligence system ever constructed. Although it is doubtful that Stephenson the cement industry in Jamaica, Stephenson had pointedly refused to initially expected this ‘tOP secret’ history to be dedusstfied in his llfettmea fg‘ discuss his wartime intelligence activities.30 An explanation for his decision I f to break his silence may lie in the serious stroke that he suffered in 1950. the text was cleverly written in order to sell the BSC organization as a “toad 0f its kinda WhiCh W0utd be userI in a WOT 1d dominated by the Three decades later Stephenson stressed the power of this attack and ascribed it to the strains of his wartime responsibility.31 It was the first of 5 represented a high-water merits and relatively recent There was certainly nothing about her which suggested that her virtue was easy, (i)t may be that her appeal to her victims was in the first place intellectual, and that the discovery of her bodily charms came later as an intoxicating realization.22 threat of atomic holocaust.23 Despite its cheerleading tone, the report described William Stephenson’s two strokes that were tO hit him_32 achievements as a function of his responsibilities as representative of the Regardless of the cause, there was some outstanding hhistet in the British secret services in the Western Hemisphere. There was no mention 9’ . ’ article that probably boosted Stephenson,s ego. The Maclean,s article of any significant diplomatic role as advisor to Churchill. In the eyes of asserted that this ‘mysterious millionaire from Winnipeg: was at the the authors, Stephenson deserved praise because of his particular genius for inspiring bureaucratic change. First, he had rationalized the flow of information from collectors to those who could use it. Second, he had set a powerful example that had been followed by William Donovan in creating the Office of Strategic Services and J. Edgar Hoover in expanding FBI operations to Latin America. Finally, Stephenson had succeeded in estab- *' 1 center of the ‘most secret of all cloak-and-dagger operations of the Second World War’.33 It praised Stephenson in grandiose terms. He was a man of enormous energy, who never seemed to sleep. He was a speed reader whose sensory perception was so acute that he could spot a tiny plaster on a secretary’s finger while he still had his eyes on his desk. The article continued: lishing a harmony of interests among the various British intelligence I services operating in the Americas, squelching their habit of destructive ;' _ t _ t . *The North American public first learned of Sir William in 1946, the year after he was competttlon- ' _ i _ _ -i . knighted. Stephenson made his first appearance in Who ’5 Who and in December of 1946 Half a Century later. the accuracy 0f the tWO admlmStratlve mStorleS: was featured in a New York Times article when he became the first non-American to receive Hyde’s 1943 report and the Playfair BSC history is difficult to judge. the US_ Medal for Merit. (New York Times, 1 December 1946). True to his reputation for Hyde brought some documents home with him at the end of the war. - 7 - d’smmn' Stephenson “’35 "0t luterVieWEd about the exploits that had earned him the _ _ _ i t . highest honor the United States confers upon a civilian. The New York Times article merel These confirmed the broad outllnes 0f StephenSOIl’S I'CSDOHSlblhtlesi b1“ reprinted as explanation the citation from President Harry Truman. Stephenson’s Who’s Wk: only in a few cases substantiated specific detaiis_24 The documents used for 33: entry showed the same care. It stated his present employment as Director of British Security the BSC history were actually destroyed at Stephenson’s direction at the ‘ C°‘°rdi"a‘i°"’ a matter 0f Puttic record» and listed his telegraphic addresses. ‘Intrepid’ ' t i in Jamaica and New York and ‘Stevefarus’ in Londo .Th ‘ l 'f‘ end of the war.25 Nevertheless, 1n the context of the evolution of the 3 any orthat infermation. n ere was no‘hlngcass} led abom 78 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? His New York headquarters staff of more than a thousand hand- picked Canadian men and women spoke of his doorkeeper as ‘Peter,’ of his secretary as ‘Gabriel’ and of him as ‘God.’ Only a handful ' ’ of them knew him by sight.“ The tone of the article could be dismissed as a product of the time and of the magazine where it appeared. Mac/ean’s was then in the habit of using breathless titles and included fiction alongside its general articles, in- viting readers to move from fact to fiction and in the process blurring the ‘ " line between the two.35 But the article stands out in the canon of Sir William Stephenson because it introduced two assertions which, though never articulated in the secret histories, were to become part of the lore of the man. First, Sir William or one of those close to him told Maclean’s that it was Winston Churchill who had sent the Manitoba native to New ' York ‘to command all his government’s secret-service operations in the western hemisphere’.36 The second assertion was that Sir William had played a significant part in deciphering German messages. To understand the importance of this indiscretion it must be recalled that the Ultra operation was not revealed publicly until 20 years later, in 1974, with the publication of Frederick W. Winterbotham’s The Ultra Secret.37 Yet the 1952 Mac/ean’s article said that the BSC had contributed to the sinking of ‘many enemy submarines by decoding their radio signals and pinpointing their position at sea’ and then gave a specific example that a careful reader could interpret as proof that the British had broken German operational ciphers.3K For all its bluster and its incautious reference to Ultra, the Maclean’s piece excited little interest.39 Having broken his silence, Sir William may well have experienced some disappointment that no journalists or historians sought to pick up the end of the thread that he had begun to unravel. Perhaps some envy of the public position of his colleague and friend William Donovan may have influenced his next move.‘10 Stephenson knew that Whitney Shepardson, the wartime chief of the Secret Intelligence branch of the 088, was working on a biography of Donovan.“ None of this can be known at present. But what is clear is that the end of the 19505, Stephenson was determined to reap some reward for his secret work and set in motion a plan aimed at widespread public recognition. He commis- sioned his former deputy at the BSC, C. H. Ellis, to write his biography, telling the latter that he wished to be portrayed as ‘a man of initiative, an innovator, who in spite of official obtuseness and sometimes obstruc— tion, created something out of nothing’.42 For Stephenson, there was more to this project than simple self-aggrandizement. He saw it also as an excellent business opportunity. Apparently Henry Luce of Time Inc. had promised Stephenson $100,000 for the biography."3 .me'“.»:’,n . the US political system. Hyde showed little concern for the l l lNTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION Washington and London, a link which Ellis, a career British intelligence ~ . officer, knew to have predated Stephenson’s arrival in New York in 1940‘15 Stephenson had no patience with this quibbling. He wanted a best- selling biography of himself. When he read Ellis’s first draft, Stephenson stopped the project, telling Ellis that he had ‘pulled (his) punches too much.’, hls style was ‘too dry’, and that the story was not sufficiently brought to life ‘to make a saleable book’.46 Stephenson next turned to his first chronicler, H. Montgomery Hyde, to realize his dream of a big biography.47 As Hyde was most reluctant to leave a professorship in Pakistan, Stephenson offered to pay his living expenses. For his part, Hyde was det ' executive summaries of the principal sections dealing with intelligence, special operations and counter-espionage in the Playfair document. 7 Similarly, Hyde did not interview Stephenson for the book. Instead he imported paragraphs from the BSC’ history, dressed them in quotation marks and ascribed them to Sir William Stephenson.50 Stephenson’s requirement of a bestseller, Hyde added anecdotal color, changed all the references to ‘BSC’ 1n the official history to ‘Stephenson’, * and dropped the turgid sections of the Playfair document dealing with Curiously, in making decisions about what to publish, Montgomery probable official British reaction. He was well aware of the potential penalties for lifting complete descriptions 80 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? of secret operations from the ‘top secret’ BSC history. As a leak of what intelligence historians describe as ‘sources and methods , The Quiet Canadian could hardly have been more ambitious. Even the most casual reader could pick up the essential elements ’of running double agents and a careful one might catch even a suggestive reference to the reading of German signals traffic, though there was nothing so blatant " as what had appeared in Macle‘an’s.51 Hyde retained the most important details of the BSC’s principal espionage operations - the double agents Tricycle (whom he called ‘Bicycle’), Springbok and Pat J and 31; penetration agent Cynthia —— and the covert action against the isolationist movement, while leaving out only a few direct references to ' ' ' ls.52 mdgilvfleliiathe nature of its revelations, Hyde’s book could well have been the Spycatcher of its day; but the British government expressly deeded to let this violation of the Official Secrets Act go unpunished. Years latfsr Hyde was to credit the fact that he had never made reference to any M or M16 documents in his text?3 Dick Ellis, who was also liable because of - his role in the affair, had assumed there would not be any prosecution because M16 had actually foregone its opportunity to screen the book an: legal action would have meant admitting its mistake. Apparently an hM officer had approved Ellis’s first draft of the biography but did not s any interest in Hyde’s more revelatory reworking of the material, despi e the fact that Ellis had told him about it.“ A more persuasrve explanation than that offered by Hyde or Ellis goes beyond a technicality or Ml6’s 7 ; amour propre. The swell of press interest in the fall of 1962 about a Soviet penetration agent in the British Admiralty, John Vassal, probably left the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan unwillisng to embark on another time-consuming and embarrassmg legal battle. The . potential for scandal in this case was especially great because in addition to being a former member of M16, Hyde had sat in Parliament for nearlly y‘ a decade as the Ulster Unionist member for North Belfast. and in t e mid—19505 had represented the United Kingdom at the Council of Europe «, Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg.56 Most suggestive of this interpreta- tion is Prime Minister Macmillan’s public handling of the book affair. Three days after confiding to his diary that ‘[t]he Vassall case IS. getting 7, more embarrassing,’ Macmillan effectively protected Hyde byfrnessrrlllg .; a direct question in the House of Commons on the applicability of t e Official Secrets Act to The Quiet Canadian.’7 The British decision to leave well enough alone paid off. Though a critical .a and respectable commercial success, the book was soon forgotten in Britain. 1‘ And while prominently and favorably rev1ewed‘ in the United Stats d {I it was compared in the New York Times to DH. Lawrence 5 a y ‘ INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 81 Chatterley ’sLover in its ability to shock — the American edition, entitled Room 3603, also failed to achieve any lasting fame.58 At the tail-end of the Quiet Canadian project, Stephenson’s physical condition intruded again into the writing of his biography. Although the date remains uncertain, it appears that in 1963 he suffered a second major stroke. His health had been declining for some time; but the attack appears to have come in the summer. Apparently it left him in a coma. His friend Ernest Cuneo, an old colleague from the BSC period who was J. Edgar Hoover’s lawyer, visited Stephenson in the hospital after he came out of the coma. Cuneo was dismayed by what he saw. Although Sir William was clearly on the mend, the stroke seemed to have erased his memory.59 Although there is some controversy surrounding the effect of the two strokes on Stephenson’s mind, Stephenson’s ill health in 1963 undeniably complicated the publication of Room 3603, the American edition of The Quiet Canadian.60 Stephenson began to exhibit a querulousness in early 1963. He started disagreeing with Hyde over how much to reveal about covert operations in the United States, especially those involving the American journalists Drew Pearson and Walter Winchell. Hyde wanted as much controversy as possible to sell more books. ‘So far as I am concerned the more public interest which its appearance in your country can create the better,’ he explained to his New York publishers Farrar, Straus and Cudahy.61 Stephenson also wanted a bestseller; but not at the cost of alienating his American friends. When David Ogilvy, the doyen of American advertising and a former BSC intelligence asset in George Gallup’s polling organization, suggested that the more condescending paragraphs regarding Americans in The Quiet Canadian be toned down in the US edition, Stephenson agreed and asked Hyde to delete 20 pages from the manuscript.62 Hyde refused.63 Instead, to calm his publishers, who had been receiving insistent messages from David Ogilvy and Stephenson, Hyde wrote: As you know, Sir William Stephenson has been and is in very poor health, also like other great characters, contemporary and historical such for instance as Mr. Nehru, he is inclined to listen to the last person who talks to him, as he cuts himself off almost completely from his old circle of friends.64 Hyde’s insubordination, coupled with perhaps the lingering effects of hisbout of sickness, soured Stephenson on The Quiet Canadian and Room 3603. By the late 19605 he had resumed his search for a satisfactory biography. Stephenson became involved with two new projects, whose contours revealed a pathetic shift in the old man’s interpretation of the past.65 Sir William began to embrace a much broader View of his role in 82 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? the Second World War. He enhanced his previous claim to have been selected by Winston Churchill for his job in Washington with the assertion that he had been the secret linchpin between the US and British govern- ments during the Second World War. The Maclean’s boast had had few historical implications, but this new version implied a role of such significance for Stephenson that were he accurately recalling the past, international histories of 1940—41 would have to be revised. To reflect this new recollection, Stephenson changed his 30—year-old Who ’5 Who entry to read that not only had he been Director of the BSC but Winston Churchill’s personal representative in the Western Hemisphere.“ By the 19703, Stephenson had the unshakable conviction that he had played a decisive role in the establishment of American support for beleaguered Britain in the period when it was going it alone. And that by extension, his intelligence work had been secondary to his primary responSIbility as Churchill’s man.67 I I I ‘ The first biographer to retell the old BSC story With this new twrst was Dick Ellis, who revised his previously rejected manuscript to reflect _ % Stephenson’s reinterpretation.68 In the unpublished ‘The Two Bills: Mission Accomplished’, Ellis asserted that Sir William had been Churchill’s personal envoy, a claim he had not made a decade before. Also added were the claims that Stephenson and the Prime Minister had been ‘close friends’ and that Churchill had viewed sending Stephenson to New York as the first step in improving Anglo-American relations in the spring-of . g; 1940.69 The change that most set the tone for the next biography, A Man Called Intrepid, was Ellis’ acceptance of the contention that Stephenson had played a decisive role in covert diplomacy before Pearl Harbor. Whereas Ellis had written in 1963 that Stephenson had had only an indirect influence on the process that resulted in the exchange of British bases for American destroyers; in 1972, Ellis asserted that Stephenson had represented Churchill in secret discussions of the ‘Destroyers. for Bases’ deal at US Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s home.70 In the intervemng decade, however, no new evidence had appeared to support a revision of Ellis’ first version.71 Ultra was one subject that Ellis did not touch. His book was written in 1972, two years before the Ultra secret was revealed by Winterbotham. The honor of linking Stephenson with Ultra fell to the second biographer, a Canadian journalist, named William Stevenson. Though the two men were not related, Sir William and the younger Canadian shared a love of adventure. The author Stevenson had been a British naval pilot during the Second World War. After a brief stint at Oxford, he tried his hand at journalism. For the next 30 years he worked INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 83 as a foreign correSpondent for a few Canadian newspapers. In addition, he produced a series of books about various political hot-spots. In 1958 he wrote about his stay in China, in 1967 he wrote about what he had found among the anti-Sukarno underground in Indonesia, and in 1971 he described life for air force pilots during Israel’s ‘War of Attrition’.72 In each case, he produced reportage.73 All of the books have the feel of a one-sided television documentary: rarely a secondary reference and many quotations uncritically presented and linked into one narrative by Steven- son’s descriptions of his own activities. In eschewing an Olympian perspective, Stevenson expected a high degree of trust from the reader.“ The result was a gaggle of fast-paced, melodramatic books with little analysis. In Stevenson, Sir William had found his Pindar. The journalist produced thebiography in the style of his many previous books. The reader was introduced to a colorful world that revolved around the central character. As for that pivot, the younger Stevenson had created Intrepid, the personal emissary of Winston Churchill, and a significant participant in work against the German ciphers. Of course this flew in the face of the Hyde wartime report and the Playfair document, neither of which mention the codename ‘lntrepid’, a meaningful role in cryptanalysis or any special personal or * professional link between Stephenson and the wartime Prime Minister. But Stephenson at last had his bestseller. A Man Called Intrepid garnered generally positive reviews and appeared on bestseller lists across North America.” The success of the book was partly a function of timing, as well as of the slick writing of the author "’ Stevenson. The book’s appearance coincided with the explosion of interest in the United States about intelligence matters, owing to the Church Committee hearings on the CIA and the FBI and the twin disclosures from the Second World War of the Ultra success and of the masterful Allied deception program involving British double agents. The author William Stevenson mined the Playfair manuscript for whatever Hyde had found too sensitive or too insignicant to include. There was little of the former, and quite a bit of the latter. Hyde had ‘ concealed the names of several suspects, informants, and agents: for example, Torkild Rieber the pro-German president of Texaco, and the Comte de la Grandville and Captain Charles Brousse, diplomats in the Vichy French Embassy in Washington. Stevenson used them.76 Hyde had also deleted information about the co-ordination of intercepted radio signals effected by BSC with the assistance of the Canadians and Americans. It is in A Man Called Intrepid.77 But the most astounding difference between the first and second tellings of the Stephenson story in book form was that in the course of the retelling the gifted British intelligence 84 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? officer of The Quiet Canadian was transformed into the secret channel between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with a hand in every single intelligence achievement of the war. Sir William’s ' I view of his own past had won out. Two examples suffice as evidence of the nature of the transformation of the Stephenson story wrought by A Man Called Intrepid. Hyde had remained true to the details contained in the wartime intelligence histories of the BSC. References in his book to Stephenson’s supposed role in the High Politics of Anglo-American relations are anecdotal and quite peripheral. InA Man Called Intrepid, however, the anecdotal takes center stage and any uncomfortable facts in the official histories just disappear. Thus hagiography became myth. The Playfair document of 1945, for instance, makes clear that Stephenson did not meet Franklin Roosevelt on his first trip to the United States in 1940. His sole contact to the White House was through an intermediary, J. Edgar Hoover’s lawyer, Ernest Cuneo.78 According to the BSC historians, it was Cuneo who related to Stephenson, who was then a special envoy of M16, the President’s wish ' that there be ‘the closest possible marriage between the FBI and you’. In A Man Called Intrepid, however, there is a summit between the President of the United States and the neophyte British intelligence officer at which Roosevelt turns to Stephenson, speaks of matrimony, and initiates the intelligence liaison between J. Edgar Hoover and Sir Stewart Menzies, the chief of M16.79 A second example involves the invention of a personal connection between William Stephenson and King George VI inA Man Called Intrepid. In describing William Donovan, Playfair wrote in 1945, ‘Donovan, by 4 his very independence of thought and action, inevitably has his critics, but there are few among them who would deny the credit due to him for having reached a correct appraisal of the international situation in the summer of 1940.’ In A Man Called Intrepid the same paragraph reappears in capital letters and in a somewhat abbreviated form as a 7 putative cable from Stephenson to the King of England, sent before Donovan’s trip to England in the summer of 1940.80 Needless to say, the Playfair report never mentions His Majesty at all, let alone as Stephenson’s penpal. In its discussion of Ultra, A Man Called Intrepid indeed seemed to . represent a contribution to Hyde’s portrait. Hyde had been unwilling to discuss the decryption of German messages in 1962. However, it was not a great omission in the context of Stephenson’s career both because he had been a consumer more than a producer and because high—level operational Ultra had not affected the progress of his most important work in the United ‘_ October 1942 there were six new installations INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 85 States, which had taken place before 1942.* Nevertheless, a case could have been made to study Stephenson’s uSe of Ultra in promoting hemispheric security, as well as his role in discussions over how much of ‘unbutton’ German signals.“ Sadly, Sir William staked his reputation on the distorted image of his career created by this book. In twin forewords, he and his failed biographer, . Ell1s, set a more sensational tone for the story of the BSC than it had ever had before.82 Stephenson introduced the notion of the ‘BSC papers’, a him a codename during the war.86 ‘Intrepid’ had not even been his nick- ‘_ name in wartime intelligence, which was instead ‘Little Bill’ (Donovan t *According to the Playfair history, the BSC’s principal contribution to the Ultra campaign was In intercepting some raw — undeciphered — messages for delivery to the codebreakers of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park. In 1942 the BSC opened hstemng posts to capture local transmissions from agent radios in Latin America. By in South America and three in Central 86 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 37 was the other Bill).* More significantly from the point of view of his '_ this approach to biography has a felicitous effect on a man’s reputation. biographies, Sir William also admitted that the ‘BSC Papers’ did not gg; SOIlICIIIgCS, the effect is a prosecutorial brief that lS.llSCd to discredit the constitute an archive.87 He blamed the anther Stevenson for all of these subJect. In all cases, such histories dlStOI‘t'thC relationships among men embellishments.88 On more than one occasion, Sir William complained arid the role of chance, bureaucracy and hierarchy in the production of that none of the published biographies was very good, dismissing The _ historical events. Quiet Canadian and A Man Called Intrepid as too journalistic.89 Despite all of these private misgivings, however, Sir William remained convmced that he had been Churchill’s special representative, though in lattlerpyears el between t e um $312333 $531123: {1:333:33 as a secret Chann British intelligence in the United States, Stephenson played a significant Stephenson’s first biographer, Hyde, also denounced A Man Called Ole "1 London’s Campaign to use all available means to press l'3ritain’s case Intrepid in private. He charged the younger Stevenson with having ‘put 111 Its moment of. greatest danger. inally, and perhaps most importantly, words and ideas’ into the elder Stephenson’s mind.“ He thought the he deSFFVCS the lion 3 share of credit for inspiring the establishment of an claim that Stephenson had had anything to do with the Ultra success Amer 1931} lntelllgenc'e 00mmtlnlty agd for building up William Donovan preposterous.92 He also denied any credit for the BSC in the assassination I as a cre‘llble‘ Player In WaShlngtOH. . I I . of SS intelligence chief, Reinhard Heydrich.93 But he too was unwilling to .But 51f William Stephenson s restless attitude toward his place in history make the case publicly. Instead, he invited Sir William to pen a foreword lamth that legficy: despite the fad that h15 lfldUlgeDt blOgraphers bear some as ‘Intrepid’ for his own memoirs and when The Times of London asked 0f the responsrbility for the myths. From now on all historians, however him to write Sir William’s obituary, he repeated part of the canard about fYTnpathEtltf to Sir Wilham s wartime role, “111.1 have to beginflzelr studies Stephenson’s role in discovering the use of the Enigma decryption machine, In the negative. Stephenson was neither Intrepid, nor Churchill 3 personal something that he did not believe.94 envoy. He did not contribute in any meaningful way to the Ultra achieve- The reluctance of Sir William Stephenson and H. Montgomery Hyde merit, nor did his beloved BSC-execute Himmler s right-hand man. Thus, (Dick Ellis died in 1975) to admit that the Stephenson story had gone out desplte all the recognition he enjoyed in the last years of his life, Sir William of control created a confusion among the general public and historians Stephenson was himself the greatest Victim of the Intrepid deception. interested in intelligence matters as to what Sir William had actually done before and during the Second World War. It was into this muddle that The Washington Post’s David Ignatius fell when he announced his discovery in 1989. Ignatius later explained that he had-used A ‘Man Called Intrepid as his guide and when he found that the BSC history differed from it, he assumed he had made an important find.” . The story of Sir William and his biographers should be a cautionary r tale for intelligence historians and the reading. public?6 In the absence of ‘ ' ' documents, the mOSt romantic YerSlon Of mtelllgenc? hlStory ls -lrreSl-snble. document entitled ‘British Security Coordination (BSC): An Account of Secret Activities This is especially true with biography. By imputing more intelligence in the western Hemisphere, 1940-45,, 31 Dec. 1945‘ [Unfonunately’ as of mid—1993, successes to Sir William than had been the case, the author of A Man this document is not yet publicly available. The author, who gained access to it through . . - - n 0 e mam At times 3. a channel that prefers to remain anonymous, hopes that the revelation of the similarities Called I "tr epld gave “1 to the temptation to pm a“ o n between the ‘BSC history’ and The Quiet Canadian will bring its official release] v 3. The Washington Post was not alone in believing that the ‘BSC Papers’ might hold important . , V ~ 1 - r ' s r * Stephenson had three of ficial codenames. In correspondence With M16, he was referred to , -, new revelationst See U-S- DubllSher has Intrepid secret Papers , The Independent, ' ‘ =,. 27 March 1989. For information regarding the number of copies of A Man Called d l nator for the United States was 48 because of the number of L g . . ‘ I ‘ V as 4800}? (Thetltiglllliign lsTghe London headquarters of the Special Operations Executive it Intrepid in print, see the Ballantine Books edition (New York, 1990).. ‘ lsrtatesht' en 51% Finally within the BSC, he was the Director of Security Co-ordination (DSC). f 4. Sir Wilharn StephensonLForeword to Man‘ Called Intrepid by William Stevenson Trig/e illleas come from Hyde, ‘Report on British Security Co—ordination in The United ' (New York. 1976), pp.xni—xx; C.H. ‘chk. Ems, . A Hist on c all Note , m A Man Called States of America’, Hyde/Churchill. Intrepld, pplxhxxm NOTES This essay is dedicated to the memory of Andrew A. Naftali (1904—92), grandfather, patient reader and friend. _ _ l. The Washington Post, 17 Sept. 1989. 2. H. Montgomery Hyde, The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson (London,3rd ed., 1962); H. Montgomery Hyde, Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York during World War II (New York, 2nd ed. , 1963). This conclusion is based on comparison of the above with the ‘BSC history’, the? 88 5. >10 \Om ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? In the mid-19705 there were few scholars or publicists familiar enough with intelligence history, especially in America, to spot the telltale flaws in the book. Ironically, John Le Carré’s review in the New York Times Book Review, 29 Feb. 1976 (pp. 1 —2), set the tone ‘ for most of the American reviews. While critical of the book’s style he recommended it as an interesting and important history of wartime intelligence: ‘... my advice is to persevere. It’s worth it.’ He added: ‘It may be quite some while before we get that disinterested history which the man and the subject undoubtedly merit.’ Newsweek’s Walter Clemons said pretty much the same thing (Newsweek, 22 March 1976, pp. 79—80). Naomi Bliven in The New Yorker even praised the book’s style: ‘clear, lively, absorbing', she wrote (The New Yorker, 5 April 1976, p. 135). Finally, National Review indulged in its own exaggeration: ‘it may well be the most fascinating non-fiction book of 1976’ (Steve Ownbey, National Review, 3 Sept. 1976, p.964). The journalist and military scholar, Hanson W. Baldwin, distinguished himself from most of the American reviewers in pointing out that the book’s flaws undermined its overall trustworthiness. While not dismissing the book out of hand, he noted its evident distortion of Stephenson’s relationship to the Roosevelt White House. Until he called the'FDR Library with a query for this review, Baldwin wrote, the librarian had never heard of Stephenson or ‘Intrepid’ (H.W. Baldwin, Saturday Review, 6 March 1976, p.26). The response of British experts was far less temperate. Hugh Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre) called the book ‘utterly worthless'. A veteran of high-level wartime intelligence himself, he knew The Quiet Canadian to have been a reasonable account and recognized the wild swing taken by Stephenson’s newest biographer. (Hugh Trevor-Roper, New York Review of Books, 13 May 1976, pp. 3 ~4). Sir David Hunt seconded Trevor-Roper’s assessment in the Times Literary Supplement, 28 May 1976, p. 643. . David Stafford, Camp X (Toronto, 1986). The debate attained its most recent form in 1989 after Sir William’s death at the age of 93 produced a stream of obituaries representing various degrees of acceptance of the claims made by and about him. For a description of this debate, see The Times, 18 February 1989. Two examples of the most laudatory comments come from the Sunday Times of London and Maclean’s Magazine. In January 1989 he was hailed in the Sunday Times as an architect of the special relationship with the United States, who was second only to Winston Churchill in responsibility for Britain’s success in the Second World War. Simon Jenkins, ‘We shall not see their like again . .. ’ (Sunday Times, 5 Feb. 1989). Maclean ’.s Magazine described him as having been Winston Churchill’s ‘key confidant in North America’, who had been entrusted with ‘the largest espionage operation in history.’ Anne Steacy, ‘Shrouds of Secrecy’, Mac-lean ’sMagazine, 13 Feb. 1989. Implied in these tributes was the belief that Stephenson had manifestly contributed to the greatest intelligence achievement of the Second World War, the decryption of high-level German messages that produced what is now referred to as Ultra. Two excellent general discussions of problems in the historiography of Sir William’s career are in Nigel West, A Thread of Deceit: Espionage Myths of World War II (New York, 1985), pp. 127—38; and David Stafford, ‘A Myth Called Intrepid’, Saturday Night Magazine, October 1989. . Entry for Sir William S. Stephenson, Who’s Who, 1989. . David Stafford, ‘ “Intrepid”: Myth and Reality’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.22 (1987), pp. 303—17; 'A Myth Called Intrepid’, Saturday Night Magazine, Oct. 1989; ‘The Man Who Never Was’, in J.L. Granatstein and Stafford’s Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost (Toronto, 1990); and see Stafford’s review of a paperback reissue of Hyde’s The Quiet Canadian, inlntelligence and National Security, Vol.5, No. 3 (July 1990). In these publications Stafford effectively weakened the case for the Intrepid legend by revealing the collusion between Stephenson, Ellis and Hyde in 1960—62. He drew much of the strength of his arguments from documents in the H. Montgomery Hyde Collection at Churchill College, Cambridge (hereafter, Hyde/Churchill). In addition to several other important papers generated by the BSC and Stephenson, Hyde left his copy of the 1943 history and a thick file of correspon- dence regarding The Quiet Canadian project. Dr. Stafford and I were among a handful of scholars permitted to view this collection by Montgomery Hyde before it was INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 89 10. H. Montgomery Hyde, ‘Report on British Security Co-ordination in The United States 11. 12. 13. 1992), pp. 345—8. of America’ Part I: Intelligence (SIS) 17 March 1943 ' ' I , _ , , pp. 10—~13, 22—6, H de/Ch . Regarding changes-1n the BSC’s responsibilities see speech by Col. C. H.yEllis 'grlfiglilh Security Coordination’, 16 Aug. 1943, Hyde/Churchill. , Hyde later recalled several occasions after Pearl Harbor when Stephenson was despondent because of the restrictions placed on his organization. Stephenson did not want his organization destroyed. Hyde described him as a ‘dollar a ’ ‘ ‘ I . ‘ - -year man who had invested more than just pride into the BSC. Hyde claimed that Stephenson had contributed some $8125 personal fortune to build up the organization. Telephone conversation, 21 May The June 1942 document cannot be found It is referred t ' ' h _ . o in the foreword of H. Montgomery Hyde 5 ‘Report on British Security Co-Ordination in the United States of , America , 17 March 1943. Hyde/Churchill. Hyde writes: “This survey of the origins development and current activmes of the Directorate of British Security Coordination and extend his interest outside the scope of what in normal times would be considered legitimate S.I.S. functions. It was inevitable too that in their joint interests these activities as they developed should be coordinated under the direction of a single individual’. In the foreword to the second survey H d ' - _ i y e ar es that his w k from its predecessor. g“ or tOOk this argument 14. For a description of the BSC’s difficulties with the US. State Department in the first half of 1942, see Hyde, ‘Report on British Security Co-ordination’, Part I: Intelligence (S.I.S.), pp.22—6, Hyde/Churchill. Hyde went into more detail about the challenge from the State Department in his own memoirs, Secret Intelligence Agent' British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS (New York, 1982) pp '174—88 Although the first half of 1942 saw an increase in Stephenson’s authority among British intelligence chiefs — in April 1942 the Security Executive (The highest committee British Domestic Security) began a direct correspondence with Stephenson — he mg; well have believed that with the working environment becoming more hostile in the Unlth States he had to DIOVC the S In“ “1le Value to be Confident that London S s 15. In February 1943, C. H. Ellis (48905), visited MIG headquarters in order to clarify the BSC’s status. For some months, London had been cablin St hens t ' of his activities. The push was on for operational intelligefice gassisirtlhglihleglligiog the continent. As the BSC was poorly positioned to provide this kind of information London sought to shift resources elsewhere. H. Montgomery Hyde ‘Report on British Security Co—Ordination in The United States of America’, I, p. 80, Hyde/ Churchill. The BSC history’ provrdes further evidence that Stephenson had lost most of his operational responsibilities by mid-1943. Stephenson relinquished whatever control he had over all M16 stations in Latin America in March 1943 (pp. 142—3). Meanwhile, because the 90 ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? threat of a Nazi invasion of Latin America had passed with the Allied recovery of Non: Africa, London began to close all of the Special Operations Executive stations in Sout and Central America. By May 1943, Stephenson had lost the remaining SOE stations in ‘ Latin America, which had formerly reported to him (pp. 222—3). Stephenson’s fealr that this retrenchment would go even further was well founded. 1n the Hyde papers t1 lere is a reference to a meeting of Duff Cooper (Head of the Security Executive),-Lord Porne (Minister of Economic Warfare), Sir Charles Hambro (Head of SOB), Sir Davr etrie (Head of M15), Sir Stewart Menzies (Head of M16), I‘Loxley (Foreign Office rggresen- tative) and Desmond Morton on 9 April 1945, to discuss the future of the B tis possible that Hyde’s report featured in their discussmn. .The group agreed to ma e no change’. Handwritten note, Section 1/ 1, Hyde/ Churchill. . . SIS um 16. The Hyde report is composed of four parts: loafceagh on intelhgence ( ), sec y, ' ' ns SOE and assport con ro . . _ l7. gzgfieffgrfahhck riferrgd to their organization. as SIS, the Secret 11112611138110; Service. Hyde, ‘Report on British Security Co-ordiliiation in The United States of menca , : ntelli ence S.I.S.), Hyde/Churchi . i . _ _ _ 18. $31k :lppeafs likely that the Hyde report was written for British eyes onlz. Inhadditioliti to admitting that the BSC worked around the State Department-(pp. 22— ), t e rtepoh contains some snide remarks about .1 . Edgar Hoover, who is described as hazing adouc of the prima donna in his temperament’ and ‘not unmindful of the bene 1:15 an Joys of publicity for himself and his organization’(pp. 12—13). It also gives Step Denzgn £1): much credit for making an intelligence chief out of 'William Donovan. F Sumac] natural predilection was towards the active sphere of nuhtary operatins [srclhs o t t his constant association with 48000 [Stephenlslciiri] sergdlgc): stimulate is in eres ‘ ' ence at a critical time in this country s s ory . . y _ 19. DIEEIgStafford, Camp X (Toronto, 1986),_pp.250—7. Stafford s accotgitl is gasecflatiirn correspondence with Tom Hill and interViews wrth Roald Dahl and 1 1:35 C layt . 1 am grateful to David Stafford for sharing his work on the origins of the is ory with me. 2(1)- l2]; interview on 21 May 1984, H. Montgomery Hyde claimed that only Giles Playfair ' l wrote the BSC history. There is reason to doubt Hyde's account. :1? 1:3: :1: 1l§Ss(13cihne 1 944 and played no part in the revision of his 1943-report. Mglreofver, none of the four contributors to the history intervrewed by Stafford, including ay air, ‘ Sichel. I ‘ 22. {Sggegr 13333, p. 153. The official BSC version of the Cynthia case is reprz‘digced practically word for word in The Quiet Canadian, pp. 105— 10. The quotaftion c1 ere can be found in its emended form on page 105. ‘Cynthia , was a woman 0drigging]!-riartr)ieetsl.l Born Amy Elizabeth Thorpe, shedwas Betty IZack during the war and 1 ml vell, Cast No Sha ow, pp. — . I I . 23 3133;353:3050 has discovered that Stephenson was anghng for thenob (if chief of . Canadian Intelligence at the time that the foreword to the history was writtin. ln :nuary 1946, Sir William requested the assistance of a Canadian BSC officer, C aresO ining, in putting the case for a Canadian intelligence serVice to federal bureaucrats in l ttav;a. Ultimately, Vining wrote a new foreword for the history that stressed the va ue o a BSC-like organization in a bipolar world. Stafford, Camp X, p. 252. St h n 24. One example of a confirmatory document is a letter from Duff Cooper to f 151131 Sensitih, in which Cooper explains Stephenson’s responsrbilities as representative 0 in1 e Western Hemisphere. At the time, Cooper was the chief of Security Executive, the nulcmegs of the British imperial security system. Letter, Duff Cooper to Stephenson, 12 Oct. , 25 that Stephenson had ordered the destruction of the BSC papers aftsr . Playfair and Sichel completed their report: ‘There are no BSC Archives , he;w saie‘i Interview with H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984. Sir WilliamStephenson con irm that there were no BSC archives later that year. Intervrew With Sir William Stephenson, INTREPID’S ‘LAST DECEPTION 91 11 Oct. 1984. This was also confirmed by Tom Hill in a 1985 interview with David Stafford. See Camp X, pp.256—7. 26. The case of the ‘Nazi Map’ is one illustration of the historical challenge posed by the Playfair BSC report. At the Navy Day dinner in October 1941, Roosevelt announced that he had proof, in the form of a map, of Hitler’s designs on South America. The Playfair history and The Quiet Canadian both assert that the BSC provided this map to the President through William Donovan. These texts also present an identical explanation of its origins. The map was purloined from a courier of the German Embassy in Rio. (The Quiet Canadian, pp. 148-50; ‘BSC History’, pp. 216— 17). A more detailed version of the same story appears in A Man Called Intrepid. Stevenson names the courier Gottfried Sandstede, a former attache in the embassy in Argentina, who had copied this map from the ambassador’s personal files. According to Stevenson this man paid dearly for his mistake. (Stevenson, A Man, p. 327). The Intrepid version had one great weakness: Sandstede was never punished by the Nazis. Finding this error in the course of research- ing Nazi activities in Latin America, John F. Bratzel and Leslie Rout, Jr., undertook a review of the standard version of the map story. From H. Montgomery Hyde, they then heard that some trickery had been involved. The ‘Nazi map’ was based upon an actual document; but the forgery department (Station M) of the BSC had made extensive changes to it to enhance its propaganda value. (Bratzel and Rout, ‘FDR and the “Secret Map” ’ The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.1 (January 1985), pp. 167—73 — credit to Dr. Fran McDonnell for finding this reference). Unfortunately, the historians’ case that the map had been tampered with rested solely upon Hyde’s testimony. Further, their work on Sandstede did not invalidate the courier from Rio thesis. In fact, instead of completely undermining the case for Sandstede being the ill-fated courier, they provided additional evidence that he had left South America for Germany in September 1941, exactly the time when the courier would have been intercepted if the Rio story is to be believed. They also demonstrated, through reference to a report from the US military attache in Argentina in 1941, that Sandstede had had a map of the new boundaries of South America hanging in his office, which showed the territorial gains that Germany’s friends such as Argentina could expect. Meanwhile, a more telling assault on the official version came from another former BSC officer, who claimed that not only had the technicians of Station M touched up the map, they had created it out of whole cloth. In 1975 Ivar Bryce wrote a short memoir, You Only Live Once: Memories of Ian Fleming (London, 1975; Frederick, MD, 1984), in which he took credit for having forged this map. Bryce related that after doodling a map of a Nazified South America he proposed a plan to Stephenson: ‘Were a genuine German map of this kind to be discovered or captured from enemy hands and publicized among the good neighbours themselves, and above all among the “America firsters" with their belief that America could get along with Hitler, what a commotion would be caused.’ According to Bryce, Stephenson jumped at the idea and came up with a plan that had nothing to do with Rio. He arranged for the FBI to ‘find’ the map by planting it at a location in Cuba that he knew ' to be a German radio post. After telling the FBI about the radio center, he sat back and let the FBI make its important discovery. Because both rest on a single, uncorroborated source, the Bratzel/Rout and Bryce challenges to the map story leaVe the truth a distant prospect. What happened? 1s Bryce to be believed in that the President’s map was a pure invention? Or was it based upon an actual map taken from Sandstede and then improved for maximum effect? What is one to make of the official BSC version, which discusses the theft but not any enhancement of the map? Elsewhere in the official history, Playfair and his colleagues spared no ink in describing how clever the BSC was at tricking Americans; why would they have neglected this supreme achievement? If, indeed, a decision was made in 1945 not to present in the BSC history any instances of deception against the US government then a great deal more than originally thought was lost in the 92 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? Nazi coup in Bolivia — was found on a German courier. However, Hyde in his later book, Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the 085 (New York, 1982), pp. 153—5, argues that the letter was another BSC forgery that went to the US government. In the light of the discrepancies in the Nazi Map and Belrnonte ‘ accounts, the Playfair BSC history begs caution and the extent of Stephenson’s political action remains a puzzle. _ McKenzie Porter, ‘The Biggest Private Eye of All’, Maclean’s Magazine, 1 Dec. 1952. Porter also received help from some of Stephenson’s colleagues, including Ernest Ouneo, formerly J. Edgar Hoover’s lawyer and liaison officer to the BSC, and Sir William Wiseman who had performed a role somewhat similar to Stephenson’s during the First World War. ' The article claims that Stephenson had forced Hitler to delay his attack on Yugoslavra for six weeks by leaking certain information. Hyde wrote in 1962 that it was Wilham Donovan who achieved this. See Hyde, The Quiet Canadian, p.46. Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: A n Intimate History (New York, 1948), p. 270. Sherwood wrote: ‘There was, by Roosevelt’s order and despite State Department qualms, effectively close co-operation between J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI and British Security Services under the direction of a quiet Canadian, William Stephenson. The purpose of . 1 this co-operation was the detection and frustration of espionage and sabotage activities in the Western Hemisphere by agents of Germany, Italy and Japan, and also of Vichy France, Franco’s Spain and, before Hitler turned eastward, the Soviet Union. It produced some remarkable results which were incalculably valuable, including the thwarting of attempted Nazi Putsche in Bolivia, in the heart of South America, and in Panama. Hoover was later decorated by the British and Stephenson by the US government for exploits which could hardly be advertised at the time.’ Stephenson did help Sherwood. In his preface, Sherwood lists Stephenson as one of those whom he, or his assmtant Sidney Hyman, interviewed for the book. Curiously, in the Sherwood papers at Harvard there is no record of any interview with Stephenson. See documents entitled ‘Intervrews and Correspondence for Hopkins Book’, Robert E. Sherwood Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. There are two letters, however, from Stephenson to Sherwood. The first is largely a discussion of Sherwood’s passage to Great Britain in 1948. Yetlthere is a tantalizing reference in this letter that implies Stephenson was prepared to discuss his secret work in some depth. ‘1 am making enquiries about the map and Will try to obtain a copy for you. This might take some time’ (Letter, William Stephenson to Robert Sherwood, 9 June 1948, Sherwood papers, Harvard). It is reasonable to believe that Stephenson was here making a reference to the so—called Nazi map of South America that FDR worked into his Navy Day address of 27 Oct. 1941. On the controversy rroundi this ma see note 26. sTuime, 6 Junrige 1949, pg. 88, 90. The magazine reported: ‘Sir William’s World War II work was so secret that he will still not discuss it. ...’ Sir William Stephenson, interview, 11 Oct. 1984, Bermuda. Stephenson’s daughter Elizabeth confirmed that he had his first stroke in the early 19505. Letter, Elizabeth henson to the author, 30 Oct. 1991. h _ Thfgrview with H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984. Hyde said that Sir William had suffered two strokes (as indeed had Hyde). Porter, Maclean ’s, 1 Dec. 1952. 'd. 1101):: article in the same vein was ‘How We Tricked the Nazi Spies’, by Col. W. Murray, the former commander of the Canadian Intelligence Corps. Maclean 's Magazme, 15 Sept. 1949. ‘952 Maclean’s, 1 Dec. . £3323“ W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York, 1974); The New York Times first mentioned British decryption of German wartime messages in November 1974. See the Times, 10 Nov. 1974. ‘ Porter, Maclean ‘s, 1 Dec. 1952. The article gave one example of BSC decryption: ‘In INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 93 39. 45. 1943 a German submarine surfaced off the coast of Uruguay. It broke radio silence for a few seconds to report its position in code. The message was picked up by a BSC radio monitor on the coast. It was transmitted to New York. It went through the decoding machine and was passed on to the Admiralty.’ One sign of this was that Maclean’s did not publish any letters to the editor on this piece, whereas on average for every long article there were at least one or two. Further- more, the article did not elicit any American response. Neither The New York Times nor any popular US journals followed up on the Maclean’s article. The 1950s brought the publication of remarkably frank, if overdrawn, intelligence memoirs by former members of William J. Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services, the American analogue to Stephenson’s BSC. Examples include Donald Downes’ The Scarlet Thread: Adventures in Wartime Espionage (New York, 1953); Aldo Icardi, American Master Spy (New York, 1956); William J. Morgan, The OSS and I (New York, 1957). The urge to tell of their unusual experiences proved overpowering for quite a few OSS officers. Memoirs of the OSS period appeared just as soon as the Second World War ended. George C. Constantinides has compiled a useful list of 088 titles in an appendix to his article, ‘The 088: A Brief Review of Literature’, in George C. Chalou (ed.), The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War 11 (Washington, 1992), pp. 115~17. Professor Christopher Andrew has suggested that Stephenson may have also aspired to a place in history similar to that of his predecessor in the First World War, Sir William Wiseman. Wisem , chief of British intelligence in New York, acted as a special channel between his government and the Wilson administration in 1917—18. Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London, 1985), pp. 208—9; 214. August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1991), pp. 460—61; 474-5. It is interesting in this regard that Wiseman was interviewed for the 1952 Maclean’s article on the other Sir William. . Dick Ellis told Hyde that Stephenson envisioned The Quiet Canadian as a companion volume to Shepardson’s work on Donovan. Section 1/ l 1 , Hyde/Churchill. Shepardson’s project was never realized. . Letter, C. H. Ellis to Hyde, 10 Dec. 1960. Through a mutual BSC colleague, John Pepper, Stephenson was able to explain to Ellis what he wanted in this book. Hyde/Churchill. Ellis gave August 1959 as the date of the commission. Section VII, Hyde/Churchill. . Ibid. Ellis wrote: ‘[i]n his original letter to me suggesting that I do the work, Bill said that Luce had offered $100,000 for the book, Makenzie (Toronto) [sic?] offered him $30,000 of the first royalties. He thinks he can get various people to boost sales here and in the US and Canada.’ . Ibid. When he passed on the project to Hyde, Ellis revealed that he had taken some reports home with him: ‘I don’t feel like sending the original material (the copies of official reports &c.) by post. In the first place I shouldn’t have them, and secondly they are close to the bone and contain much that is not publishable.’ Evidence that Ellis had access to the M16 archives can be found in a letter of June 1963. In the wake of Kim Philby’s defection in January 1963, M16 had tightened security at headquarters, and Ellis could no longer consult documents as easily as he had in the past. ‘Norninally’, he wrote to Hyde, ‘I am not entitled to see pp. later than ’47, & now the particular type of record you are interested in is being moved to another building so that no one without good reason can call for papers. This, of course, is a sound move, but it makes it almost impossible for anyone without "the right to know” to look up facts.’ Letter, CE. to Harford, 18 (or 10) June 1963, Hyde/Churchill. Letter, CH. Ellis to H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 Aug. (1961?). Ellis wrote: ‘Bill seems to think everything started with him. It didn’t really. The link existed but owing to US Neutrality Act it was “working to rule” only in 1939 & early ’40.’ 46. Letter, C. H. Ellis to H. Montgomery Hyde, 10 Dec. 1960; Ellis’ manuscript, Anglo- American Collaboration in Intelligence and Security: Notes forDocumentation, c. 1963, is not in the Hyde collection; however, it bears all the hallmarks of being his attempt at the BSC history. Stephenson shares the spotlight in this work with William Donovan: 94 47. 49. 50. 51. ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? ‘The circumstances in which this development He. the formation of Anglo-American collaboration in intelligence and security matters] took place have as yet found only brief reference in post-war memoirs or in the more or less sensational war stories that have appeared in recent years. The account given in the followmg pages of cooperation for the common effort of the Canadian, William S. Stephenson and the American, William .1. Donovan — the “Two Bills”, as they were known at the time '— should go some distance to fill this gap in the record and place on record,.an_d in its proper g perspective, an achievement that contributed in great measure to the winmng of the war. Ellis, Anglo-American Collaboration, p. 7. Despite this focus on William Stephenson, there is strong internal evidence that this manuscript was written before The Quiet Canadian. Hyde’s book is not mentioned, and the only secondary sources Cited in the text are those listed by Ellis in his letter of 10 Dec. 1960 to Hyde, when he turned the project over to him. The only known copy of the Ellis manuscript belongs to Thomas ro , who kindl shared it with the author. ' I IrnteI'view with Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984. On 10 December 1960, Dick Ellis .. wrote to Hyde suggesting that he take over the project because Sir William_had just 7 rejected his manuscript. In 1966, Hyde wrote to Stephenson s secretary, Miss A. M. Green: ‘1 need not remind you that the idea of the book, which has caused me such a - costly expenditure of time, energy, anxiety and money over the past three years since _; this wretched action began, did not originate with me and that l was inVited by Sir William to write it.’ Letter, H. Montgomery Hyde to Miss A.M. Green, 22 March 1966, Hyde/ Churchill. By ‘this wretched action’, Hyde meant a costly libel case involvmg former Vichy French diplomat Gaston Henry-Hayehthat he had lost. In the book — p.95 — Hyde had asserted that Henry-Haye organized “a kind of Gestapo in_ the Washington embassy. Hyde’s assertions about the character of the former Vichy ambassador to the US did not hold up in court. For information about the libel case see Hugh Trevor—Roper’s review of A Man Called Intrepid, in New York Revrew of Books, a 1976. ' Ilia/913,}, H. Montgomery Hyde to Miss A. M. Green, 28 Jan. 1962, Hyde/Churchill. Hyde writes that he began the project in December 1961 and expected to take three or four months to write the book. In the spring of 1966, Miss Green wrote on'behalf of Sir William to request that Hyde repay his ‘outstanding debt’. Apparently Sir William was reneging on his original offer to pay Hyde’s expenses for the period when he was writing the book. This incensed Hyde. ‘In view of everything that has happened I should be extremely astonished if Sir William sees fit to press for its repayment now. Letter, H. Montgomery Hyde to Miss Green, 22 March 1966, Hyde/Churchill. The book went to the printer on 6 June 1962, according to Hyde s records. ‘- Two examples: compare Hyde, The Quiet Canadian, p. 36 With pp.9—10 in the history’; and compare pp.21—4 of the ‘BSC history’ With pp. 152—6 of The Quiet , figfizfifié Quiet Canadian, p. 179. Hyde wrote: ‘In this connection Stephenson made available to Donovan the deciphered wireless communications between Germany and the various secret wireless stations in South America concerning the activmes of Nan agents.’ This was not as harmful a revelation as the Maclean .9 reference to the submariners’ messages because the A bwehr agents in Latin America generally encrypted their messages by hand. These transposition ciphers were not very challenging to ‘ i professional codebreakers. In fact, they were often broken by amateur code and cipher : enthusiasts. U~boats, however, employed Enigma machines to hide their messages. It was the success of the British against those vastly more complicated cryptological systems ‘. that constituted the Ultra secret. Regarding the ciphers used by Abwehr‘ agents in Latin . America, see I ohn F. Bratzel and Leslie B. Rout, Jr. , ‘Abwehr Ciphers in Latin America, . Cryptologia, Vol. 7, No.2 (April 1983), pp. 132—44. In 1984, Hyde argued that Stephenson ; .a ' ' ' like Sir ~ h d anted to reveal the Ultra secret in his biography. Hyde refused because un _ /% Igilli‘Zm, he planned to live in Britain and would therefore be subject to the Offimal Secrets Act. Interview, Hyde, 17 April 1984. , INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 95 58. 59. 52. On the double agents, see The Quiet Canadian, pp. 217—20. The ‘Cynthia’ case is described in pp.105—10, whereas a description of the BSC propaganda campaign involving the US media can be found on pp. 199—210. In the ‘BSC history’, pp. 30340 describe ‘Bicycle’, ‘Springbok’, and “Pat 1’. ‘Cynthia’ is described on pp. 152—4 and 166—7. The interventionist propaganda campaign is covered on pp. 91—9 in the ‘BSC history’. . Interview, Hyde, 17 April 1984. . Mary Lovell quotes a letter of 5 Nov. 1962 written by Ellis to Hyde: ‘It is not strictly accurate to say that the proofs were submitted to M16 and returned with few corrections. Ml6’s SO saw the first draft (mine) and passed it, and when I offered the final version, he said he did not want to see it but trusted me to scrutinize it for possible security lapses. I gather “C” is being harassed but I think it extremely doubtful that the DPP take action as the book was offered for clearance.’ Lovell, CastNo Shadow, pp. 345 —6. Ellis was reprimanded, however, by M16. He lost his position with the Intelligence Research Board, a division of M16. In the fall of 1963 he wrote Stephenson requesting monetary compensation for losing this job. He said it carried a salary of £1,000 a year. Ellis to Hyde, 3 Nov. 1963, Hyde/Churchill. . The timing and extent of press interest can be gauged by looking at the US Army’s file on John Vassall. See ‘Vassall, .Iohn’, AA855209, Record Group 319, National Archives, Washington, DC. The press feasted on revelations about Vassall, who was homosexual and had carried on a friendly correspondence with the Under-Secretary v of State for Scotland, Thomas Galbraith. Macmillan had been unhappy with the press’s conduct in 1961 when a different Soviet naval intelligence ring and George Blake were uncovered. When he learned of Vassall’s treachery in September 1962, he predicted: ‘There will be another big row.’ Vassall was sentenced to 18 years in prison on 22 Oct. 1962; but strong press interest continued because of the implication of Galbraith. See Alistair Horne, Macmillan, 195 7—1986: Volume II of the Official Biography (London, 1989), pp.456—67. The quotation, which Horne found in Macmillan’s diary, appears on p. 460. . From 1950 to 1959 Hyde was the Ulster Unionist MP for North Belfast. For three years during his parliamentary career, Hyde represented the United Kingdom at the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg. This comes from Hyde’s curriculum vitae, dated 1984, deposited at Churchill College, Cambridge. . Macmillan’s official biographer, Alistair Horne, found this particular reference to Vassall in Macmillan’s diary entry for 5 Nov. 1962. Macmillan, II, p. 461. On 8 November Macmillan rose to address the Hyde matter in the House of Commons. In an exchange with Prime Minister Macmillan, Dame Irene Ward asked: ‘Will he explain how it is that Mr Montgomery Hyde has an access to papers — presumany Foreign Office papers — how it is that Sir William Stephenson has been able to give all his experiences, and how Mr Sefton Delmer has been able to write a book giving all sorts of experiences of his, while other people have their books refused?’ Macmillan responded: ‘My honourable friend’s question was cast in general terms, and I therefore replied in general terms. If she will give me particular instances I will certainly look at them.’ The general response to which the British Prime Minister was referring was his earlier statement that all those who had signed the Act knew their responsibilities and he did not think ‘that any special steps [were] required to ensure uniformity of treatment between individuals .. . ’ Hansard, House of Commons, UK, 8 Nov. 1962, cols. 1 153—54. The legality of The Quiet Canadian was never raised again in the House of Commons. Ladislas Farago, New York Times Book Review, 30 June 1963, p. 7. Interviews with Ernest Cuneo, 27 J an. 1984; 19 Oct. 1984. In the second interview, Cuneo recounted the story of the hospital visit. He said that there had been some fear 1 that Stephenson would never emerge from the coma. Apparently he had a brain lesion. Cuneo placed this meeting at the time of President Eisenhower’s trip to the Far East. According to Stephen Ambrose, the presidential trip to the Far East took place in June 1960. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, II: The President (New York, 1984), pp. 581—2. 96 61. 62. 63. 65. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE? However, there is reason to doubt the date given by Cuneo. There is no mention of the illness in Ellis’ letter of 10 Dec. 1960, which describes the collapse of the first Quiet Canadian project; whereas there is ample evidence in Hyde’s corrCPOndence from 1963 that _' Stephenson was seriously ill. It appears that the worst period was that summer. By 1964, Stephenson was described as an invalid. See Sections 1/5 -1/11, Hyde/Churchill. David Stafford, ‘A Myth Called Intrepid,’ Saturday Night Magazine, October 1989: David Stafford argues that A Man Called Intrepid was based on the-deluSions that Stephenson Suffered after a stroke in the 19605. See ‘Letters to the Editor , Saturday ' ht Ma a ine, for rebuttals. ' filter, lVlzontgomery Hyde to Roger W. Straus, IL, 22 Feb. 1963. Hyde/Churchill. Two cables, Intrepid (Stephenson’s cable address) to H. Montgomery Hyde, 15 and 16 Feb. 1962. Hyde/ Cambridge. Regarding David Ogilvy’s career, see Hyde, The Quiet Canadian, .194—5. _ Letter, RogIe:P W. Straus, Jr., to David Ogilvy, 1 Feb. 1963. Hyde/Churchill. Straus wrote that Hyde had made ‘several’ of Ogilvy’s slugggsted changes but any further changes out of the uestion as the book had a rea y gone 0 press. _ {Sign H. Montcglomery Hyde to Roger W. Straus, Jr., 22 Feb. 1963. Hyde/Churchill. Later in this letter, Hyde was even more condescending: ‘I‘have always liked the little man [Stephenson] and have been on fairly friendly terms with him for the past twenty- three years.‘ However inexcusable Hyde’s treatment of his former mentor, there was increasing evidence that the 67 -year—old Stephenson had impaired judgement. He began > to fantasize about a Communist conspiracy against him. In March 1963 he furiously cabled Hyde hoping to stop the sale of rights to an Icelandic publisher. ‘Hyde, there > ‘ ’ is a Comic [sic] plot to handle publication and use that hotbed Reykjavik as ,base to disaredit us and create unfriendly relations Sweden and whole of ScandinaVia. Cable, Intrepid to H. Montgomery Hyde, 15 March 1963. Hyde/Churchill. Telephone conversation, Stephenson, 12 Sept. 1984; 1nterv1ew, Stephenson, 11 Oct. 1984. On the telephone, Stephenson showed little enthusiasm for The Quiet Canadian and complained that there was nothing very good in print about him. Who’s Who, 1974. This entry also lists ‘The Two Bills’, and A Man called Intrepid - as published books (in 1972 and 1973, respectively). Ellis’ manuscript was never pubhshed and AMan Called Intrepid was published only in 1976. i . When asked what he considered his greatest contribution, Stephenson said in 1984 that it was ‘getting supplies when Britain was practically sinking’. Interwew, 11 Oct. 1984. . I I _ Although it is not certain that Ellis’s ‘Anglo-AmericanCollaboration in Intelligence and Security: Notes for Documentation, c.1963’ is identical With his first draft of The Quiet Canadian, given that ‘Anglo-American Collaboration’ does attempt to describe Stephenson’s pre—war role, it is useful as evidence of the broad change in Ellis Views ir William’s career. _ Elliss, ‘The Two Bills: Mission Accomplished’, 1972, p.8. .[The author is grateful to Thomas Troy for sharing this document with him.] The manuscript’s preface was written by Maj or-General Colin Gubbins, the wartime head of the Spec1al Operations Executive in London. Gubbins argues that The Quiet Canadian left out the story of Stephenson 5 work as a channel between Churchill and Roosevelt. Gubbins gives the ‘Destroyers for Bases' deal as the best example of Stephenson's diplomatic work. ‘Anglo—Ameiican Collaboration in Intelligence and Security: Notes‘for Documenta- tion, c. 1963’, p. 33; ‘The Two Bills: Mission Accomplished’, Sept._ 1972, p.29. Cordell Hull does not mention this meeting in his memoirs, The Memozrs of Cordell Hull, 2 volumes (New York, 1948). There are no references at all to Stephenson in these volumes. . . I In his authoritative reconstruction of the negotiations over the destroyers, Davtd Reynolds leaves out Stephenson. Citing Hyde, Reynolds does mention Stephenson in the text but argues that his own archival research did not turn up any further substan- tiation of Stephenson’s role in diplomacy. See David Reynolds, The Creation of the INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 97 72. 73. 74. 75 . 76. 82. l 83. 85. 86. 87. 88. Anglo-A mericanA lIiance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Co-operation, (London, 1981), p. 331. See William Stevenson’s entries in Who ’5 Who (London, 1977, 1978); See also ‘A man who could well be called intrepid’, Mac/ean’sMagazine, 3 Nov. 1980, pp. 10—13. William Stevenson, The Yellow Wind (Boston, 1959); idem., Birds" Nests in Their Beards (Boston, 1964); idem. , Zanek! A Chronicle of the IsraeliAir Force (New York, 1971). In Zanek!, supposedly a non-fiction account of the Israeli Air Force, Stevenson warns the reader that he has invented ‘S’, a narrator who acts suspiciously like Stevenson. ‘Being unable to inject myself into a chronicle about those who daily face dangers far greater than any I have known, I have had to create the stranger S. He could be in several places at once, watching and listening. He could bring together a number of separate incidents and make them happen on the same day. When necessary, S could create one character out of several men whose identities had to be protected for the security reasons indicated above.’ But then he asks himself who that ‘S’ was. ‘I’m not sure who the stranger S really is. Myself, perhaps, and the ghosts of the dead already.’ Ibid., p. vi. See note 5. Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid. On Rieber, see p. 115; On Cynthia and the Vichy officers, see pp. 337—76. . Ibid., pp. 194—6. . In another twist to this story, Cuneo maintained to his death that he had had no role in bringing Roosevelt and Stephenson together. He specifically denied carrying the ‘marriage’ proposal. Cuneo thought that Vincent Astor, who was in charge of US intelligence co—ordination in New York City, might have been the intermediary. Cuneo said that he did not meet Stephenson until 1942. Interview with Ernest Cuneo, 12 Dec. 1984. . See ‘British Security Coordination (BSC): An Account of Secret Activities in the Western Hemisphere’, pp. iii—xii; Hyde, The Quiet Canadian, p. 26 and Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid, pp. 83—4. . 'British Security Coordination (BSC): An Account of Secret Activities in the Western Hemisphere, 1940—45’, p. 9; Stevenson, Intrepid, p. 121 . Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid. Stevenson discusses Stephenson’s role in acquiring a mockup of the Enigma machine on p. 45. Stephenson‘s suggestion that computers be employed to crack German ciphers is on p. 105. On p. 57, Stevenson writes that so far as Sir William was concerned solving the Enigma puzzle was the most important opera- tional responsibility he had in 1940. There is no evidence of any of this in the Playfair BSC history, which does describe most secret sources in other respects. There is reason to doubt that Ellis wrote the foreword attributed to him. Hyde believed that Ellis had not been in any shape to write it. Interview, 14 March 1984. Sir William Stephenson, Foreword to A Man Called Intrepid by William Stevenson (New York, 1976), pp. xiii—xx; C. H. ‘Dick’ Ellis, ‘A Historical Notc’, inA Man Called Intrepid, pp.xxi—xxiv. These were an honorary LLD from the University of Winnipeg and an honorary DSc from the University of Manitoba in 1979, an honorary DSc from the University of Winnipeg in 1980, and an honorary DSc from the University of Windsor (Ontario) in 1985. See Sir William Stephenson’s entry in Who‘s Who, 1989. Who’s Who, 1989. Interview, Stephenson, 11 Oct. 1984. When asked the genesis of the codename Intrepid, Sir William averted: ‘Out of the imagination of the writer William Stevenson.’ Ibid. Despite his disappointment over the book A Man Called Intrepid, Sir William did authorize a second Intrepid book in 1983. He later said that he had done so reluctantly because he thought the book Intrepid ’3 Last Case, which was about his role in the Igor Gouzenko affair, would ‘smoke out all of the Reds’ in Western governments. He had 98 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. ESPIONAGE: PAST, PRESENT. FUTURE? also hoped that it might serve to defend his late colleague Dick Ellis, who had died in 1975 with accusations of treachery hanging over his head. Interview, 11 Oct. 1984. . Telephone interviews, Sir William Stephenson, 12 Sept. 1984 and 26 May 1985. . Interview, Stephenson, 11 Oct. 1984. Stephenson repeated the assertion that he had been Churchill’s representative in the Western Hemisphere in a telephone discussion of 26 May 1985. For evidence of his shift away from the view that he had acted as the secret channel between FDR and Churchill, see what he wrote, or had published under his name, in 1982. After John Colville, formerly Winston Churchill’s Private Secretary, attacked the description of the Stephenson/Churchill relationship in A Man Called Intrepid, Stephenson defended himself in two forewords the following year. See John Colville, Winston Churchill and His Inner Circle (New York, 198]), pp. 83—4. In his foreword to Hyde’s Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS (New York, 1982), pp. xiii—xviii, Stephenson repeated the claim that Churchill had named him as special representative at a meeting on 10 May. Colville, who had worked with Churchill before and during the Second World War, disputed Stephenson’s account, saying that he had never heard Churchill speak of Sir William Stephenson, nor did he know of any proof of the meeting on 10 May. Stephenson countered: ‘My calls at No 10 [Downing Street] were invariably late at night when Colville had probably gone to bed, or else was away sewing with the RAF which he did between October 1941 and the end of 1943.’ Incidentally, in this foreword, Stephenson disputed the allegation that he had commissioned Hyde’s biography. ‘It was a purely spontaneous effort on the part of the author, but he did it with my approval and he had access to BSC records.’ Nevertheless, this foreword did evince some stepping back from the spirit of the Intrepid account. In response to Colville, Sir William wrote: ‘Whatever may have been written or said about me by others, I can state categorically that I never at any time claimed to provide a secret liaison between the British Prime Minister and the American President.’ In the second foreword, which he wrote for a biography of William Donovan, Stephenson repeated the story of the visit with Churchill on H) May. Significantly, Sir William ascribed to himself only a secon- dary influence on the ‘Destroyers-for-Bases Deal’. Sir William Stephenson, Foreword to Donovan: America’s Master Spy (New York, 1982), pp. vii-x. Interview, H. Montgomery Hyde, 17 April 1984. Ibid. Hyde said that Stephenson had purchased an Enigma machine in 1934, but he had had no idea that it would be used by the Nazis. He was not one of those responsible for solving the puzzle posed by the Nazi ciphers. Ibid. Hyde did allege that one of the five assassins had had some training at Camp X, though not in connection with an attempt on Heydrich. Staff ord’s account of the train- ing school, however, shows that even this limited connection with the assassination could not be true. Camp X only opened in December 1941, months after the members of the Czech team had begun their training in England and only three weeks before they parachuted into occupied Europe. See Camp X, pp. 273—5. Sir William Stephenson, Foreword to Secret Intelligence Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS by H. Montgomery Hyde (New York, 1982); Sir William Stephenson, Obituary, The Times, 3 Feb. 1989. Hyde described ‘Intrepid' as Stephenson’s 'nickname’ during the war. About Stephenson’s role in the Ultra story, Hyde wrote: ‘In 1937, through his contacts in the German communications industry, Stephenson discovered that a revised and portable version of Enigma was being used by the Nazis. ...’ Hyde did not allege that Stephenson orchestrated the capture of an Enigma prototype; For a first draft of this obituary see Hyde, Secret IntelligenceA gent, pp. 78—81. Interview with David Ignatius, Oct. 1990. In his article on this case, David Stafford also described the Intrepid affair as a cautionary tale for those interested in intelligence history. ‘A Myth Called Intrepid’, Saturday Night Magazine, Oct. 1989. INTREPID’S LAST DECEPTION 99 97. A fresh example is Tom Mangold’s stud of Jame . ' ‘ 98 James Jesus Angleton, the CIA is Mastzr Spy Hush-:0A (2:13 ($10333:ng Lewd warn”? . 'Hmsley and C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War 0 .4. Security and Counter-Intelligence (London, 1990), pp. 142—8 Ironicall th h supplemented by some documents, the official British description of the BSC ’y, oug stbilmes 13 based on Hyde’s Quiet Canadian. See footnotes, p. 156 s respon- 99. See Thomas F. Troy Donovan and the CIA ' A ' , . H ‘ Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, MD, l981).mary 0f the Esra/“hm”, 0f the ...
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