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Midterm Review

Midterm Review - Materialists Logical Behaviorism(Hempel...

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Dualists Materialists Descartes Logical Behaviorism (Hempel) psychological explanation is deductive- nomological explanation Central State Identity Theory (Smart) Functionalism (Sterelny, Fodor) Eliminative Materialism (Churchland) (Critic: Dray) Intentional Systems Theory (Dennett) (Critic: Stich) psychological explanation is rational explanation Covering-law model: psychological explanation works much like explanation in the natural sciences Stance      – explanatory 1. Physical stance – lawfulness  (constitutive ideal of physical) o covering-law model o doubly empirical 2. Design stance – proper functioning 3. Intentional stance – patterns of rationality                                                          ^ norm ( Nagel ) – an understanding of consciousness as very difficult to fit into the natural world; consciousness is the kind of thing that can’t be appropriately studied by natural science Consciousness understood in terms of a subjective type of point of view (“what it’s like to be like….” -We have no idea how to give a physical/objective account of consciousness e.g. we can understand echolocation only in terms of our external p.o.v. you can understand another’s consciousness/p.o.v. only to the degree that you are “sufficiently similar” to them Smart : strict contingent type identity claim There are no sensations: a man is a vast arrangement of physical particles but there are no sensations or states of consciousness over and above this It is not the thesis that, for example, "after-image" or "ache" means the same as "brain process of sort X" (where "X" is replaced by a description of a certain sort of brain process). It is that, in so far as "after-image" or "ache" is a report of a process, it is a
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report of a process that happens to be a brain process. in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes. Strict identity on the brain-process thesis the identity between the brain-process and the experience is a contingent one. Hempel: logical theory about the statements of psychology Thesis: There is taken to be an absolutely impassable gulf between the natural sciences (which have a subject matter devoid of meaning) and the sciences of mind and culture (which have an intrinsically meaningful subject matter) There isn’t. Proof: e.g. statements about “pain” can be retranslated – it is an abbreviated
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