cold war notes

cold war notes - Cold War notes 4/8/2008 11:47:00 AM In...

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Cold War notes 08/04/2008 10:47:00 In reality: all about timing and access.  A lot of the theoretical insights get lost Outline:
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CMC-> Model III End of Cold War Should we have been “afraid”? Model III:  Most interesting application is with respect to Soviet decision to  withdraw the missiles (area in which we also have least information).  Because we don’t  actually know what happened, we can’t necessarily as easily take that question and  reflect it back onto these larger theoretical causes. Khrushchev wavered on whether to take up defensive stance against US or not.  He had convinced himself a few days before withdrawing the missiles that the US was  not sincere in their threat of attack. Book suggests that Castro was also a factor.  Decided to start shooting at  intelligence flying over Cuba (succeeded in shooting one).  Kennedy was assassinated  a year after the Missile Crisis, that is why the historical record is a bit vague.  One  theory: as a former combat officer, Kennedy may have thought the shooting was a  decentralized decision, not necessarily orders from Castro (Model III theory) Suggests there may have been strange channels of information giving  information.   Each of these models provide different answers to the "why" questions: Why did the Soviets build up missiles?  Why did the US respond with a  blockade?  Why did the Soviets decide to withdraw? Model I:  Khrushchev wants to resolve Berlin crisis, Kennedy wants to avoid  nuclear war. Model II:  Kennedy's response was shaped by capacities of larger  organizations (air force could do not attack Kennedy originally envisioned,  though navy could organize blockade).  Public demand vs. private willingness  to make trade in regard to Jupiter missiles.
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Model III:  Khrushchev’s decision-making looks haphazard, often based on  faulty information.  Washington’s decision-making looks political (which set of  advisors would win Kennedy’s approval).  The fact that each leader had a the  weight of a nuclear option on their shoulders may have influenced their  decision making. Model I: Nuclear crises are manageable.  When nuclear options are manageable, 
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This note was uploaded on 04/18/2008 for the course POLS V1601 taught by Professor Putnam during the Spring '08 term at Columbia.

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cold war notes - Cold War notes 4/8/2008 11:47:00 AM In...

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