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1) REINTRODUCING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW a) IO law making: a survey of charter provisions b) The external ripples of internal law i) The assembly’s purse string powers ii) Legal personality and its consequences iii) The alleged treaty basis for charter powers iv) The limits of enumerated powers v) The distinction between external and internal rule making c) Revisiting the development of international law through the political organs of the UN i) Statehood and participation ii) Participation by non state actors iii) Human rights and the shrinking concept of domestic jurisdiction iv) The security council and the article 2(7) 2) THE VAIRED FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUIONAL LAW a) The Security council as law maker b) The security council: Between Power and law c) Standard setting in other IOs: A selective survey i) The Codex Alimentarius ii) ICAOs standards and recommended practices (SARPs) iii) IO “advisory” material iv) ILO recommendations v) IAEA standards vi) The FAOs and UNEP’s prior informed consent regime vii)WTO soft law viii) The WHO’s code on marketing of breast milk substitutes ix) The world bank guidelines x) IMF conditionality xi) Emerging global administrative law d) Interim conclusions 3) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS TREATY MAKERS 4) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BY NON JUDICIAL ACTORS a) Within the UN i) The security council- 416 ii) The UN compensation commission- 424 iii) The General assembly – 428 iv) The secretary general- 433 v) The Human Rights Commission- 435 vi) The Secretariat- 436 b) In other IOs i) Regional organizations ii) The IMF iii) The international civil aviation organization iv) Other UN specialized agencies 5) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BY QUASI JUDICIAL AND JUDICIAL BODIES a) Introduction- 458
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i) The Project on International Courts and Tribunals have identified its 43 existing, extinct, dormant or nascent international “judicial” bodies by applying the following five criteria- (1) They should be permanent institution (2) They have to be composed of independent judges (3) They should adjudicate disputes between two or more entities at least one of which is an IO or a state (4) They should work on the basis of pre determined procedure (5) They should render legally binding decisions. ii) How do the IOs maintain the impartiality of the arbitrators? (1) Fully judicial bodies- (a) They are selected from among the independent judges elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment in the highest judicial offices or are juris consults of recognized competence in international law. (2) Quasi judicial bodies (WTO/ILO) (a) Select arbitrators who are specialists in the law implicated by the disputes at issue, such as their knowledge in trade/labor law and not because they are accredited government representatives before the relevant IO. iii) They generally claim that they discover the rules that apply to a particular
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