{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

Operational_Warfare

Operational_Warfare - NWC 1001A E U N IT E D S T A S TE NA...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–6. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
NWC 1001A T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E V I R A I B U S M R I V I C T O R I A OPERATIONAL WARFARE ADDENDUM Copyright © 2002 Milan Vego JMO Department Naval War College September 2002
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
PREFACE 1. This publication is the 2 nd and revised edition of the Addendum to the basic textbook Operational Warfare (September 2000). It follows the same organizational format as the original publication. 2. Three new chapters were added to this 2 nd edition: (1) Influence of the Physical Environment on Warfare in the Littorals; (2) Objectives of Naval Warfare; and (3) Operational Deception. New chapters will be written and added in the future.
Background image of page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I: FUNDAMENTALS Policy, Strategy, and Operations ..................................................................................... 1 Part III: THE THEATER Influence of Physical Environment on Warfare in the Littorals ..................................... 27 Part VII: OPERATIONAL PLANNING Objectives of Naval Warfare ........................................................................................... 46 Operational Deception ..................................................................................................... 64 Part VIII: OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP Operational Lessons Learned .......................................................................................... 82 Appendix A: Guidance For Deriving Operational Lessons ............................................ 121
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
PART I: FUNDAMENTALS
Background image of page 4
1 P O L I C Y , S T R A T E G Y , A N D O P E R A T I O N S Policy and strategy are conducted uninterruptedly both in peacetime and in time of conflict or war. They are closely related and inextricably linked to each other. Operations, or in U.S. terms “operational art,” deal with the actual employment of one’s combat forces and, hence, are dominated by policy and strategy. Yet operations influence, often to a considerable degree, decisions made by the highest political and military leadership. The boundaries among policy, strategy, and operations are often difficult to separate clearly. This is especially true of policy and strategy. The mutual relationship among these three fields of study and practice is extremely close and highly dynamic. The effects of each on the others are by no means identical. Policy has a more critical and long-lasting effect on strategy than strategy has on operations. At the same time, errors or failures in the conduct of operations are bound to undermine, and might even lead to the failure of, strategy and policy. No policy or strategy can be successful for long without at least adequate performance in the conduct of operations and tactical successes in the field. The terms and meanings of policy, strategy, and operations have undergone significant changes through history. Until the nineteenth century, policy and strategy were viewed separately. Strategy was principally concerned with military aspects of war. It also included the actual employment of one’s military forces—what is considered today the domain of “operations.” Afterward, the scope of strategy was expanded to include many non-military instruments of national or alliance/coalition power. The term “operations” is even less well defined or commonly accepted. A number of terms, such as “grand tactics” by Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini and General J. F. C. Fuller, and “operational art” by the Soviets and U.S./NATO military, are used in referring to that intermediate level between strategy and tactics. The terms
Background image of page 5

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Image of page 6
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}